

GATEWAY

*A collection of historical essays written by undergraduate students
at Washington University in St. Louis.*

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Letter from the Editors

Cynthia Mancha and Ian Ross

After a two-year absence, the Gateway Journal has been revived. Due to unfortunate circumstances, the History Department at Washington University was unable to publish an anthology in 2008. It is a tradition that we as enthusiastic students felt compelled to restore, because it allows us to more actively engage with our field. Studying history entails more than learning facts and figures – it also involves being part of a community of scholars who share their research and ideas in an open forum. The Gateway journal is that forum.

Our submissions this year vary by subject and time, covering social and political issues from the Middle Ages to the modern era. This collection illustrates the wide variety of interests that exist among both students and faculty within the History Department at Washington University. These entries are presented close to their original form – the majority of modifications have been made for formatting purposes.

As editors, it has been a great pleasure to help reintroduce Gateway to the academic community, but please recognize that the heart of this journal lies in the diligent research and analytical efforts of the included authors. We thank them for their eager participation in this process.

We hope you enjoy the following compositions.

The Return of Martin Guerre in History and Fiction

Randall Pippenger

“While most Renaissance popes and princes have been forgotten by everyone except the historical specialist, one peasant of the sixteenth century, from a village near Toulouse in the foothills of the Pyrenees, remains well-known.”¹ Thus begins Robert Finlay’s critique of Natalie Davis’s *The Return of Martin Guerre*. When put in such perspective, it is amazing that the story of Martin Guerre, Arnaud du Tilh and Bertrande de Rols should be remembered by a wider audience than historians, when other ‘great’ men of the time are not. After all, peasants, especially individual peasants, have rarely been studied or remembered at all. Indeed, before Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s *Montaillou*, Carlo Ginzburg’s *The Cheese and the Worms*, and *The Return of Martin Guerre*, which were all published within four years of one another in the late 1970s, peasants were largely considered to be insignificant, and were routinely treated as a bloc. Even in today’s historical scholarship, there remains a strong tendency amongst historians, including Carlo Ginzburg, to refer to and understand peasant culture as “unchanging.”²

Countless historians and reviewers have all pondered and expostulated on exactly why the story of Martin Guerre breaks this mold. While there have been many different answers to this question, the simplest explanation, which is often the best, was Davis’s own answer: “Rarely does a historian find so perfect a narrative structure in the events of the past or one with such dramatic popular appeal.”³ The story of Martin Guerre is remembered and is so popular because it combines the best elements of fiction with history. Many historians have been and remain afraid to combine any elements of fiction with historical writing, perhaps with the exception of a narrative structure. *The Return of Martin Guerre*, and its film counterpart *Le Retour de Martin Guerre*, call into question the differences between fiction and non-fiction – between stories and histories. They effectively illustrate that historians can experiment with mediums, forms and techniques of writing and telling history that are traditionally relegated to fiction, while at the same time produce a serious work of history.

The story of Martin Guerre, Arnaud du Tilh and Bertrande de Rols is truly remarkable. So remarkable, in fact, that if most historians were given the plot of the story and were asked to determine if it actually

occurred, they would probably conclude at first glance that it was fictional. Even contemporaries were inspired by the oddity and improbability of the story. The version of the story that Davis used as her primary source, which was written by a judge of the case, Jean de Coras, included in its title “*historie prodigieuse*.⁴ According to Davis, “the prodigious is strange, though not necessarily unique; it is more rare than other events of its kind.”⁵ Without getting embroiled in the controversial interpretations of how events actually occurred and why individuals acted in certain ways,⁶ a brief summary of *The Return of Martin Guerre* is in order.

Martin Guerre, after an apparently loveless adolescent marriage, abandoned his wife, Bertrande de Rols, and young child. Some years later, Arnaud du Tilh arrived in Artigat and claimed to be the long lost Martin Guerre. He was miraculously accepted as the true Martin Guerre for a number of years, even conceiving children with Bertrande, until Martin’s uncle, Pierre Guerre, accused him of being an imposter. During the trial, just before Arnaud du Tilh was about to be declared innocent, the real Martin Guerre finally showed up. Bertrande, who had previously maintained that du Tilh was really Martin Guerre, about-faced and embraced the real Martin Guerre as her husband. Arnaud du Tilh, or Pansette, was subsequently executed. As Davis claimed, “The Martin Guerre story had a perfect plot.”⁷

It is impossible to discuss *The Return of Martin Guerre* without first understanding its relationship with the film - *Le Retour de Martin Guerre*. This relationship is unusual and noteworthy because the film actually predated the book. Because of its ‘perfect’ plot, Davis felt that the story of Martin Guerre was uniquely fashioned for film, and she subsequently became the historical consultant for *Le Retour de Martin Guerre*. Davis said, “When I first came upon the story of Martin Guerre, I wanted to tell it only as a film.”⁸ However, the film ultimately went in a different direction than Davis had envisioned, and the book was written specifically to address the deficiencies in the film that Davis perceived, and to “follow the historical evidence closely.”⁹

Too many historians, when writing or thinking about modern historical films, “lament their obvious ‘inaccuracies.’”¹⁰ While Davis did do that to some extent, noting that the costume designer had used the wrong color robes for the judges of the Parlement of Toulouse throughout the movie, and that the trial would have been secret in Old Regime France rather than open and public, she considered these departures either trivial or correctable.¹¹ Her major problem with the film was the portrayal of Bertrande. Ironically, her own interpretation of an empowered, feminist Bertrande also garnered criticism from the historical community. Finlay claimed that “Davis fails to show that her

view of women in peasant society is relevant to the case she is examining. Instead, she imposes her notion of peasant women on Bertrande,” and continued Finlay, Davis’ perspective “does not yield a portrait of Bertrande that is either plausible or persuasive.”¹² While Davis had a feminist notion of Bertrande, the film portrayed Bertrande as passive and complicit. Davis believed “recasting Bertrande this way made her into a nineteenth-century figure, who romantically followed the man she loved without practical considerations.”¹³ This of course is a reference to the romantic historical novelists of the nineteenth century such as Alexander Dumas and Sir Walter Scott who, at least from a modern perspective, first blurred the line between fiction and history. As Ann Rigney claimed, writers such as Scott called “into question any easy separation of fictional narrative and historical fact, of invention and representation.”¹⁴

The dramatic representations of history found in films present modern historians with many of the same problems first introduced by the historical novelists of the nineteenth century. One of these problems is the practice of trying to reconcile dramatic reconstruction with historical accuracy. There is a basic difference between history and film, because films, “rather than attempting to understand or explain events or movements of people, tend to be romances.”¹⁵ *Le Retour de Martin Guerre* follows this formula. The film, with Gerard Depardieu as Arnaud du Tilh, focuses more on the romantic storyline between Arnaud and Bertrande. Arnaud was clearly the hero, and the cinematic climax was his execution. The ending of Davis’s book, on the other hand, was a discussion of Jean de Coras and the writing of his memoir of the trial – *Arrest Memorable*.¹⁶ Davis also had a broader focus on the individual stories of Martin, Coras, Bertrande and Arnaud, in addition to the ‘romance’ between Arnaud and Bertrande, throughout *The Return of Martin Guerre* than the movie did. A.S. Byatt would have probably claimed that Davis’s use of “stories within stories,” which was the technique he used in the fictional story, *The Virgin in the Garden*, was a fictional technique that she applied to a historical work.¹⁷

In many ways, today’s historians have nearly the same problems that filmmakers and historical novelists have in relation to historical reconstruction. Perennial questions that all historians are confronted with during the course of their writings are what the precise relationship between fiction and history is, and where historical research and scholarship end and where invention and imagination begin. This is not to say that historians, filmmakers and novelists use the same process or possess the same considerations and priorities – far from it. Historians, unlike filmmakers and most novelists, are generally not concerned with how many books they sell. Most of the time, historians are not writing

for the masses, but instead for specialists. Therefore historical books rarely share the same historical reconstruction problems as films, because historians rarely feel the need to write a ‘romantic’ history, although somewhat unfortunately, that is not universal.

While it is fairly easy to establish a clear demarcation between the imaginative problems of history and filmmaking, this is not always the case with historical fiction. Attempting to differentiate some historical novels from history is very difficult to do. As Byatt claims, “there is a large body of serious and ambitious fiction set in the past, not for the pleasures or escapism or bodice-ripping, but for complex and intellectual reasons.”¹⁸ A relevant example of this is Umberto Eco’s *The Name of the Rose*, which while still a novel, is set in the early fourteenth century for very complex and well-thought out reasons.¹⁹ *The Name of the Rose*, and other novels like it, blur the line between history and fiction because it is just as, or even more, historically plausible and true to historical evidence than many professional historical narratives are. What historians, including the cliometricians, historical novelists and even filmmakers all share in common, and what permanently calls into question any clean separation between fiction and non-fiction, is storytelling. As Lawrence Stone reflected, “Historians have always told stories,”²⁰ and all three professions ultimately do the same.

The differences between histories, at least histories by scholars Stone would describe as the ‘new historians,’ and fictional stories are often minute, especially in regard to research and invention. Stone’s new historians of the 1970s, including Ginzburg, Ladurie and Davis, wrote microhistories. Microhistories, as they were disparagingly labeled by their detractors,²¹ “are almost without exception concerned with the lives and feelings and behavior of the poor and obscure rather than the great and powerful.”²² The focus on feelings and thoughts requires a massive amount of research, but also quite a bit of invention and imagination. Davis concludes her introduction in *The Return of Martin Guerre* with the statement, “what I offer you here is in part my invention, but held tightly in check by the voices of the past.”²³ After all, there is only so much that a specialist can ascertain from records of trial and inquisition proceedings without ultimately relying on some imagination. This is something that all novelists and historians do to some extent, not just microhistorians. Byatt claimed that “this is a professional extension of a normal reading process, in history and fiction, making a fuller, more vivid, more hypothetical narrative precisely around what we are not told.”²⁴

Of course, this imaginative reconstruction process has several accompanying dangers for the historian attempting to be true to evidence. It is extremely difficult to recreate a personality out of the past

without corrupting the character with at least a few of the modern conceptions and predispositions of the author. For example, Finlay and other historians' most salient critique of *The Return of Martin Guerre* is the feminist, post-modern outlook that Bertrande Rols sometimes appears to exhibit. As Stone claimed:

The narrator will need all the skill and experience and knowledge acquired in the practice of analytical history of society, economy and culture, if he is to provide a plausible explanation of some of the very strange things he is liable to find.²⁵

Unfortunately, even in the best conditions, a very good historian can have problems doing that.

Davis was very aware of all of these ambiguities when she wrote *The Return of Martin Guerre*. “In historical writing, where does reconstruction stop and invention begin?” is precisely the question I hoped readers would ask and reflect on.²⁶ While she undoubtedly believed that her interpretation and reconstruction of the story and characters of Martin Guerre was correct, she recognized at the end of the book that even the best historical reconstructions could be faulty. “I think I have uncovered the true face of the past – or has Pansette done it once again?”²⁷

A narrative form of history or storytelling is crucial to microhistories, and is important to address in a discussion of the relationship between history and fiction. Stone described narrative as, “the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots.”²⁸ A narrative form is shared by both history, or at least microhistory, and fiction. Before the rise of microhistories in the 1970s, narrative storytelling in history, at least by forefront historians, was beginning to die out. Microhistory’s goals of “trying to discover what was going on inside people’s heads in the past, and what it was like to live in the past,” claimed Stone, “inevitably lead back to the use of narrative.”²⁹ It is not clear why narrative seems like a natural way to tell stories, since it certainly is not. A correlating example of that is the story of confession. Before the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, and for years thereafter, medieval individuals did not see their lives in a narrative form. They did not believe that decisions made in their childhood affected who they were as adults. It was only after the entrenchment of confession and inquisition that people began to view their lives as one continuous narrative. Perhaps Western culture’s fascination with narrative forms stems from these events.

Stone speculated that microhistorians were returning to a narrative form of telling stories out of a “desire to make their findings accessible once more to an intelligent but not expert reading public.”³⁰ This seems to accurately portray Davis’s intentions. She claimed that she originally desired to make the story a film because “as a film, the Martin Guerre story could reach millions of people who otherwise would have only the vaguest idea about the sixteenth century and how peasants lived and felt in the past.”³¹ However, in the book itself, one of Davis’s intentions was to illustrate that narratives themselves could be ambiguous, even if they are linear. For example, at the end of the book the reader comes to two similar realizations. First, the book’s narrative is almost circular, with the epilogue being eerily similar to the introduction. Second, Davis could have logically told the story in reverse, although her conclusions and arguments probably would not have been nearly as persuasive.

Some critics of microhistories do not question their persuasiveness, but on a deeper level question their value as works of history. Leading this attack is historian Anthony Grafton. Grafton claimed that microhistorians caused history to lose the ability to tell grand narratives. By focusing on the ‘little people,’ we could no longer see the big picture. He went even further, and claimed that microhistories actually contributed to the death of history. “And yet – so the standard stories go - just as history reached its zenith, it shattered and collapsed.”³² Quite honestly, this particular argument is not that compelling. Historians have not lost their ability to see the big picture or tell grand narratives. Nothing inherent about microhistories makes them incompatible with other forms of writing history. Microhistories complement the grand narratives. They serve to flesh them out and give them life. If the specific examples used by microhistorians seem to contradict the grand narratives, then maybe we need to rethink our version of the big picture.

Through the lens of *The Return of Martin Guerre*, this essay has explored many of the characteristics that history, microhistories in particular, share in common with fiction. Even the most analytical, statistics-oriented historian is engaged in recreating what he believes history was like – which is still a form of telling a story. This historical reconstruction and invention should be as true to the historical evidence as we can make it. As Robert Finlay said, “The historian should not make the people of the past say or do things that run counter to the most scrupulous respect for the sources.”³³ Microhistories heavily contribute to our historical understanding of the past. In this genre of history writing, which successfully and intelligently combines elements of history and fiction, the people of the past, including the obscure peasant, has the ability to come to life. Without the invention of microhistories, or the perseverance of authors like Natalie Davis, who initially faced

considerable criticism, the historical characters of *The Return of Martin Guerre* may never have been expressed.

¹ Robert Finlay, "The Refashioning of Martin Guerre," *The American Historical Review*, 93 no. 3 (June 1988), 553.

² Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992).

³ Natalie Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), vii.

⁴ Ibid., 105.

⁵ Ibid., 106.

⁶ For more information see, Robert Finlay, "The Refashioning of Martin Guerre," *The American Historical Review*, 93 no. 3 (June 1988), 553, and Natalie Davis, "On the Lame," *The American Historical Review*, 93 no. 3 (June 1988), 573-603.

⁷ Natalie Davis, "Movie or Monograph? A Historian/Filmmaker's Perspective," *The Public Historian*, 25 no. 3 (Summer 2003), 45.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 47.

¹⁰ Robert Rosenstone, *History on Film/Film on History*, (Harlow: Pearson, 2006), 12.

¹¹ Davis, Movie or Monograph, 47-48.

¹² Finlay, 557.

¹³ Davis, Movie or Monograph, 46.

¹⁴ Ann Rigney, *Imperfect Histories: The Elusive Past and the Legacy of Romantic Historicism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 16.

¹⁵ Rosenstone, 12.

¹⁶ Davis, *Return of Martin Guerre*, ch. 10-12.

¹⁷ A.S. Byatt, *On Histories and Stories: Selected Essays*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 130-131.

¹⁸ Ibid., 93.

¹⁹ See Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1980). Also, for his reasoning, Umberto Eco, *Postscript to The Name of the Rose*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1983).

²⁰ Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History," *Past and Present*, 85 (November 1979), 3.

²¹ See Anthony Grafton, "History's Postmodern Fates," *Daedalus* (Spring 2006), 54-69.

²² Stone, 19.

²³ Davis, *Return of Martin Guerre*, 5.

²⁴ Byatt, 103.

²⁵ Stone, 22.

²⁶ Natalie Davis, "On the Lame," *The American Historical Review*, 93 no. 3 (June 1988), 572.

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- ²⁷ Davis, *Return of Martin Guerre*, 125.
- ²⁸ Stone, 3.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 13.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 15.
- ³¹ Davis, Movie or Monograph, 45.
- ³² Grafton, 57.
- ³³ Finlay, 571.

The Legitimacy of Religious Women: a Product of Support from Male Ecclesiastics

Courtney Caruso

The religious roles of women in medieval Italy were limited by practices and policies associated with the conventional belief that religious women were inferior to religious men and thus seen as naturally unfit to have significant positions of power within the Catholic Church. Women were therefore restricted in independence and in achieving autonomy within the Church as well as within society at large. The preacher, Raymond of Capua, and the nun, Sister Bartolomea Riccoboni, revealed existing gender constraints by discussing beliefs about female religious inferiority and highlighting the lack of female religious autonomy in the lives of Catherine of Siena and the nuns of the Venetian convent of Corpus Domini.

The writings of Raymond of Capua expressed a commonly held belief of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that women, because of their inherent frailty, vulnerability, and susceptibility to sin and scandal, were unsuited for religious autonomy. Raymond's biography of Catherine of Siena demonstrated the conformist conviction that Catherine represented the inferior sex, and as a result, he openly described the weaknesses of her sex in order to strengthen the credence of his writing and defend Catherine's sanctity. He wrote that women were often easily deceived by the trickery of the Devil and unable to distinguish evil visions from Godly ones, citing Eve's initial mistake as a prime example of this female flaw. He recognized that because of her sex, Catherine could be easily led astray by the Devil, and thus, suggested the likelihood of some readers finding it difficult to trust her genuine religiosity.¹ Raymond went on to describe that Catherine, herself, acknowledged the weaknesses and limitations of her own sex; she understood that the consequential societal gender roles for females limited her freedom to save souls and rendered her ineligible to perform public work with friars. To overcome the barriers of her gender, she resolved to disguise herself as a man and join the Order of Friars Preachers.² According to Raymond, Catherine knew as a young child that women did not appropriately belong in such uninhibited religious roles.

