GATEWAY

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# Table of Contents

**Letter from the Editors**  
*Amanda Matheson, Michael Richardson, and Marshall Mayer*  
4

**Crafting Global Feminisms: Moving Towards a Model That Recognizes the Diversity of Women’s Commitments**  
*Ali Karamustafa*  
5

**From the First of the Blacks to the First of the Whites**  
*Ben Noble*  
11

**“Full of Light” Yet “Plunged into Dark Obscurity”: Indian Reception and Incorporation of Catholicism in Colonial Mexico, Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries**  
*Lindsey Waldenberg*  
23

**“I am Jewish and Buddhist”: Explorations of the Jubu**  
*Jennifer Locke*  
36

**The Controversies over the Construction of the New Capitol for Christendom**  
*Jacob Kayen*  
58

**Freedom for Fighting: Black Slave Soldiers and Manumission during the Wars for Independence in the Río de La Plata Region 1810-1828**  
*Jennifer Jeffers*  
67

**Hanged by Its Cross of Iron: The Vietnam War’s Virulent Effect on the Military-Industrial Complex**  
*Stuart Davis*  
79

**Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts**  
99
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Letter from the Editors
Amanda Matheson, Michael Richardson, and Marshall Mayer

This year we are incredibly pleased to present the twelfth edition of Phi Alpha Theta’s Gateway History Journal. With great encouragement from the Washington University faculty, we received an astounding number of submissions for this year’s publication. We were delighted to see works from all classes, including a substantial number of papers written by freshmen. Such enthusiasm on the part of the younger members of the Washington University community gives us great hope that Gateway will continue to be an exciting publication for years to come.

From the original batch of papers, we selected the following seven works after weeks of considerable deliberation. We believe that the following works represent some of the best historical work being done across the University. Many of our submissions came from outside the History Department, lending a great deal of diversity to the publication. From a proposal for a new framework for feminism to a discussion of the military industrial complex, these works tackle a variety of topics from across the centuries and demonstrate the considerable talents of our undergraduate writers and researchers.

For the second year in a row, we are proud to include the abstracts for the senior honors theses. We have quite the group of dedicated students writing theses to earn honors from the History Department for the 2011-2012 academic year, and we are pleased to be able to give our readers a taste of the fascinating topics these young men and women explore in their larger works. Together with the individual essays presented in this volume, these abstracts represent some of the highest caliber work being done at Washington University.

As expected, serving as editors for the Gateway Journal has been an enlightening experience. We are particularly grateful to Phi Alpha Theta’s new faculty advisory, Professor Cassie Adcock, for bravely stepping in and providing constant encouragement and direction for this project.
“[I]t cannot be said that a strong ‘feminist’ current has developed in the Arab world, in the narrow sense of fighting for women’s rights irrespective of the other political and economic needs of society.”

-Nadia Hijab, *Womenpower*, p.164

Is there a feminist alternative to the overly simplistic notion of a global struggle against patriarchy? Nadia Hijab’s quote implies that in the context of a global patriarchy one might have expected a “feminist current” in a narrow sense to have blossomed in the Arab World and Middle East. According to her judgment, such a movement has not emerged. I argue that the expectation for such a movement is ill-considered in that there are struggles and group narratives that Middle Eastern women choose for themselves other than the question of their subjugation as women. To understand women’s experiences fully we must embrace a framework that acknowledges multiple competing struggles (a self-effacing feminism of sorts) such as those for nationhood, the enfranchisement of the economically dispossessed, and the attainment of piety.

This new framework for understanding women is by necessity one that encompasses a multiplicity of groups; women, men, children, the elderly, and other mixed gender groupings. It is a paradoxical and self-collapsing framework, but it exists because we insist on studying women. Women are often on trajectories that cannot be explained solely by their womanhood and that may even conflict with the advancement of women’s status in society. In this essay I will explore three of these trajectories that have rendered what I will call “liberal rights feminism” or feminism in the “narrow sense” that Hijab posits impossible or undesirable in the lives of countless women in the Arab World or Muslim Middle East. This could be characterized as a third-wave feminist ideology, or one that embraces confliction and contradiction, but I prefer to eschew the amorphous third-wave imagination that is characterized by identity politics in favor of a simpler and less tokenizing notion: women have multiple commitments, and these do not often fall in place as we expect them to. I will address a few of the most important commitments of Middle Eastern women in this essay.
Decolonization

Women’s lives in the Middle East have often been shaped by colonial struggles. Scholar Marnia Lazreg adroitly grapples with the issue of the perceived tension between women’s status and decolonization in the Algerian context in a chapter of her book entitled, “The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question.” In this chapter Lazreg brilliantly addresses the question of women’s commitments head on by declaring that women should not be expected to prioritize liberal feminism when their societies are being colonized.

I have referred to it as a perceived tension because of the feminist view that there was a central conflict between women’s rights and revolutionary struggle in colonial Algeria, such that we should regard the 1962 revolution with ambivalence. At the very least, says the feminist view, our memory of women’s involvement in the revolution should not be celebratory because they did not share with male revolutionaries in the spoils of war. Lazreg rejects this wavering stance and all of the purported tension that these feminists apprehend by reminding the reader that women also felt the pressing need to rid their country of its French occupiers. She reasons that the urge for national liberation may well have superseded the desire for women’s liberation (if such a concept even carried much currency among Algerian women at the time). With this line of reasoning not only does Lazreg reject the sentiment of feminist disappointment but she also rejects the trend of equivocation with regards to the revolution. Of course there were human costs that we should not eject from our memory of the revolution, but Lazreg notes that to criticize the historic event for not taking up the cause of women’s liberation is myopic and relegates women to the position of gullible revolutionary pawns.

We may note that Lazreg does not anywhere claim that Algerian women enjoyed a rewarding and fulfilling revolutionary experience. She does not avoid the ugliness of war and the particularly brutal experience of women in war, a stance she makes clear in the beginning of her chapter by listing the especially violent circumstances that women faced in times of revolutionary upheaval. Yet she believes that the twin concerns of decolonization and women’s rights should be evaluated separately so that each is awarded its true consequence in historical discussions about Algerian women. She posits, “That women did not, as a group, share equally with men in the benefits accrued from the independence of their country is a separate empirical question that must be addressed as such.” To address this question separately is to realize the urgency of the revolutionary spirit and how it could have overwhelmed matters faced by sub-groups of the revolution. Lazreg does not make light of women’s issues; in fact, she respects their
revolutionary will and agency all the more by realizing their decision to participate was a deliberate and meaningful act. Women were not simply duped into revolting before being denied their proper rights; they too longed for liberation from the French. Lazreg’s argument respects women’s choices, intelligence, desires, and above all their priorities. For many Algerian women, it was decolonization that they strove for with the utmost drive and mettle.

Class Struggle

Other women have conceived of their lives on another trajectory more directly steeped in class struggle, although still affected by colonial interests. An interview conducted by Abdolrahmane Mahjoube with a young Iranian revolutionary named Sakine in 1980 (the year following the Iranian Revolution) suggests for the liberal rights feminist a world in which the community of the economically dispossessed takes primacy over all other social groupings.

The reader gleans during the interview and from Mahjoube’s introduction that for Sakine revolutionary Islam is grounded in economic realities. This Islamic framework rests on an undergirding tension between the powerful and the dispossessed, of whom the latter must revolt to create an ideal Islamic society. Mahjoube explains that “Islam here is essentially the religion of the dispossessed, the poor, the people that sacrifice their life for it. If religion helps the dispossessed, if the poor recognize themselves in it, it is because this religion identifies itself with them and with their struggle. Islam is the religion through which there will be no more dispossessed: in it is incarnated the demand for equality.” Indeed Sakine stays faithful to this appraisal in emphasizing notions of equality and communalism in Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology. Although she rejects Marxist ideology for its un-Islamic associations, her own ideology is based on very nearly Marxist ethics and economic principles. For Sakine as for Marx, history is driven by material conditions and is therefore defined by class struggles.

Although it is nominally an Islamic struggle, given Mahjoube’s assessment of the movement and Sakine’s thematic thrust in the interview it is more accurate to name it a class struggle as well. Sakine conjectures that, “The dispossessed are the lowest stratum of society, but they saved Islam and, by the grace of God, will continue to do so… The powerful, on the other hand, are those who do wrong to the dispossessed and to Islam.” For Sakine, class upheaval is the backdrop to Islamic progress as the rural disempowered unite and triumph to bring Islamic equality unto all and to save the religion for all of its adherents.

As an interviewer, Mahjoube does little to analyze the words of Sakine save provide a concise introduction to the interview in which he
poses that her primary commitment is Islamic class empowerment. His ethnographic tendency is to allow the subject to speak for herself, without explicitly confronting the fact that Sakine is not a feminist by the standards of liberal rights feminism. She disapproves of those who do not wear the veil and does not seem dedicated to or even concerned with women’s rights. Mahjoube does not grapple with the issue of feminism, either implying that he respects Sakine’s commitment to Islamic socialism or that for him it is not an important topic (the reader cannot know from reading the article, given the interviewer’s rather distant character and commitments). Ultimately Mahjoube’s interview provides space for Sakine to delineate her class commitments as a Muslim woman, fully separated from the context of liberal rights feminism. Today it is clear where her priorities lay, as she ardently advocated for the new Islamic Republic and the class revolution it professed to bring.

Piety

Another avenue for women’s existence outside of Hijab’s liberal feminist framework is in the quest for piety. Attaining piety has been especially important in recent decades because of the Islamic revival movement that has reached Muslims worldwide, and particularly those in the Middle East. Saba Mahmood traces the contours of the piety movement in contemporary Egypt in her book, *The Politics of Piety*, and in a fashion similar to Lazreg’s reminds the reader about the multiplicity and complexity of women’s commitments.

Mahmood focuses on women who regularly attend mosques for religious lessons, a trend that she identifies as the mosque movement and an important part of the Islamic revival that Egypt has witnessed since the 1970’s. Mahmood notes that amidst a perceived prevalence of religious laxity, “The da’iyat [female sermon-givers] and the mosque attendees want to ameliorate this situation [i.e. the seeming lack of popular religious commitment] through the cultivation of those bodily aptitudes, virtues, habits, and desires that serve to ground Islamic principles within the practices of everyday living.” The desire for piety, which can take numerous and even conflicting forms, is the central impetus that drives this movement and is the ultimate prize towards which these women strive. An example of this yearning for piety can be found in one woman’s description of the pious urge to pray: “[The constant guarding] against disobedience and sins wakes you up for the morning prayer. Salat [prayer] is not just what you say with your mouth and what you do with your limbs. It is a state of your heart.” Through the words and conversations of the women of the mosque movement (many of which Mahmood transmits verbatim in her excellent
monograph) yet another iteration of life’s struggles takes form in which liberal rights feminism has a minimal role.

As with Lazreg, Saba Mahmood does not overlook the patriarchal system that Egyptian women inhabit. In fact, she demonstrates that women may willingly embrace this system because of its presence in piety frameworks, in the case of spousal loyalty for example. Here, agency and oppression collide to confuse scholarly notions of resistance and an assumed struggle for liberation. She shows how many women choose to seek fulfillment on terms that do not adhere to liberal feminist assumptions about the self, the individual, and the centrality of freedom. For them the most coveted of rewards is Islamic piety.

**Inferences and Conclusions**

In her final analysis Mahmood delivers a blow both to the primacy of liberal rights feminism and to the supposition that such a feminism is always sought after even if overshadowed by other priorities. She daringly unseats the assumption that given the appropriate conditions, all women will desire political freedom enshrined in a liberal rights model. Radically, Mahmood posits that even if women did not have numerous pressing commitments they would not always yearn for liberal rights feminism in the first place.

Then we must move towards embracing a new model of global feminism that insists upon women having multiple commitments and that furthermore does not assume the desirability of a liberal rights model of women’s liberation. Women’s liberation must necessarily account for the other non-gender specific forms of liberation or non-liberating fulfillment to which countless women adhere in the Middle East and around the globe. This also means questioning the primacy of liberal rights feminism in the West, where liberal feminists are more likely to expect with indignation that all women advocate for a liberal political notion of a feminist future. This new commitment-oriented framework allows us to probe for the spheres of significance that influence women’s lives rather than inanely imbuing them with a generic series of women’s priorities or oppressions. It also allows for the possibility of multiple overlapping commitments, which we witnessed in the confluence of Islam and class struggle in the case of Sakine. With caution this new framework can be applied globally, where we should expect to discover commitments of the sort that would continue to break with the liberal rights model of feminism.

1 Here by the term we I do not mean only Western academia, but all of those around the world who have acknowledged the plight of women living in patriarchal societies. We
still believe that inequality exists along gender lines and this is what makes the study of women worthwhile. Yet, while “we” see ourselves in a world that is rallying to overcome structural inequalities, countless others do not view humanity with the same narrative backdrop.

2 Note that I do not think it impossible that an Arab or Muslim woman advocate Hijab’s rendition of feminism. For many Middle East women, this certainly is the case.


4 Ibid, 139.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid, 118.

7 Ibid, 119.


9 Ibid, 63.

10 Ibid, 64.


12 Ibid, 45.

13 Ibid, 125.

14 Ibid, 152.

15 Ibid, 144.
Although the period from 1776 to 1843 is generally referred to as the Age of Revolutions in Western history, it is ironic that the most radical revolution of that era is generally absent from this historiography.¹ In 1791, a slave rebellion led by Toussaint Louverture, a former slave, erupted on the French colony of Saint Domingue, which ultimately succeeded in throwing off the chains of colonialism.² However, academics and Western histories rarely mention this figure despite the fact that “only one other man of that time could rival Toussaint’s meteoric trajectory, with its dizzying climb and precipitous fall: Napoleon Bonaparte, who in so many ways resembled the black leader whose nemesis he became.”³ It is this connection that explains our own institutionalized ignorance. Napoleon, the first consul of Imperial France and conqueror of mainland Europe, was ultimately defeated by a band of slave soldiers. He was forced to abandon his dream of a transcontinental France at the hands of that army’s general, Toussaint, once no more than a slave himself. Outraged by his own defeat, Napoleon made it his own scared quest to silence the revolution and ensure that its leader, who mirrored the French consul in so many ways, would never share his spotlight.

History draws from records; historiography is written from primary sources. Without the writings of the actors present at the time, we have no record by which we can write history. While “historiography is selective” and written by future generations, who shapes the selection process?⁴ Although in some ways it is the authors of historiography who form our understanding, it is also those who record or destroy the evidence during the actual events. They can shine new light on the subject, or cast it deep into the shadows. Acclaimed scholar Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues that silences – moments in history where those with power have erased the less powerful from records – can enter the process of historiography at four crucial moments.⁵ The first, and arguably most important, is in the production of sources.

It is from primary documents that we can understand a period and begin to analyze it, forming our own opinions and our own writings. If something is left out of our own reference material, how can we ever hope to learn of it? German historian Thomas Reinhardt argues that “it is only future generations that – in a complex interplay of memorizing and forgetting – give the past a meaningful and well ordered appearance.”⁶ He does not believe the makers of history write it, but something seems fundamentally wrong with this line of reasoning. Trouillot concisely
states that “in history, power begins at the source:” both the source in terms of a document and the source as a particular moment in history.\textsuperscript{7} While future historians do shape the past and give it a “well ordered appearance,” this clean view cannot be presented without the works of those who lived during the period in question. The figure of Toussaint Louverture is mysteriously absent from Western historiography, and while that is in part the fault of historians, Napoleon Bonaparte’s agency cannot be overlooked. As one of the most powerful men in his time, an unrivaled general bested by a former slave, Bonaparte had both the motivation and the means by which he could influence the production of sources, conveniently forgetting to include Toussaint. While future historians do shape the past and give it a “well ordered appearance,” this clean view cannot be presented without the works of those who lived during the period in question.

Toussaint Louverture did not originally plan to lead a slave insurrection against the crown, nor was the French home government always at odds with the colony. In fact, in 1789, Saint Domingue was appropriately referred to as the Pearl of the Antilles. It was by far the most productive of the French colonies, where forty percent of the world’s sugar was produced by a population of enslaved Africans who outnumbered their white masters and free blacks by a ratio of ten to one.\textsuperscript{8} However, the French who resided in Saint Domingue did not view the colony in the same way as those across the Atlantic. The wealthy white plantation owners, the \textit{grands blancs}, constantly lived in fear of a slave revolt, and they also struggled against a class of free blacks, the \textit{gens de couleur}, who were demanding racial equality. Whites on the island also battled the French home government, an institution that was increasingly trying to restrict their autonomy. Furthermore, the Spanish and the British, who also owned territory in the region, coveted this pearl and were hoping to relieve the French of their possession. An intense environment existed on the island when the French revolution broke out later that year. Inspired by the \textit{Declaration of the Rights of Man}, the \textit{gens de couleur} demanded voting rights and other civil liberties. When the \textit{grands blancs} refused to acquiesce to their demands, a civil war erupted on the island. Slave groups rose in revolt as well, forcing the French government to ultimately abolish slavery three years later in an attempt to save the colony itself.