Furthermore, societal challenges to female religiosity also derived from the notion that devout women lived in opposition to human nature.

During her flagellations, Catherine reported visits of demons that advised her that taking a husband and becoming a mother was the natural function of female nature. They tested Catherine's devotion by speaking of examples of saintly women who were mothers and wives and taunted her by asking why she would take on an unnatural life in which she would "never be able to persevere."³ Although Catherine did not succumb to these inducements, Raymond's account of their occurrences demonstrated the belief that the unnatural choice of female chastity over reproduction often precluded religious women from maintaining a virtuous lifestyle because it entailed denying their own human nature.

The idea that females were naturally unfit for the religious lifestyle was perpetuated by the differing expectations for religious men in the Dominican Penitent Rule. While both the prior and prioress's principle obligation was to ensure compliance with the penitent rule and to correct those who faltered in following it, the prioress was charged with the additional task of ensuring the preservation of the reputation of the sisters by carefully examining their activities, habits, and clothing.⁴ The added dimension of preventing scandal through close scrutiny of female behavior reinforced the idea that because of an innate religious and gender inferiority, women were more likely to sin and, as a result, they needed to be protected and supervised in ways men did not.

Religious inferiority in women, and the idea that women needed a religious man, or at least manly characteristics, to successfully complete the will of God was salient in Raymond's account of God's espousal to Catherine. When God gave Catherine the ring symbolizing their celestial marriage, He proclaimed, "So now, daughter, do manfully. From now on you must never falter about accepting any task."⁵ Raymond wrote that God told Catherine to act manfully and valiantly because acting in these ways would help her overcome the religious limitations of her sex, and allow her to be successful and unwavering in her faith.⁶ Furthermore, in this interaction, God bestowed on Catherine the strength, courage, and wisdom associated with religious men. Raymond highlighted this event to demonstrate that Catherine never self-directed her triumph over the inherent weakness of her sex, but was given by God a permanent spiritual source of support in the form of masculine characteristics.

Even though Raymond asserted that inherent female weaknesses often made women incapable of leading strict religious lives, he justified the importance and indispensability of devout women, like Catherine of Siena, by describing a temporary need for female religious presence. Raymond admitted that the time in which he wrote was one filled with an excess of learned, arrogant men who practiced a corrupt faith and had forgotten their duties to God.⁷ As a result, God redirected the gift of His grace to women as a means of humbling men, humiliating them, and

demonstrating that they had erred. According to Raymond, women were chosen to show these lost souls that they lacked the true wisdom and knowledge that can only be bestowed by God.⁸ In other words, Raymond justified and enthusiastically defended the presence of women like Catherine in religion by claiming that God was using these women as tools to teach self-serving men a religious lesson. God sent “women who of themselves [were] ignorant and frail, but whom [He would] fill with the power of God and the wisdom of God.”⁹ In telling this story, Raymond validated Catherine’s presence in the religious world and showed that the existing situation called for the use of ignorant and weak women as a means of teaching and saving countless men. By implication, Raymond revealed that the need for religious women to gain prestige and take on saintly positions was a temporary one and ultimately served the purpose of bringing males to a higher level of religiosity. Given that the purpose of religious women, in this context, was to teach a debasing lesson to learned men, once this lesson had been taught and these men had seen the error of their ways, there would no longer be a need for women to play a significant role in religion, and God would discontinue bestowing grace upon a considerable number of them. Therefore, the presence and religiosity of Catherine was provisionally justified and legitimized despite her inherent weaknesses as a female because the point of God’s revelation through women was to benefit men, not the women who were his means of communication.

The chronicle of Sister Bartolomea Riccoboni’s Venetian convent demonstrated the practical necessity of male alliance and support of religious women. Giovanni Dominici was invaluable in Riccoboni’s story of the convent of Corpus Domini. Riccoboni recognized that although the convent was a place outside of Venetian society where a certain degree of female autonomy existed, the convent relied on the financial and spiritual support of a male preacher. She described the convent’s relationship with Dominici as an integral one; Dominici found a prioress for the convent, used money from two girls’ dowries to build the convent, traveled to Rome to obtain the proper Bulls and approval of the Pope, and employed his connections with the Venetian patriciate to acquire political and financial support for the convent. Dominici continued his support of the women of Corpus Domini by vesting them, preaching throughout Italy of their convent’s prestige, and recruiting dozens of women.¹⁰ Riccoboni described Dominici’s exile from Venice as occurring at a time when the convent was devastatingly deprived of alms, bread, and spiritual benefits.¹¹ As an author, Riccoboni understood that Dominici was vital to the functioning of Corpus Domini, and the sisters of the convent relied on him for their spiritual and physical livelihood. He provided the women with religious authority by

consecrating them, helping them to receive God's gifts, and giving them sustenance in the form of food. Riccoboni referred to Dominici as the father of the convent. Most importantly, Dominici could vouch for the women and their piousness. Riccoboni's writing described the limited roles for women in the Church, and demonstrates the reasons religious women needed a religious man to advocate for them. For this reason, Riccoboni included detailed information of Dominici's life in both the Chronology and Necrology of *Corpus Domini*.

Raymond recognized that in order for Catherine to be considered a legitimate saintly figure, he needed to prove she successfully overcame the weaknesses of her sex and that she never acted of her own accord, but instead, only in accordance with the will of God. Simultaneously, Riccoboni's writing illustrated the specific ways women were limited in their religious independence. Even in a self-governed female community, the women of *Corpus Domini* relied on Dominici for their livelihood. Without Raymond's written attestation of Catherine's piousness, she might never have been canonized as a saint; without Dominici, *Corpus Domini* would have been a doomed convent. When Thomas Caffarini of Siena translated the *Legend of Giovanna of Orvieto* in Italian, he changed the legend to imply that a formal Dominican Order of Penance existed during her lifetime,¹² even though the order was established after her death. Because he wanted Giovanna to become a role model for future Dominican penitent women, he was obligated to establish a strong bond between the friars and the penitent women in order to legitimize Giovanna's religiosity. In contrast, the author of *The Miracoli*, a second biography of Catherine of Siena, failed to acknowledge issues surrounding Catherine's sex. Unlike Raymond, however, this lay author was not writing with the purpose of selling Catherine to others and promoting her canonization; he had no need to prove her authenticity with the vigor with which Raymond approaches the task. In these ways, it was apparent that perceptions of female religious inferiority guided the ways authors wrote about religious women. They struggled with the fact that there was no uniquely carved, autonomous place for women in the Catholic Church, and as a result, they strove to counter assumptions about inferior religious women and used the advocacy of males to promote female religious legitimacy.

¹ Raymond of Capua, *The Life of Catherine of Siena*, trans. Conleth Kearns (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1960), 80.

² Ibid., 38.

³ Ibid., 98.

⁴ “The Dominican Penitent Rule,” in *Dominican Penitent Women*, ed. Maiju Lehmijoki-Gardner, (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2005), 54.

⁵ Raymond, 107.

⁶ Ibid., 108.

⁷ Ibid., 116.

⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

⁹ Ibid., 116.

¹⁰ Sister Bartolomea Riccoboni, *Life and Death in a Venetian Convent*, ed. and trans. Daniel Bornstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 5.

¹¹ Ibid., 42.

¹² Maiju Lehmijoki-Gardner, “Legend of Giovanna of Orvieto,” in *Dominican Penitent Women*, 60.

The State of Science in *The Name of the Rose*

Adam Merzel

While arguably one of the most dominant themes of the Middle Ages was the proliferation of religion, it is interesting to note that the sometimes-conflicting principles of science and technology were not obliterated. Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose* eloquently demonstrates how the forces of science and religion coexisted in the Middle Ages. William of Baskerville employs the scholastic method, designed to narrow the chasm between science and religion, and rejects the popular monastic belief of the period – simple demonic possession.¹ Science was seen as a discipline that conflicted with God's will, trying to methodically determine exactly why things happen the way they do could be construed as an indication of shaky faith. As a result, the field of science clashed somewhat with the doctrines of medieval Christianity, despite the irony that most scientific advancements were facilitated by Church sponsored scholars. However, it did survive, and even flourished to the point where it provided a legitimate groundwork for modern scientists.²

Eco's novel *The Name of the Rose* is a perfect example of religious beliefs clashing with scientific forces in the Middle Ages. The protagonist of the story, William of Baskerville, travels to an Italian monastery to investigate a puzzling murder that has taken place there. William and his apprentice, Adso of Melk, implement common sense and the basic principles of logic in their attempt to determine what happened at the abbey. This method of using deductive reasoning is a significant break from the typical response of the earlier portion of the Middle Ages. The most common explanation for unnatural death or other unfortunate circumstances was demonic possession; any deviance from the expected course of events, that otherwise could not be rationalized, was a break from God's will, and thus the work of the devil.³

The Middle Ages was a period deeply affected by Christianity. Most Latin Europeans shaped every action they made around the doctrines of the Bible. Peasants paid a ten percent tithe to the Church, sometimes at the cost of feeding their families, in order to ensure the ascension of the soul to heaven. The Church imposed its own laws and regulations on the people in Latin Christendom. The separation of Church and state was non-existent; bishops and archbishops played a significant role in government, and even held positions on the king's

council. Toward the conclusion of *The Name of the Rose*, inquisitor Bernard Gui exerts his authority to charge and convict supposed heretics to be burned at the stake. The reality that the leader of the papal legation could release supposed offenders to the secular arm for capital punishment against anyone who broke the Church's laws was an all-too-common instance of the Church's domineering presence over the medieval population.

Many scholars acknowledged the validity of science, but generally condemned much of technology and philosophy as anti-Christian.⁴ From their standpoint, trying to identify the mechanisms behind the forces of nature and conducting scientific experiments to further understand how the world worked undermined one's faith. The strongest Christians were expected to lay their scientific curiosity aside and focus on praising and placing their faith in God, which was the only way to guarantee one's ascent to heaven.⁵ Salvation entailed resisting this scientific temptation to question how elements of nature worked, and accepting that God meant for it to happen that way. Science and philosophy did not create a strong foundation for accepting God's omnipotence and ensuring the salvation of one's immortal soul.

Roger Bacon was a thirteenth-century English scholar who highlighted the importance and validity of empiricism as a method of solving problems. He became a Franciscan – certainly a parallel to William of Baskerville – in 1256. Bacon lectured on alchemy and astrology at the University of Paris. Pope Clement IV ordered him to conduct an analysis of the function of philosophy under the broader context of religion. At his request, Bacon wrote up his findings in *Opus Majus*, which outlined his views on how the doctrines of Aristotle coupled with the emerging findings of the time could be formulated into a new brand of theology. Bacon's ideas underscore the progression of ideas in medieval England regarding the marriage of science and religion.

Bacon's ideas are prominent in *The Name of the Rose*. William of Baskerville uses empiricism to guide him towards logical clues that will help him decipher the mystery of the abbey. During his investigation, William remarks to Adso that "The library should be kept under observation...at this point it would not be a bad idea to try to get into it somehow." Adso then observes that "Circumstances now authorized his curiosity."⁶ This type of logical reasoning corresponds with the guidelines of the empirical method; observation sheds light on possible clues, and those clues are subsequently pieced together to solve the problem at hand. Furthermore, William even directly mentions Bacon when he and Adso are discussing the "new and humane theology that is natural philosophy." Adso asks if such an idea is realistic, to which

William replies: “Bacon thought so.”⁷ This indicates that there is a clear connection between Bacon’s work and the empirical methods of William of Baskerville.

Despite the fact that religion was the major lens through which most people of the Middle Ages saw the world, many intellectuals still examined their surroundings from a scientific point-of-view.⁸ There were a multitude of scientific discoveries and breakthroughs, many of which still contribute to modern science. One of the most important was the evolution of the scientific method, which came together as the result of independent work by scholars such as Al-Haytham, Grosseteste, and Bacon.⁹ Instead of explaining phenomena away as acts of God or the devil, these scholars produced a brand of controlled enquiry grounded in qualitative observation, active experimentation and attempted verification of hypotheses.¹⁰

The concept of medieval science is in some ways a paradox. The supposedly progressive, forward-thinking conclusions of scientific discovery during the Middle Ages was sponsored almost entirely by the Church. Scholars like Aquinas and Bacon were not motivated by a desire to break down the world into understandable pieces, but rather by a desire to reaffirm their faith. Scholasticism was designed to be a philosophy of religion, situated within the confines of the Church, rather than a “free investigation of nature.”¹¹ Bacon violated this unwritten code. He suggested that “without experience, nothing can be sufficiently known,” which undercuts the notion of placing faith in God to guide one through the unknown.¹² He used a primitive, concave lens telescope to view the stars, described what we now know to be the principles of refraction and reflection, and anticipated modern technological advances, such as the locomotive and the suspension bridge. He was ultimately imprisoned twice for insubordination and exiled by his Franciscan superiors, for criticizing bishops and popes and adhering to philosophy on a scientific basis rather than a theological one. Paradoxically, in an attempt to discover scientific evidence to support Christianity, the Church unwittingly created anti-scholasticism.

Many important breakthroughs were initiated by scholars outside of Latin Christendom. Notably, Muslim intellectuals and scholars were responsible for advancements in mathematics during the Middle Ages. The Islamic scholar Al-Khwarizmi introduced the Hindu decimal place system into the Muslim world in the ninth century; it filtered into European society about three hundred years later.¹³ His findings also opened doors for later Muslim scholars, who dealt with negative solutions, and discovered how to reduce quadratic equations and even polynomials of higher degree.¹⁴ Even as early as the sixth century, philosophers such as John Philoponus accurately predicted the movement

and interaction of objects in terms of physics, a millennium before Sir Isaac Newton lived. Advancements in myriad areas such as differential calculus, optics, antiseptic surgery, chemistry, trigonometry, navigation, and weaponry all stemmed from the Middle Ages, many from Muslim scientists.

Ironically, much of the scientific progress that was made after the fall of the Western Roman Empire was due to the efforts of church scientists. Scholars such as Thomas Aquinas rekindled the “scientific spirit” that had been lost to Western Europe. However, it came at a heavy price. Aquinas’ teachings were condemned by a 1270 edict by the bishop of Paris, and he was moved to Italy by the Dominican order.¹⁵ Even after his death, Aquinas’ reputation was tarnished – the bishop issued another edict in 1277 which further depicted his works as heretical. It wasn’t until Pope John XXII proclaimed Aquinas a saint of the Catholic Church, about fifty years after his death, that his reputation was restored. By keeping this scientific curiosity alive, a thirteenth century church scholars such as Thomas Aquinas helped build the foundations for the Scientific Revolution over two hundred years later.¹⁶

This idea of using deductive reasoning to solve problems began to flourish in the fourteenth century. Even though most people were very religious, the popularity of the scholastic method became more widespread. Characterized by information-gathering and the use of empirical evidence, scholasticism questions conclusions that cannot be proven, and seeks to bridge the gap between religion and science. People using this method typically analyze information and follow their instincts in order to piece facts together into a comprehensive whole.¹⁷

Deductive reasoning is a major factor in *The Name of the Rose*. William often assesses one thing and uses logic and inference to uncover another related conclusion. While he and Adso are investigating the death of Adelmo – the first mysterious death – William remarks, “It’s useless to try to open these windows: too high, and perhaps closed for decades. How could they think Adelmo had thrown himself down from here?”¹⁸ From the separate statement that the windows were “too high, and perhaps closed for decades,” William deduces that Adelmo’s suicide likely did not originate from the windows. This brand of logical observation shifts the focus away from unverifiable explanations, like demonic possession, and seeks to piece together a logical origin for strange events that can be substantiated.

There are several noteworthy departures from Eco’s novel in the film version of *The Name of the Rose*, which was adapted to the screen in 1986. The film is much more centered on action and confrontation, and the events of the plot are condensed.¹⁹ The Abbot is the sixth victim in

the novel, out of the seven who die mysteriously, whereas in the film he simply ceases to appear. Omissions such as these are inevitable in the adaptation of a five hundred page novel to the screen, but there are also exclusions that potentially detract from Eco's points about religion and science. The novel contains a character named Benno of Uppsala, who aids William and Adso's investigation, and is considered as a suspect; he does not appear in the film. This takes away from William's ability to utilize deductive reasoning, since he has less information around which to form conclusions. In addition, Adso's extended dream sequence is entirely cut out of the film, even though it serves as a commentary on theology – the dream involves *Coena Cypriani*, a book which is satirical of the Bible.²⁰ While we must acknowledge that the detail of historical writing and scholarship is nearly impossible to represent perfectly on the screen, omissions of key details can blunt the force of the original argument.

It is also important to consider *The Name of the Rose* within the framework of semiotics. Semiotics is the study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behavior. It includes the study of how meaning is constructed and understood. Umberto Eco is a professor of semiotics at the University of Bologna, and is considered one of the most important semioticians of all time.²¹ He has a style of creating “stories within stories” and enmeshing indisputable fact with imagination. William of Baskerville’s quest to solve the killings relies heavily on the subject matter of Aristotle’s book on Comedy, which supposedly no longer exists in print. However:

Eco nevertheless plausibly describes it and has his characters react to it appropriately in their medieval setting, which, however, though realistically described, is partly based on Eco's scholarly guesses and imagination.²²

This technique is known as partial fictionalization, and it leaves the reader thinking about the true meaning of what he has just read. Eco also intentionally leaves many of his passages up to interpretation; ambiguity is a significant feature of his narrative. An important application of semiotics involves the examination of how humans interact with their environments, and Eco challenges the reader to explore that notion in *The Name of the Rose* by writing opaquely.²³ Ultimately, the reader cannot with any conviction separate factual historiographic information from the plausible fiction that Eco created through guesswork and conjecture.

Eco may be undercutting his own notion of the “science of science” in *The Name of the Rose*. His book *A Theory of Semiotics* (1976) is a

criticism of the premise that the meaning of signs is dictated by the objects, ideas, or events to which they refer.²⁴ However, William of Baskerville uses semiotics in his attempt to unravel the mystery of the monastery, but the signs that he follows lead him to an incorrect interpretation of the correct chain of events. He eventually hits upon the right answer, but only did so by coming to the wrong conclusion first. Near the conclusion of the novel, Jorge of Burgos admits to William and Adso that he had “taken a brush from Severinus, and used gloves to spread the ointment.” William replies, “I was thinking of a more complex device, a poisoned pin or something of that sort.”²⁵ However, when he realizes that the pages of the book stick together, and require the reader to moisten his hand with his tongue in order to separate the pages, William stumbles upon the correct conclusion about how the victims were poisoned. Only after William used the principles of semiotics to arrive at the wrong answer was he able to arrive at the correct one.

Eco’s title is consistent with the ambiguity of the book. His original title was “Adso of Melk,” which he liked because of its neutrality, but after this title was nixed by his publisher, he settled on “The Name of the Rose.”²⁶ This title arises from the last lines of the book, taken from the poem *De contemptu mundi* by Bernard of Morlay, a twelfth-century Benedictine: “stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus.”²⁷ This translates roughly to: “Of the rose of the past, we have only its name.” Again, the lack of concrete interpretation is evident. The loss that Adso of Melk alludes to could be the labyrinthine abbey that burned to the ground, Aristotle’s heavily sought book of Comedy, the seven monks who died, or even the peasant girl with whom the narrator interacted. According to Umberto Eco himself, “the rose is a symbolic figure so rich in meanings that by now it hardly has any meaning left.”²⁸ The reader then has to superimpose his own meaning over the broader framework of the novel, and interacts with the text yet again.

The Middle Ages was a period during which science was visible, even if only to reinforce the ideologies of the Church. Scholars performed research and disseminated their ideas, even though they sometimes faced harsh reprimands for undermining the pervasive religious ideas of the time.²⁹ Eco’s ideas in *The Name of the Rose* help bring to light the paradoxical nature of medieval science, combining fiction with history in a nearly seamless fashion. Muslim scholars utilized advanced mathematics and science in the tradition of the ancient Greek philosophers, and scholars such as Roger Bacon and Thomas Aquinas lived during an era which carried as fervent religious overtones as any period in history, but still emphasized logic and philosophy as a companion of theology. Their brand of science was not a separate endeavor, but rather a subset of the Church itself, since they were both

religious men seeking to incorporate their scientific findings with their religion. Medieval science did not play a factor in the lives of most in the Middle Ages, but the inventions and conclusions that resulted from the labor of Church scholars and intellectuals still play an integral role in more secular twenty-first century life.

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- ¹ Andrew Lang, *Demonic Possession; The Making of Religion*, (London: Longmans and Green, 1900), 128-146.
- ² Joseph J. Kockelmans, *The World in Science and Philosophy*, (Bruce Publishing Company: Milwaukee, 1969), 171.
- ³ Hans Peter Broedel, *The Malleus Malificarum and the Construction of Witchcraft*, (Great Britain; Manchester University Press, 2003), 32-33.
- ⁴ Kockelmans, 53.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose*, trans. William Weaver, (New York; Harcourt, 1984), 114.
- ⁷ Ibid, 206.
- ⁸ Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, (Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1951), 37.
- ⁹ William Ian Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation*, (London; Vintage, 1960), 3.
- ¹⁰ Claire Parkinson, *Breakthroughs: A chronology of great achievements in science and mathematics*, (London: Mansell, 1985), 4.
- ¹¹ Horatio W. Dresser, *History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company Publishers, 1926), 235.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ali Abdullah al-Daffa, *The Muslim Contribution to Mathematics*, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 143.
- ¹⁴ Carl B. Boyer, *A History of Mathematics*, (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 251-258.
- ¹⁵ Hans Kung, *Great Christian Thinkers*, (New York: Continuum Books, 1994), 112.
- ¹⁶ Richard S. Westfall, *The Construction of Modern Science*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), 17-21.
- ¹⁷ J. Gracia, *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (London: Blackwell, 2003), 12.
- ¹⁸ Eco, *The Name of the Rose*, 176.
- ¹⁹ Marc Ferro, *Cinéma et Histoire*, (Paris: Denoël, 1977), 17.
- ²⁰ Michael F. Suarez, *Mock Biblical Satire From Medieval to Modern*, (Athens: Blackwell, 2007), 4.
- ²¹ John Deely, *Basics of Semiotics*, 4th ed, (Tallinn: Tartu University Press, 2005), 69.
- ²² Christopher Butler, *Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction*, (London; Oxford University Press, 2002), 126.
- ²³ Daniel Chandler, *Semiotics: The Basics*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2001), 2.

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- ²⁴ Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 3.
- ²⁵ Eco, *The Name of the Rose*, 472.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 504.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 502.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 504.
- ²⁹ Dresser, 276.

Public Health Media and the National Body in Early-Modern England

Ian Ross

Since the end of the fifteenth century, new political forces had been shaping the borders of Europe, for the era of nation-building had begun. Monarchs who had long assumed nominal control over substantial areas of land realized that their authority lacked security under the feudal system, and began to adjust accordingly. These adjustments were aimed largely at consolidation of quasi-integrated lands into truly organized states. Historians Brian Levack, Edward Muir, and others outlined these adjustments as follows: the creation of national, professional armies; reorganized tax systems with fewer provisions for privileged entities; reasserting state – meaning royal – dominance over the church and aristocrats; and, finally, the placement of representative ambassadors abroad.¹ These developments encouraged the creation of national identities. Before, people technically subject to the king were in actuality primarily affiliated with a whole array of uncooperative authorities, from semi-autonomous dukes to religious leaders. Now, however, monarchies were forming identifiable states with identifiable units, now called citizens. For the state to be successfully integrated, all realms of society had to be functional contributors to the whole. Part of this consolidation process was the creation of the national body and body politics. These forces were especially evident in England. By the seventeenth century, the theory of body politics had settled firmly in the minds of the English population, and the public believed that their own individual action – in this case the use of tobacco and coffee – affected the health of the state. Englishmen and women expressed their belief in the concept primarily through public health media. This essay looks, firstly, at how the genre became a vehicle for public discussion, and secondly, what it showed about popular perceptions of the human body in seventeenth-century England.

Public access to the body: The beginnings of popular health

At the end of the seventeenth century and for decades into the eighteenth, a man by the name of Johann Storch practiced medicine in Eisenach, Saxony; he is the main subject of body historian Barbara

Duden's *The Woman Beneath the Skin*. Based on his education, he was a 'medicus', a position as close to that of a professional physician as possible during this period, though he knew as little about the body and the nature of his prescriptions as the village quack.² Despite the intense competition for patient loyalty in growing towns such as Eisenach, Storch managed to assemble a substantial base of clientele. Yet his patients, many of them women, did not value his knowledge very highly. While he was sought after as a source for advice, most of his clients ostensibly considered themselves just as knowledgeable, albeit not without some degree of insecurity, about their own bodies as he was. Duden wrote:

These women frequently knew what was 'wrong' with them and tried to obtain the necessary remedies of their own, without recourse to a legitimate healer. Self-diagnosis and self-therapy run through Storch's cases like a red thread of everyday practice and are present even during his visits.³

Duden continued to describe Storch's role as the town's primary medicus; even as the highest authority of 'academic medicine' in the community, his patients saw him for confirmation of their own ideas of the body, not for his own 'learned' opinion.

How did the public's self-reliance come about? Was Duden's patient base an anomaly? A variety of primary source documents from seventeenth century England showed that this was a common phenomenon in early modern Europe. There were several reasons for this fact. Firstly, physicians like Storch were only the tip of the iceberg when it came to the medical profession; apothecaries, surgeons, and quacks formed substantial sub-groups, some of whom were more accessible and outspoken than others. Secondly, there was a growing distaste for professionals during this period. Historian Roy Porter wrote, "In critics' eyes, the universities and medical colleges had combined to pervert English medicine, so that it provided unlimited buy worthless treatment for the rich and all too little for the rest."⁴ Porter went on to claim that there was great interest in publicizing medical knowledge, and the sources show that this was what happened. Based on almanacs, self-help books, protest transcripts, and other popular media, it is clear that medicinal 'knowledge' of the body and its functions was no longer a privilege for the elite, but that it was firmly set in the public discourse.

By the seventeenth century, the printing press and the services it provided had been available in England for a little over a century, but the explosion of medicinal texts available to the masses was less than forty

years in the making. Historian Louise Curth wrote that, beginning in 1565:

In England, the genre of such medical works aimed primarily at laypeople began to grow...This trend continued in the seventeenth century, due in part to the many medical reformers who demanded a greater availability of medical works in English.⁵

And these demands were quickly met by a host of authors, many – perhaps most – of whom had far less ‘official’ training than Johann Storch.

Initially, the most common literary sources for medical advice were almanacs. Almanacs had been around since the availability of the printing press, and they escalated into the mainstream media once transcribed into the vernacular of lay people.⁶ These books found great popularity because, as Duden claimed, physicians were hard to come by in the seventeenth century. Physicians like Storch, considered to be the most knowledgeable of the various medical professionals, were often distributed one to a few thousand people.⁷ Owning a medical almanac provided peace of mind to many lay people who, if living in a city, might have limited access to professional help or, if living in the country side, might have no access at all.⁸ Curth wrote, “There were also a large number of texts on the market...[which] promised to ‘sufficiently instruct’ readers in the intricacies of astrological physick.”⁹ Such books were not unlike the popular ‘for dummies’ guides today. Yet like medicis in Eisenach, these books were sought after not just for medical insight, but also for validation of already-popular regimens and recipes.¹⁰

Once almanacs and the printing press were available to the public, however, it did not take long for non-professionals – meaning men and women whose occupations could not be related to medicine – to produce their own. There is disagreement in the motivations for authoring these books. Curth cited the arguments of historians Brean Hammond and Bernard Capp, who assert that authors were primarily interested in furthering their own reputations through the publicity of almanacs; Curth, however, disagreed, claiming that the monetary rewards of such enterprises were sufficient enough to appear lucrative.¹¹ Regardless of their reasons, almanacs made for the public *by* the public served as an important recursive message; lay authors were role models, and the more books they wrote, the more strongly laypeople were drawn to the endeavor. An example: the period saw a steady increase in female writers who, in addition to the indirect influence from the availability of their works, actively encouraged women like themselves to pursue

careers in writing.¹² Almanacs began as alternative sources of medical advice, but they also provided strong encouragement for prospective lay authors, inserting public thought into a previously professional discourse.

The medical laity also had less formalized methods of accessing medicine and publishing their views. Knowledge spread orally in the public forum. Occasionally, products were so controversial that groups of lay people organized protests against their distribution. At these public gatherings, anyone who wanted to contribute their thoughts on the matter had the opportunity. A transcript from a 1675 protest against tobacco reads:

A doctor's wife claimed the preeminence; saying, that she [from the experience she had learned from her husband's books] could discover and lay open unto them, the many and injurious impediments that were occasioned in the body of man by the poisonous fume of the tobacco...¹³

These gatherings provided a venue for learning and expression, serving for the popularization of a wide range of beliefs on medicine and the human body.

The basic reality was that almost everyone had something to say about medical matters in the seventeenth century. Academic physicians, apothecaries, and surgeons may have considered themselves the only authorities on the subject, but this did not stop people from joining the conversation. Porter wrote:

Thousands of other people [dabbled in] medicine at this time. Grocers and pedlars sold drugs. Blacksmiths and farriers drew teeth and set bones...Itinerants toured the country, selling bottles of brightly coloured 'wonder cures'...Every village had its 'nurses' and 'wise women' well versed in herb-lore...¹⁴

People from many different occupations – not to mention their relatives and others who knew them intimately – had reason to believe that their thoughts held weight in medical discussion. For the modern observer, this is not a foreign idea; in today's media, how often can one find fad diets and work-out routines whose bases in science are dubious? The seventeenth century foundation of medical 'knowledge' was wide, as was based in public opinion.

This section has aimed to illustrate the foundation and development of popular health in seventeenth-century England. 'Popular health' is a name for a public forum, one in which men and women of many trades could offer their opinions on matters of human health. These sources are

so compelling because they allowed participants to reveal popular conceptions of the body and the historical forces which were shaping them. The medical discourse of physicians during this period was very heavily concerned with peculiarities of theory. Popular health media took the private professional discourse as a given, then extrapolated on it to explore new constructions of health and the body. The primary sources used for this essay were, at their heart, components of the public discussion of health in early-modern England. None were written by trained physicians or even quacks; rather, they were authored by a king, the medical laity (the public), and poets. They were written to benefit the health of the average Englishman, much like any modern article describing the best ways to avoid the flu. Yet they were also strongly intertwined with their environment – the seventeenth century was an exciting time in England, rife with political turmoil, threats from abroad, and opportunities for those who wanted to expose their ideas to the public. Hence, these sources on popular health inevitably went far beyond mere prescriptions. They opened a path towards understanding much deeper conceptions of the body – in this case, the national body of England.

Nationalism, commerce, and the political body

While the macro-trends of nationalism were observable throughout the continent, seventeenth-century England was experiencing the most turbulent period of politics in its history. Beginning in 1604, the relationship between the English king and Parliament proceeded down a path of increasing conflict. The ideologies of absolutism and ‘divine right’ were gaining steam, trends which put Parliament leaders and supporters on edge. Tensions came to a head during the reign of Charles I between 1625 and 1649. Through unpopular religious and economic policies, the king created a major rift in the English population, a separation which eventually led to civil war. After a series of armed conflicts, the Royalists were defeated by the Parliamentarians and their allies. Charles was tried and executed in 1649, and a hastily assembled republic was formed in his stead. However, the political sphere was rife with animosity, and after two decades of conflict and multiple regime changes, Charles’ son was crowned the king of England, and the monarchy was reinstated.¹⁵ While the bloody and taxing process seemed to have very little net impact on English politics, an important idea was revealed in Charles’ trial. Despite all of his disagreeable acts, the court could not find acceptable grounds on which they could try him.¹⁶ Under absolutism, the king was the state, so treason was a crime committed

against him and him alone, and it was not clear how the court could accuse the king of such a thing. The court modified the definition of treason, “according to which the king had attacked his own political body, which they identified with the kingdom or the state.”¹⁷ This new view of treason equated the whole people, rather than solely the king, to the body of the state. This became a hallmark of the English political structure for the rest of the century and beyond, and explains why the concept of an absolute monarchy, though some monarchs tried to introduce it, could never catch hold in the nation as it did in the rest of Europe.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the integrity of the English ‘body politick’ was threatened by new commercial trends. In 1607, Jamestown in modern-day Virginia established itself as the first major English colony on the North American mainland. Much more well-established than its predecessors, Jamestown withstood its initial tests as an outpost in an alien land and became the nexus for English expansion on the continent. It did not take long for these colonists to find their cash-crop: tobacco. Tobacco was not to be found in European societies before the discovery of the New World in the fifteenth century. Its uses were revealed by Native Americans, and this knowledge was transferred back to the metropolitan communities, allowing the plant to insert itself into English culture.¹⁸ It soon found high demand in Early Modern England, along with several other crops from around the world which had immersed itself in the ‘commercial revolution’.

One of these other such crops was coffee. Coffee came from the other side of the planet experiencing European exploration. With caravels rounding Cape Horn and the renewed organization in the Middle East brought along by the Ottoman Turks, products from the Eastern world were more accessible than ever before. The majority of England’s coffee imports came from India, Anatolia, and much of the far eastern Mediterranean. Once introduced, coffee became one of the most popular consumer items in England, finding its niche in coffeehouses across the country.¹⁹

The reason coffee and tobacco stand out among the wide variety of new world crops is because they were the only ones to spark very serious debates amongst the English population. The debate over the merits of these two imports found its way into a wealth of popular mediums. Health almanacs often contained entire sections devoted to coffee or tobacco, describing the various medicinal qualities or toxicity of each. Poems and dissertations were written by authors from all realms of society. The media transcribing this debate revealed a strong popular conception of the body in seventeenth-century England – that bodies were national units, themselves part of a national identity. To show this,

I will use a handful of primary sources: a self-help almanac, a collection of arguments against the good nature of tobacco, women's protests against tobacco and coffee, and a male response to these protests.

One of the primary elements of the political body was both organizational and metaphorical. The theory drew connections between the human body and the state, placing the sovereign at the top and his subjects at various places throughout the rest of the body. The national leader was symbolically the head of the state, while everyone else made up the natural machine which executed the head's enlightened wisdom. As a whole, a well-functioning state was a well-functioning body. In the foreword to his *Trial of Tobacco*, John Hancock illustrated this theory. Englishman John Hancock's *Trial of Tobacco*, a collection of authors' arguments regarding the nature of tobacco, illustrated the diverse range of mediums used in medical literature. The anthology contained first a case study of victims of tobacco abuse; second, an essay by King James I; third, two physicians' recommendations against the use of the herb; fourth, a transcribed clergyman's sermon; and fifth, a number of poems on the subject.²⁰ Hancock saw the popularity of tobacco in England as a disease. It was an affliction which affected not only individual citizens' well-being, but the very health of the state. To follow the rhetoric, the spread of tobacco was effectively a cancer to the political body, causing gears in the national machine to come loose. Hancock felt that relief could only come from one source. He wrote:

It is the King's part (as the proper physician of his politick body) to purge it of all those diseases, by medicines meet for the same...as every one of these diseases, must from the King receive the one cure proper for it.²¹

In his opinion, curing the state of this disease could not be a grass-roots movement. Reflecting the medical conventions of the time, internal diseases to the liver or the lungs could not be cured by themselves or the actions of the hands. Such maladies could only be accessed by medicine, and medicine was decided upon by the head.²² Likewise, diseases to the nation could only be assessed and eliminated by choices made by the head of the state – in this case England's King James I.