During this tumultuous revolution, a hero emerged: Toussaint Louverture, a self-educated former slave and a successful general. He originally fought under the Spanish flag, but he promised to return his allegiance to France on the condition that they would abolish slavery when the war was done. The French followed through on their promise, and even promoted Toussaint to governor of the colony. During his time
as governor, Toussaint attempted to bring normalcy back to Saint Domingue by instituting a policy that would put former slaves back to work on fields, and he slowly advocated for the return of the *grands blancs* who had fled to France. In this way he could maintain productivity and keep the French happy, insulating himself against a forceful takeover. He “defended his policies by insisting that it was necessary to limit liberty in order to sustain it.” Political opponents resisted these measures, but Toussaint was able to craftily defeat them and maintain control of the colony. Although his rivals and other Frenchmen claimed he wanted complete independence, Toussaint preferred to remain under the French flag. Declaring independence would have been an invitation for the Spanish or the Americans to take control of the island, and Toussaint enjoyed the protection afforded by his relationship with France. His primary goal was to chart his own course while nominally remaining French.

In 1801, five years after his promotion to governor, Toussaint drafted his own constitution in response to one published by the new leader of France, Napoleon Bonaparte. To protect his office, Toussaint assured the French that the entire extent of Saint Domingue would remain part of the French Empire, but he insisted that he would govern the island using particular, special laws. He promised that slavery would not exist on the colony; however, he did tie former slaves to the land. He concluded the constitution by declaring himself governor for life. Much like Napoleon, a dictator who had risen to power on the promises of freedom and equality, Toussaint had also “turned himself into a dictator, and the colony he ruled over into a society based on social hierarchy, forced labor, and violent repression.” Although Toussaint believed he was working towards the interests of the French government, the publication of this document convinced Napoleon that Toussaint was out of control and would soon sue for independence. In the months that followed, Bonaparte made plans for one of his key generals, Charles Leclerc, to attack the island of Saint Domingue and wrest power from its leader.

Although Bonaparte had promoted Toussaint to commander-in-chief of the island just months before, in response to the constitution and conversations he had had with the British, Napoleon secretly expunged Toussaint’s name from the rolls of the French army. Years later, during his time in exile, Napoleon reflected, “the honor, along with the interest of France, required that we make [Toussaint and the blacks of Saint Domingue] go back into nothingness.” Here, Bell hints at, but does not overtly discuss, one of the primary reasons why Toussaint is not taught in the Western academies. Against specific orders of the French government, the governor of Saint Domingue published his own
constitution and treated with the enemy, and, at the moment of fact creation, Toussaint paid for his insolence. Bell ignores the plight of Toussaint, instead focusing on Napoleon and the actions he took rather than those of the Haitian governor. This historical shift of focus, from Toussaint to Napoleon, was the French leader’s intention. Trouillot argues that “history, as a social process, involves people in three distinct capacities: 1) as agents, or occupants of structural positions; 2) as actors in constant interface with a context; and 3) as subjects, that is, as voices aware of their vocality.” This act was the first of many that Napoleon would take to erase his foe’s name from the histories, and it was done with a goal in mind. Napoleon, acting as an agent well aware of his own voice and power, purposefully erased Toussaint’s name from this important record, and Bell falls into his trap. Although he does Louverture justice by composing his autobiography, he does not analyze the significance of Bonaparte’s action. Napoleon intended to send Toussaint back to nothingness, and he did so by physically, secretly, altering a document that has become a primary source for historians of this period. Although Bell caught the French dictator in the act, he ignores his agency at the moment of fact creation.

Napoleon’s secret instructions to Leclerc (1801) reveal much about the French general’s military genius and cunning. However, when one reads between the lines of the document, one can begin to see signs of fear reflected in the dictator’s writing. The three-part plan outlined in the document makes use of deception and military strength to wrest power from the Toussaint Louverture. In the first step, Leclerc was to “promise everything [Toussaint Louverture] may ask for, in order to take possession of the places and to get in the country.” Once he established a foothold on the island, Leclerc was to treat Toussaint and his generals with respect in an effort to exact a pledge of loyalty to the new French Republic. If that tactic failed, Leclerc could make use of the large military force to capture and deport Toussaint to Paris.

One of the most shocking passages of the Secret Instructions can be found in the first chapter concerning the army. In total, Napoleon sent 19,000 troops to the tiny Caribbean island and detailed an incredibly long plan of attack (three pages of an eight-page document) that Leclerc was to follow upon arrival. Furthermore, Napoleon intended to secure additional troops by arming “all the whites of the Cap, the colored men and the faithful men among the blacks.” One could argue that Napoleon simply wanted to be thorough and ensure an easy victory by sending such a large host of troops, but it also points to his own fear of Toussaint’s power and skill as a general. Although Toussaint’s army came in the form of an untraditional, slave militia, Napoleon intended to combat him with over 20,000 troops, most of which were trained soldiers
from Europe. In fact, his army was so large that it prompted Toussaint to cry, “All of France has come to Saint Domingue.”

Napoleon’s primary goal was to remove Toussaint from St. Domingue and place him under his control in France. However, the French Consul also made a point of deporting “every priest who served Toussaint,” and all unruly whites, free coloreds, and slaves either to France or other French islands. In his instructions, he explained that once the general was gone, “all donations made by Toussaint are null,” and “commerce must, during the first, second, and third periods be accessible to Americans, but after the third period, Frenchmen only will be admitted and the ancient rules from before the revolution will be put back into force.” Through his three-part plan, Napoleon intended to erase all the progress Toussaint had made and transform the island back into a slave-based plantation economy. Although he does state that “the French nation will never give irons to men it had recognized as free,” the plans that follow betrayed that promise as nothing more than empty words. While he publicly proclaimed his opposition to the institution of slavery, he secretly informed Leclerc that reinstating slavery was the end goal. In negating all of Toussaint’s changes to the island, and by deporting all potential sources of rebellion, it becomes clear that Napoleon intended to silence this period in Haitian/French history. By removing all vestiges of Toussaint’s power, Bonaparte was attempting to wipe the slate clean. Simply removing him from the island would not do, as several would live to fight battles in his name. However, if all those who had formerly supported the black governor were also removed from the island, who would be left to carry on Toussaint’s memory? The instructions detail a plan to reinforce the old rules on the colony full of loyal Frenchmen and new slaves, and if this plan was successful, Napoleon and the French could simply pretend that this small eruption had never happened.

The Secret Instructions are an incredibly useful document that allows historians to see into Bonaparte’s mind in his dealings with Toussaint and the rebellious Saint Domingue. It reveals the consul’s fears of Toussaint’s strength and his desire to erase him and his slave rebellions from the Haitian (and presumably French) memory. However, all of these insights must be gleaned from a careful reading of the document. Napoleon was a strong man and a fierce leader. He was unlikely to admit fear of an adversary, especially in a document sent to one of his top generals.

Leclerc ventured to Haiti to relieve Toussaint of his post and assume his role as the governor of the island, but events did not transpire as he and Napoleon had predicted. Although those close to Toussaint had warned the Consul that attacking Saint Domingue would be a mistake,
the brash general ignored their council in his efforts to quickly eliminate Toussaint. He had been told the exact strategy Toussaint would follow, but Napoleon’s army was caught off guard when the black general ordered his forces to retreat to the mountains and burn everything along the way, leaving the French soldiers to die from the diseases unique to the tropical climate. While the French were able to easily capture towns and win small engagements, controlling and subduing the island was an entirely different matter. Unlike the wars in Europe, the capture of territory in Saint Domingue did not signal the end of the war.

Although Napoleon had expected the engagement with the black army to last no more than six weeks, the conflict dragged on for a full four months. Within weeks of this presumably “quick” invasion, Leclerc wrote back to France, complaining, “I am here without food or money… It is necessary that the government send me provisions, money, troops. That is the only means of ensuring the preservation of San Domingo.” The conflict dragged on, and “every day of war was piling up mountains in the way of Bonaparte’s clear and precise instructions.” Each week, Leclerc lost more men and squandered more provisions, and the goal of returning the colony to the direct control of Bonaparte seemed farther and farther away, in a large part, due to Toussaint’s expertise in the field. C.L.R. James, one of the first and most famous writers on this period in Haitian history, clearly demonstrates Toussaint’s strength as a commander. He forced the French to fight a battle unlike one they had ever fought before. These soldiers were accustomed to fighting wars against an organized army, one who met them on the field of battle, one in which Napoleon could make use of his superior artillery knowledge to best his foes. However, Toussaint’s army “had the organisation [sic] and discipline of a trained arm, and at the same time, all the tricks and dodges of guerrillas.” He threw Napoleon’s grand army into uncomfortable territory and forced them to submit to his unfamiliar tactics. Although Napoleon had expected his force to walk all over the Haitian island, each day he lost ground against the blacks, an unacceptable position for the emperor of France. James notes that “Bonaparte feared him,” which would give Napoleon the motive to eliminate Toussaint from the sources. While James does not make this argument in explicit terms, his lengthy chapter describing the Bonaparte-Louverture conflict certainly alludes to this historical fact.

Although Toussaint was holding his own against the European invaders, he was ultimately forced to surrender when one of his key generals, Christophe, defected, transferring key strongholds to the French. Through deception, Toussaint was convinced to leave his plantation at Ennery and meet with General Brunet, who immediately bound him in chains and deported him to France. On his departure,
Toussaint was quoted as saying, “You have only cut down the trunk of the tree of liberty of the blacks in Saint Domingue: it will spring back from the roots because they are numerous and deep.”  

Toussaint did not fear for his colony knowing that his own time was at an end. He had given the blacks in Saint Domingue the spark they needed to continue the revolution without him.

Despite ridding the colony of its commander and deporting other leaders of rebellion, the specter of Toussaint continued to haunt Charles Leclere. In August of that year, he wrote to France crying, “it is not enough to have taken away Toussaint, there are 2,000 leaders to be taken away.”  

Although in his instructions Napoleon had ordered his general to deport the leaders, it soon became apparent that every former slave was somehow a general. These men hated the institution of slavery and were willing to fight to the death to ensure it was not reinstated on the island.

Before the battle was won Leclerc fell prey to yellow fever, however, he wrote to Napoleon with a final word of advice:

We must destroy all the nègres of the mountains, men and women, and keep only children under twelve years old...otherwise the colony will never be quiet. If you wish to be master of Saint-Domingue, you must send me twelve thousand men without wasting a single day.

Despite the continuous influx of troops from Europe and new, cruel tactics instituted by Leclerc’s successor, the blacks survived and were able to declare independence in 1804. Much to Bonaparte’s dismay, it seemed as though Leclerc’s advice was the only way to win back the island, and he was unable to follow through. Although the war against Toussaint only lasted four months, the battle for control of Haiti continued after Louverture’s death, lasting ultimately two years, costing the French over 60,000 men.  

Napoleon was forced to abandon his dream of a transcontinental France at the hands of untrained slaves. They defeated “la grande armée” – the great army that in the preceding years had marched almost effortlessly through Europe,” and this greatly upset the French consul.  

It markedly colored his opinions not only about Toussaint, but also about the entire revolution and the black race in general. He is known to have censored the press and strictly controlled information, and it seems likely that he would work hard to ensure reports concerning the Haitian revolution and his own failures would not spread.  

Toussaint had begun a revolution that could not be stopped, but Bonaparte foolishly believed he could burn the island to the ground and begin anew.  

In his memoirs, Bonaparte reflects on Toussaint’s character and blames him for causing France to waste excessive capital.
He further remarks that, due to Toussaint, “the colonial system, which we have witnessed, is closed for us, as well as the whole continent of Europe.” Too much time and money was wasted subduing Toussaint that the French were forced to abandon not only colonization, but also conquest of Europe. Embarrassed by the defeat and angered by his inability to carry out his grand plans of conquest, Napoleon covered up the affair.

But what of Toussaint? Although the revolution on Saint Domingue continued without him, what happened to the unrecognized general who toed the line with the most powerful man in the world? Once he arrived in France, he was immediately sent to Fort-de-Joux, a castle turned prison in the Jura Mountains. During his captivity, Toussaint asked if was Napoleon’s aim to bury him alive, and eerily, this goal seemed to be the emperor’s exact intention. Bonaparte wanted Toussaint to die naturally, but as quickly as possible. Any sort of public hearing or execution would transform Toussaint into a martyr and further inspire the slaves to revolt. Although in his memoirs Toussaint asks for nothing but a fair trial, Napoleon denies him this wish. To do so not only would have undermined the consul’s goal (to rid himself of this menace), but it also would have drawn attention to the man and kept the memory of Toussaint alive. Instead, Toussaint was denied adequate food, water, and medical attention. In Fort-de-Joux the air was cold and damp. It didn’t take long for a man who had never left the tropics to die of pneumonia in his cell. His body was buried in an unmarked grave.

Napoleon quietly killed off Toussaint, denying him a fair trial or even the amenities of a human being. Through these actions we can see that Napoleon not only wanted to kill the man, but his memory as well. Bell makes the argument that Napoleon’s intent was to systematically erase the existence of Toussaint Louverture. He describes his poor treatment in detail and explains that allowing Toussaint any sort of military trial, as he requested, would simply revive his name and his power. Bell believes, however, that Bonaparte’s attempt to erase the memory of Toussaint was a failure, proven by the fact that the war continued on Haiti, allowing the former slaves to ultimately declare independence. And while this fact may be true, American and European contemporaries of Napoleon simply forgot that the Caribbean island even existed. Bell was correct in stating that Napoleon had failed to eradicate the specter of Toussaint in Haiti, however, the author’s scope of the silencing is too limited. Although Toussaint’s memory was not dead to those who still fought for his name, for those outside Haiti, his memory vanished like the flame of an extinguished candle. Bonaparte was able to take advantage of the fact that contemporaries refused to engage the revolution in historical discussion and debate, and while
Toussaint’s memory lived on in Haiti, the outside world quickly covered it up and forgot about it.\textsuperscript{47} Napoleon, then, is the underappreciated, most important agent in the revolution’s silencing. Although the revolt was ultimately successful and Haiti became a free and independent colony, the memory of Toussaint slowly faded away as did the memory of this revolution in Europe. As previously mentioned, those who lived through this historical period found the Haitian revolution “unthinkable,” and while emphasis has been placed throughout on Napoleon’s agency in intentionally altering historical sources and eliminating historical actors, none of the silencing would have been possible without the collusion of his contemporaries and future historians.\textsuperscript{48} Trouillot argues that the revolution “challenged the very framework within which proponents and opponents had examined race, colonialism, and slavery in the Americas.”\textsuperscript{49} Although some felt that blacks should have equal rights and that slavery should be ended, most found that blacks were inferior to whites.\textsuperscript{50} It was impossible, then, to believe that somehow slaves were able to overcome the most powerful and celebrated army in all of Europe. Rather than change their worldview, it was easier to just pretend the revolution had never happened at all, that Haiti was simply some fictional location, and Napoleon was not one to argue. Trouillot focuses primarily on the reactions of the “average citizen,” but obviously the political figures have a hand in history making as well. Bonaparte was the most powerful man in all of Europe. He controlled the press and publications. Being the crafty and skilled leader that he was, Napoleon was able to take advantage of the general disbelief in the revolution and quiet his own colossal failures.

But, in the end, Napoleon, ironically, came to regret his decision. In a book about the emperor’s life in exile, he is quoted as saying that he “ought to have been satisfied with governing [Saint Domingue] through the medium of Toussaint.” His alliance with England was not yet solidified, and engaging in a colonial war served only to weaken him. He laid blame on the colonists who had lobbied for a re-colonization of the island in a selfish attempt to reclaim their lost property. However, as one continues reading, it becomes clear that it was not just the colonists who had problems with Toussaint. In the chapter, Napoleon repeatedly downplays the intelligence and skill of the black general and blames Toussaint for the end of French colonization. Even at the end of his life, after his own defeat by the allied forces of Europe, Bonaparte still disrespects Toussaint. He refuses to give him credit for his merits and continues to begrudge him for the “three to four hundred millions of capital swept away from France to a remote country,”\textsuperscript{51} that would not have been squandered otherwise. James argued that Napoleon
blamed the blacks for what was happening in San Domingo...That the blacks would not docilely submit to be slaves again was an unpardonable crime and they wreaked their vengeance on the man whom they considered mainly responsible for the disappointment. It was Toussaint’s resistance which had upset all calculations.52

Although Napoleon regretted deposing Toussaint, it was not because the former slave was actually a strong leader and who had been advancing the interests of France. Bonaparte simply lamented his decision due to inopportune timing and his own shortcomings in battle. Even at the end of his life, Napoleon still worked to downplay the black general’s achievements and diminish his importance in comparison to his own.