Hancock described the king as the physician for his own political body, and then commended the king for choosing a particular remedy – reasoned arguments – with which to combat this disease and return the elements of the political body to health and the national machine to function. Hancock wrote:

His Majesty wisely foreseeing the evil consequences that would follow, by such immoderate sucking in the foul smoke of this Indian weed, and he being the physician of the body politick, doth by many strong and excellent arguments, dissuade his subjects from imitating the practice of the heathen Indians, in drinking this noxious fume.²³

It was the king's advice against the abuse of tobacco which was to be the medicine which cured the political body. For example, the king tried to dispel the myths which surrounded the qualities of tobacco. According to him, one of the purported benefits of tobacco was that it was hot and dry, complementary to – and thus apparently good for – the naturally cool and moist nature of the human brain. Instead, James asserted that it was necessary to maintain the natural state of body parts as they were designed in order to perform their purposes. James wrote, "The application then of a thing of a contrary nature to any of these parts, is to interrupt them of their due function, and by consequence hurtful to the health of the whole body."²⁴ This was the kind of advice expected from the king, not as a professional physician but as the head of the political body, making the decisions to cure it of impairment.

The theory of body politics did not only define the role of James as head of the national body; it also dictated the role of citizens as cogs which completed the machine. The health of this body was not solely the responsibility of the king, but it was shared by each and every constituent. James wrote:

Thirdly, is it not the greatest sin of all, that you, the people of all sorts of this Kingdom, who are created and ordained by God, to bestow both your persons and goods for the maintenance both of the honour and safety of your King and Common-wealth, should disable yourselves in both?²⁵

Here, James argued that it was the function of the citizens of England to work towards the preservation of the whole and the accomplishment of its goals. The key word in James' statement was 'disable', implying that citizens affected by disease represented by tobacco were non-functional units of the nation, and thus defective cells of the national body. James concluded with harsh words, writing, "By [using tobacco], making yourselves to be wondered at by all foreign nations, and by all strangers that come among you."²⁶ The king implied that tobacco users were tarnishing the image of the English nation and body. By escaping from the ruinous practice of smoking tobacco, Hancock and King James

suggested that English men and women would not only repair their own bodies' health but that of the nation as well.

Body politics were not only concerned with organizational matters; they also worked to establish an identity for the English body unique from the bodies of other nations. Given what has been said about national bodies so far, it should be easily understood why products such as tobacco and coffee were of such great interest to those involved in popular health media. Not only were they perceived by many as harmful, but they were foreign, exotic parasites sapping the strength of the home state. They were easy targets for 'body politicians' who were invested in protecting the integrity of the English body while deriding that of others.

Tobacco and coffee were attacked by activists who believed they weakened the unique qualities of the English body. These attacks revealed what the public considered specific to English men and women. In 1674, a group of women assembled in London to protest the distribution of coffee, believing it rendered Englishmen infertile. The transcript from this speech reads:

To our unspeakable grief, we find of late a very sensible decay of that true Old English valour; our gallants being every way so Frenchified...Never did men wear greater breeches, or carry less in them of any mettle whatsoever.²⁷

These women identified a particular quality to English men – a unique valor. This is then compared to the French body, which is implicated as not having this trait. Here it is possible to see the formulation of national identity working through the guise of the national body. With the national body, there was a distinct difference between being *English* and being *French*, and this concept was exposed through public concerns over the healthiness of coffee. The women continued, saying:

By the perpetual fumes of tobacco, and bewitching effects of this most pernicious coffee, whereby nature is enfeebled, the offspring of our mighty ancestors dwindled into a succession of apes and pignies.²⁸

Through using the words 'mighty ancestors', the protestors revealed a national identity that had not existed until the recent consolidation of states. Before, there was no such thing as English ancestors. The English body could not have fallen to the level of primates because it had never truly existed. The age of nationalism was dawning, however, and people were beginning to forget about the factionalism which had once

handcuffed politics on the British Isles and identified with a new, united England.

The ideologies of body politics even extended to the English tongue. Some English activists identified coffee with Turkishness, while equating ale and even water to Englishness and Christianity.²⁹ The women boycotting coffee argued that men with English bodies should be naturally disposed towards drinking uniquely English beverages. They said:

Certainly our country-men's palates are become as fanatical as their brains; how else is it possible, they should apostatize from the good old primitive way of ale drinking, to run a whoring after such variety of destructive foreign liquors, to trifle away their time.³⁰

The argument here is that something must have been missing from the English body to cause Englishmen to lust after foreign drinks. In other words, if these men had English tongues, they would of course not be tempted away from national products. The popular literature and activism attacking tobacco and coffee provided evidence for the existence of an idealized English body, which was comprised of its own distinct elements and attributes.


The two imports were equally useful in creating bodies of the 'other'. Essential to maintaining an image of the English body was the creation of comparables, and during the petitions against tobacco, this led to portrayals of the Indian body.³¹ In his "Counterblast", King James described the origins of tobacco to his readers, writing:

Tobacco was first found out by some of the barbarous Indians to be a preservative, or antidote against the pox, a filthy disease, whereunto these barbarous people are (as all men know) very much subject, what through the uncleanly and adust constitutions of their bodies...³²

James stated that the peculiarities of the Indian body were responsible for its own supposed inability to fend off the pox disease. He attributed this weakness to the 'constitutions of their bodies', differentiating the Indian body from the English body. James went on to state that tobacco, while able to have noticeable medicinal effects for the "pocky Indian slaves", it is not strong enough to make a difference in the health of an Englishman.³³ The Indian 'other' was reflected in Hancock's piece as well as the women's petition against tobacco. It was an important

distinction to make in order to keep the powerful image of the national body intact.

It was the blending of the English body with the foreign ‘other’ which truly frightened the nationalist population of England, as evidenced by the illustration below.³⁴ This image depicts Europeans smoking tobacco and drinking coffee with a Native American (far left) and a Turk (far right). Looking over the scene is a coat of arms, a distinctly European device in the 1600s. The typical coat of arms would be capped by a European-style helmet, but here it was replaced by a clearly non-European head smoking two pipes. The central shield is flanked by two coffee pitchers, similar to the one being held by the Native American. These two vessels are the source of the dark smoke billowing around the perimeter of the coat of arms; soot and smoke were strongly associated with both tobacco and coffee as part of the strategy to discredit them. This coat of arms was a powerful symbol of the growing fear of foreign influence on the English body and the weakening of the state.



The introduction of tobacco and coffee into early-modern England spurred debate over their qualities, a debate which was fueled by anxiety over the status of the English body. This discussion showed how the swelling of nationalism in the seventeenth century was matched with the rising principle of the national body. It was a populist idea in its nature, and it found its way into popular medical media, authored by the king, poets, protestors, and other individuals beyond the bounds of ‘professional’ healers.

The analysis above shows that the English public sphere was clearly concerned with the integrity of the English national body, but what made tobacco and coffee so dangerous? While the fear of cultural blending – that the use of foreign products somehow made the English body less English – was powerful, this was not the whole of the issue. The public was very much concerned with concrete effects of their diets on their bodies. This concern, however, reflected not only an interest in the maintenance of their bodies’ health, but the health of the state as well. Indeed, one of the major components of body politics is how the behavior of the citizen affects the fate of the nation.

The most frequently noted concern in the popular debate over tobacco and coffee was the products’ effects on human regeneration. The women who organized the public petitions blamed them for their husbands’ infertility. They said:

We can attribute to nothing more than the excessive use of [coffee], which...[has] crippled our more kind gallants, that they are become as impotent, as age, and as unfruitful as those [Arabian] deserts, whence that unhappy berry is said to be brought.³⁵

Again, the Englishwomen made a subtle attack on the foreignness of coffee, but here their primary concern is how the beverage has affected their men’s bodies. Tobacco endured similar criticism, as protestors argued:

I may say as likely to be got with child as any woman in England...yet this man cannot do the feat, and the reason why it is not done, I must clearly impute to his smoking that infernal Indian weed, which they call tobacco.³⁶

Activists based these claims on a combination of empiric observations and the best theories science had to offer. The leader of the petition against tobacco made her case known to the assembly; she stated that although she was as capable of “the work of generation” as any other

Englishwoman, she and her husband of fourteen years had only managed to produce one child. However, a neighboring couple, during nine years of marriage, birthed nine “lusty, brave children”. She attributed this observable difference to the poisonous qualities of tobacco, which her husband had smoked throughout their marriage, while the neighboring male had forever abstained.³⁷ Other women present chimed in with conventional medical wisdom, derived from Galenic principles. In both instances of protestation, as well as in many popular health almanacs, one of the primary expressed vexations against tobacco and coffee concerned their effects on regeneration.³⁸

These effects of tobacco and coffee were of course disputed, but even the rebuttals confirmed the public’s obsession over strong and plentiful regeneration. In response to the women’s protest against coffee, a group of male Londoners organized their own public petition to defend their new behaviors. These men said:

’Tis base adulterate wine and surcharges of Muddy Ale that enfeeble nature, makes a man as salacious as a goat, and yet as impotent as age, whereas coffee collects and settles the spirits, makes the erection more vigorous, the ejaculation more full, adds a spiritualesce to the sperm, and renders it more firm and suitable to the gusto of the womb.³⁹

When making a case for the merits of coffee, the male response did not downplay the importance of regeneration but held it as high as the original petitioners. The running theme in the protests and the counter-protests was attacking that which hindered procreation and glorifying that which promoted it.

In body politics, one of the most important duties of the national citizen was the generation of *new* national citizens through reproduction. The strong English nation was composed of strong English individuals, and the maintenance of this system was paramount. One of the women against coffee made this clear when she related the power of England to the capabilities of Englishmen to produce children. She claimed that in the Golden Age of England – when the nation was as powerful as it had ever been – “lusty lads” exceeding seven hundred years of age were perfectly capable of reproduction, while their husbands in their mere twenties and thirties were impotent.⁴⁰ This statement illustrated the connection between generation and the health of the state. When assessing the root motivations for these complaints, it is important to note that the whole of this exchange took place on a public stage in front of public officials. A modern skeptic might point out that the protestors might have been concerned with generation because more children

would increase the family's potential for wealth. This argument is illogical. If a family was suffering economically thanks to a lack of manpower, both the husband and the wife were affected equally, and the issue of eliminating his smoking habits was a private matter. However, if his and many males' inability to regenerate was hurting *society*, this was a public matter to be debated before public authority. The perception of these protestors was that it was a public matter, and it was hurting the English state.

Impotence was not the only topic important to the debaters. The defenders of coffee, males in this case, brought up another matter relating individual health to England's health by upholding the medicinal benefits of the product. These debates occurred in 1674, less than two decades after the English Civil War, and that conflict and period of English vulnerability still stood strongly in the minds of some citizens. The male defense of coffee read:

Why must innocent coffee be the object of your spleen? That harmless and healing liquor...at a time when brimmers of rebellion, and fanatic zeal had intoxicated the nation, and we wanted a drink at once to make us sober and merry.⁴¹

At this time, coffee was considered to be a depressant while alcohol, thanks to its tendency to lower inhibitions, was viewed as a stimulant. Here, the men looked back to the years of the civil war, labeling rebelliousness and disorder as toxins, which was a very important point. The phrase 'intoxicated the nation' revealed the conceptualized body of the English nation, poisoned by the reckless behavior and discontentedness of its components. The men identified coffee as the antidote to this affliction, calming revolutionary spirit and restoring the health of the English nation.

Conclusion

Public health media in seventeenth-century England served many purposes. It was considered an invaluable resource for families in a world of mysterious diseases and often unreachable professional care. While most popular advice was medically useless, the genre provided important illustrations of the popular conceptions of the body. In the context of the rise of European nationalism and political strife in England, public health media revealed the English population's strong investment in the concept of the national body. The popular outcries against and for tobacco and coffee on medical bases showed that

Englishmen and women were highly concerned with preserving the integrity of the English national body. The idea of the nationalized body has certainly not disappeared. Nazi Germany's eugenics experiments reflected a belief that the fitness or genetic strengths of the individual enhanced the fitness of the state. More recently, the temporary "freedom fries" fad in the United States showed that even the diet can still be nationalized, if only at a small scale. These phenomena were inheritors of the legacy of body politics, a theory which was just beginning to unfold in tumultuous political environment in Early-Modern England.

¹ Brian Levack et al., *The West; Encounters and Transformations*, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 367.

² Barbara Duden, *The Woman Beneath the Skin*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 51-53.

³ Ibid., 74.

⁴ Roy Porter, *Disease, Medicine and Society in England 1550-1860* (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1987), 13.

⁵ Louise H. Curth, *English Almanacs, Astrology and Popular Medicine: 1550-1700*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 20-25.

⁶ Ibid., 26.

⁷ Harold J. Cook "Good Advice and Little Medicine: The Professional Authority of Early Modern Physicians," *The Journal of British Studies*, 33 no. 1 (1994), 4.

⁸ Porter, 18.

⁹ Curth, 118.

¹⁰ Steven Shapin, "How to Eat Like a Gentleman," in *Right Living*, ed. Carl Rosenberg, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 21.

¹¹ Curth, 57.

¹² Ibid., 68.

¹³ *The Women's Complaint Against Tobacco or, an Excellent Help to Multiplication*, (London, 1675), 2-3.

¹⁴ Porter, 21.

¹⁵ Ibid., 500-501, 504.

¹⁶ Sean Kelsey, "The Death of Charles I," in *The Historical Journal*, 45 no. 4 (2002), 734.

¹⁷ Levack, 502.

¹⁸ Ibid., 397.

¹⁹ S. D. Smith "Accounting for Taste: British Coffee Consumption in Historical Perspective," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 27 no. 2 (1996), 184-185.

²⁰ John Hancock, *The Touchstone or, Trial of Tobacco*, (London: 1676).

²¹ Ibid., page 3 of foreword.

²² Porter, 8.

²³ Hancock, page 1-2 of foreword.

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- ²⁴ James I of England, “A Counterblast to Tobacco,” in *The Touchstone or, Trial of Tobacco*, ed. John Hancock (London: 1676), 3-4.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 10.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 12.
- ²⁷ *The City-Wifes Petition, Against Coffee*, (London: 1674), 1.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 2.
- ²⁹ “A Broad-Side Against Coffee or, the Marriage of the Turk,” in *The Touchstone or, Trial of Tobacco*, ed. John Hancock, (London: 1676), 58.
- ³⁰ *The City-Wifes Petition*, 3. It should be noted that the term ‘foreign liquors’ is referring to coffee, at it was included in the category of liquor during this period.
- ³¹ The primary sources used for this essay all used the term ‘Indian’ to describe Native Americans, and to avoid confusion I will follow suit.
- ³² James I of England, 2. ‘Adust’ is a largely obsolete word by modern standards, meaning ‘sun burnt’ or ‘dried up by heat’ in this context.
- ³³ Ibid., 8.
- ³⁴ Hancock, 63.
- ³⁵ *The City-Wifes Petition*, 2.
- ³⁶ *The Women’s Complaint Against Tobacco or, an Excellent Help to Multiplication*, 1.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 1.
- ³⁸ Thomas Tryon, *Health’s Grand Preservative: or the Women’s Best Doctor*, (London, 1682), 9-11.
- ³⁹ *The Men’s Answer to the Women’s Petition Against Coffee*, (London: 1674), 4.
- ⁴⁰ *The City-Wifes Petition*, 1. The Golden Age of England referred to the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, during the latter half of the sixteenth century.
- ⁴¹ *Men’s Answer*, 2.

Divisions in American Jewry Between the 1880s and 1930s

Stephanie Schiffman

Between 1881 and 1914, over two million Jews from Eastern Europe made the trek from their homeland to America's distant but promising shores. This mass migration stemmed not only from the pogroms, but also from hardships due to the placement of legal restrictions upon Jews, the worsening of economic and social conditions in these countries, and the overpopulation of Jews in these regions.¹ The influx of Eastern European Jews greatly altered the composition of the American Jewish population, and great strain emerged in the relationship between the well-established and acculturated Central European Jews and the newly arrived Eastern European Jews. Division within American Jewry was perpetuated by the wide range of religiosity that separated the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, as well as by the considerable variation in opinion amongst American Jews as to the meaning and implications of Zionism. Differences in ethnic and cultural background, socioeconomic status, loco-regional practice, generational practice, and religious affiliation all served to foment divide between American Jews between the 1880s and 1930s.

The mass exodus of Jews from Eastern Europe, specifically Russia, to the United States gave birth to an unfriendly relationship between acculturated Jews and immigrant Jews in the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century. Not only was there conflict between these two groups, but new arrivals clashed amongst themselves, as “the Russian hates the Lithuanian, the Lithuanian is an enemy of the Pole; they unite against the Rumanian...”² Social, economic, and political differences separated Eastern European Jews from Central European Jews. “The German Jews were the rich; the Russian Jews the poor. The German Jews were the dispensers of charity; the Russians Jews were the receivers of it.”³ Typically, Eastern Europeans Jews worked establishments owned by Central European Jews. As immigrants became part of organized Jewish trade unions, however, they conflicted with Central European employers’ interests. The two groups inevitably competed against one another, and as a result, the Eastern European rivals were fired.⁴

Central European Jews were the benefactors of Eastern European immigrants, making the two groups very distant socially. Their relationship was inevitably unequal, as Eastern European Jews had come

to depend on Central European Jews. The “Uptowners” pitied their “Downtown” brethren and formed numerous charities such as the Hebrew Emigrant Aid Society and Hebrew Institute to assist and Americanize Jewish immigrants. One immigrant commented that “in the philanthropic institutions of our aristocratic German Jews you see beautiful offices, desks, all decorated but strict and angry faces. Every poor is questioned like a criminal, is looked down upon...”⁵ Though Central European Jews tried to help, Eastern European immigrants resented the fact that they were treated as charity projects and did not feel comfortable with Jews they found so utterly different from themselves.⁶

The terms “Uptown” and “Downtown” Jews, as Central European and Eastern European Jews were called, reveal how these two groups were separated physically as well as socially.⁷ Confined to cramped tenements overrun by bedbugs and roaches, with no windows, hot running water, or bathroom, Eastern European Jews lived in what “resembled an African Jungle.”⁸ Uptown Jews, however, had much more spacious and comfortable surroundings. Acculturated and immigrant Jews not only lived separately, but also spoke and dressed dissimilarly. While Eastern European Jews kept Yiddish alive, Central European spoke English and viewed Yiddish as “piggish jargon.”⁹ Central European Jews viewed these differences substantiated proof of the cultural backwardness and un-American nature of Eastern Europeans.

Fear was pervasive among Central European Jews because they considered themselves well assimilated into society and did not want Jewish newcomers to threaten this. With the influx of Eastern European immigrants, the Eastern European Jewish minority grew rapidly, leading to overt anti-Semitic sentiment from the Central European Jews. At the University of Wisconsin, the label of New York Jew became synonymous with Eastern European Jew. Assimilated Midwestern Jews at the University identified New York Jews as “clannish” and claimed that they were “making themselves obnoxious on campus and in classes by their loud dress and manner,” showing that even along regional lines there was a divide among American Jews.¹⁰

In an effort to avoid discrimination, acculturated Jews wished to be perceived as white Americans, and thus they distanced themselves as much as possible from African Americans and even from less assimilated Jews. They were embarrassed by Eastern European Jews who were concerned more about Jewish self-definition than about being perceived as white. Because the Eastern European immigrants did not identify with a white Americans, it was more common for them to act friendly towards blacks.¹¹ However, Eastern European immigrants to the South and their children were far more concerned with their self-image. Upon

immigrating to the South, they encountered a region of America with few Jews and with well-entrenched racial segregation. Consequently, the desire to assimilate was greater and more immediate. Children of Southern immigrants desperately wanted to fit into the white American culture. Only as time went on and the immigrants in the North moved out of the ghettos and into mixed neighborhoods in the 1920s did the rest of the Eastern European Jews realize the importance in America of being considered white.¹²

Zionism as both a cultural belief and a political movement was unquestionably one of the most troublesome issues American Jews faced between the 1880s and 1930s. Inciting much controversy and debate, Zionism divided synagogues as well as families.¹³ For the most part, Eastern European Jews “sympathized with Zionism’s goals” and saw Zion as an answer to anti-Semitism.¹⁴ They identified with the yearning to return to the promised homeland and viewed Zion as a utopian goal for the future. Though only totaling 12,000 Jews in 1912, the Federation of American Zionists showed Eastern European Jews’ positive outlook on and acceptance of Zionism.¹⁵ Like many of the Jewish immigrants, Orthodox and emerging Conservative Jews were in favor of Zionism. For the Orthodox, Zion was an unfulfilled dream and a vision of a promising future for Jews as a people and a nation. Mizrachi, the Religious Zionist organization, held a convention in America in 1914 with a hope to reinforce Jewish life both in America and abroad and connect “traditional Judaism” with the Zionist movement. Conservative forerunners Solomon Schechter and Mordecai Kaplan believed that Zionism would revive and strengthen Judaism. While Schechter asserted that Zionism was to be “the great bulwark against assimilation,” Kaplan stated “the fate of Judaism (was) bound up with the success of Zionism.”¹⁶

Some prominent Jewish leaders, such as Louis Brandeis, were actively involved in promoting Zionism. Though Brandeis was relatively non-observant, the successful lawyer and friend of Woodrow Wilson used his stature to show that there was no contradiction between Zionism and American patriotism. Most importantly, Brandeis brought Zionism much prestige.¹⁷ Brandeis helped Zionism became a “civil religion” for followers, “synthesizing their Progressive ideals with their hitherto somewhat latent Jewish attachments.”¹⁸ However, though immigrants were initially overjoyed with Brandeis’ help, they became disenchanted with his Americanized version of Zionism, as it overlooked the “Jewish component” and Yiddishkeit that they found central to the movement.¹⁹

On the other hand, most acculturated Central European Jews proclaimed Judaism as solely a religious faith rather than a race or peoplehood. Unlike Eastern European Jews who had experienced a great

deal of anti-Semitism in Europe, Jews firmly established in America experienced little to no discrimination, with anti-Semitism being an “exception rather than the rule,” making Zionism seem unnecessary.²⁰ Central European Jews had come to see themselves as Americans, and did not want to risk their hard earned status in America by becoming a “hyphenated” citizen by expressing dual loyalties.²¹ Thus, for those of the Reform movement, including the majority of the Central European Jews, Zionism was considered an “anathema.”²² Reformers, as noted in the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, considered America to be Zion and Washington to be Jerusalem for Jews desiring a permanent residence.^{23 24} Furthermore, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations produced a resolution in 1898 explicitly declaring Zion as “a precious possession of the past” and America as the true Jewish homeland.²⁵ Nevertheless, it is important to remember that there were Central European Jews split along religious branch lines as well as ideological splits in the Reform party. In fact, Reformers in favor of Zionism defended the movement using strictly American terminology to show that while they supported a homeland for Jews, they were indeed faithful to America.²⁶

During the interwar years, however, a younger generation of Reformers including many children of Eastern European immigrants began to associate with and adhere to Zionism. In 1930, a survey of students at Hebrew Union College showed that the vast majority of future Reform rabbis in America (ninety-one percent) held a positive or neutral view towards Zionism.²⁷ New Reform leaders, such as Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, came out in favor of Zionism and helped disseminate the necessity of a Jewish state for the “downtrodden and oppressed”. In 1920, Rabbi Wise helped reinvigorate the American Jewish Congress. The American Jewish Congress stood in opposition to the American Jewish Committee, an anti-Zionist organization, and called for Jewish national rights in Europe in Palestine. Following suit, and in the wake of Nazi anti-Semitism, the Columbus Platform of 1937 strayed away from the anti-Zionist position taken in the Pittsburgh Platform, declaring Jews as a people with a “historic task to cooperate with all men in the establishment of the kingdom of God”, rather than solely as a faith.²⁸

Divisions along religious lines among American Jews can be seen most prominently in the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1920s, a new generation of Jews had grown up on American soil. Judging the Orthodox institutions to which their parents belonged “completely foreign,” young Jews sought a more modern and Americanized version of their religion that still embodied Orthodox ideals. In American society, it became almost impossible for Jews to live up to Orthodox expectations. Simply buying kosher meat was a difficult task, as frauds in the meat industry “abandoned piety for profit.”²⁹ As a result, a new

form of Orthodoxy emerged from immigrant Orthodoxy that was more relaxed and embraced modernity. With sermons in the vernacular, more attention to decorum, a hazan, and new architectural synagogue designs, American Orthodoxy gained respectability in the eyes of many who still desired to preserve “the core of traditional tefillah and Orthodoxy’s understanding of time and seating configurations.”³⁰ In the face of Agudath ha-Rabbanim, the rightmost wing of Orthodoxy formed in 1902, young Israel attempted to disseminate this modernized version of Orthodoxy to the Jewish youth.³¹ The initiators of the movement were disenchanted with Stephen Wise’s liberalism as witnessed in the Free Synagogue and worked to counteract this “threat to downtown orthodoxy.”³² Additionally, the American Yeshiva, founded in 1928, emphasized both Jewish and secular education, further showing the Americanization and modernization of the American Orthodox movement.³³

The severance of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism began very early in the twentieth century under the influence of Solomon Schechter. In America, Schechter became leader of the Jewish Theological Seminary, reorganized the institution, and endorsed a “synthesis of tradition and modernity.”³⁴ He recognized problems with Reform and Orthodox Judaism and advocated an Orthodox Judaism that would accept “change and development of accommodation to new surroundings.”³⁵ However, Conservative Judaism only became recognizably separate from Orthodox Judaism during the interwar years. Conflicting interests on issues such as mixed seating and “the anchored wife” pulled the two sects of Judaism in opposite directions.³⁶ Divisions emerged within the Conservative movement as well. Mordecai Kaplan, founder of Reconstructionist Judaism, wanted to “reconstruct” Judaism in order to make the religion more accommodating for American Jews, exemplified by his synagogue-center innovation.³⁷ ³⁸ Other Conservatives, however, were in favor of preserving tradition, demonstrating the fact that even after the Conservative and Orthodox branches of Judaism parted ways, the Conservative movement found itself fragmented.

As Conservative and Orthodox Judaism each consolidated as branches of Judaism and gained more adherents, the Reform movement felt the need to redefine itself to attract more members. Reformers, under the influence of Mordecai Kaplan, began referring to Judaism as a civilization, rather than just a religion. Emanuel Gamoran believed that Reform Jews should be versed in traditional Jewish customs and ceremonies.³⁹ Traditional Jewish practices, such as the bar mitzvah, were being brought back into Reform Judaism in order to gain Eastern European adherents. The Columbus Platform recognized Judaism as a

faith as well as an ethnicity and solidified Zionism as a newly Reform creed.⁴⁰ Consequently, Reform Jews were able to consolidate their need for both a religious faith and sense of peoplehood.

Between the 1880s and 1930s the division among American Jews was astonishing. As Eastern European Jewish immigrants settled into America, their cultural differences from Central European Jews polarized the two groups. Political issues such as Zionism further separated America Jews and became a popular topic of debate. Orthodoxy and Reform, as the prior two most prominent branches of Judaism, cracked as a Conservative movement emerged, the overarching label of Orthodox Judaism broke into American and Traditional factions, and the Reform movement reinvented a definition of what it meant to be Jewish. Though these divisions plagued the idea of a unified American Jewish population in the early twentieth century, the ascend of the Nazi Party in Germany forced American Jews together to unite against the rising wave of anti-Semitism and to confront the harsh reality of the Holocaust.

¹ Jonathan D. Sarna, *American Judaism: A History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 201.

² Ibid., 157.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Moses Rischin, “Germans versus Russians,” *The Jewish American Experience*, ed. Jonathan D. Sarna, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 140.

⁵ Ibid., 145.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Israel Friedlander, “The Division Between German and Russian Jews (1915),” *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Paul Mendes- Flohr, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 486.

⁸ Eric L. Goldstein, *The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 63.

⁹ Rischin, 139-140.

¹⁰ Jonathan Pollack, “Jewish Problems: Eastern and Western Jewish Identities in Conflict at the University of Wisconsin, 1919-1941,” *American Jewish History*, 89 no. 2 (2001), 4.

¹¹ Goldstein, 98.

¹² Ibid., 138.

¹³ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 203.

¹⁴ Melvin I Urofsky, “Zionism: An American Experience,” *The American Jewish Experience*, ed. Jonathan D. Sarna, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 248.

¹⁵ Ibid.

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- ¹⁶ Mordecai Kaplan, "The Reconstruction of Judaism (August 4, 1920)," *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Paul Mendes- Flohr, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 500.
- ¹⁷ Urofsky, 248.
- ¹⁸ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 205.
- ¹⁹ Urofsky, 254.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 247.
- ²¹ Ibid., 249.
- ²² Sarna, *American Judaism*, 202.
- ²³ Friedlander, 486.
- ²⁴ Conference of Reform Rabbis, "The Pittsburgh Platform (1885)," *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Paul Mendes- Flohr, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 468-469.
- ²⁵ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 202.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 203.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 250.
- ²⁸ "The Columbus Platform (1937)," *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Paul Mendes- Flohr, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 518.
- ²⁹ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 162.
- ³⁰ Gurock, 305.
- ³¹ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 193.
- ³² David Kaufman, "Shul: The Orthodox Synagogue in Transition," *Shul with a Pool: The "Synagogue Center" in American Jewish History*, (Hanover: Brandeis University Press/University Press of New England, 1999) 201.
- ³³ Bernard Revel, "The American Yeshiva (1926)," *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Paul Mendes- Flohr, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 506-507.
- ³⁴ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 188.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 189.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 240-241.
- ³⁷ Kaplan, 499-502.
- ³⁸ Kaufman, 204.
- ³⁹ Sarna, *American Judaism*, 251.
- ⁴⁰ Columbus Platform, 517-518.

Domestic Morale: Defeatism and Democracy

Carly Schlosberg

An excerpt from “Saving the Children: the Children’s Overseas Reception Board, 1940,” a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Honors Program in History in the College of Arts & Sciences.

On Thursday, June 20, 1940, a short press announcement appeared in Britain’s morning papers introducing the Children’s Overseas Reception Board. Outlining the proposed evacuation scheme, the notification advised all parents interested in sending their sons and daughters across the oceans to the safety of the White Dominions – Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa – as well as the United States, to make direct inquiries at the Board’s headquarters, 45 Berkeley Street, W1. Only days earlier, Geoffrey Shakespeare, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to the Dominions, had requisitioned the space, ironically, the former premises of the travel agency Messrs Thomas Cook, and hastily arranged for a group of women, led by Mrs. Thelma Cazalet M.P., to interview parents and provide additional information about the Scheme.

Nobody was prepared for the scale and speed of the public’s response; by ten o’clock over three thousand people had gathered, forcing the police to marshal the crowd into an ever-lengthening queue.¹ By June 25, the Board had already received twenty-eight thousand inquiries, and while the staff now numbered one hundred, the Board was forced to replace personal visits with written applications.² Over the following weeks, mail vans brought in such a steady avalanche of letters that Shakespeare had to hire an all-night staff to sort through the mounds of paper; soon, the Board had 620 staff members. Before deciding to suspend further entries on July 4, the Board was more than inundated with applications: in only fifteen days, 211,448 had been received. While the public undoubtedly embraced the Scheme, Prime Minister Winston Churchill wholeheartedly believed that it “should be sternly discouraged.”³ On July 1, Churchill told his War Cabinet that the Scheme’s “spirit” was “entirely contrary to the true facts of the position,” underlining that Britain was by no means anticipating the need for the evacuation of significant numbers of children from her shores as the mass evacuation design would suggest.⁴ Resolved that the Board’s evacuation plans encouraged pessimism, the Prime Minister was and

remained in strict opposition to the Scheme throughout the duration of the war. Nevertheless, the Scheme marched forward in a climate of unstoppable domestic politics as the government insisted on providing children of all classes the opportunity to seek refuge overseas, a privilege previously reserved for children of the well-to-do.

Like many others, Churchill considered the Scheme for the evacuation of “very large numbers of children” defeatist and was certain that both domestic and world opinion would be adversely affected if Britain were thought to be “admitting her sense of territorial insecurity to such a degree that she was dispatching her children to the Dominions.” The Prime Minister continually emphasized that he would have preferred that citizens seek safety at home, staying put and digging themselves more deeply into their shelters. To rush to safety elsewhere, he exclaimed, “smacked of ‘rats-and-sinking-ships.’”⁵ Consequently, upon learning that arrangements had been made for Jaquetta Digby, the sister of his daughter-in-law, to be sent to Canada, Churchill glaringly remarked that, “No relative of mine is going to run away.”⁶ Clementine Churchill was likewise frantic when she discovered that the Prime Minister’s five-year-old great-niece Sally Churchill was also to leave for Canada. Even though Sally was but a distant relative, Mrs. Churchill spoke with Sally’s mother and, “Although the child was on the point of embarkation... Clementine insisted [to the point of having the girl’s passport withheld] that in no circumstances could she be allowed to depart.”⁷

Accordingly, when the Government first sanctioned the Interdepartmental Committee’s proposal on June 17, the Prime Minister did not confer his approval. In fact, as the War Cabinet was examining the Committee’s report that summer day, Churchill continued to object to the Scheme, particularly stressing his concerns that the Board’s mere existence could be construed as panic action on the part of the Government. But when a messenger hurriedly interrupted the discussion to present the Prime Minister with a note, the attention of the Cabinet quickly shifted. The note disclosed shocking news – that France had finally capitulated. Although no decision had been reached on the recommendations of the Committee, Shakespeare excused himself from the Cabinet to allow the nation’s leaders to concentrate on the more urgent matters of war strategy. Much to the Under-Secretary’s surprise, the following day the Cabinet minutes reported that not only was the proposal for the Scheme approved, but that it was reached before news of the French cease-fire arrived at Westminster.⁸ While it is possible that Churchill acquiesced in a moment of aberration, his sharp disapproval of the Scheme suggests that the decision instead might have rested elsewhere; perhaps the Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey, simply

entered a wrong minute, or more boldly, consciously made the decision to introduce the Scheme himself, “ticking” the paper and giving the go-ahead without Churchill’s consent.⁹

The Prime Minister was certainly not alone in his conviction that overseas evacuation was fatalistic and even unpatriotic. While both the government and the Royal household urged the King and Queen to send the two princesses, Elizabeth and Margaret Rose, to British Columbia’s Hatley Castle, Queen Elizabeth refused, remarking that, “They could not go without me, I could not go without the King – and the King will never leave.” In a display of unwavering commitment to their country, the Royal Family remained in England alongside their subjects, King George VI urging his nation to “stand calm, firm, and united in this time of trial;” and when, like many others, their home, Buckingham Palace was bombed, the Queen joked that at long last she could “look the East End in the face.”¹⁰ Even though the King and Queen retreated to Windsor Castle at night, the public lauded the Royal Couple for refusing to desert their country. Britons likewise respected the men, women, boys, and girls who remained within the country’s borders, while disparaging those who “cosseted in Canada or North America.”¹¹ In October 1940, a columnist in the magazine, *The Lady*, declared that, “We want a new generation of English men and women... not cosmopolitans who have lost the conviction that one’s country is something by which one stands or falls.” The journalist argued that children are not “charming pets to be kept away from real life,” but rather, “British people, and they may be better British people because of their patriotism being tested in their early years.”¹² For many, allegiance to the nation became easily demonstrable; the public esteemed those remaining at home and enduring the hardships of the war, while lampooning those who fled.

Whether defeatist or unpatriotic, evacuation was defended by others anxious to protect the wellbeing of the nation’s children. As war continued and the threat of German invasion appeared more and more imminent, the Government began designating what had been previously “neutral” and “reception” areas as “evacuation” zones and ordering the domestic evacuation of more and more schoolchildren. As late as July 15, 1940, *The New York Times* reported that in anticipation of a German invasion, the British Government was not only evacuating 8,500 children from the southeastern coast but also removing 3,000 London children who had already been relocated to the coastal town of Worthing, and transferring them to “safer places inland.”¹³ Almost no town in Britain seemed invulnerable; the prospect of the nation’s children finding refuge overseas and beginning a new life, removed from the ravages of war, therefore became increasingly attractive.