Although we have recently seen a renaissance in terms of information concerning the Haitian Revolution, there is still much to be learned. While it may be that we have not discovered certain sources yet, it is even more likely that certain information concerning the life and times of Toussaint Louverture will never be uncovered. History is about power, and those with power write it. In his time, Napoleon Bonaparte was one of the most powerful men in the world, and although it can be argued that Toussaint came close to eclipsing his glory, Napoleon ultimately bested him. The result of this victory was the obliteration of Toussaint from the history books. But all is not lost. By reading between the lines in documents such as “The Secret Instructions,” Napoleon’s memoirs, letters from General Leclerc, Toussaint’s writings, and others, we can see the fear that the emperor and his generals harbored for his black counterpart. We begin to see the signs of silencing. Although the Haitian revolution is the only successful slave revolution that has ever taken place, most people die without ever hearing the name Toussaint Louverture. Napoleon won the battle for power, and as a result, Toussaint paid the ultimate price.

2 Now known as Haiti
5 The other three include the making of archives, the making of narratives, and the making of history (historiography), all of which occur after the production of the sources, all of which build upon those sources. Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 26.
6 Reinhardt, 200 Years of Forgetting, 246.
7 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 29.

Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 191.


Ibid., sec. 28.

Ibid., 253.

Ibid., 222.

17 A moment where those who had power to influence history created source documents about that particular period. In this case, those who crafted documents historians would later use diminished the importance of Toussaint or completely removed him from that history.


21 “Haiti: Napoleon’s Secret Instructions -- Haitian Revolution,” 1.


24 Ibid., 5.

25 Ibid., 6.

26 Ibid., 3.


29 Ibid., 243.

30 Reinhardt, 200 Years of Forgetting, 247.

31 James, *The Black Jacobins*, 304.

32 Ibid., 319.

33 Ibid., 317.

34 Ibid., chap 13.

35 Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 265.


38 Reinhardt, 200 Years of Forgetting, 247.

39 Ibid., 248.


41 “Haiti: Napoleon’s Secret Instructions -- Haitian Revolution.”


43 Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 283.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 284.
47 Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, chap. 3.
48 Ibid., 82.
49 Ibid., 82–3.
50 Ibid., 83.
“Full of Light” Yet “Plunged into Dark Obscurity”: Indian Reception and Incorporation of Catholicism in Colonial Mexico, Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries

Lindsey Waldenberg

I. Introduction

In his 1679 letter to his Father Provincial, Father Fernandez states that he “can know no greater glory than to employ [his] life in the conversion of [Indian] souls.”¹ His words reflect the enthusiasm with which many missionaries such as himself approached the conversion of Mexican Indians to Christianity. With the Spanish conquest of Mexico came the declaration of a new ruler, the establishment of a new culture, and the transplantation of a new religion, and by extension, the purposeful eradication of all past traditions, social structures, and organizational rule. To confirm their complete and total takeover, Spaniards saw the establishment of Christianity as a necessity, for the religion represented a fundamental pillar of Spanish culture. As stated by Ernest Galarza, Spanish nationalism “was inseparably united and identified with the Catholic religion, and it was the very nature of the Spanish soldier to proclaim in one breath the majesty of his king and the glory of his religion.”²

Though the Spanish came to the New World with hopes of finding gold—the impetus for many of the conquerors’ “deeds” and “cruelties”—the “desire to spread the holy Christian religion” was of equal importance.³ Many missionaries, especially Franciscan friars who sought to share the glory of God, accompanied the influx of Spanish soldiers and Spaniards. Evangelization in New Spain began as early as 1511, when Fray Jeronimo de Aguilar brought the first Catholic prayer book to the area.⁴ In 1524, the famous “The Twelve” Franciscans landed at Veracruz to convert the Indians on behalf of the Pope and Spanish monarchs. The Augustinians, who arrived in 1533, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits soon followed the Franciscan Order, each aspiring to convert as many Indians as possible and spread Catholicism throughout the land.⁵

Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, these men traveled throughout New Spain, seeking to establish themselves as respectable and approachable community leaders to convert the indigenous people through various methods of education. Missionaries appealed to the Indians by using their native languages to communicate, or at least recite, elements of the religion.

Historians have debated the efficacy of the missionary movement in Colonial Mexico. Robert Ricard’s *The Spiritual Conquest*
of Mexico, one of the most influential texts regarding the promulgation of Catholicism, argues that the imported religion effectively and completely conquered the pagan religion of the indigenous peoples. Responding to this theory of the absolute Spanish overhaul of indigenous life, historians have referenced this text in their own works to demonstrate how Spanish culture and Catholicism thoroughly replaced existent indigenous culture and society. Ernest Galarza’s book *The Roman Catholic Church in Mexico* similarly contends that, although fraught with setbacks and some difficulties, the phenomenon forced conversion unconditionally, leaving no opportunity for individual indigenous expression.

While the majority of historiography concerning this topic affirms the total takeover of religious life, few analyses detail the issues implicit with cultural conquest, such as to what extent the Indians rejected Catholicism and maintained their own individual beliefs. Some historians, like Francisco Morales, focus only on the obstacles missionaries faced in their task, while others such as Martin Austin Nesvig cite different problems within the Church and orders as complicating the conversion phenomenon. Others, like Mark Christensen, attempt to draw connections between Christian and indigenous religious beliefs as a way of explaining how Indians interpreted Catholic doctrine. However, because most of the existing primary documents come from missionaries and friars, historians tend to view the Catholic conquest of New Spain through a mostly European lens, relying on the texts’ written word as purveyors of truth and accuracy. Yet these texts communicate only one side of the story, and merely hint at how Indians received Catholicism in actuality. My paper analyzes these texts and what they say (and do not say) to demonstrate the attitudes of Indians towards Catholicism, and by extension argue that Indians were not completely eager adherents to Christianity.

In reality, the degree of enthusiastic acceptance varied among Indians. Many individuals used elements of their pre-conquest religions, such as myths or rituals, to understand and translate this strange new worldview, which the Spanish had pushed them to practice, into relatable ideas. Furthermore, the conversion of the Indians of Mexico was by no means uniform. Because many different Indian tribes occupied various regions throughout Mexico, they each approached Christianity with a slightly different religious viewpoint and frame of reference. In addition, the variation between groups signified that the missionaries, while using the same general approach, had to somewhat tailor their conversion efforts to individual groups. There is evidence that many Indians continued to appeal to certain aspects of their religions, particularly idol worship, despite a seeming recognition and approval of Christianity. Yet despite these instances of rejection, some Indians felt so connected
with the Catholic faith that they desired to become members of the clergy, living as priests and nuns who would embody and promote Christianity in a positive manner. This paper explores how Indians in Colonial Mexico understood and responded to Catholicism, and to what extent they embraced or rejected the religion. While there existed numerous indigenous groups with variable histories, as set forth herein their experiences are used to highlight the general trend of acceptance among Indians in New Spain. Ultimately, the indigenous groups used their own personalized modes of participation and applied their own traditional religious beliefs to understand and relate to Catholicism. This hybrid nature of the indigenous practice of Catholicism demonstrates the complicated efficacy of the Spanish missionary movement in changing the religious and cultural landscape of Mexico.

II. Religious Education and Conversion

To ensure the complete colonization of New Spain, the Spaniards declared that conversion of the native peoples was not only optimal, but also compulsory. The task of converting the Indians fell upon the friars and missionaries who had traveled to the New World precisely to spread the Word of God. Indeed, many missionaries were shocked by the indigenous rituals they observed, and attempted to eradicate any element of pagan pre-conquest beliefs. However, they recognized that to cement conversion they needed to establish themselves as trusted figures in the community whose benevolence and goodwill would speak to the Indians and show the righteousness of Christianity, in effect acting as examples that would encourage Indians to adopt Catholicism wholeheartedly. Missionaries soon declared themselves as the village, town, or region’s authorities, and strove to convey their passion for Christianity through various avenues, especially religious observance.

Education was an important pillar in the Franciscan way of life, and therefore it was the chosen method of conversion. Communicating how to be a proper Christian, correctly and effectively practice rituals, and embody the elements of the Catholic faith required an eventual complete and total takeover of indigenous life. The life and experiences of Father Juan Fernandez, a Jesuit missionary converting the Seri Indians of the Sonora region in the seventeenth century, lend insight into the precise methods missionaries used to educate and convert indigenous peoples. Because he was working in the seventeenth century, in the midst of the missionary movement, his work embodies the typical approach missionaries took in converting their charges.

In a letter written to his Provincial Father Tomas Altamirano in 1679, Fernandez discusses his supposed complete success in converting
the Seri Indians. Although a Jesuit missionary, there is no doubt that his conversion efforts parallel those of Franciscan missionaries, due to his thorough emphasis on education. Father Fernandez’s letter is a biased account that reveals interesting information about how the Jesuit order interacted with one particular indigenous group, thereby shedding some light on what methods Christian missionaries employed to convert indigenous peoples. As an initial matter, it must be considered that Fernandez’s letter was written to his Provincial, to whom he was accountable; therefore, Fernandez likely felt pressure to portray a successful and trouble-free conversion.

One of the most significant, informative and revealing details of the letter is Father Fernandez’s discussion of the methods by which he taught the Seris aspects of Christianity, using the Seris’ own language to impart the Christian doctrine and “teaching it to them word for word.” His letter reveals that the use of native language was a key tool for conversion of the native people.

Fernandez’s letter also shows that one of the most effective methods for teaching Catholicism was through the teaching of ritual. Missionaries reasoned that by going through the physical motions of prayer, such as using rosaries and committing to a schedule of gathered devotion, denoted by the ringing of church bells, Indians would soon began to incorporate Catholic worship into their daily routines. Father Fernandez sought to reinforce his teachings by encouraging the Seris to gather “every day, in the morning and in the afternoon…and recite” what they have learned. The Seris came to hear mass, and learned “the ways of our holy faith and the things they must know for their salvation.”

Father Fernandez also instructed them how to use rosaries, which the Seris utilized to recite prayers in their native language before an image of the Holy Virgin every afternoon. As a sign of his success, he even requested that the messenger bring more rosaries, implying that the number of converting and practicing Seris continued to rise. Furthermore, Fernandez details how he had baptized more than one hundred and thirty people, each of whom had desired to receive this sacrament, and how his faithful converts would make their confessions and receive the sacrament of communion. While he mentions how some Seris had been almost desperate to be baptized, he does not reveal any details about the Seris who had not converted to Christianity. There is no explanation of why they were not baptized or why they did not participate in other religious practices. Beyond that, he does not reveal if he tried to counteract this resistance; Father Fernandez just paints a picture of Christian joy and totally disregards any mention of defiance. Ultimately, this document, although quite informative, silences the responses of the Seris and ignores the totality of the conversion
phenomenon in Colonial Mexico. Fernandez’s letter is useful for understanding how indigenous populations were introduced to Christianity, but is vague in its approach to revealing the reality of indigenous reception.

Father Fernandez’s use of native language signals an important trend in colonial conversion efforts, one that stirred much debate in the world of the Church and clergy. The use of indigenous-language Bibles was a source of contention, as some believed that the words were too holy to be sullied by native languages. However, some monastic orders, particularly the Franciscans, argued that the eradication of translations of the Scripture would damage the missionaries’ conversion efforts, as it would be “virtually impossible for friars and missionaries to explain important concepts to Indians in sermons without accurate translations of the Bible on which to draw.”20 The Spanish Inquisition eventually banned the existence of Indian-language Bibles, affecting the transmission of Christianity in New Spain. Ultimately, there existed the concern within the Church and its orders that teaching these Indians Spanish “would open the way to corrupting influences by challenging [the missionaries’] own role as mediators between Spaniard and Indian,” and in a sense allowing the Indians to rise above their lowly place in Spanish society.21

In spite of fervent attempts to ensure permanent conversion, not every Indian embraced Christianity or kept practicing it. In Treatise of the Superstitions, Idolatry, Witchcraft, Rites, and Other Gentile Customs of the Aboriginal Races of Mexico, Jacinto de La Serna, secular priest and “famous expurgator of native idolatry,” reveals that despite learning about Christianity and being “full of light,” some Indians still “plunged into [the] dark obscurity” associated with indigenous religion, particularly idol worship.22 Completed in 1656 but not published until 1892, Serna’s anthology of Indian religious practices and ceremonies meant to record how Indians’ practiced Catholicism in reality, and reveal the lack of authenticity in Indians’ conversion.

In the treatise’s first chapter, titled “On the State of the Idolatries Before the [Congregations] of the Indians into Towns,” Serna discusses the occurrence of idolatry among Indians who had supposedly converted to the Catholic faith. He claims that these Indians never abandoned their pagan behavior, but had rather continuously worshipped their idols, fooling the Spanish priests with their cleverness. Indians would conceal their idolatry by “mixing their rites and idolatrous ceremonies with good, holy things, joining light with darkness to Christ with reverence, venerating Christ our Lord, his Holy Mother, and the saints (who some take to be Gods), together with their idols.”23
While Serna acknowledges that the majority of this idolatry takes place in rural areas where priests have not reached, he contends that the Indians have a natural predilection to fall back into their savage, Devil-ridden religion, and will go to extreme lengths to trick the benevolent fathers, who only wish to help them, in order to worship their idols. Serna’s piece illustrates that while the Indians were seen to be naturally prone to evil, they were not regarded as completely unintelligent beings. They went to lengths to disguise their practices from the Spanish missionaries, understanding precisely why the Spanish settlers would disapprove. While extremely prejudiced, Serna’s account reveals that Spanish religious conquest was not initially as successful or complete as the Church and the Spanish throne wanted it to be.

The Indian Inquisition, a phenomenon that took over New Spain in the sixteenth century, developed out of these observed lapses in Catholic observance and the outright rejection of Christianity. In May 1562, two Mani Indians in the Mayan Yucatan found a cave filled with “a number of idols and human skulls” and reported the find to the head of the local monastery.24 The suspect Indians “freely confessed” to worship, citing that they prayed to these idols to make sure they would have corn and deer, and claimed that Indians from other areas also had continued to worship idols for similar reasons.25 This confession launched the beginnings of the three-month Indian Inquisition, where the very same friars who had taught the indigenous peoples tortured thousands of Indians as retribution for the betrayal and dismay the missionaries felt. The Indian Inquisition illustrates that missionaries were paranoid and suspicious of Indian behavior and were capable of inflicting harm on their charges when needed. Although, in their minds, they had been nothing but compassion, missionaries questioned the commitment of Indians to the Catholic faith. Once that lack of commitment manifested itself, these missionaries made a statement by punishing many Indians for just a few individuals’ “mistake.” Undoubtedly, the astonishing violence was meant to send a message to Indians that the Church’s tolerance was conditional, but perhaps was also used as an excuse to act on the Catholic Church’s racist sentiments towards the indigenous people.

III. The Blending of Old and New

The most problematic issue of conversion was the need to make Catholicism not only palatable but also attractive to the Indians. Missionaries needed to be aware of indigenous traditions, understanding the religion and the reasons for horrifying acts such as idol worship. Although most Indian communities adopted Christianity, a number of pre-Hispanic “practices continued, such as the use of pulque and the
clandestine worship of pre-Hispanic deities, or were integrated into Mexican society, such as the use of chocolate and the fusion of ancestor worship with All Saints’ Day in the form of the Day of the Dead." In her article “Religious Conflicts in the Conquest of Mexico,” Ursula Lamb emphasizes the disparity in the concept of ethics between Christian and Aztec traditions. The “priestly interpretations of the will of idols,” rather than the voice and commandments of a singular God, informed the way the Aztecs organized and conducted their lives. When the missionaries arrived and effectively destroyed the authority and social status of the priests, they filled a religious and social void with saints, dogma, and processions. Lamb’s article demonstrates that while missionaries strove to establish Catholicism as the one true religion, Indians attempted to understand it through applying Christianity to their own faith.

Similarities lay in both cultures’ “tested patterns of habit, revered folkways, inherited pieties.” One of the precedents of Christian religion was a similar conception of sacraments. Indians thoroughly embraced such activity (particularly confession), as opposed to the theological side of Catholicism, because of their need for expression and religious guidance. Many Catholic sacraments mirrored the important milestones in Aztec life, such as birth and death, and by extension effectively allowed Indians to retain some core participatory elements of their pre-conquest religion.

In addition, some Indians in Central Mexico applied beliefs from their own religion to the idea of the Trinity. The Trinity, as it exists in Catholicism, is the concept of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as the three parts that form God. Jill Leslie McKeever Furst speculates on how the Aztecs interpreted the Holy Trinity, suggesting that individuals associated different bodily animating forces that were believed to form a person’s spirit with specific aspects of the Trinity. The application of these indigenous beliefs to a transplanted religious idea theoretically allowed the Aztecs to maintain their pre-conquest religious values but simultaneously appreciate and understand Catholicism. Indeed, Furst’s argument holds value, as the idea of the Trinity could have served as a gateway for these people to continue their Aztec view of humankind and the spirit realm.

The *Historia Eclesiastic Indiana*, an account written in 1596 by Mendiata who summarizes Fray Andres de Olmos’ words, also demonstrates how Indians pulled certain associations from their own pre-conquest religions to understand Christian Bible stories, particularly the creation of man. This retelling, informed by paintings and reports that *caciques* and *cabeceras* gave him, is meant to give a general representation of what the various cultures of the different Mexican
regions believed about the creation of man. According to his understanding, in the heavens there existed a god called Citlalatonac and a goddess called Citlalicue. Citlalicue gave birth to a knife; however, this knife frightened her godly children and so it was tossed to the earth where it landed on a spot called Chicomoztoc, which means “Seven Caves.” Out of this explosion came one thousand and six hundred gods, which Olmos sees as an explanation for the fall of the evil angels, i.e. Lucifer, from Heaven. These gods ask Citlalatonac and Citlalicue if they could have men as servants, but Citlalicue denies this request and suggests they ask Mictlan Tecutli, the Lord of Hell who may give them some men born of bones or ash of the dead. Mictlan Tecutli does give these sixteen hundred gods some bones and ashes, and the gods let their blood upon these objects. A short time later, a baby boy and a baby girl were born, somewhat paralleling the Christian concept that Adam, the first man, was created from dust from the ground. While the differences between the Christian and Indians views of the creation of man are quite obvious, Olmos desires to discern where the Indians have strayed from the Christian truth, and where they have kept elements, though twisted, of the truth of the creation of mankind, such as the fall of the angels and God’s formation of man from dust. This retelling of an Indian interpretation of creation provides one example of how individuals probably associated elements of Christianity and biblical stories with their indigenous religious beliefs and myths to better understand, appreciate, or prove their acceptance of Christianity.

The more complete synthesis of Christian and indigenous tradition is illustrated in colonial ecclesiastical texts, which conveyed biblical stories and lessons, used to educate the Indians. While these texts were supposedly the responsibility of missionaries, many of these men relied on the help of indigenous aides to translate Christian messages into the native language. Mark Christianson contends that because indigenous vocabularies lacked “exact parallels,” native aides were responsible for translating the Christian concepts to keep as much of the original meaning as possible. Despite the desire for these texts to remain unadulterated, “frequent misspellings of Spanish loanwords, indigenous tropes, and above all the influence of pre-contact rhetoric and culture on ecclesiastical terms all betray the hands of indigenous aides.” Many preexisting indigenous terms, imagery, and religious associations pervade these texts, showing the native aides’ interference and illustrating that those who heard these texts were not hearing a completely Christian message. Rather, they were hearing Christian stories as partially interpreted through an indigenous religious lens. Therefore, these peoples’ initial exposure to Christianity was colored with their original traditions and religious concepts.
However, just because Indians thought about Catholicism with pre-conquest religious images, terms, and stories in mind does not mean that they resented Christianity. Due to the missionaries’ conscious, tireless efforts, many Indians adored the Christian doctrine, as evidenced by various religious celebrations. In Motolinia’s Historia de los Indios de Nueva Espana, the Franciscan missionary describes the Christian pageant the Tlacaltec stage on the festivals of Corpus Christi and San Juan in 1538. Motolinia presents a very detailed and delighted description of the massive celebration of the Eucharist where the Indians decorated the parade route with thousands of flowers and triumphal arches. Motolinia writes that the festival deserves to be memorialized because he believed that if the Pope and the emperor with their courts had attended, they would have been much pleased to see it. Although there were no precious jewels and no brocades, there were other decorations that were fine to see, especially the flowers and roses that God created in the trees and in the fields—so much so that it was pleasing and worth note that a people who until now were taken for bestial, would know how to do such things.  

The glory and beauty of the pageant astounded Motolinia, and the adornments of gold and plumes on crosses and images of saints “were so finely worked that people in Spain would have held them in higher esteem than those of brocade.” Motolinia desired to convey the awe-inspiring decorations and religiosity of the event, which was like “heaven on earth;” his detailed descriptions illustrate that, at least in Tlaxcala, the Indians had thoroughly embraced Catholicism and wished to celebrate the glory of the God in the lavish, proper way God deserves. In effect, Motolinia’s account suggests that the tireless efforts of missionaries paid off, for some Indians had been saved from their heathen ways and became practicing Catholics. However, it must be considered what Motolinia is not saying; it is unclear if all Tlacaltecas participated in the pageant, or whether their celebration was sincere or merely just a show to satisfy the Spaniards. Regardless, this source demonstrates that Christian celebrations were beginning to take root and become a part of life in colonial Mexican villages and towns.

IV. Indian Priests and Nuns

In some cases, conversion efforts were so successful that Indians not only venerated Catholicism, but also wanted to devote their entire lives to the religion. Some individuals wished to become priests or nuns so as to fully give every essence of their being to God, and to also
actively share and spread the glory of the Christian faith. However, various racial and gender prejudices affected, and in some cases denied, the extent to which these Indian individuals could become official members of the clergy as seen in the eyes of the Catholic Church.

In terms of gender prejudices, women undoubtedly suffered more than men. Women, regardless of race, were believed to be infinitely less educated, and thereby unable “to undertake the mental rigors of religious observance after conversion.”

The incorporation of Indian women into religious life began in the early sixteenth century, when Bishop Zumarraga planned a cloistered school for girls to be educated in Christianity. However, Indian parents objected to the idea of educating their daughters, because the girls were educated in “Spanish ways,” making them undesirable to Indian suitors. The first convent for women in New Spain opened in 1550, but was only opened to women of Spanish heritage. Despite their desire to become nuns, Indian women were initially only able to receive access to this type of spiritual life by working as servants for these Spanish nuns. Eventually, the first convent that served Indians exclusively, Corpus Christi, was founded in 1724. A Franciscan convent dedicated to Saint Clare, the place served as a refuge for Indian women who wanted to be nuns, and effectively ended “two centuries of exclusion of Indian women from spaces privileged for women in the Roman Catholic Church.”

As cited by Asuncion Lavrin, Indian women wished to join convents to “serve willingly and with great pleasure, and live there among the religious with the greatest of virtue,” not because of their lack of dowries or poverty.

However, their preferred gender did not mean that Indian men had an easier time being accepted into religious orders. Racism was prevalent among members of the Spanish church and settlers alike, and indubitably affected how they viewed the capabilities of Indians to lead an untarnished Christian life. Previous experiences and encounters, such as Jacinto de la Serna’s account, had persuaded Spaniards that many Indians were insincere and incomplete in their conversion to Christianity. These individuals had been tempted by the Devil, and were not steadfast in their devotion. Therefore, church authorities saw the Indian as an unreliable Christian who could not handle the responsibilities of Christian life and thereby should not be entrusted with the task of spreading the Word of God because he might spread idolatrous practices instead. Essentially, the “Indian was not deemed to be as fit as a Spaniard to be a custodian of souls, whether his own or that of another.”

Some missionaries, particularly the Franciscans, had more faith in the Indians’ proclamation of their love for Christ. In the early sixteenth century the Franciscan order had established a monastery as
well as a college in Tlatelolco. The Colegio de Santa Cruz was an “idealistic school of linguistic study of Nahuatl and Indian culture, where Indians…studied classical Latin, Spanish grammar, and Catholic theology in preparation for the priesthood.” The purpose of the college was to create a Catholic Indian laity and to train Indians for the creation of a future priesthood. Furthermore, the college emphasized a humanistic education, teaching Indians how to read and write to comprehend Scripture. However, the school was met with much criticism, and was eventually shut down by the Spanish Church. Despite the college’s attempts, it took many more years for Indians priests to be accepted and allowed to practice, representing the contradictory nature of conversion efforts in Colonial Mexico. Indians could receive and embody the tenets of Catholicism, but were not strong enough to spread and teach the Word of God. Once again, Indian men wanted to join the Church to express their piety and devotion, and to educate others in the ways of Christ. Yet their desire could also speak to their wish to demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish crown and attain an elevated position in colonial society. It is possible that men saw positions in the Church as opportunities to break through racial barriers and achieve a better lifestyle than the destitution forced upon many Indians. Indigenous aspiration to join the Catholic clergy revealed that some Indians subscribed to the tenets of Catholicism, moving beyond the comfortable knowledge of their indigenous religions and accepting Christianity as the “correct” way of life, effectively succumbing to the persuasion of proselytization.

V. Conclusion

The conversion efforts of Catholic missionaries in Colonial Mexico intended to transform the pagan landscape into a land of Christendom. As part of their holy duty, missionaries felt responsible for saving Indians’ souls from the grips of their pre-conquest, heathen religion. The process was colored with successes and setbacks, but in the end was quite effective in creating a nation of new Catholics. Indians received Christianity with various degrees of enthusiasm and skepticism, questioning if this new religion could answer their pleas with the same amount of effectiveness as their traditional gods. In some cases, Indians consciously (and unconsciously) maintained practices and beliefs of their religion, using these ideas to understand Catholicism and keep connections with their gods, who may indeed be the true rulers over all creation after all.

The process of conversion in New Spain illustrates the tension implicit within the process of acculturation. Through the study of primary documents and the consideration of existing historiography, we see that Indians attempted to maintain their indigenous culture while...
simultaneously being exposed to foreign ideologies. Eventually, the Christian conquest of Mexico resulted in the creation of a new class of Catholics who infused their newfound faith with indigenous beliefs, effectively producing a unique, synthesized brand of Christianity.

3 Ibid., 15.
4 New Spain was a viceroyalty of the Spanish colonial empire and included the area of Mexico.
5 Galarza, The Roman Catholic Church, 20-22.
7 Galarza, The Roman Catholic Church, 20.
9 Mark Z. Christensen, “The Tales of Two Cultures: Ecclesiastical Texts and Nahua and Maya Catholicisms,” The Americas, 66 no. 3 (January 2010), 356.
10 Ibid., 355.
12 Morales, “The Native Encounter with Christianity,” 139.
14 The Sonora region is located in Northwest Mexico, an area that was predominately occupied by the Jesuit order.
15 The missionary movement was full of conflicting opinions between orders about how Indians should be educated and what their potential was. Franciscans were the most optimistic teachers, using native language to teach Catholicism and lobbying for the complete humanistic education of Indians. The Jesuits, who worked closely with the crown, were similar to the Franciscans in teaching Christianity by using the native language and encouraging the practice of sacraments; however, they were mostly concentrated in one area in the northwest. Dominicans, while wishing to educate Indians, were wary of the use of native language to teach Scripture, and thereby denounced it as a gateway to heresy. Nesvig, “‘The Indian Question’,” 63-75.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Nesvig, “The ‘Indian Question’,” 75.
Given the wide diversity of cultures in Mexico at the time, there existed a variety of religious traditions and beliefs. The citation of these beliefs is intended to demonstrate not only the different rituals, but to emphasize how Indians generally viewed their creation, their world, and their existence, and how they drew parallels between their own traditions and Catholicism.

A cacique was an Indian chief, and a cabecera was a “head town” that had legal and administrative authority over subordinate towns within a certain district.

Christianson, “The Tales of Two Cultures,” 356.

Nesvig, “The ‘Indian Question’,” p. 76.
Over the last decade, the Buddhist tradition has attracted an increasing number of Americans, especially Jewish individuals. There are an estimated four to six million Buddhists in the United States with thirty percent having a Jewish background.¹ This pattern has led to the emergence of what are sometimes called Jewbus or Jubus (Jewish-Buddhists) - individuals who integrate various elements of Buddhism and Judaism into their lives. This paper will explore this interesting phenomenon as it is reflected in three recent works: The Jew in the Lotus: a Poet's Rediscovery of Jewish Identity in Buddhist India by Roger Kamenetz, That's Funny, You Don't Look Buddhist: On Being a Faithful Jew and a Passionate Buddhist by Sylvia Boorstein, and One God Clapping: the Spiritual Path of a Zen Rabbi by Rabbi Alan Lew. While these three largely autobiographical accounts do not necessarily represent the experience of all Jubus, they point to what would appear to be a fairly common path to becoming a Jewish-Buddhist.

This common path is marked by three general transformation stages. First, Kamenetz, Boorstein and Lew all began with a fairly secular Jewish background. In this situation, secularism refers to the decline of spiritual and esoteric aspects of religion where “…individuals become less likely to view matters of social life or even ultimate concerns in religious terms… [and] individuals lose their faith in the existence of religious truths or their beliefs in the existence of religious beings.” ² During this first stage, Jubus-to-be culturally identify themselves with the Jewish people and their Jewish ethnic backgrounds, which includes heritage, family ties, customs, and traditions. Religious practice and personal spirituality do not play a major part in their lives. The second stage is a period of emotional and intellectual turbulence, followed by a search for answers to the meaning and purpose of life. These Jubus report receiving from Buddhism both practical spiritual guidance and some meaningful answers to their existential questions. I use spirituality to refer to the process in which one tries to find a greater meaning and explanation of life and a deeper understanding of oneself, rather than connecting to one’s family or community. Through spiritual practices such as meditation, chanting and contemplation and exploring Buddhist philosophy, an individual attempts to identify a purpose for living and to explore oneself and one’s relationship to the world. Spirituality also involves integrating ideas and experiences of the transcendent into their everyday life experiences. Finally, there is a stage
marked by an effort to combine both Jewish and Buddhist aspects into one’s life – in other words, becoming a Jewish–Buddhist.

Before taking a detailed look at these transformations in the three books by Lew, Boorstein and Kamenetz, I will briefly discuss the history of Jewish involvement in the emergence and growth of American Buddhism. Both Charles Prebish, professor of Buddhist Studies at Utah State University, and Rick Fields, author of “How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America”, describe two distinct types of Buddhist growth in America. Asian Buddhism first appeared in America in the 1840s as Chinese immigrants settled on the West Coast and constructed the first Buddhist temple in San Francisco’s Chinatown in 1853. Several decades later, however, a new form of Buddhism emerged that involved a mostly white and middle-class group who embraced Buddhism not because it was part of their cultural tradition, but out of “intellectual attraction and interest in spiritual practice.” This group, which scholars have labeled as “Euro-American Buddhists”, “missionary Buddhists”, or, even “white Buddhists” (Rick Field’s term) began its history when the American Jewish businessman, Charles Strauss first took refuge in the Three Jewels (the Buddha, the Sangha or community of monks and nun, and the Dharma or the teachings of the Buddha) at the World Conference on Religions in 1893.

During the early twentieth century, an ongoing stream of Chinese and Japanese immigrants brought various lineages and schools of Buddhism to the United States. The period after World War II in particular saw some extremely significant developments for Jews. Many Jewish immigrants fleeing from Europe struggled to create a new identity in the United States during the late 1940s and 1950s. According to the documentary Jews and Buddhism: Belief Amended, Faith Revealed, the attempt to integrate Jewish practice with modern American culture “brought great trouble, great pain, confusion… in this process we have lost access of our ancient wisdom… our identity as Jews has weakened. Many Jews born of Jewish families no longer consider themselves Jewish, certainly not in a significant way.” The post-War period brought greater material and political opportunities for the Jewish people, including the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. At the same time, there were many who felt that synagogues were so focused on practical needs, such as establishing community schools, hospitals, and other organizations, that they completely ignored the more spiritual side of the Jewish religious tradition, such as the study of the Kabbalah, which draws on texts like the Zohar to explain the nature and purpose of the universe and the human experience. Young people from other religious traditions were also feeling the same lack, and it was largely a search for a more meaningful spirituality that in the 1960s attracted many
young people especially to Eastern religions, including Hinduism and Zen Buddhism. Jack Kerouac first used the term “Beat Generation” in 1948 to describe a group of writers protesting the values of post-War America, including materialism and a lack of spirituality, and rejecting traditional, social, and artistic forms of expression. While this movement was not limited to Jews, one of its best known members was the Jewish poet Allen Ginsberg, who eventually became extremely involved with Shambhala Buddhism, which was affiliated with the Tibetan or Vajrayana school of Buddhism. The popularity and influence of the Beat movement was in part behind the turn of many people, including Jews, to Eastern spirituality and in particular, to Buddhism.

The three books that I examine in this paper can help explain some of the reasons why Buddhism has found such a large following among American Jews. Roger Kamenetz discusses some of the basic factors of this phenomenon in The Jew in the Lotus: a Poet's Rediscovery of Jewish Identity in Buddhist India. This book is centered on an account of the 1990 journey of a group of Jewish delegates (including Kamenetz himself) to Dharamsala, India where they had a week-long visit with the Dalai Lama, who was curious to learn more from the Jewish community about spiritual survival in the Diaspora. Kamenetz describes not only conversations between the various Buddhist figures and Jews residing in Dharamsala but also the impact of the experience on his own Jewish belief system as well as his views regarding the Jewu phenomenon.