While civil evacuation schemes would indeed shelter children from the atrocities of war, some insisted that they would also benefit the nation's collective war effort. In a letter to the editor of *The Times* printed in May of 1938, when the possibility of evacuation had long been under discussion, a Mr. John A. Ryle wrote:

The relief of mind to parents and the improved freedom of action left to the adult inhabitants of cities by a scheme of this kind would provide a contribution to defence, an inspiration to trust, and a counteractant to panic, the value of which can scarcely be overestimated.¹⁴

Ryle suggested that not only would evacuation lessen parents' concerns for their young ones but it would benefit the national defense; without having to tend to their children, men and women would be freed to more wholeheartedly serve their country, whether in battle overseas or in a local munitions factory. In a time of crisis, particularly a food crisis, overseas evacuation would perhaps have even greater benefits; in a meeting of the War Cabinet on June 17, 1940, Anthony Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio summed up this position when noting that, "if this country were to become an 'island fortress,' it would be desirable to have fewer mouths to feed."¹⁵ Months earlier, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., had similarly expressed this position in a letter to the Prime Minister. Encouraging Churchill to approach the United States and "get them to take and keep our useless mouths," Wedgwood wrote that, "Their conscience would make them consent; at worst the race would survive; they would be by far the best propaganda for armed help."¹⁶ Although Wedgwood was largely rebuked for his comment on preserving "the race," his premise, later expressed by Greenwood, was nonetheless recognized as an unintended yet advantageous consequence of evacuation. Even as late as July 18, Mr. Cocks of Broxtowe declared the evacuation of children overseas an "important factor in the military defence of Britain."¹⁷ Prime Minister Churchill, however, responded sharply to Mr. Cocks' comment, again stating that he did not believe that a large-scale exodus should take place, nor did he think that the military situation necessitated "such a proceeding."¹⁸

It was not uncommon for the wealthy and influential, including a number of government officials, to privately arrange for the evacuation of their own children across the high seas; although shipping space was certainly a limiting factor, the Government constructed no additional barriers to prevent their flight. Over the course of the war, some six thousand children were evacuated privately to Canada alone; from June 1940 to the end of 1942, 11,309 children were privately sent overseas for

safety, traveling to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States.¹⁹

While evacuation might have been the prerogative of those who could make the proper arrangements, the mass departure of these wealthy children stirred considerable debate in Parliament – both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords – where countless politicians viewed such evacuations as wounding the nation’s already fragile morale. On July 17, 1940, James Griffiths, Member for Llanelli, rose before the Commons and condemned the evacuation of the privileged. Griffiths implored that such action must be halted because “Class distinctions are odious at all times, but in times like this, the morale of the country is likely to be broken if the common people feel that they are being left to face it all, while others are going away.”²⁰ To preserve the unity of the nation, he urged his colleagues to set an example by sharing in Britain’s common fate, insisting that the children of all members of Parliament remain in the country. In so doing, Griffiths hoped that the country would not simply allow “the children of the poor to stand all risks.” Griffiths was well received by his peers; Major Braithwaite of Buckrose followed the Member for Llanelli by concurring with his assertion that class distinctions in this matter “ought to be ruthlessly stamped out,” as did Mr. Kenneth Lindsay of Kilmarnock. All too similarly, speaking before the Lords only six days later, Lord Marley remarked that, “if any children are going, poverty should not be a bar to the parents having a right to opt whether their children should go or not, because we are in a national emergency, in which we are all in the same boat.”²¹ Demanding that there should be complete equality “in this matter,” the statements of Griffiths and Lindsay thereby make it clear that both Houses sought a balanced migration for rich and poor alike.

Accordingly, the Government scheme was deliberately established as a democratic measure to afford working class children an opportunity previously reserved for the well-to-do. While the Prime Minister was very much opposed to the Scheme, he did reluctantly acquiesce to it on July 10 – after a Labour M.P. suggested that should the government not evacuate children from the country, the children of the wealthy should be prevented from leaving Great Britain. Churchill made it clear that he saw no other solution but to conclude that the Scheme could not be stopped. Had the government closed a scheme which would have enabled the poor to participate, the Prime Minister remarked that, “It will probably look as if those who should be the natural leaders of the people have run away like rats from a sinking ship; that there is still a loophole for those who have money to go, but there is no chance for the poorer classes.”²² No matter how strong his opposition was to what he

considered a wholly defeatist scheme, Churchill was forced to accept the egalitarian plan.

In a further display of classlessness, the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Reception of Children Overseas recommended in June of 1940 that because shipping space was so limited, parents able to make their own arrangements for the evacuation of their children be required to obtain the permission of the Children's Overseas Reception Board. While the Board acknowledged that this suggestion was well intentioned, it quickly found that it could not take responsibility for all these children because not only was obtaining such permission "unduly drastic" but the unwieldy number of requests made it "administratively impracticable."²³ The War Cabinet agreed; the Right Honorable Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Lord President of the Council, preferred to "overcome the difficulty of class distinction" by announcing that there would be a limited amount of accommodation for children, both first class as well as third.²⁴ Still, when a number of schools pressed for permission for their pupils to continue their education at "sister" schools in Canada within the framework of the Scheme, Shakespeare demonstrated his commitment against granting special facilities to a privileged few by emphatically opposing their appeals; the Under-Secretary was resolute in his determination not to appear defeatist in any way, and while he was prepared to allow individual children to leave Britain's shores he was not prepared to permit this for institutions. On July 2, 1940, speaking about the possible transfer of schools, the Under-Secretary therefore announced before the House of Commons that, if adopted, this policy, "would militate against the spirit of resolution and tenacity with which we intend to prosecute the war to its final conclusion."²⁵ Under no circumstances was Shakespeare willing to relax his commitment to balanced migration to allow for such a transfer.

In order to accomplish their "democratic" goal of a balanced migration, the Board's selectors paid careful attention to ensuring that the schoolchildren chosen constituted a representative sample of Britons. At the outset, applicants were divided into two categories: class A, consisting of children at grant-aided schools, and class B, children at private schools. The Advisory Council quickly resolved to select the ratio of children from both categories in accordance with the proportion of children attending these schools in the population, ultimately concluding that for every ten children accepted from "A" schools in England, one child from a "B" school was to be accepted. In the case of Wales, the Council settled on a ratio of 16:1 – for every sixteen children accepted from "A" schools, one would be accepted from a "B" School – while for Scotland, 50:1.²⁶ By utilizing this system, the C.O.R.B. hoped to ensure that a representative cross-section of the nation's classes would

be chosen for evacuation, making it impossible for any impression to gain ground that class distinction was operating during wartime.²⁷ While the Board was primarily concerned with selecting children of different economic means, “care” was also taken to ensure the selection of a “due proportion of each sex and of the different ages.”²⁸

To eradicate any semblance of “privilege” in the evacuation program, it was imperative that the government scheme be affordable; therefore, while all parents were asked to contribute towards the maintenance of their children overseas, the Board established separate scales of payment for children attending non grant-aided schools and for children attending grant-aided schools. In the first case, the C.O.R.B. fixed scales according to the average school fees paid in 1939, which amounted to twenty shillings per child weekly. This sum, however, was later reduced to ten shillings per child, and in certain circumstances, nine shillings was even accepted without investigation.²⁹ In the latter case, the Board asked for the same contributions demanded in the domestic evacuation scheme: nine shillings a week, although six shillings was also accepted in “full discharge of their obligation,” without inquiry into means. Hoping that monetary issues would not preclude any child from participating in the Scheme, the C.O.R.B also made provisions that would allow the Assistance Board to assess payment levels for those unable to contribute even the minimum of six shillings; in fact, ten percent of the parents of class A children paid less than six shillings, and some even paid nothing.³⁰ Additionally, while the Board did ask parents of class B children to pay for both inland transport and sea passages, £15 for Canada and South Africa and £22 for Australia and New Zealand, the government paid all transport charges for children from grant-aided schools.³¹ Once overseas, the United Kingdom maintained children on the basis of a flat rate grant for each child, irrespective of the actual contributions of individual parents, “to discourage firmly any idea that a parent by remitting money... could secure preferential treatment for a child or that any preference is given under the scheme to parents who are able to pay the whole or the greater part of the cost.”³² In doing so, no child would be at a disadvantage because of the inability of his or her parents to pay the full weekly contribution (although in practice, the foster parents in the Dominions covered these maintenance costs and contributions from Great Britain went towards paying for medical expenses and other special expenditures which were unreasonable for foster parents to bear). Through establishing the machinery by which children from all classes could be sent overseas and making arrangements for the children’s welfare and maintenance once in the Dominions, the Board therefore hoped that a cross-section of British society could truly be represented under their scheme.

Children were indeed selected from average, normal families; in total, 2,606 children who arrived safely overseas were in Category A; only 58 were in Category B.³³ A close examination of 1,074 C.O.R.B. children's record cards reveals that over 460 of the children had fathers engaged in manual occupations, including "labourers," "dockers," "miners," "bus drivers," "trolley bus drivers," "engineers, tool-makers, fitters and electrical workers," and "clerks."³⁴ Fewer were in the higher salaried occupations of "doctors," "dentists," "ministers of religion," "architects," and "accountants;" 22 of these "professional" fathers sent only 36 of the 1,074 children, while 26 "schoolmaster" parents sent only 35 children. In fact, in his memoir, Shakespeare recounted that, "On one occasion I remember an ill-disposed woman, watching a party of eighty children pressing up the gangway of a large ship. 'Look!' she cried. 'There go the children of the rich!'" Nevertheless, the Under-Secretary proudly recorded that, "In point of fact these children were all working-class children from some of the worst slums of an overcrowded city."³⁵ In contrast, the 11,309 children privately evacuated to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States had, for the most part, "professional" fathers: children with ties to the British Medical Association were taken in by doctors of the Canadian and Australian Medical Associations, children of professors at Oxford University were welcomed by families at the University of Toronto, and a number of children of employees at American firms such as Ford, Hoover, Kodak, and Warner Brothers, with offices in Britain, were sent to their parents' colleagues in the United States.³⁶

The Board did, however, impose specific restrictions on certain groups, although none of these restrictions were ever publicly admitted.³⁷ While the Inter-Departmental Committee that first assessed the possibility of overseas evacuation in June 1940 advised that in so far as the overseas countries were prepared to receive Allied refugee children, these children "should take their proper place within the scheme," and even recommended that the "restriction of the scheme to school attendance would be waived in their cases," the Board resolved not to select any of the nearly 9000 requests to evacuate refugee children.³⁸ Likewise, the Board also decided not to select any "coloured children," defending both these decisions "in view of the overwhelming number of application of British children and the preference of the Dominions for these." The Dominions further restricted the admittance of children of two religious groups: at most, twenty-five percent of those going to any Dominion at one time could be Roman Catholic, ten percent of those going to Australia could be Jewish, and, unless nominated by hosts,³⁹ Jewish children could not be selected for the Union of South Africa. These limitations indeed functioned to limit the heterogeneity of the

children selected. The Board's definition of a "cross-section" of society was therefore restricted primarily to a "cross-section" of classes, with the C.O.R.B. additionally taking into account the sex and age of the children.

As the country was being enveloped in war, the government found it insufficient to simply *consider* domestic opinion on evacuation; instead, they needed to *prioritize* domestic opinion. Since children of the well-to-do were evacuating the country in large numbers, in order to maintain any sense of class parity, the government needed to provide this opportunity for all classes of children. As such, although Churchill was very much reluctant to support the Children's Overseas Reception Board, the government found it prudent to introduce the Scheme nonetheless. Even if the Scheme were to be defeatist, the statistics show that the Government answered the people's demand; although on a limited scale, the Board was successful in evacuating children of a cross-section of society, bringing a privilege once reserved for only children of the privileged to all children of Great Britain. Given contemporary attitudes, however, the implementation of the Scheme could hardly be regarded as nondiscriminatory; the Scheme was designed for white, Anglican, British children, although white, Anglican, British children of any class.

¹ Michael Fethney, *The Absurd and the Brave: CORB – the True Account of the British Government's World War II Evacuation of Children Overseas*, (Sussex: The Book Guild Ltd., 1990), 43.

² "Sending Children to the Dominions," *The Times*, June 25, 1940.

³ "Meeting of the War Cabinet," July 1, 1940, CAB/65/189.

⁴ "Meeting of the War Cabinet," July 1, 1940, CAB/65/189.

⁵ Ruth Inglis, *The Children's War: Evacuation, 1939-1945*, (London: William Collins Sons &Co. Ltd., 1989), 106.

⁶ Quoted in Jessica Mann, *Out of Harm's Way: the Wartime Evacuation of Children from Britain*, (London: Headline Book Publishing, 2006), 66.

⁷ Mary Soames, *Clementine Churchill: Revised and Updated Edition*, (London: Doubleday, 2002), 330.

⁸ Penny Elain Starns and Martin L. Parsons, "Against Their Will: The Use and Abuse of British Children During the Second World War," in *Children and War*, ed. James Alan Marten and Robert Coles, (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 269.

⁹ Fethney, 38-39.

¹⁰ "Queen Mother: 1900-2002, The War Years," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/obituaries/queen_mother/the_war_years.stm.

¹¹ Even as recently as 1990, wartime evacuees continued to be belittled. During a debate on the War Crimes Bill, Lord Shawcross referred disdainfully to MPs critical of Nazi atrocities if they "had been lucky enough to have a childhood cosseted in Canada or North America;" quoted in Mann, 37.

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- ¹² Quoted in Mann, 38.
- ¹³ "Child Refugee Aid Offered in Britain," *The New York Times*, July 15, 1940.
- ¹⁴ "The Evacuation of Children: A Weapon Against Panic," *The Times*, May 9, 1938.
- ¹⁵ "Meeting of the War Cabinet," June 17, 1940, CAB/65/7/65.
- ¹⁶ "Parliamentary Report: Children for Dominions," *The Scotsman*, July 3, 1940; Quoted in Michael Henderson. *See You After the Duration: the Story of British Evacuees to North America in World War II*. (Baltimore: PublishAmerica, 2004), 34.
- ¹⁷ Quoted in "Child Evacuation Overseas: Mr. Churchill's Statement," *The Times*, July 19, 1940.
- ¹⁸ Quoted in "Child Evacuation Overseas: Mr. Churchill's Statement," *The Times*, July 19, 1940.
- ¹⁹ "Activities of the Board, June 1940 – April 1941," DO/131/43; Henderson, 20.
- ²⁰ *House of Commons Debates*, (July 17, 1940).
- ²¹ *House of Lords Debates*, (July 23, 1940).
- ²² Mann, 69.
- ²³ July 10, 1940, CAB/65/8/11; *House of Lords Debates*, (July 23, 1940).
- ²⁴ July 10, 1940, CAB/65/8/11.
- ²⁵ "Expert From Statement Made By Mr. Shakespeare In the House of Commons," DO/131/44.
- ²⁶ Meeting of the Advisory Council, July 23, 1940, DO/131/3; *House of Lords Debates*, (July 23, 1940).
- ²⁷ *House of Commons Debates*, (July 17, 1940).
- ²⁸ Meeting of the Advisory Council, July 16, 1940, DO/131/3.
- ²⁹ "Finance," DO/131/43.
- ³⁰ DO/131/29.
- ³¹ See Appendix I, "Information for Children Attending Grant Aided Schools," and "Information for Children Attending Non-Grant Aided Schools," for more on the cost differences.
- ³² DO/131/45.
- ³³ Fethney, 121.
- ³⁴ These 1,074 children included the 577 evacuated to Australia, the 202 evacuated to New Zealand, and 295 of those evacuated to South Africa; Fethney, 299.
- ³⁵ Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, *Let Candles Be Brought In*, (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1949), 259.
- ³⁶ "Sending Children Overseas: No More Applications To Be Made," *The Times*, July 6, 1940; DO/131/8;
- Kathryn Close, *Transplanted Children*, (New York: 1953), 7; Shakespeare, 253.
- ³⁷ Mann, 63.
- ³⁸ DO 131/45; One Dutch boy, Marinus Verstraeten, was the exception, because a British naval officer sought legal guardianship for him; the officer had found the boy in France after being orphaned and left homeless by the Nazi blitz on Rotterdam.; Fethney, 119.

³⁹ Meeting of the Advisory Council, July 16, 1940, DO/131/3.

The Stalinist Transformation: Re-evaluating Apparent Successes

Cynthia Mancha

The main thrust of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe occurred swiftly after the end of World War II. From 1948 to 1953, Stalinism brought immense political, cultural and economic changes to the region. In each sphere, the changes that were implemented resulted in seemingly successful outcomes, but I will argue that these successes can actually be reinterpreted as failures when analyzing their underlying nature, which had detrimental effects in the long run. Politically, while the Party successfully gained global recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, it imposed its rule onto the area and maintained power by forcing submission rather than espousing actual support. Culturally, the Party succeeded in bringing ideology to the forefront of everyday life but alienated its citizens in the process. Economically, the new Soviet system saw initial improvements under industrialization but failed to build functional systems that would bring positive change in the long run. The changes implemented by the new leadership after Stalin's death and the lack of support from the greater population due to the political, social, and economic policies demonstrate the true failure of the Stalinist transformation, shown by the attempt at a new course strategy in the 1950s, the program of de-Stalinization, and the popular uprisings in 1956 in Poland and Hungary.

The first area of transformation I will examine occurred in the political sphere. The political changes implemented during the post war years can be seen as an accomplishment in that they successfully established Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe on the international scene and transformed the U.S.S.R. into a global superpower. The post-war years saw the descending of the iron curtain across the region, and while this was indeed considerable, by examining the Party's methods of establishing and maintaining power, we can note the failures of the transformation.