During this visit, Kamenetz became more open to both Buddhist and Jewish spirituality, and his perspectives of Jews drastically changed. Kamenetz explains that when he arrived in Dharamsala he “had a certain prejudice that maybe Jews who went over the deep end into Buddhism would lose their individuality and become like zombies.” Kamenetz explains that he started his journey to India with the preconceived notion that Jews were just following the popular religious “fashions” of the time, and that if they were sincere and truly Jewish they would be content to remain Jewish. Kamenetz points to his own upbringing as the source of his assumptions. Growing up in an American Jewish family during the post-Holocaust years heightened his sense of Jewishness. This identity was based on the ethnic tradition and heritage of his Jewish family and larger community, which did not place much value on the spiritual experience of the individual. As a result, Kamenetz did not think much of the idea of spirituality:

Part of it was that I identified spirituality itself with Gentiles. Perverse but true. If they had faith, they gave faith a bad name... After all, as a child I didn’t know many spiritually minded Jews. I knew rabbis, of course, but they were affable, or highly intellectual. None of them...
struck me as full of religious enthusiasm... Religious enthusiasm I consigned to the distant Jewish past, the schmaltzy world of *Fiddler on the Roof*... the contemptuous attitudes I had toward Gentile spirituality had blocked me from ever looking for spirituality in Judaism.

Kamenetz claims that he himself had never met any truly spiritual Jews. To his mind, rabbis were examples of intelligence and scholarship, not spirituality. He always identified spirituality with non-Jewish individuals, and this attitude blocked him from exploring Jewish spirituality. What is ironic about Kamenetz’s situation is that he had to travel halfway around the world to a Buddhist community to begin to appreciate the potential for spirituality in his own life. He realized that his Jewish experience had become a very dry and unexamined affair and that “I had missed tremendous areas of a living spiritual depth in Judaism.” While in this book Kamenetz does not specifically discuss how he incorporates both Jewish and Buddhist practices into his personal life, he does, nonetheless, express his gratitude that this experience altered his personal outlook on spirituality and his understanding of what it means to be Jewish. The visit to Dharamsala and the conversations with the Dalai Lama also encouraged Kamenetz to examine the general Jubu phenomenon, and he makes a number of observations on the basis of his experience and his discussion with the Jubes he met in India. Kamenetz suggests that there were a number of factors that caused these Jubes in Dharamsala to embrace Tibetan Buddhism, factors that may or may not be applied to other Jubes and other types of Buddhism elsewhere.

The Dharamsala Jubes that Kamenetz spoke to explained to him that they turned to Tibetan Buddhism because it offered a deeper form of spirituality, rather than just another religion. This was made easier by the fact that they perceived a number of similarities between Tibetan Buddhism and cultural Judaism, including a shared history of exile, a respect for scholarship and learning, and a perception that its practitioners often had a great sense of humor. Kamenetz does not explicitly say that these specific factors influenced his personal transformation; nevertheless, his personal anecdotes suggest that they did. The Tibetan people share a similar history of persecution with the Jewish people. Many individuals compare the invasion of the People’s Republic of China and the displacement of Tibetans from their homeland to the experience of the Holocaust and the Jews in the Diaspora. As Kamenetz writes:

> When I read about celibate Tibetan nuns and monks being humiliated and tortured, I remember the SS forcing rabbis to spit on the Torah
before shooting them. And the death of more than a million Tibetans as a result of the occupation brought up the inevitable charge of genocide... The Chinese came to your people as the Germans came to mine.\textsuperscript{9}

This common past makes it easier for Jewish individuals to relate to Tibetan culture. Jews of the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century have images of the Holocaust ingrained in their minds and are very conscious of the six million Jews lost in genocide. When a group targets another population, Jews reflect upon their own personal and collective group history and compare the two situations. This creates sympathy and compassion for the new targeted group. The Tibetans face the same difficulties, such as maintaining a unified identity and preserving cultural and religious practices, just as the Jewish people have experienced. This repetition of history creates increased sensitivity and interest in the Tibetan's suffering.

Another resemblance between Judaism and Tibetan Buddhism (in particular, the Gelukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism with which the Dalai Lama is associated) is a shared respect for scholarship and learning intellectualism. Rabbinical students study the Torah, Talmud, Mishnah, and other works, while many Gelukpa Buddhists also utilize texts to gain knowledge as well as to achieve insight. In order to become a monk or a rabbi, individuals receive education for a number of years, and part of that education involves the incorporation of formal debate. Interestingly, Tibetan Gelukpa monks and Jewish rabbinical students and rabbis both use debating as part of their religious training and practice. This training similarity encourages Kamenetz to comment about the Dalai Lama that “It was uncanny how much he was able to think like a Jew.”\textsuperscript{10} Kamenetz refers here to a widely-held perception that many Jewish people are very intuitive and ask questions to understand the concept at hand. This seems to correspond to the Buddhist emphasis on “the inquiring mind,” and the practice of investigating both the mind and one’s responses to it.

Kamenetz compares the sense of humor between the Tibetan Buddhists and the Jewish delegation. As is true of most religious traditions, there are certain rules that regulate the lives of its followers. The Jews follow the Commandments of the Torah, while Tibetan Buddhists follow a number of precepts (and ordained monks and nuns follow many hundreds of rules). While many of these rules and disciplines are quite strict and taken very seriously, this does not mean that those who follow them lack a genuine sense of humor and fun. Kamenetz describes how “The constant resort to humor was an unexpected meeting of the two cultures. Joking and kidding flowed from both sides. Laughter was never far from his [the Dalai Lama’s] heart.”\textsuperscript{11}
Kamenetz describes in one situation how the Dalai Lama joked about the exchange of scarves when the delegation presented the Dalai Lama with a *tallis* (a prayer shawl), and he returned to them a *katak* (a thin silk scarf). This shared sense of humor, along with a similar intellectualism and history, helps both Tibetan Buddhists and Jews cross the boundaries between these two communities. When Jewish people turn to Tibetan Buddhism, they do not have to give up, repress or try to change these particular cultural characteristics, since they actually help to create a common language. According to Kamenetz’s experiences in Dharamsala, these three elements allow for a smoother transition from cultural Judaism to Tibetan Buddhism, even though they are not the main reasons behind the rise of the Jubu phenomenon.

In the end, Rodger Kamenetz points to the state of Jewish and Buddhist spirituality as the main factor contributing to the emergence of Jewish Tibetan Buddhists. On his trip to Dharamsala, he found that the Jubus he interviewed felt that Judaism offered them no access to spirituality, while Buddhism provided them with immediately relevant answers and attitudes to both their own problems as well as those of the world at large. Exploring the current ideas of identity and of spirituality in American Judaism will explain why this feeling of spiritual absence is a common theme among a large portion of Jubus.

Many Jubus have come to the consensus that American Judaism focuses more on cultural provisions than spiritual ones:

The mainstream American Jewish religious identity has become highly exoteric, with strong emphasis on ethnicity and the politics of Israel… Rabbi Schachter explained, “our teachings have been kept secret even from Jews for a long time. So every day, when people get up and say their prayers, there is an exoteric order. But hidden inside the exoteric is the esoteric, the deep attunement, the deep way.” The deep way is the way of kabbalah.12

Most Jubus come from more secular forms of Judaism, such as the Reform movement, and the Jewish esoteric traditions remain closed off to many, for reasons that will be explained shortly. As a result, many Jewish people define themselves based on cultural aspects, such as ethnic pride and family ties, and many Jewish education systems teach children to emphasize this Jewish particularism. For example, many children learn to identify each letter in the Hebrew alphabet and its corresponding sounds, but never really learn actual words, much less the meaning of those words. This teaching system fails to explore spiritual ideas. Even if a Jewish individual went to his rabbi for more information about Jewish spirituality, his exploration would most likely end there. Why is
it that the Jewish esoteric experience is unavailable to the majority of Jewish people?

The Torah as well as its traditional commentaries and modern interpretations tend to look negatively on the question of spirituality. As Kamenetz puts it, the Torah often suggests that exploring spirituality can easily lead “to apostasy, madness, and death— an attitude that still strongly marks the mainstream Jewish view of the esoteric.” Because studying Jewish spirituality was traditionally believed to create such harmful responses, its study was limited to males of at least forty who were accomplished scholars of the Torah and other texts. Many people, especially those growing up in secular Judaism in America, do not have the time and financial resources to enroll in rabbinical school to become scholars before beginning their journey into Jewish spirituality. Instead, they want to begin their personal explorations as soon as possible. While Orthodox Jews more strictly follow these rules than do Conservative or Reform Jews, these rules do severely limit who can access spiritual doctrine. Concerning the regulations of gender, Kamenetz reports that many of the Jewish-Buddhist nuns he met in Dharmasala “sought a much more individual and free spiritual path than the traditional roles of Jewish wife and mother could have provided them. The Judaism they had left behind did not seem to offer women an independent spiritual path.” The more secular Jewish movements allow for greater gender equality when studying Torah than do Orthodox communities such as the Hasidic groups; yet these secular congregations do not have the same spiritual resources, like rebbes (Hasidic spiritual and community leaders), that Hasidic people have. A woman in the Hasidic community has no opportunity to study spirituality even though this group has the most spiritual resources.

According to Kamenetz, the Torah also engrains the importance of memory into its readers by emphasizing the need to remember past Jewish cultural experiences, especially reminding its readers “to remember the Sabbath and keep it holy, to speak of the law constantly and teach it diligently to your children. The sacralization of memory has been an essential feature of Judaism throughout its history.” Jews emphasize being a member of the Jewish community in order to set themselves apart from others. This stems from the historical need to preserve traditions from being destroyed or lost, especially after the Holocaust. About a third of the Jewish population died during World War II, which resulted in many feeling an urgent need to preserve Judaism and the Jewish community. Labeling oneself as a Jew no longer simply meant being a part of a community that shares similar beliefs; it also came to mean having hope for the future. This emphasis on Jewish preservation creates a more complex religion intermingled with a number
of issues, such as political concerns over Israel, and has diminished the focus on religious simplicity and spirituality.

Even if there was increased access to Jewish spirituality, according to Kamenetz, often those who teach it are not looked upon with respect. Kamenetz mentions a conversation with Allen Ginsberg concerning the accessibility of the Jewish esoteric, and he explains that “When I mentioned the outreach of the Lubavitcher rebbe, who lives across the river from him [Ginsberg] in Brooklyn, Ginsberg exploded, ‘He seems like a complete crank and a political reactionary on top of that. Who’s going to go to him for wisdom?’” One of the few Jewish communities that focuses on spirituality is the Hasidic community. Many such communities, such as the Bobovers, focus on spirituality while also differentiating themselves from more secular Jews through different customs, such as speaking in Hasidic Yiddish and dressing in distinctive clothing. More secular Jews do not want to turn to Hasidic traditions for a spiritual explanation because of the difficulty in joining these communities, not to mention the perception that they often appear anti-modern and excessively religious. Many secular Jews who desire increased spirituality wish to find a teacher and teachings that relate to their current circumstances and do not want to alter their lives drastically. For them, joining these Hasidic communities is not a viable option.

As I noted earlier, the Jewish experience in America often focuses on the cultural manifestations, rather than the spiritual forms of Judaism. The lack of spiritual accessibility encourages some Jewish individuals to look elsewhere, including examining Buddhism. What is it that they find in Buddhism that they cannot find in their own tradition?

Many Buddhist teachings and practices represent methods of inner exploration that can be used by anyone regardless of education, background, age, or gender. Tibetan Buddhism, in particular, has become extremely visible during the last few decades, largely due to the political difficulties surrounding Tibet and the charismatic popularity of the Dalai Lama. In addition, Buddhism and Buddhist techniques, such as mindfulness meditation, have become increasingly mainstreamed. As a result, Buddhism is often represented as offering “the balance we need in this world today.”

The appeal of Tibetan Buddhism in particular is that it seems exotic, with all of its colorful deities and rituals, and yet is essentially very accessible. The Jews that Kamenetz interviewed felt as if their everyday lives and communities did not have the answers to their problems, which is why they went beyond normal confines and explored different and unfamiliar cultures. Many were attracted to Buddhism because of its relative lack of dogma, not to mention the fact that it did not require that one be a Buddhist to engage in many of its practices.
One was free to experiment and to choose the ideas and or techniques that addressed one’s questions about spirituality:

Buddhism, or at least Buddhism as it is presented in the West, is a “try as you go” religion. People attempt different techniques, such as breathing exercises and chanting, to see whether Buddhism is helpful. Rather than laying down strict rules, Buddhism provides a training process, giving practitioners the skills to explore their questions in their own unique way. If practitioners receive positive feedback from their experiences, they will continue to explore Buddhism.

Kamenetz interviews Thubten Chodron, a Jewish housewife turned Tibetan nun, and finds that her experience echoes the perspective that Judaism is lacking and Buddhism provides answers to life’s major questions:

Sunday school turned me away from Judaism. What I learned there I couldn’t accept. I wasn’t able to understand it in a way that brought meaning into my life… I saw a poster for a mediation course. What they were talking about started to provide answers to questions I’d been asking a long time: Why am I alive? What’s the purpose of life? What does it really mean to love people?

Thubten Chodron’s experience of Judaism alienated her from the Jewish tradition. For her, Sunday school sought to reinforce the Jewish American identity as being primarily a matter of cultural pride and Jewish heritage. She explains that what she learned focused on Jewish suffering. Teachers tell Jewish children to never forget all of the pain that the ancestors have experienced, from being slaves in Egypt to losing six million Jewish people in the Holocaust. Chodron wanted to reach past Jewish suffering while also finding an answer for why all types of individuals, not just the chosen Jews, suffer. According to her, Buddhism is a universal religion that helps all sentient beings, while Judaism constantly creates an “us vs. the them” mentality, a fact that results from the need to preserve Judaism.

Kamenetz describes a conversation between Chodron and Nathan, a member of the Jewish delegation, about how Judaism explains suffering. Nathan’s response confirms Chodron’s initial findings about Judaism:
I don’t think my tradition explains suffering away. Or can explain suffering. I think my tradition holds that suffering is ultimately utterly inexplicable… Traditional answers to such questions are unacceptable to many Jews today. Also, we don’t believe that suffering is ultimately overcome. Our tradition mediates how we suffer and thereby makes suffering sufferable through rituals, life cycles, passages, and so on. But it doesn’t promise, doesn’t really entertain the idea of ultimately overcoming suffering, except in a future universalist sense, the messianic hope.  

Judaism’s explanation of suffering as inevitable and unexplainable does not seem to offer answers to many people’s questions. The idea of spirituality in Judaism might be found in more conservative and strictly-observant communities that believe zealously in the coming of the Messiah, but this messianic hope does not speak to many other secular Jews, including Chodron. Judaism removes the dialogue of overcoming suffering and other spiritual ideas from their texts. The Talmud expresses anxiety around exploring spirituality and does not allow the investigation of certain topics. Conversely, the Jubus in Dharmasala explain that Tibetan Buddhism allows each person to ask their own questions and find their own solutions, using their intellectual curiosity to probe a variety of topics. Jubus can even turn to Buddhist teachers for help.  

Many of the Jubus that Kamenetz interviewed lament the lack of spiritual teachers in Judaism, while Tibetan Buddhism is full of lamas, rinpoches, and other holy teachers. These Buddhist teachers challenge their students to go “beyond your limitations. It’s hard to find that from your average suburban rabbi, and it’s very hard to do it on your own. The ghetto feeling of many Hasidic communities is something most modern people are not willing to put up with.”  

Buddhist teachers seem more approachable than Hasidic rebbes especially because these teachers allow an individual to continue their life without any major changes. Instead, Buddhist teachers encourage students to look for meaning, compassion, and reflection in their everyday activities.  

The head teacher and leader of the Tibetan Gelukpa Sect, the Dalai Lama, is also an extremely alluring factor. Secular Judaism does not have one leader that followers can look upon for answers and explanations. The Dalai Lama continues the lineage as a genuine leader of the Tibetan people and spiritual guide. The political events in Tibet have helped Jewish individuals identify the Dalai Lama as the Moses figure of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama gives people hope in both secular and religious ways - hope that a lost community will one day return home and hope that an American population will explore a new spirituality. The Dalai Lama’s personality also invites Jubus into Tibetan
Buddhism. Secular Jewish people are very pragmatic, relying on rational and debate. This comes from the rabbinical tradition of Judaism along with trends in Western society. The Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that if science can disprove a Buddhist idea, that doctrine will no longer stand true. People view the Dalai Lama as a very charismatic man, rooted in tradition yet open to the future. The Dalai Lama represents this exotic religion, but his personality, along with his intelligence and openness to new ideas, attracts people to Buddhism. Jubus want to find a balance between their secular and spiritual lives, and the Dalai Lama is an exquisite example of this balancing act.