Though it is now recognized that the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe was not only facilitated by external factors, most scholars agree that it was indeed the external elements that played the biggest role. Author and professor Gail Stokes explains "East Europeans did not voluntarily adopt socialism after carefully weighing its possible advantages and pitfalls. Stalin imposed the hyperrationalist vision on

Eastern Europe by force.”¹ The Communists came in and sought to monopolize power; initially this was accomplished by eliminating other political groups. They did this through the creation of ‘coalition’ or popular front parties, in which others factions merged, usually forcibly, with the Party. Scholar Hugh Stetson Watson has put forward a model describing the general imposition of Soviet rule, which progressively led to the Party coming into complete dominance as it diminished and eventually eliminated the factions’ role in the merged coalition.² Because the Party established power in this manner, scholar George Schopflin explains “for the majority of East Europeans, [the Party] represented an alien political system and was resented as such.”³

In establishing itself, the Party built a new class of people that were “promoted into positions of power...as reliable on the grounds of their class origins.”⁴ Using the *nomenklatura* system, the Party controlled appointments from the inner Party system down to the managers of factories, building a group of people whose loyalty they gained and could depend on in exchange for these positions. “From the outset, therefore, the communist strategy was to capture institutions and ‘colonize’ them...with individuals either loyal to the party or those who could be blackmailed into reliability.”⁵ This arrangement, for the time being at least, perpetuated the Party and its prominence. However, as these people were selected based on class rather than talent, they did not produce improvements in society and blocked any advancement that would threaten their positions. Perhaps more important, the support base was only a portion of the population and left many with circumstances that made change desirable. The number of people actually benefiting from the system, and hence genuine supporters of it, were few.

Once establishing power, the Party maintained it by weeding out political opposition and scaring the population into submission using means such as the terror, the show trials and the mobilization of the secret police, invoking fear and resentment. This arrangement combined with the Party’s externally imposed nature did not espouse popular support and can hence be seen as a failure. Relying on force and was not an effective way of establishing a government widely supported by the people, as we will see when I discuss the events of 1956.

Culturally, the Stalinist transformation of Eastern Europe succeeded in that it established Marxist doctrine and ideology as the dictating philosophy. Ideology was at the forefront of everyday life, making every aspect of living politicized. In this manner, the Party clearly established its leading role in society. Stalin sought “to effect a total merger of the public and private spheres...as a way of enhancing [the Party’s] claim to total control.”⁶ The Party attempted to control every aspect of society, and sought to eliminate those institutions that did not promote or that

posed a challenge to ideology. Through the use of propaganda and public demonstrations, the ideology seemingly provided a cohesive uniting feature in society. However, this entailed the use of force to ensure behavior. Under Stalinism, “all institutions, all organizations, all forms of communal activity, all individuals were expected to conform to a predetermined set of norms or suffer the consequences,”⁷ and “the degree of homogeneity imposed on the area and the extension of Soviet norms were very far-reaching indeed.”⁸

Though outwardly this spread of ideology seems successful in that it managed to establish the supremacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology, it “proved to have inflicted lasting damage, making regeneration difficult and leaving these systems vulnerable to normlessness.”⁹ Centralizing ideology was injurious because “once legitimization and power were elevated into ideological categories, communism entered an era where mounting problems could find no solution because they could not be perceived.”¹⁰ More so, the ideology was not capable of inspiring the masses, and for the majority of the population its pervasiveness in everyday life was merely alienating. Effectively, “the victory of communist ideology eventually proved to be its undoing.”¹¹ It was “successful only in as much it was able to extract conformity to a set of behaviour as far as the majority was concerned,”¹² but again as we will see, this was only true for the time being.

Failing to provide political or cultural legitimization for itself, the Party also relied on economic elements to gain support, but we see that that the policies of the Stalinist era failed here too. The post war years in Eastern Europe saw vast changes in the economic realm. Stalin placed an emphasis on industrializing the war torn economies. Indeed, under Stalinism the countries achieved considerable economic success, demonstrated by 1949 when the “gross value of industrial production in each state exceeded the prewar totals.”¹³ The growth continued until the death of Stalin in 1953, and by this time:

The gross industrial output of five countries...was 119 per cent above that of 1949, and the share of industry in the gross national income of each state had been raised to more than 50 per cent.¹⁴

From these figures, it seems that the economic transformation of Eastern Europe was a success. However, in examining its process and the time subsequent to it we can actually see that these figures are misleading, and the economic transformation actually disabled Eastern Europe far more than it aided it.

First of all, the process was very rapid one, which meant “each country had to bear the burdens produced by exploitation, the redirection of trade, postwar reconstruction and a structural reorganization of the economy.”¹⁵ Furthermore, during the Stalin era, the process of industrialization was applied equally to every country, regardless of its natural resources¹⁶ as “the plans were based upon Soviet models, and Soviet experts assisted in their preparations.”¹⁷ To undertake the process of industrialization, each nation adopted a five-year plan to help achieve its aims. The planning system, however, was very rigid and proved to be ineffective.

The process of industrialization not only failed to produce functioning systems, but also hindered further development. Since so many resources had been put into industry, it was difficult to change the system when it needed a new direction, causing economic problems for the duration of the Soviet Union. We can especially see this in the 1960s as the economies went into serious decline, all showing negative growth rates¹⁸, demonstrating that the system introduced under Stalin failed in the long run.

Equally, if not exceedingly, important is the fact that although economic figures suggested advancement, “the pitiful over-all living conditions of the Soviet man-in-the-street did not improve in comparison to prewar standards.”¹⁹ During this time, agriculture and the production of consumer goods had also been wholly inadequate, which led to dire living conditions.²⁰ These were the same people that did not benefit politically or culturally from the system, and I will shortly highlight the implications of this.

There are many indications that the political, cultural and economic transformation of Eastern Europe under Stalin was a failure. I have described some of the problems and failures in each area, and we can see these problems culminate in the 1950s and 1960s. Most telling are the changes in policy made by the post-Stalin leadership and the demonstrations of the people’s dissatisfaction with the system. After Stalin died, the Soviet leadership knew that it had to alter the course of their policies. Leaders chose to adopt a new course strategy in 1953 that affected political, cultural and economic realms in order to excoriate the mistakes of the past few years.²¹ Regarding policy, “a relaxation in political pressure became discernible” as the Party “engaged to some degree in ‘fence-mending.’”²² The policy was also largely intended to induce economic improvement. It sought to “make amends for overzealous industrialization, which had resulted in lopsided economic growth.”²³ Furthermore, after being effectively ignored, “the consumers’ goods and agricultural sectors of the economy were promised increased investments and greater attention.”²⁴ The program was short lived as

many of the Party's inner apparatus criticized it, but demonstrates that there were major problems directly caused by the Stalinist transformation. Further admission of the failures of the Stalinist era came with the program of de-Stalinization launched in the 1950s. The height of de-Stalinization came in 1956, when then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered the Secret Speech, in which he formally denounced Stalin and his actions, acknowledged their brutal nature and signaled a relaxation of policies.

The uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 were signaled by this slight hint of a relaxation of policies, also indicating the degree of failure incurred by the transformations. After nearly a decade of Communist rule, the people wanted change. The outcomes varied, but the uprisings are important in that they illustrate the true failures of the Stalinist era. Though Stalin established the Party as the central power, crowned Marxist ideology as supreme, and made industry a priority he failed to gain the support of the majority of the people and make improvements in everyday life. At the first sign of the Party loosening its grip, the people revolted, illustrating their misgivings towards the system.

Stalinism entailed "transforming the East European countries in the image of the Soviet Union" by:

Destroying their indigenous political, social and economic institutions, replacing them with Soviet prototypes and extirpating traditional values, and substituting in their place new concepts extolling the superiority of Soviet values...²⁵

In all the cases examined above, we can question the very notion of success itself. Of what value is it if it is only short term and actually soughs the seed for discord in the future? Reanalyzed, it is clear to see that these successes were actually long-term failures. The Stalinist transformation of Eastern Europe "while apparently a substantial success, created dissatisfaction...It stirred profound nationalistic forces and promoted measures which broke loose after his death when some slight relaxations of his policies were effected by his successors."²⁶ Indeed, the Stalinist transformation was a failure precisely in that, because of its forceful, imposing nature and failure to create improved living conditions, it failed to espouse popular support among the people and hence overlooked the most basic element of legitimacy.

¹ Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 8.

² For more information, see George Schopflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, (Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell ,1993), 58-59.

³ Schopflin, 84.

⁴ Ibid., 85.

⁵ Ibid., 64.

⁶ Ibid., 87.

⁷ Ibid., 75.

⁸ Ibid., 77.

⁹ Ibid., 79.

¹⁰ Ibid., 74.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 75.

¹³ Stanley Zyzniewski, "Economic Perspectives in East Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 75 no. 2 (1960), 205.

¹⁴ Ibid., 208.

¹⁵ Ibid., 201.

¹⁶ Robert Byrnes, "The Climax of Stalinism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 317 (1958), 9.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Schopflin, 138. For further information about economic decline in the 1960s, consult Scopflin, 127-156 and Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain, *Eastern Europe Since 1945*, (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 118-145.

¹⁹ Edward Taborsky, "The 'New Course' in the Soviet Economy," *Southern Economic Journal*, 23 no. 2 (1956), 161.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Paul Zinner, "Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, no. 303(1956), 160.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Zinner, 158.

²⁶ Byrnes, 11.

International Inadequacy: U.N. and N.A.T.O. Involvement in the War in Yugoslavia

Lauren Weiss

The wars that were to cause a loss of life and destruction in the heart of Europe not witnessed since the Second World War proceeded unchallenged for four years: the most powerful countries of the West were unwilling to intervene and even connived to reward the principal aggressor, Serbia.

-- J.A.S. Grenville

For the first time in Balkan history, the question of external intervention in the region revolved less around perceived strategic or economic issues than around humanitarianism.

-- Misha Glenny

The end of the Cold War has meant anything but the end of conflicts around the globe. Even as the United States and Russia made their peace, “long suppressed ethnic conflicts, nationalistic rivalries and civil wars – crisis situations *within* countries” have erupted around the world, including in what is now the former Yugoslavia.¹ The United Nations has become an arbiter of and a participant in many of these conflicts, creating a devastating (for the people of Yugoslavia) situation in the early 1990s and U.N. forces were scattered around the globe. In this post-Cold War world, the U.N. has moved to a focus on “preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-enforcement, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian intervention and post-conflict peace-building.”² However, the U.N., N.A.T.O., and the international community at large failed to fulfill these mandates in the former Yugoslavia, a volatile region that witnessed some of the worst horrors since the Holocaust in the civil war that stretched from 1991 to 1995 and ended only with U.S.-led N.A.T.O. bombing in 1995.

The conflict

The foundations for the war in Yugoslavia were laid in 1980 with the death of the dictator who had ruled the country for decades. The various ethnic and religious factions that Tito had held together through sheer

force of will began to fracture in the 1980s, and by 1986 the extremely weak national government was “under siege” on various fronts.³ Serbian politician Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in the chaos of this period, and from 1987 to 1989 he created “nationalist hysteria” within the Serbian community in an effort to gain personal power.⁴ The rising tensions throughout the region made war between the Serbs and the Croats “all but inevitable” by 1991.⁵ In March of that year, Milosevic declared that the Republic of Serbia no longer recognized Yugoslavia’s authority, beginning the break-up that would lead to a decade of war.^{6; 7} Later that year Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, and Serbian operations against non-Serbs in those two republics and against Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina began that fall.⁸ Serbian troops, faced with a lack of sufficient weapons to take over these areas, relied on sieges and shock troops that committed atrocities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina to coerce the republics into ceding to their control, a strategy at which they ultimately failed.⁹

The war between 1991 and 1995 was so destructive due to the barriers to compromise that existed between the feuding groups.¹⁰ The intermixing of persons from the various ethnic groups in the region—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, among many others—in the territories that made up Yugoslavia meant that there was no way to draw borders between the ethnic groups.¹¹ In addition, the Serbs, who made up thirty-three percent of the population but sought seventy percent of the territory of the region,¹² sought to enlarge their holdings at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the latter of which wished for the same at the expense of the Serbs and the Bosnians.¹³ According to the World Bank, this conflict over borders and ethnic identity left 250,000 people dead, 200,000 wounded and 2.5 million displaced.¹⁴

Early U.N. and N.A.T.O. involvement

The United Nations focused on the humanitarian crisis during the war, and its failures to secure the welfare of civilians in the region continues to draw harsh criticism. The U.N. did seek to end the war through diplomatic negotiations while using some “political, economic, humanitarian and military means” to further that process, but even a temporary peace was not achieved until the U.S.-led Dayton Accords in 1995.¹⁵ Although some members pushed for a large-scale military operation, there were worries that such a tactic would create a “Vietnam-like quagmire,” and other members were pushing for the U.N. to remain completely unininvolved in the developing crisis.¹⁶ In the end, the U.N. created the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) with

Security Council Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992, which sent 10,000 troops to Croatia (a number that increased to 36,000 over Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by June 1994).¹⁷ UNPROFOR troops performed quasi-governmental functions such as weapons oversight, immigration control, and monitoring compliance with flight bans out of the main office in Sarajevo, which opened in April 1992 and had little effect in immediately deterring the conflict.¹⁸ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was supplemented by the presence of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which handled many of the humanitarian issues resulting from the displacement of thousands of civilians.¹⁹ Finally, in July 1992 the U.N. began sanctions against all participants in the first coordinated international response of the conflict, which highlights the failures of the international community to understand the complexities of the conflict, as issuing sanctions against the victims and the victimizers makes no sense.²⁰

Given the U.N.'s humanitarian focus, it needed the participation of other international organizations to supplement its efforts and provide the threat of force that UNPROFOR, as a result of its mandate, was forbidden to use. The U.N. turned to the N.A.T.O., representing a shift in the level of cooperation between the two organizations, both of which had operated in vastly different spheres during the Cold War.²¹ During the Rome Summit in 1991, N.A.T.O. redefined its mission to include maintaining stability in Europe, including areas as far east as Yugoslavia, as a way to ensure Europe's security.²² N.A.T.O.'s mission in Yugoslavia, which began in 1992 after U.N. requests for assistance and not because of an independent desire of member states to get involved, was its first peace-keeping mission and included the enforcement of the arms embargoes, economic embargoes and the ban on military flights in addition to protecting U.N. personnel and the safe areas in the later years of the conflict.²³ Although N.A.T.O. formally guaranteed that it would support U.N. requests for military assistance in December 1992, it did retain independence throughout the war in determining whether to support any specific mission throughout the war.²⁴ The general pattern throughout the conflict was that the U.N. Security Council would pass a resolution for an action that required N.A.T.O. support, the U.N. would formally request N.A.T.O.'s assistance. Then, the North Atlantic Council, which heads N.A.T.O., would debate the political ramifications of the given mission, and the mission would be accepted.²⁵

In the early years of its involvement, N.A.T.O. focused on enforcing the embargoes that the U.N. had imposed. On July 16, 1992 N.A.T.O. began Operation Maritime Monitor, in which it monitored the arms embargo at sea,²⁶ and in October of that year the mission was expanded to protecting air space, which Serbians continued to violate, with

Operation Deny Flight.²⁷ In the latter operation N.A.T.O. was limited to shooting down planes that failed to respond to repeated commands to leave the no-fly zone. However, it did not shoot down any aircraft until February 28, 1994, in which four Serbian aircraft were shot down in N.A.T.O.'s first military action since its founding.²⁸ These operations were hampered by the lack of enforcement power that N.A.T.O. controlled; at sea, N.A.T.O. did not gain the right to board all ships in Yugoslavian waters until the passage of Security Council Resolution 787 on November 16, 1992, more than a year and a half after the mission began.²⁹ In addition, Operation Deny Flight suffered from worries about negative consequences to shooting down an aircraft that could be carrying injured civilians, including concerns about bad press. This hesitation led to a total of 1,005 violations of the air space by March 1994, with a pace that increased after N.A.T.O. became involved in enforcing the ban.³⁰

Call to act: ethnic cleansing

Significant external pressure to increase international involvement in Yugoslavia did not appear until reports of ethnic cleansing operations by Serbian troops.³¹ Ethnic cleansing, which the U.N. views as a type of genocide, involves the displacement of people from one region for the purpose of creating ethnically homogenous territories by any means necessary, including mass murder, sexual violence, and the forced expulsion from one's home.³² The perpetration of these crimes creates a situation, in the eyes of historian J.A.S. Grenville, where civilization itself does not exist because basic human rights to life, liberty and justice are not held to be sacrosanct."³³ He explains further that in Yugoslavia, from which the term ethnic cleansing developed, the "reversion to barbarism...was terrifyingly swift and unexpected,"³⁴ creating huge pressure on governments and supra-governmental agencies to act to halt the spread of such travesties.³⁵ In addition to perpetuating these crimes en masse against Bosnian Muslims, Serbian troops obstructed deliveries of humanitarian supplies, presumably because any relief would decrease the incentive on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government to cede its authority. In a report from December 1994, the Secretary-General of the U.N. estimated that thirty percent of supplies did not reach their targets in October 1994, with that percentage rising to fifty percent in November.³⁶

The first instance of ethnic cleansing came in August and September 1991 with the siege of Vucovar, Croatia, by the Serbian army. Grenville notes that the supposedly 'civilised Europe' responded only with

mediation attempts and the U.N. peace-keeping force, a response that he terms “shockingly inadequate.”³⁷ By April 1993, the U.N. was admonishing Yugoslavia to immediately “take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,” a request that means little when not backed up with sufficient troops with the potential to engage in combat operations.³⁸ One resolution in that month described ethnic cleansing as “unlawful and unacceptable” and acknowledged that there had been a “tragic humanitarian emergency in Srebrenica.”³⁹ As journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little relate, those words could not even come close to the devastation wrecked upon the Muslim enclave by a months-long siege by the Serbs, to whom the town surrendered in April after the U.N. had proven that it could not protect the community, let alone ensure the passage of food, shelter, and medical supplies. The tragic situation, which involved the shooting of schoolchildren and the maiming of men who managed to survive the siege, made a farce of UNPROFOR, which refused to send troops against the Serbs for fear of losing neutrality in a situation that was never one of equally matched sides.⁴⁰

Reaction: safe areas

Following the failure of UNPROFOR to protect the citizens of Srebrenica, the U.N. created the concept of ‘safe areas,’ a concept that failed drastically. Silber and Little write that although the concept represented a step forward in terms of the U.N. and the West taking some kind of responsibility for the devastation in the region, the term safe area was a “cruel misnomer [as the] safe areas were among the most profoundly unsafe places in the world.”⁴¹ These safe areas, by the end of the war, included Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Zepa and Gorazde,⁴² and were the site of much of the fighting and ethnic cleansing from the time of their designation through the end of the war.⁴³ Security Council Resolution 836, which was adopted in June 1993, stated that the safe areas were intended as a ‘temporary measure’ to protect people and not territory while the U.N. continued to work to negotiate a permanent peace plan.⁴⁴ As the following examples will demonstrate, even as a temporary measure they failed.