For these Jubus, the relationship between their Jewish and Buddhist identities is constantly changing. Kamenetz does not mention a single individual who completely shed his or her Jewish background. What seems more common is that Buddhism enriches one’s Jewishness. Kamenetz explains that his friend Marc, who was also a Buddhist “Seemed a better Jew than I was, certainly more knowledgeable and observant than most I knew.” Buddhism helps create a mindfulness of one’s self. For Kamenetz and his friend Marc, Buddhist investigation led them to recommit themselves to Judaism even as they continued to exploring a new-found spirituality. Studying Buddhism and traveling to Dharamsala did not diminish Kamenetz’s Jewishness. Rather, his experience gave him a new appreciation of both religious traditions and helped him better understand the Jubu phenomenon. He summarizes his finding as follows: “Although the fruit of our [Jubu’s] religious activities might lie within the Buddha dharma, the roots of our tradition and heritage will always lie with the Jewish people.”

Kamenetz is not the only Jubu who has written about his ideas and experiences. In fact, perhaps an even more well-known Jewish-Buddhist figure is Sylvia Boorstein, who for many decades has taught Vipassana meditation to Americans. She has written many books about meditation, but the book that will be discussed here is *That’s Funny, You Don’t Look Buddhist*, where she talks explicitly about her Jewish roots. In this work, Boorstein writes about the complementary and harmonious relationship that Judaism and Buddhism have played in her life and about how her meditative practice and Dharma understanding have come to enrich her actively Jewish lifestyle. She describes her early internal struggles to identify herself as a Jubu while dealing with external factors, such as people’s judgmental opinions. Eventually she accepts that both traditions will always be central to her life and to her identity, regardless of what others say.

Growing up in Brooklyn, New York during the 1930s and 1940s, Boorstein was raised in a traditionally observant Jewish three-generation household. Her parents were secular Jews; they supported the state of
Israel as Zionists and only went to synagogue on the high holidays. Boorstein recalls that her grandmother was the religious member of the family, teaching and singing prayers and keeping kosher (Jewish dietary laws). Her parents only kept kosher out of respect for Boorstein’s grandmother and only within the home. Boorstein recalls about her childhood that “I went regularly with my parents to the Chinese restaurant in our neighborhood where we all ate Lobster Cantonese. Lobster isn’t kosher, but it didn’t seem like a big deal.”25 However, Boorstein did attend Jewish summer camp and Hebrew school where she learned Yiddish. The focus at these places, however, was not the teaching of Hebrew prayers but of patriotic Zionist songs.

In other words, Boorstein had a largely secular Jewish childhood, which corresponds to what I have called the first of the three stages of transformation into a Jubu. Boorstein describes about her childhood religious identity that “Being a Jew was something I just was, part of a clan. My parents liked the clan, and I did too.”26 Her childhood encouraged positive feelings about cultural Judaism. Boorstein credits her grandmother as the first religious teacher she had, because she kept kosher and sang prayers. With her grandmother’s death, however, Boorstein no longer had those spiritual reminders. Her Yiddish education along with her camp experiences and her exposure to Zionism created a sense of difference and also close identification with the Jewish people.

Many of the Jubus that Kamenetz spoke with described a similar upbringing in that they were exposed to cultural Judaism during their childhood. Although Boorstein never says that her childhood influenced her to become a Buddhist, I would suggest that it was then that the potential of spirituality was planted. As we will see, Boorstein’s Judaism would later come to be reflected in the language with which she explains her Buddhist-influenced beliefs and philosophy. Before turning to this topic, I will explore what propelled Boorstein to become involved with Buddhism.

Boorstein explains that she became discontent with herself and experienced the second stage of transformation when she reached middle age. She was minimally engaged with Judaism at this point; she did not keep kosher, and peace movement and civil right causes were her major Jewish activities.27 She explains that this was not enough:

I found myself frightened, alarmed about the fragility of life. Because it was the seventies and meditation and Eastern philosophy were becoming popular in the West, and I think, because of grace, I met some Buddhist teachers who spoke to the very issues I was frightened
Boorstein found that Buddhist teachings provided explanations for her general feelings of depression, anxiety, loss, grief, and inevitable pain. The Four Noble Truths, which is a major doctrine in Buddhism, explains why and how people suffer, and it outlines the specific path to overcome that pain. Through accessible teachers, she learned that she was not alone in feeling dissatisfied. Buddhism became a vehicle in which Boorstein could alleviate her problems here and now. Boorstein felt that “The Buddhism that had come to the west offered a clear explanation for suffering and tools for the direct, personal realization of a peaceful mind. It required practice, not affiliation. It was a great spiritual path. It promised transformation.”

One reason that Boorstein felt alienated from Judaism is that women had limited opportunities. Boorstein describes how, while at an Interfaith Conference in Toronto in 1987, she spoke to Deborah, a Jewish delegate, about her limited spiritual involvement in Judaism. Deborah commented that Jewish leaders who have the skills and knowledge to teach spirituality were not willing to educate women. This confirmed Boorstein’s experience with Judaism. Until that point, Judaism had only been a cultural practice for her. Even if she had known that there was in fact such a thing as Jewish spirituality and that it was accessible to women as well as to men, the following implies that it still might not have been the best solution for her at the time: “Judaism as a religious path is limited because, at its very best, it develops a loving heart. It doesn’t take the step of seeing through separateness to ultimate emptiness as the source of all form.” This indicates that the answers provided by Judaism were less satisfactory for Boorstein than those provided by Buddhism. These unsatisfactory Jewish answers may have even caused her to view Judaism in a very negative light. She never explicitly discusses this, but her descriptions point to this conflict.

Boorstein eventually found ways to bring Judaism into harmony with her adopted faith; however, she did this after facing additional hurdles: “I was attached to Judaism being perfect, and I was attached to everyone recognizing that Buddhism is wonderful. I was also attached to my reputation.” Boorstein had the expectation that everything would fall into place. Internally, she hoped that her Buddhism and Judaism would work together harmoniously and that people would respect her decision to have both in her life. She wanted to belong to both the Buddhist and the Jewish communities, but felt she could not fully be either Buddhist or Jewish.
The biggest problem Boorstein faced was acceptance by the Buddhist and Jewish communities. Boorstein recalls that she feared that “I might be challenged about whether I was a ‘real’ enough Buddhist teacher... Perhaps I thought I’d be called upon to prove that being a Jew made sense.” It may be that her Jewish background explains this need of approval. The Holocaust and its aftermath created a desire to feel accepted and safe. With this engrained in her, she applied this to all aspects of her life, even things as opposite to Judaism as Buddhism. Similarly, her internal challenge focused on accepting herself for who she had become – someone who found spiritual sustenance in Buddhism but still considered herself Jewish:

I often hesitated. I circumlocuted. I said, when pressed to identify myself, I am a Dharma teacher,’ or ‘I teach Buddhist psychology,’ or ‘I am a Buddhist meditation teacher.’ To say, ‘I am a Buddhist’ seemed too much like taking a plunge that I didn’t need to take.

By calling herself a Buddhist, she was afraid that she would be thought of as an inauthentic Jew. She also feared that her deep allegiance to the Jewish community, which was such an important part of her life, was not strong enough. Boorstein needed to re-examine her ideas of herself, exploring these views and how her attachments to these terms actually caused her more pain.

Boorstein eventually came to the conclusion that the question of whether one is a Buddhist or a Jew or a Jewish-Buddhist is ultimately unimportant. She finally realizes that “I am a real Buddhist. I’m not an ethnic Buddhist, but I am a real Buddhist, and I’m also a Jew. I’m not a person without a country. I am a person who has dual citizenship.” Describing the ethnic background of the people at one of her meditation retreats, Boorstein noted how “non-noteworthy” it was that it included people with Jewish backgrounds. This says something about the Jubu phenomenon itself. The Jubu had become a normal facet of the American Buddhist movement. As a result, people were not surprised to hear that others come from various backgrounds. In fact, most American Buddhists were not brought up Buddhists and only find Buddhism later in their lives. Boorstein eventually realized that most do not care what she “is” and that she had been overly attached to what other people have thought of her. This attachment to other’s opinions prevented her from accepting herself, but once she realized this, her identity conflict disappeared.

As a result of combining both aspects into her life, Boorstein found that Judaism and Buddhism complement each other, and so she felt free
Boorstein claims that Buddhism helps her Jewish side because it makes her more actively Jewish and appreciate what Judaism has to offer. Her Jewish part aids her Buddhist side because she finds she can often talk best about Buddhism using Jewish language. Her Jewish background allows her to be a successful meditation teacher today for many Jews, helping them to bridge that gap that she too had to cross at one point in her life.

If Sylvia Boorstein was finally able to find a satisfactory balance between her Jewish and Buddhist sides, this was not the case for Rabbi Alan Lew, whose experience illustrates a less harmonious relationship between Judaism and Buddhism. Lew’s personal experiences as outlined in his book One God Clapping: the Spiritual Path of a Zen Rabbi also encompasses the three stages of transformation. Each stage in Lew’s life was associated with a different religious identity. He began his life as a secular Jew, and then in his twenties, he took up the practice of Zen Buddhism. Issues with Buddhism propelled Lew to stop his Buddhist practices and return to Judaism, where he focused on cultivating a Jewish spirituality. However, as the years went by, Lew’s Judaism became infused with Buddhist ideas from his past. The last stage Lew describes puts him into the Jubu category according to the definition provided in this paper, even if he himself might not agree to being categorized as such.

Like Sylvia Boorstein, Alan Lew grew up in a secular Jewish household. Living in Brooklyn in the forties, Lew writes about how his world was completely Jewish but limited to family gatherings and political activism. His grandmother and mother raised funds and resources that were sent to Israel for the War of Independence. Even in this Jewish environment, however, his family did not observe the Sabbath. Lew recalls that his Zayde (Yiddish for grandfather) Sam gave him a five dollar bill during Yom Kippur service to use for the subway. Jewish tradition does not allow using money and transportation during
Yom Kippur and the Sabbath. Apart from the High Holidays, Hanukkah, and Passover, “there was no Jewish observance in our house”.37

Lew’s family served as an important thermometer in measuring his spiritual identity. Both of his grandfathers were very religious, especially his paternal grandfather who was an Orthodox rabbi. These men exposed Lew to the spiritual side of Judaism, which was lost when Lew’s family moved to Pleasantville, New York. Lew suggests that his father’s more cultural Judaism became the norm. He explains that during his youth his “father told me reading Torah was a skill I had to master. He did not tell me that the Torah was divine because it wasn’t, in his opinion.”38 The Lew household reserved Judaism for the big holidays, and they made little effort to follow everyday rituals, such as keeping kosher, much less explore Jewish spirituality. Lew’s father’s disinterest in these things may have been due to his difficult relationship with his own father, Lew’s grandfather. Lew explains that his grandfather and his father did not get along because “There had been a divorce, and my father had sided with his mother.”39 To show his disapproval of Orthodox Judaism, Lew’s father deemphasized Judaism within his household, limiting it to a few activities. Like Boorstein, Lew ended up with a cultural Jewish identity devoid of Jewish spirituality. Lew suggests that he was indifferent towards Judaism since he “simply didn’t see Judaism as a serious spiritual path, so I set out... I found Zen Buddhism.”40

Because Judaism had not offered Lew any spiritual guidance, Lew became one of the numerous spiritual seekers of the sixties, incorporating Zen Buddhism into his life. Being a Buddhist played a central role in Lew’s life for a number of years. He was drawn particularly to Zen Buddhism because of its simplicity, its meditation practice, and its visible effects. Lew recalls that as a child he often felt very claustrophobic and boxed-in: “I could feel the weight of all these toys pressing down on my chest. As I lay helpless in my bed, I yearned to clear all these things away so that I could breathe. Now at last I was fulfilling that yearning. My room was completely empty.”41 This emptiness allowed Lew to focus on his spiritual issues without being distracted. The emphasis on zazen (sitting meditation) attracted Lew to Zen Buddhism, especially the physical form and routine of meditating. Lew describes how he loved “the way the Zen students filed into the room for the lecture, the way they took their seats, the quality of their attention, the density of consciousness that filled the room as they sat listening to the lecture. All of this led me to a ‘Eureka!’ moment.”42 This path led to a direct experience of Dharma for Lew and provided him with specific instructions to help examine the existential truths of his life. By
sitting with the correct posture and focusing on his breath, Lew saw results; he began to see things the way they really were.\textsuperscript{43}

These first two stages in Lew’s story follow the general progression that we saw in the stories of Kamenetz and Boorstein. Judaism was a central element of Lew’s childhood, but it was largely a secular and cultural Judaism. His childhood was empty of spirituality although full of Jewish family events and customs. His desire for a deeper spiritual path developed when he was in college, just as Kamenetz realized this in Dharmasala and just as Boorstein sought a better comprehension of her life when she entered middle age. Boorstein and Lew’s explorations coincided with the Beat cultural trend in the 60s and exposed them to Eastern religions, including Buddhism. Buddhism eventually fulfilled their spiritual curiosity, but in doing so, returned them to Judaism. While Boorstein incorporated both Buddhist and Jewish aspects into her life, Lew, at first, returned to a strictly Jewish lifestyle. It was largely because of his Buddhist practices that he began to better understand himself and who he really was:

I am beginning to see that a highly disproportionate amount of my own unconscious material is Jewish. I am suddenly aware, for example, of a kind of Jewish background noise ... after ten years of peeling back the layers of my own spirituality and coming closer and closer to the core of it, I am experiencing that core to be irredeemably Jewish.\textsuperscript{44}

Being a Zen Buddhist for ten years helped Lew find his Jewishness. Buddhism provided methods to investigate himself, and in so doing, he discovered that his essential self was in fact Jewish. Lew was on the path to becoming a monk in the Zen tradition, but even as he took refuge in the Three Jewels, he felt uncomfortable: “I couldn’t say that I took refuge in Buddha anymore- I couldn’t say it because I was a Jew.”\textsuperscript{45} This marked a pivotal point in Lew’s spiritual transformation. Taking the refuge in the Buddha is one of the first steps people take to proclaim their Buddhism, and since Lew felt awkward about doing this, he found he was no longer comfortable calling himself a Buddhist. Returning to Judaism became the next natural step for Lew.

Although Lew does not explicitly say so, it appears that there were a number of other issues behind his decision to return to Judaism. What initially was an appealing reason to join Zen Buddhism became a major factor in Lew’s discontent with his practice. “When I think of this practice for the rest of my life it seems endlessly bleak. There is something about Zen that is irrefutably dry. All the gestures are very mannered, slow, and choreographed. There is something very solemn and serious about it all.”\textsuperscript{46} Lew’s original attraction to the form and
routine of Zen meditation fell through, and his old feelings of claustrophobia returned. He realized that Zen Buddhism no longer provided the space that he had once craved and sitting in meditation no longer felt so beneficial.

A growing dislike of his Zen teacher, Baker Roshi, was another factor in Lew’s decision to leave the Buddhist community, something we do not find with either Kamenetz or Boorstein. Both Kamenetz and Boorstein discuss how it was in large part the accessibility of spiritual teachers that drew them to Buddhism. In this situation, Lew explains that the exact opposite occurred, since he believed that “There was an element of cruelty about Baker Roshi that I had once admired … But now I began to think that it had, in fact, been cruel and sadistic… I no longer trusted Baker Roshi.” This negative relationship with his teacher, along with a lackluster feeling towards meditation and a need for a re-energized spiritual experience, made Lew realize that he needed to return to the Judaism of his birth if he wanted to continue growing spiritually. Nevertheless, his return to Judaism was a direct result of his Zen experiences.

One important Jewish element he missed while exploring the Zen tradition was the emphasis on family:

The Zen Center I belonged to was a strong, positive community, and the connection between the people were deep and real, but it wasn’t a blood connection. There was not the essential and permanent bond that comes with family...Looking through the window at this Jewish family across the way, I experienced a profound and surprising sense of longing.

In other words, it was because of his Zen practice that Lew gained a renewed appreciation for his family, and in particular, of their strong adherence to Jewish heritage and culture, and for the deep connection felt by Jews everywhere for each other, despite differences in time, space, nationality and language.