Despite the U.N.’s devotion to neutrality, the Security Council did give UNPROFOR the right to use force in self-defense and to protect humanitarian supplies, a step that moved slightly closer to an actual defense of the noncombatants in the region but did not, ultimately, do enough to stop the carnage.⁴⁵ Although this resolution stated that the U.N. would keep “other options for new and tougher measures” on the

table, no significant shift in policy occurred until summer 1995, and then the proposals were led by N.A.T.O.⁴⁶ The Secretary-General was unhappy with even this small shift toward non-neutrality; although he clearly recognized that something needed to be done about the humanitarian crises, he found one of the weaknesses in the safe-concept to be the partiality necessitated by the possibility to use force, a fact that, in his view, violated UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission and could lead to further destabilization in the region.⁴⁷ These concerns, combined with its superior military capabilities, led N.A.T.O. to authorize "close air support" to secure the safe areas in July 1993, just after the zones had been designated.⁴⁸ These air strikes were only authorized when a humanitarian issue was at stake, a situation that would arise frequently over the following two years.

N.A.T.O.'s threat of air strikes became less and less successful as the war dragged on into 1994 and 1995. On August 2, 1993 N.A.T.O. stated that it was willing to use air strikes to defend Sarajevo from the Serbs, a declaration that caused the Serbs to cease advancing on one section of the city.⁴⁹ Another successful threat came following the February 5, 1994 market bombing in Sarajevo, an attack that left 68 dead and 200 injured and gained worldwide attention.⁵⁰ N.A.T.O. again threatened air strikes on Serbian military targets in retaliation, a threat that led Serbian troops to hand over some heavy weapons to UNPROFOR in a de-escalation of tensions.⁵¹ However, throughout 1994 Bihac, another safe area, saw heavy fighting that N.A.T.O. and UNPROFOR were unable to stop.⁵² Although N.A.T.O. struck Serb targets in bombings from November 21 to November 23, there was still no humanitarian access to Bihac by the beginning of December.⁵³ Finally, 1995 saw the death of the safe area concept, which led to an increased push for a more effective solution to the crisis, namely a permanent peace agreement. Hostilities in Sarajevo, which had seen sporadic fighting following the February 1994 market bombing, renewed in April 1995.⁵⁴ On 25 and 26 May N.A.T.O. struck Serb targets near Sarajevo in response to the attacks on the safe area and on UNPROFOR personnel, who were kidnapped at various points during the conflict. However, unlike the earlier strikes, the Serbs responded with anger to these strikes and declared that they would no longer abide by any U.N. or N.A.T.O. resolution.⁵⁵ In another humiliation of the U.N., Srebrenica fell again on July 11, 1995, just more than two years after it had been declared the first safe area.⁵⁶ The fall was precipitated by insufficient air support and unwillingness by N.A.T.O. to engage in air strikes to gain some leverage over the Serb army and led to the final push for peace talks.⁵⁷

As evidenced by the continuation of ethnic cleansing and other humanitarian crises following the designation of safe areas, the U.N.'s

tactic failed to actually protect the Bosnian Muslims. The Secretary-General acknowledged this failure in his December 1994 report, in which he stated that the travesties at Bihać demonstrated the “inherent shortcomings of the current safe-area concept, at the expense of the civilian population, who have found themselves in pitiable plight.”⁵⁸ He acknowledged that the “only effective way to make the safe areas, as well as other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, truly safe is to achieve a comprehensive political solution through negotiations,”⁵⁹ and that air strikes could not sufficiently support the zones due to the inherent difficulties in isolating targets and the need to avoid attacking transports with civilians.⁶⁰ As explained in the previous paragraph, the air strikes also, more often than not, increased tensions between the U.N. and the Serbs. For example, N.A.T.O. hit targets in the Gorazde area on April 10 and 11, 1994 in the first use of combat power in N.A.T.O. history.⁶¹ These strikes led the Serbs to view UNPROFOR as “a potentially hostile force,” a position that did not encourage the Serbs to end their crimes against civilians in the area.⁶²

What went wrong in the former Yugoslavia

As demonstrated by the abject failure of the safe area concept, the U.N. made many missteps in dealing with the developing crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The war led to 53 resolutions and 40 presidential statements, each of which required the assistance of member states and other organizations due to the U.N.’s lack of resources, underscoring the U.N.’s unpreparedness to handle this kind of internal conflict.⁶³ Many of these resolutions, furthermore, hurt the people who needed help the most; it was not until May 1992 that sanctions applied only to Serbia and Montenegro and not to all players in the conflict, including the victims of atrocities,⁶⁴ and some of the sanctions contributed to an economic decline in the region that further fueled inter-group anger.⁶⁵ One of the biggest problems facing the U.N., however, was disparity between the enormity of the humanitarian crisis and the paucity of resources that the U.N. and other organizations and countries contributed to handling it. Historian Misha Glenny wrote that UNPROFOR was “outgunned, demoralized, and subject to the most inflexible bureaucracy in military history.”⁶⁶ Even the Secretary-General recognized the futility of UNPROFOR’s situation, and he admonished the Security Council for only authorizing the presence of an additional 7,600 troops in 1994 even though approximately 34,000 more were needed.⁶⁷ By May 1995, in fact, the U.N. had considered withdrawing UNPROFOR troops because of the number of attacks, including kidnappings, on U.N. personnel.⁶⁸ As the

U.N. could not even adequately defend its own troops, it was foolishness to assume that they could protect millions of civilians in a conflict-ridden region.

As much as the U.N. failed to adequately address the humanitarian issues in the conflict, the international community at large deserves much of the blame for the situation. Glenny writes that the “international community repeatedly ‘declared itself happy with what were only partial solutions, ignoring that the problems of all six republics were inextricably bound up with one another,’” and that allowing the conflict to advance with a rapidity ought not have been tolerated.⁶⁹ Some of their ignorance of the situation can be placed on the first Gulf War, which began in August 1990; the “revival of an obscure Balkan squabble seemed trivial set against the rising tension in the Middle East.”⁷⁰ However, much of the inattention was due simply to nations’ unwillingness to commit their resources to the conflict. Western governments continually told the public that an intervention would be too large and that air strikes would be ineffective, a fact that, as evidenced by the end of the war, was not necessarily the case.⁷¹ These governments “wrung [their] hands” for the majority of the war, only authorizing air strikes in 1994 after the crisis had already exploded.⁷² Even in 1933 some governments recognized their failures—U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in February of that year that the West had “missed too many opportunities to prevent or contain this Buffering, bloodshed, and destruction when the conflict was in its infancy” (sic).⁷³ Although the U.S. made up, in part, for those missed opportunities by pushing forward the end of the arms embargo against the Croats and the Bosnians, a decision that allowed them to fight back against the Serbs and was part of the ultimate victory against the Serbian armies, that decision came far too late for millions of people in the region.

One option that the U.S., Britain, France and other involved nations did not seriously consider, albeit for very different reasons, was a military invasion on the ground. The U.S., which became much more involved when Clinton ascended to the presidency in 1993, followed a policy of “lift and strike” rather than commit ground troops, a compromise that allowed Clinton to assuage his morals without risking ground forces, a group that was already under strain following the failure in Somalia and the successful Gulf War and an action that had little Congressional or public support.⁷⁴ The U.S.’ apparent ambivalence on the issue widened the rift between it and the British and the French. For the latter, who had already committed significant troops to the peace-keeping force, providing thousands more soldiers did not seem appropriate given the U.S.’ failure—or, as Glenny terms it, ‘cowardice’—to commit any of its resources to resolving the conflict on

the ground.⁷⁵ In fact, the French had advocated sending European troops into Croatia as early as 1991 as part of the Western European Union, but that decision, which did not come to fruition, seems to have been guided more by a desire to assert French authority in the European sphere rather than a serious consideration of what was best for the Croatians and the Bosnians.⁷⁶ Finally, Russia, which was slowly adapting to a post-Cold War frame of mind, opposed ground troop intervention for a reason not unlike the French; the Russians did not appreciate N.A.T.O. and especially U.S. intervention in Eastern Europe, over which the Soviet Union had, until recently, significant influence (although to a significantly lesser extent in Yugoslavia itself than elsewhere).⁷⁷

Some of the most strident remarks regarding the international community's failure to intervene in an adequate fashion that I found came from a July 1995 Security Council meeting in which representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia spoke to the council. Mr. Misic, the Bosnian representative, discussed his frustration with the international communities decision to "go neither to the left nor to the right, and above all not to go forward" in regards to the escalating situation in Bosnia.⁷⁸ Following the "debacle" that was international involvement in the region, he continued, the U.N. must face the consequences of its indecision: 200,000 dead, 1.2 million displaced persons, and the ethnic cleansing of seventy percent of Bosnia.⁷⁹ The world has been "brazenly mocked" by the Serbian troops, who have not been deterred by its feeble actions against the crimes against humanity, he claimed, and the U.N.'s "distorted concept of neutrality and impartiality" must be tossed aside, for it treats the "terrorist and the terrorized" in the same fashion.⁸⁰ In requesting the introduction of U.N. troops with the ability to actually engage the Serbs, he declared that neutrality "guarantees nothing less than the triumph of evil."⁸¹ The Croatian representative was just as strident in his alert to the council of the growing refugee crisis in his country.⁸² He blamed the growing violations over the past two years in the region on the "international community's turning a blind eye to the serious increase in Serbia's interference in the occupied territories of Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina."⁸³

The end of the war

The war in Yugoslavia ended, finally, in the fall of 1995 (the later conflict in Kosovo notwithstanding). The Dayton Peace Accords did not, in the end, offer a lasting resolution to the conflict, but they did, for a while, end the explicit conflict in the region.

In what was the beginning of the end, the U.S. and Germany convinced Croatia and Bosnia to form the Bosnian-Croat Federation in March 1994.⁸⁴ This alliance eventually gave the Croats, with the aid of the U.S., the strength necessary to launch successful attacks against the Serbs, who began to be pushed back toward their original territory in May 1995.⁸⁵ In addition, the U.N. supplemented the peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR with a peace-enforcing Rapid Reaction Force, which had a more explicit mandate that authorized the use of force, in June 1995.⁸⁶

The most decisive military strategy toward ending the war, however, was a targeted N.A.T.O. bombing campaign. On July, 11 1995 Serbian troops killed 8,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica in the “single biggest crime of the Bosnian war,”⁸⁷ a travesty that was followed on August 28 by a mortar attack on Sarajevo by the Serbs.⁸⁸ The public outcry following these attacks led to Operation Deliberate Force, in which N.A.T.O. struck Serb military targets in “intense bombardments” from August 30 through September 14.⁸⁹ On September 14, the Serbs began removing weapons from Sarajevo, leading to a temporary cease-fire that became permanent once the peace talks began to bear fruit.⁹⁰ Although Milosevic was already in discussion with lead American negotiator Richard Holbrooke before the bombing campaign started, it is unclear when the war would have ended without that campaign.⁹¹

The diplomatic end to the war began on September 8, 1995, when Holbrooke, an Assistant Secretary of State, got an agreement on the first set of Basic Principles. This agreement created a unified, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina with fifty-one percent as a Bosniac-Croat Entity and forty-nine percent as a Bosnian-Serb Entity, which entailed a loss of territory for the Serbs.⁹² On November 21, 1995 the Dayton Peace Accords were initialed, and they were formally signed by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in Paris on December 14, 1995.⁹³ Despite the apparent success in reaching any agreement, the accords reinforced the partitioning of Bosnia and created a “model for reconciliation and for rebuilding a shattered society [that] was and remains severely limited.”⁹⁴ The accords are held together by the presence of thousands of international peacekeepers, and many observers, including Glenny, believe that the war will begin again if the troops ever leave.⁹⁵

The situation in the former Yugoslavia leaves much to be desired. The ethnic cleansing began again, this time in Kosovo, just a few years after the end of the first conflict, and there an intensive and controversial N.A.T.O. bombing campaign was necessary to stop the violence. The region remains plagued by instability and poverty, and the refugee situation has yet to be resolved in an adequate manner. It is futile to suppose what would have happened with more significant international

involvement earlier in the conflict, but there is no doubt that further action was necessary.

¹ Dick Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), 4. Emphasis original.

² Ibid., 2.

³ Misha Glenny, "The hot house: Yugoslavia, 1981-9," 623-5. †

⁴ Ibid., 628.

⁵ Ibid., 627.

⁶ Ibid., 633.

⁷ In this paper I will focus solely on the 1991 to 1995 war and will not discuss the situation in Kosovo due to space limitations.

⁸ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 34.

⁹ Ibid., 41.

¹⁰ I do not attempt any survey of what happened during the war itself, instead choosing to focus on the humanitarian crises and international involvement in the war, again for reasons of space.

¹¹ J.A.S. Grenville, "The Wars of Yugoslavia: a Requiem," 930. †

¹² Misha Glenny, "The Balkan Vortex: Nationalism, war and N.A.T.O., 1989-99," 644. †

¹³ Grenville, 932.

¹⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, *Former Yugoslavia – Complex Emergency Report OFDA-05* (5 Sept. 1996), 1, <http://cidi.org/disaster/96b/0013.html>.

¹⁵ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 11.

¹⁶ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷ U.N. Security Council, 3122nd meeting. "Resolution 781 [Bosnia and Herzegovina]." 9 Oct. 1992. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 www.un.org/documents/scores.htm. 12.

¹⁸ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 20-21.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

²⁰ Glenny, The Balkan Vortex, 639.

²¹ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 1.

²² Ibid., 4.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Ibid., 19, 8.

²⁵ Ibid., 25.

²⁶ Ibid., 24.

²⁷ Ibid., 31.

²⁸ Ibid., 34-35.

²⁹ Gow, 130.

³⁰ Ibid., 134-135.

³¹ Some Croatian troops also perpetrated crimes of genocide against Serbians near the end of the war, but I have chosen to focus on the Serbian

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- violations, which garnered much more attention and which were at the heart of increased U.N. and N.A.T.O. involvement.
- ³² George J. Andreopoulos, “ethnic cleansing: war crime,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed 10 Dec. 2008, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/194242/ethnic-cleansing>, 1.
- ³³ Grenville, 930.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 41.
- ³⁶ U.N. Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994).” 1 Dec. 1994. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://un.org/Docs/secu94.htm>, 3.
- ³⁷ Grenville, 932.
- ³⁸ U.N. Security Council, 3199th meeting. “Resolution 819 [Bosnia and Herzegovina].” 16 April 1993. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, 1.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 1-2.
- ⁴⁰ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1996). Chapter 20 (pp. 265-75).
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 274.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Dick Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force* (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1996), 54.
- ⁴⁴ U.N. Security Council, 3228th meeting. “Resolution 836 [Bosnia and Herzegovina].” 4 June 1993. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, 3.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 3.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 4.
- ⁴⁷ U.N. Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994).” 1 Dec. 1994. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://un.org/Docs/secu94.htm>, 13, 18.
- ⁴⁸ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 45.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 47-48.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 51.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 52-55.
- ⁵² Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 648.
- ⁵³ U.N. Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994).” 1 Dec. 1994. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://un.org/Docs/secu94.htm>, 6.
- ⁵⁴ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 63.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Grenville, 936.
- ⁵⁷ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 73-75.

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- ⁵⁸ U.N. Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994)." 1 Dec. 1994. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://un.org/Docs/secu94.htm>, 8.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., 20.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., 10.
- ⁶¹ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia*, 58.
- ⁶² Ibid., 59.
- ⁶³ Ibid., 1.
- ⁶⁴ Grenville, 933.
- ⁶⁵ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 639.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 641.
- ⁶⁷ "U.N. Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959 (1994)." 1 Dec. 1994. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://un.org/Docs/secu94.htm>, 1.
- ⁶⁸ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 64.
- ⁶⁹ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 634.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 635.
- ⁷¹ Grenville, 933.
- ⁷² Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 641.
- ⁷³ Warren Christopher, "N.A.T.O. and US Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4.9, 1 March 1993, *Academic Search Elite* accessed 2 Dec. 2008 <http://omega.library.uu.nl>, 4.
- ⁷⁴ Gow, 212.
- ⁷⁵ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 641.
- ⁷⁶ Gow, 161.
- ⁷⁷ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 641.
- ⁷⁸ U.N. Security Council, 50th year, 3553rd meeting. *Record of the Meeting S/PV.3553*. 12 July 1995. Accessed 30 Nov. 2008 <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact1995.htm>, 2.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., 3.
- ⁸¹ Ibid.
- ⁸² Ibid., 4.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 5.
- ⁸⁴ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 647.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid., 650.
- ⁸⁶ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 68.
- ⁸⁷ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 650.
- ⁸⁸ Leurdijk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 78.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., 79-80.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 651.

⁹² Leurdujk, *The United Nations and N.A.T.O. in Former Yugoslavia, 1991—1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, 93.

⁹³ Ibid., 95.

⁹⁴ Glenny, *The Balkan Vortex*, 651-652.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 652.

† The indicated citations do not appear in their full form because they were not required by the associated professor. They were found in course text that is no longer available to us or the author; hence, we were unable to add the missing information.

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