Lew became a “born-again Jew,” who looked to Judaism for the answers to his questions about life. He began to keep kosher and Shabbat, wear a kippah (head covering), and attend services at his synagogue. He saw the potential for practices of Jewish meditation, such as using Tefillin (small black leather boxes used in Jewish prayer) and reading the Torah, that before his Zen experience he did not fully appreciate. His first rabbi, Rabbi Abrami, taught Lew how to pray, “Which I would do three times a day… I would visualize the words as an energy exchange, the words going up to God and God’s attention coming
Prayer began bringing me to the same place my Zen practice had taken me. This increased interest in Judaism eventually led Lew to enroll in the Jewish Theological Seminary, a Conservative Rabbinical school, where he suggests his studies tested his way of thinking as well as his devotion to Judaism: “I have to go into this fiery furnace where everything I thought I believed is challenged. But it’s not going to destroy my faith. I’m going to come out unscathed.” Lew’s Talmud study was a very turbulent experience that altered his outlook on life. Studying became a spiritual activity in itself. One topic was especially potent for Lew. Judaism explains suffering very differently than in Buddhism. While Buddhism explains suffering through the Four Noble Truths, the Talmud “takes as an unassailable refutation that suffering could have any meaning at all. Suffering is just suffering.” Lew had to face this problem head on when he became a chaplain. His actions suggest that he sided with the Jewish perspective. This speaks great lengths about his transformation and dedication to Judaism. He no longer considered himself a Buddhist, and while he still found many Zen ideals to be good ones, he consciously made the decision to follow his new spiritual path of Judaism.

While Lew had clearly established his allegiance to Judaism, over the years he found that his earlier experience with Buddhism continued to influence him in certain ways. For one thing, it had taught him how to focus and pay attention. “For the next fifteen years, I would focus quite single-mindedly on practicing the Jewish spiritual path with the same intensity, authenticity, and discipline that had characterized the Zen practice I had experienced.” Seated meditation (zazen) had taught Lew to be an exceptionally dedicated student, a dedication he then applied to his exploration of Judaism. At first, Lew had no interest in incorporating Buddhism into his Jewish path. Nevertheless, situations beyond his control forced Buddhism back into the center stage of his life when the Jewish Bulletin of Northern California published an article about him titled Rabbi of Prominent SF Conservative Synagogue was Buddhist for Ten Years. Lew initially believed that this news would be detrimental to his career, but surprisingly it had the opposite effect. With the publication of the article, two general types of individuals began to seek guidance and spiritual advice from Lew. Some were very devoted Jews who felt as if something was missing from their practice. Others were Jews who practiced Buddhism or some form of meditation. Lew became the leader and guide for both of these groups.

Lew’s own congregation’s interest in Buddhism and general forms of meditation forced him to revisit his past experiences with Buddhism. With the inclusion of both Buddhist and Jewish elements in
his life and work, Lew effectively became a Jubu. Some individuals might disagree with this conclusion because Lew did not initially and consciously choose to reintroduce Buddhism into his new Jewish path; nevertheless, in the end, he did decide to embrace the combination of Buddhist and Jewish elements. An article titled *Rabbi and Zen Priest Spring from Same Spiritual Source* quotes Lew as saying “‘Forty-five minutes of meditation prior to prayer…makes 10 minutes of davening very meaningful’… ‘I’ve become fascinated with the possibility of Zen practice as a way of opening people to the possibility of what is there.’” This indicates that Lew accepted and embraced his role as a Zen rabbi. He consciously used Zen techniques to create a more meaningful Jewish experience for his congregants and for himself. When Rabbi Lew passed away in January of 2009, he did so not as a Jew and not as a Buddhist, but as a Jubu.

While it would be risky to generalize and say that the experiences described by Kamenetz, Boorstein, and Lew are representative of all American Jubus, I would argue that they share certain common characteristics that may well apply to other early Jubus as well. These three Jewish individuals came of age during the post-Holocaust era, and all of them came from families that negotiated American modernity through the creation of a largely secular and cultural Jewish identity. Kamenetz, Boorstein, and Lew represent the forerunners of today’s generation of Jews and Jubus. It would appear that more and more Jews today are turning toward Jewish spirituality to answer their questions. Spirituality has lost much of its negative stigma and is becoming more mainstream in American society in general but also in the Jewish community. The emergence of Reconstructionist Judaism, which is “a progressive, contemporary approach to Jewish life which integrates a deep respect for traditional Judaism with the insights and ideas of contemporary social, intellectual and spiritual life,” is one indication of the changing perspective of spirituality. I believe that this openness to spirituality is not only a result of Kamenetz, Boorstein, and Lew’s (along with other early Jubus’) work but the changing definition of being a Jew. The post-Holocaust atmosphere caused many American Jews to be extremely ethnically aware and separate from non-Jewish communities, resulting in a cultural Jewish identity. Since the Holocaust is becoming more of a distant memory as years pass, Jews now feel freer to define their Jewish identity in more diverse terms, including in spiritual ways. While I cannot say Judaism in general is become less secular, there are now more opportunities for Jews to explore the more spiritual sides of Judaism. With that being said, I do believe that some Jewish people will continue to use Buddhism as an example and model
of spirituality and will integrate many of its elements, such as meditation and mindfulness, into their Jewish lives.

1 Jews and Buddhism: Belief Amended, Faith Revealed, Produced and directed by Bill Chayes and Isaac Solotaroff, 40 min, Petaluma, California: Chayes Productions, 1999, Videocassette.
4 Jews and Buddhism: Belief Amended, Faith Revealed.
7 Ibid., 112.
8 Ibid., 112.
9 Ibid., 92.
10 Ibid., 106.
11 Ibid., 68.
12 Ibid., 75.
13 Ibid., 174.
14 Ibid., 218.
15 Ibid., 99-100.
16 Ibid., 149.
17 See Ayala Fader’s Mitzvah Girls: Bringing Up the Next Generation of Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn.
18 Ibid., 130.
19 Ibid., 149.
20 Ibid., 136.
21 Ibid., 142-143.
22 Ibid., 156.
23 Ibid., 10, 229.
24 I will also be utilizing Boorstein’s 2003 article "It's a No-Karma Event." to provide supplementary information.
26 Ibid., 23.
28 Ibid., 8-9.
29 Ibid., 12.
30 Ibid., 86.
31 Ibid., 26.
33 Boorstein, That’s Funny, You Don’t Look Buddhist, 5.
34 Ibid., 9.
35 Ibid., 50.

56
57 I will also be using supplementary information from Lew’s 2003 article “Becoming Who You Always Were: The Story of a Zen Rabbi.”


38 Ibid., 18.


40 Lew and Jaffe, 303.

41 Ibid., 76-77.


43 Lew and Jaffe, 75.


45 Lew and Jaffe, 120.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 121 & 123.

48 Ibid., 99.

49 Ibid., 154.

50 Ibid., 173, 197.

51 Lew, 54.


Saint Peter’s Basilica is one of the largest and most grandiose buildings in the world, over 300 years after its completion. It serves as the physical manifestation of one of the arguably most historically and culturally important institutions of the last 2,000 years. This basilica, not a cathedral, is the headquarters of the “Church,” the Roman Catholic Church, that is. However, as a basilica and not a cathedral, it is neither the formal seat of the pope nor any other bishop. It is simply the church of the papacy, the church of Christianity. Today as the Roman Catholic Church struggles for the power and wealth it once had—although still quite powerful and rich—Saint Peter’s Basilica stands as a symbol of faith and the wonders faith drives people to create.

Inarguably beautiful and awe-inspiring, the reconstruction of Saint Peter’s was never a unanimous decision. The decision to raze the old Constantinian basilica was never agreed upon; the final design was never agreed upon; the accumulation of funding through indulgences was never agreed upon. These decisions could have been put forth and executed only by such a totalitarian leadership as the papacy. It was these decisions that nearly tore the Church apart, from within and externally by the loss of the enormous backing it had in the Middle Ages. Although Saint Peter’s is partially responsible for the major loss of power and wealth of the Church since the Renaissance, it stands today as a testament to the predominant faith that formed Western Culture (as it is known today) and remains to be a powerful sight for all the nonbelievers and believers alike who step within the boundaries of the 2,000 year-old site.

Saint Peter’s Basilica is located on the Vatican Hill, or Mons Vaticanus as it was originally called in Latin. Located outside of the walls of the city of Rome, no notable constructions were evident on or near the site until the early first century A.D. when the Circus of Nero was built nearby. At the time, under Roman law no one could be buried within the walls of Rome. As a result, the Vatican Hill area became a burial site for charioteers who built lavish mausoleums that were eventually joined by fellow pagan burials. The site also saw the burials of early Christians who were killed for their treasonous, new religion. Thus, this site became the notable burial place of Peter, one of Jesus’s twelve apostles who was chosen by him to carry on the Christian faith and is regarded as the first pope. Having been condemned for treason like many of his fellow early Christians, he was nailed to a cross, though
upside down so as not to imitate the crucifixion of Jesus, and then buried within the Vatican Hill. Early Christians cherished this site for the 300 years during which Rome remained pagan. It was not until 312 that the site would become the recognized home of Christianity when Constantine declared Christianity the new official religion of the Roman Empire. Following his decree, Constantine decided to build the largest church in the world for that time. Started in 320 and finished within the short time period of seventeen years, the original Saint Peter’s Basilica became the center for the Christian faith and a monument marking the burial of Saint Peter. As such, it was centered over his tomb in a colossal form of over 350 feet long. It remained in its place for the following twelve centuries serving as a landmark to an increasingly Christian Europe. This structure withstood the test of time and saw many significant events, most notably the crowning of Charlemagne as the First Holy Roman Emperor in 800.

By the middle of the 15th Century during the papacy of Nicholas V, the first formal plans were put into action to remodel the then 1,200 year-old basilica. The architect he selected for the undertaking, Leone Battista Alberti, proposed major changes to the building that was still predominately the late Roman structure. Work began with a new choir, but only the foundations were laid when work came to a halt for the first of numerous times when Pope Nicholas V died in 1455. Such interruptions in construction became a prominent trend for the Renaissance builder popes, as few survived as pope for very long, especially not long enough to solidify and make considerable headway on their plans with Saint Peter’s and other Vatican works. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Pope Nicholas intended only to remodel the old basilica, not build a completely new one.

After 50 years of papal neglect, Saint Peter’s Basilica was in considerable decay by the time Pope Julius II was elected in 1503, allegedly irreparably so for the technology of the time. Therefore, Julius hired Donato Bramante to design an entirely new church to take the place of the old basilica. One main reason for the construction of a new Saint Peter’s was a selfish one: in 1505 Julius hired Michelangelo from Florence to come to Rome to design his tomb. The design that Julius finally accepted was of a tomb so grand that no church in Rome was big enough to hold it. Regardless of what Julius’ main motivation was, he started receiving designs for a new structure that year from Bramante. Because of the countless designs that survive for Saint Peter’s, it is difficult to know precisely what Bramante’s final intentions for the structure of the church were, but a general plan was set forth for a building in the shape of a Greek cross, with four equal sides, set in conjunction with a square containing domes at each of the four corners,
and a much larger, colossal dome in the center directly over the Tomb of Saint Peter. This remained the intended design as work continued for decades as evidenced on the medals made by Caradosso to commemorate the laying of the foundation stone in 1506.9

However, to build the new Saint Peter’s, the original one built by Constantine would have to be taken down, “the sacrifice of one of the oldest and most venerable sanctuaries in all of Christendom.”10 Not only was the tomb considered holy, but the old church was regarded as sacrosanct as well. As the construction continued, Bramante’s plan, while grandiose and magnificent, was a source of great sorrow for many and caused much animosity towards the architect. One prominent artist documented that Bramante “‘was so anxious for the work to progress that he destroyed in [old] St. Peter’s many fine tombs of popes, paintings and mosaics, thus obliterating the memory of many portraits of great men scattered about the principal church of Christendom.’”11 Critics of Bramante accordingly claimed, “‘He would have destroyed Rome also and the whole world if he had been able.’”12 In Julius’ defense, Pope Nicholas V had declared that the building was in threat of collapse 50 years earlier indicating that it was likely in an even worse state by the time of Julius.13 Nonetheless, Julius allowed Bramante to destroy recklessly the tombs of numerous popes, the church’s ancient pillars, and many other sacred artifacts.14 Bramante even wanted to build the basilica facing south instead of east, like the original so that it could line up with the original placement of the Egyptian obelisk in the Circus of Nero. Julius immediately rejected this idea because he refused to violate Peter’s tomb.15 For such acts, Bramante gained the nickname “Ruinante,” or destroyer.16 Regardless of the countless complaints received by the Cardinals and artists—notably Michelangelo and Raphael alike—the old structure was successively dismantled as work began and continued on the new Saint Peter’s Basilica.17 After 100 years of construction, all remaining parts of the ancient Basilica of Constantine had been torn down.18

Aside from direct complaints about the construction itself, the new basilica would cost a great deal of money:

The building of the new church had been seen by many as the immediate catalyst for the bloody sectarian strife that split the Christian world. Luther’s Ninety-five Theses of 1517 had specifically pointed to the selling of indulgences to pay for its construction as a source of suffering. By midcentury this complaint had become a commonplace among Protestants and was picked up by reform-minded Catholics.19 Five theses that Martin Luther posted on the door of a church in Germany in 1517 dealt directly with the building of the new Saint Peter’s Basilica. Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses became the foremost influential
catalyst causing the Protestant Reformation that immediately damaged the overriding role of the Church and thereafter decreased its power to the state in which it exists today—no longer such a predominant political power, but more of a purely ecclesiastical authority. Thus, dedicating five of these theses to the new church had a profound effect. One of the principle targets of Luther’s crusade was the Church’s tactic of soliciting money from all social classes for the reason that money given would lessen one’s own time, or that of a relative, in Purgatory. This practice of selling indulgences had little foundation in the New Testament or early patristic writings in the eyes of Luther, Calvin, and other like-minded reformers. They did not believe that one could pay to hasten one’s entrance into heaven. As a political entity with control of much of southern Italy at the time, the Church spent its money from indulgences on numerous wars and building projects, particularly the new Saint Peter’s Basilica. Moreover, because the domain of the Church was so widespread throughout Europe and soon the Americas, much of the money collected was difficult to account for. Luther comments and questions in his Ninety-Five Theses:

50. Christians are to be taught that if the pope knew the exactions of the indulgence preachers, he would rather that the basilica of St. Peter were burned to ashes than built up with the skin, flesh, and bones of his sheep.

51. Christians are to be taught that the pope would and should wish to give of his own money, even though he had to sell the basilica of St. Peter, to many of those from whom certain hawkers of indulgences cajole money.

81. This unbridled preaching of indulgences makes it difficult even for learned men to rescue the reverence which is due the pope from slander or from the shrewd questions of the laity.

82. Such as: “Why does not the pope empty purgatory for the sake of holy love and the dire need of the souls that are there if he redeems an infinite number of souls for the sake of miserable money with which to build a church? The former reasons would be most just; the latter is most trivial.”

86. Again, “Why does not the pope, whose wealth is today greater than the wealth of the richest Crassus, build this one basilica of St. Peter with his own money rather than with the money of poor believers?”

Here, Luther brings up points which few asked publicly because of the great power of the Church. The corruption he mentions regarding the building of Saint Peter’s had a strong influence in the Protestant reform movement’s belief that churches should be plain places of worship rather than grandiose physical manifestations of faith. The extraordinarily decadent baroque interior expressed the Counter-Reformation’s rebuttal to this mentality. The lavish gold and marble that covers the interior
distanced the Church from the Protestants on the one hand, but on the other, aided in attracting new believers in the centuries after its completion.

From the onset of construction, Pope Julius II wrote to the King of England and Bishops in England for money to help pay for this massive project. He then appointed numerous commissioners to go throughout Europe collecting funds for the project. However, such methods placed the Church in poor regard, as evident by Luther’s statements. These objections were well founded. As a warrior pope, Julius used much of the funds allotted for the construction of the basilica on his wars abroad, notably that with France in 1511. At this point in time, work on the basilica decreased even more. Additionally, as work progressed during successive popes, the costs increased as the plans for the church were revised and became increasingly elaborate. For example, documents show that during Julius II’s reign (1503-1513), 70,653 gold ducats were spent on construction whereas from 1529 to 1543, 89,727 gold ducats were spent, and from 1543 to 1549, 160,774 scudi were spent on construction (both the ducat and scudi were of roughly equal value). Thus, as the structure progressed, its cost greatly increased relative to the decreasing amounts of time during which these costs were calculated.

After the death of Julius II in 1513 and Bramante soon after, construction diminished. First, Pope Leo X (1513-1521) hired Giuliano da Sangallo, Fra Giocondo, and Raphael to take on the continuance of work on the basilica, but little was accomplished, and even less so during the reigns of Popes Adrian VI (1522-1523) and Clement VII (1523-1534). In 1527, Rome was sacked by Charles V of the Hapsburg Empire, which ultimately led to a halt on all work on the church. Because of the lack of long-term, unified leadership, much work completed by subsequent popes is unrecognizable, as successive popes took it down, especially the work of Antonio da Sangallo under Paul III. Michelangelo, then 71 years old, succeeded Sangallo as architect after many refusals. He critiqued the plans of Sangallo considering them far too complicated and declared that the design would attract wrongdoers, such as pickpockets, going as far as to say that there were “so many dark lurking places above and below that they afford ample opportunity for innumerable rascalities, such as… the raping of nun.”

He much preferred Bramante’s plan and made his own architectural plans based on those of the original architect. In response, Paul III allowed him to destroy a large portion of what had been previously constructed and to reshape the exterior into a more unified form. Unfortunately, like much of Sangallo’s design, not all of Michelangelo’s designs are evident in the final product. Until recently it was believed
that he had been responsible for the renowned attic and distinctive dome, but he was actually directly responsible for neither, although much of the subsequent work after his death was heavily influenced by him. Nonetheless, Michelangelo managed to finish the drum, the upright base of the dome, within his lifetime, though it would take another twenty-four years for the dome to be erected on top of it. Pope Sixtus V commissioned Giacomo della Porta for the final design of the dome, who utilized Michelangelo’s hemispherical design for the interior dome but built a more elongated exterior dome, a design that became prevalent during the later Renaissance. A workforce of 600 men constructed the 435 foot dome in less than two years, an astonishingly short amount of time. Under Sixtus, Porta also managed to move the obelisk from where it had stood for over 15 centuries at the center of the Circus of Nero to the front of the basilica.

During the later reign of Paul V, beginning in the early 17th Century, the pope gave the orders finally to demolish the remaining ruins of the old basilica, which lay in front of the newly constructed church. With the new space opened up, it was determined that the basilica would be extended into a Latin cross rather than the originally intended Greek cross. Paul V commissioned Carlo Maderno to complete the front nave and façade of the church, which was later criticized for its awkward dimensions. However, because of inconsistencies of viewpoint from one papal reign to the next, the façade was extended to hold bell towers on each side, though only one was partially built then razed, leaving the façade as it stands today. The wider design of the often-criticized façade displays a Latin inscription documenting its construction during the reign of Paul V. Interestingly, the excessive width allows for the inscription of Paul V’s name to be located in the center where the façade protrudes the most.

With the majority of the building complete, Pope Urban VIII finally consecrated the basilica on November 18, 1626, exactly 120 years after Pope Julius II began the project. However, the church was still many years away from its present form. After the death of Maderno, Urban chose his friend, Gian Lorenzo Bernini, to continue work on the basilica. It was during his role as architect that some of the most noticeable features of the present church were designed and completed. He first tried, but ultimately failed, to complete Maderno’s façade with the two bell towers. Because of underground springs below the newly constructed south tower, the tower began to sink and crack, resulting in its destruction and leaving the façade in its current state. Not surprisingly, Bernini’s reputation suffered from this initial fiasco. However, by the time of Pope Alexander VII, Bernini had gained influence once more and was given the task of constructing the
baldacchino. This canopy, made to cover the high alter in the crossing of the four naves, consists of bronze and weighed 90 tons standing 100 feet high and remains unrivaled by any other in the world. The reinforcement to the floor necessitated by the weight of the baldacchino destroyed many more early Christian graves and relics. Workers formed protest marches against the sacrilege, but after a pay raise, work continued.\textsuperscript{37} Brilliantly designed, the four colossal columns that hold up the canopy are patterned after the columns that supported the canopy in the original basilica with their notably twisted form. Bernini moved eight of the twelve columns that were located in the Tomb of Peter in the old basilica into the center of the new basilica. Two columns surround each of four statues, which hold the relics.\textsuperscript{38}

Bernini also designed several other interior elements, but most importantly, he designed the most recognizable feature of the entire Vatican complex—St. Peter’s Piazza. At the time of Bernini’s employment, there was no formal enclosure for Saint Peter’s Basilica, simply an irregularly shaped area formed by Vatican buildings built throughout its past. Pope Alexander VII assigned Bernini the task of designing a fitting front to embellish the rest of the basilica. He eventually came up with the design of an oval opening surrounded by a colonnade on either side, four columns deep with the obelisk in the center of the plaza.\textsuperscript{39} Finally, Bernini designed 140 statues to stand on top of the colonnade. He also constructed a second fountain to be symmetrical with the one on the other side of the obelisk. Speaking about the piazza, Bernini said it is “…’like the arms of the Church, which embrace Catholics to reinforce their belief, heretics to reunite them with the Church, and agnostics to enlighten them with the true faith.’”\textsuperscript{40} As Boorsch stated, Bernini’s creation is:

an immense space that is nonetheless enclosed and orderly, a vast and monumental space that is nonetheless subordinate to Saint Peter’s itself, a space that in fact adds to the grandeur of the building and in so doing enhances the power and authority of the Church.\textsuperscript{41}

When Pope Nicholas V had the idea to renew the old Saint Peter’s Basilica and Pope Julius II decided to build a wholly new one, neither of them, nor any of the subsequent builder-popes, did so with the intention of diminishing the Church’s control over the Western European populous. Paradoxically, building a new Saint Peter’s Basilica contributed significantly to the Protestant reformation, rather than reinforcing the Church’s influence. Through the acquiring of indulgences to pay for the massive and lengthy project, the Church angered Christians throughout Europe. Many of those who recanted their allegiance to the Catholic Church had to do so in secrecy in an effort to avoid persecution, as did the early Christians before the edict of Constantine. Ironically, the
martyrdom of St. Peter himself, who was persecuted for being a Christian believer in pagan Rome, was the very reason why a church had been erected on Vatican Hill in the first place. The Protestant movement questioned the relationship between church and religion—which doctrines by the Church were in accordance with religious laws? The Papacy had considered church over religion, because at the time church was not only religion, but state as well. Thus, the Church had to exploit the religious rules for the benefit of the state and the papacy itself. Everything in Saint Peter’s is credited to a pope, but few popes took dominance over the entire structure. The basilica was constructed over the course of many popes, many mentalities, many desires, and many priorities, which greatly extended the time needed to erect it.

Although the construction of Saint Peter’s Basilica distanced many Christian followers from the papacy, it brought others closer to the Christian faith united under one symbol that characterized an age, a symbol that to this day substantiates a belief. In serving this function, the basilica solidified the Counter-Reformation, ultimately helping the Church remain afloat in the flood that the building nearly single-handedly created. It is the product of collaboration among many brilliant minds in an effort to build something that would otherwise be unimaginable. Regardless of religion, Saint Peter’s Basilica is not simply a testament to faith and the Catholic Church, but more so to the strivings of humanity.

2 Jerrold M. Packard, Peter’s Kingdom (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985) 17.
3 Ibid., 18.
4 Ibid., 32-3.
5 McClendon, “The History of the Site of St. Peter’s Basilica, Rome,” 64.
6 Packard, Peter’s Kingdom, 34.
8 Ibid., 460.
10 Pastor, The History of the Popes, 468.
12 Pastor, The History of the Popes, 469.
13 Ibid., 471.
14 Ibid., 478.
16 Pastor, The History of the Popes, 478.
17 Ibid., 469.
20 Pastor, The History of the Popes, 472.
21 Ibid., 482.
22 Ibid., 483.
24 Packard, Peter’s Kingdom, 35.
26 Ibid., 13.
27 Ibid.
30 Packard, Peter’s Kingdom, 37.
32 Ibid., 18.
33 Ibid., 28.
35 Packard, Peter’s Kingdom, 39.
36 Packard, Peter’s Kingdom, 40.
37 Ibid., 41-2.
40 Ibid., 31.
41 Ibid.
I. Introduction

After marching for three grueling weeks across the Cordillera de los Andes in February of 1817, the Argentine independence hero José de San Martín led troops into the battle of Chacabuco just north of Santiago, Chile, driving back royalist forces and winning a decisive victory in the independence struggle of the Southern Cone (Uruguay, Argentina, Chile). Though this story is legendary, the knowledge that San Martín crossed the Andes with thousands of black soldiers is not. San Martín’s army of six thousand suffered heavy casualties while crossing the mountains, and of the 2,000 to 3,000 Argentine libertos [free black soldiers] who crossed the Andes into Chile with San Martín, fewer than 150 returned with him in 1823.¹ These black men, which “included both dark-skinned negros and lighter-skinned, racially mixed mulattoes or pardos (browns) who show visible evidence (skin color, hair texture, facial features) of African ancestry,” were not always free men who had willingly joined the military.² The majority of liberto troops were composed of black slaves who were securing their freedom by serving in the military. The white elite revolutionaries of this time, the criollos, often downplayed how crucial military participation of black slaves was in winning the wars for independence, and the implications that this participation had not only for the independence project but for the end of slavery in the Americas. Though black slave soldiers have been historically left out, or silenced in the independence narrative, they fought, died, and defended the nation alongside criollos, and through a policy of manumission through military service, gained access to freedom and the process towards abolition.

Recent scholarship is just now rewriting blacks into the independence narrative of the Río de la Plata region (Uruguay, Argentina). In studying how popular classes participated in the wars for independence, nineteenth century historians often denied the significance of instances where blacks, pardos (free colored people), or indigenous people were armed and fought with the criollos, and contemporary historians have often given too much “weight to nineteenth-century political narratives, which continue to be read as documentary evidence of lower-class attitudes.”³ Marixa Lasso in her study of pardo participation in revolution in Colombia establishes that independence was not a top down process, but rather involved the active participation,
support, and direction of the lower classes, including pardos, slaves and poor whites. This is evident in Argentina, where free blacks made up ten percent of the militia in 1810, and in Uruguay where the all-black 6th regiment secured victory for the revolutionaries at the Battle of Cerrito in 1811, which kept royalist forces from Montevideo, a source of food and supplies for soldiers.

How then have slaves and free blacks been written out of the independence narrative, and why was this narrative told? The production of one historical narrative over another, or silencing, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot explains, can occur from the “uneven power in the production of sources, archives, and narratives.” In nineteenth century Argentina and Uruguay this silencing was reflected in elite officials’ choice to promote a myth of a white nation over the mestizaje identity that other Latin American nations were adopting. Argentines and Uruguayans “preferred to think of themselves as entirely white [nations],” a belief that was reflected in state policies of not accurately recording indigenous and Afro populations in censuses. However, black slaves did fight in great proportions for the independence of Uruguay and Argentina. The former colonies, scarcely populated and bereft of sufficient men to fill the armed forces, turned to arming slaves, despite the fears that this could lead to an insurrection like that in Saint Domingue. Due to the need to appease slave soldiers and address the inherent contradictions between their revolutionary rhetoric and the continued existence of slavery in the colonies, the elite adopted a policy of manumission through military service for slaves who were able to serve the patria, or the nation. This policy was not an attack against the institution of slavery itself; elites were more committed to property rights than abolition (which did not occur for another thirty years). Nevertheless this policy created fissures that allowed for more resistance to slavery and eventually concluded in abolition. In this paper I will explore how black slave soldiers have been silenced in the independence narrative of the Río de La Plata, the ways in which they participated or did not participate in the independence project, and the implications of the policy of manumission through military service for Afro-Argentines and Afro-Uruguayans. In contrast to arguments made in earlier historiography, the process by which manumission through military service led to abolition was not unilateral; this was not just a policy implemented by criollos on slaves, but rather it involved the manipulation of this policy by both criollos, who attempted to force slaves to serve more than their term and keep them in militaristic bondage, and by the slaves as they used this policy to escape cruel masters, sell out royalist owners, and secure freedom while not necessarily fighting for the patria.

68
II. Criollos and the production of a white independence narrative

In constructing an independence narrative and national ideologies, Argentina and Uruguay have historically relied on drawing connections to Europe and emphasizing a cultural association with the Old World. The early Argentine intellectual and president Domingo Faustino Sarmiento emphasized the creation of a European culture in Argentina to legitimize the nation and erase the “barbarous” indigenous and African influences on culture in his famous essay *Facundo, or Civilization and Barbarism*. This idea is also demonstrated in an ode to independence that appears in a newspaper from Buenos Aires during the early nineteenth century. This poem, which draws contrasts and parallels between the French Revolution and the independence movements in the Spanish colonies, is a key example of how black slaves have been silenced in the criollo version of the independence narrative:

It is not the liberty that France had
Cruel Regicides
Perverse Vassals […]
Infamy and vice is their white[ness]
Heroic virtues are our white[ness].

In citing the French Revolution, the Argentines both legitimized their revolution by connecting it to a successful overthrow of European monarchy, and made the claim that the American independence movement perfected what the French could not. Simultaneously, this poem links independence movements to “whiteness” and silences both the Haitian revolution that preceded and influenced the Río de La Plata revolutions, and the participation of blacks in these movements. This poem was written only months after the May Revolution of 1810, the start of hostilities with Spain and the independence process in Argentina in which Argentines ousted the Viceroy and established an independent government. By this time, the precedent of arming free blacks and slaves to defend the colony had already been set. In 1906-07, during the British invasion and occupation of Argentina and Uruguay, criollos relied heavily on black soldiers to defend the borders. Thus, black soldiers historically had a place in defending the patria, a truth that this poem, in its focus on white, Western ideals, does not reflect.

In the neighboring country of Uruguay, criollos also created an exclusionary independence narrative that based the foundation of the nation on the elite descendants of Europe, and erased any indigenous or black presence in the nation. The fierce indigenous population, the Charrúas, made Uruguay a challenge to colonize, but by the 1830s had disappeared from the elite consciousness. In George Reid Andrews’ analysis of primary school history textbooks published in Uruguay from the 1920s to the 1960s, mention of an Afro-population only appears
twice in the book, with no mention of the role black soldiers played in fighting in the wars for independence. Though the “fatherland that [the patriots] created was […] for the white and for the black; it was for the gaucho and for the Charrúa” this message was contradicted by the concluding text in the book, a poem “How White Your White Whiteness” which explored the same themes as the Canción Patriótica above. Thus even in the twentieth century the idea that indigenous and black peoples had little to do with the founding of the nation continued to be prevail in the Uruguayan consciousness.

Despite criollo attempts to erase blacks from the independence narrative, Buenos Aires and Montevideo during the nineteenth century boasted large black populations. These blacks shared knowledge of the Haitian Revolution and other revolutions occurring the Americas and found ways to identify with independence rhetoric and Enlightenment thought. The influence of the Declaration of the Rights of Man that was sweeping the globe did not pass over blacks living in the Río de La Plata, and in Uruguay criollos were accusing French shipmen of spreading unrest and revolutionary ideas to slaves. These ideas created a need for criollos to address the inherent contradictions in their wish for liberation from Spain and the continued existence of slavery in the colonies. Military leaders who worked closely with black troops believed it was “madness [the idea] that a revolution for liberty should try to maintain slavery.” Thus the policy of manumission through military service was a way of both attempting to pacify black populations and make gradual, if insincere steps towards abolition. Though slaves have been silenced from this narrative and from the idea of the “white nation,” early nineteenth century Montevideo and Buenos Aires were thriving with settled black populations with slaves arriving monthly from Africa. On the eve of independence in the Río de La Plata, the resurgence of the slave trade and the growing free black populations in the cities would make this region prime for the use of slaves as a military force.

III. “They never allowed the majestic Kings of Spain to know that in their Americas slavery continued”

In 1502 the first slaves were transported to Spanish America to the island of Saint Domingue, and by 1680 they began arriving in the port city of Montevideo, brought by the Portuguese into the former colony Sacramento. The arrival of these slaves was the result of the Bourbon reforms and Spanish officials intent to expand economic wealth and increase tax revenues through the promotion of plantation colonies. The slave trade to Southern Cone quickly grew, with “an estimated 45,000 slaves imported through Buenos Aires between 1750 and 1810 for sale in both the city and the interior. Another 15,000 passed through
Montevideo after 1770. Around 1800, about 30,000 slaves were living in the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, and in Montevideo blacks composed one-third of the population by 1805, with only ten percent of that population represented by free blacks. By 1816 nearly half of all Uruguayan households had at least one or two domestic slaves, while slaves in Argentina were also being employed primarily in households and in food processing and meat salting plants. Although some slaves were needed in both regions to work on cattle ranches, the majority of slaves in the viceroyalty were not being used for plantation agriculture. This is crucial in that Argentina and Uruguay had a slave workforce that could readily go to war without having a serious disruptive economic impact. Unlike in Brazil, where slaves were needed to manage large sugar and coffee plantations, “in many parts of Spanish America slaves were not absolutely essential to local economic activities and, consequently were available [for military service].” Thus conditions in the Río de La Plata region were already favorable to use slaves as a military force.

As Spanish America had larger manumission rates than English and French colonies in the Americas, the number of free blacks living in Uruguay and Argentina also grew with the slave trade. Some of these free blacks like the lawyer Jacinto Ventura de Molina became advocates for abolition and defenders of the Afro communities before the wars for independence began. Molina, born in 1766 to free parents in the town of Río Grande, Uruguay, often represented the African ethnic organizations or Naciones Africanas in Montevideo and became a political and intellectual voice for the black community. His views, as one of the earliest black voices recorded writing politically against slavery in Uruguay, are particularly informative. Molina considered himself a Royalist, or supporter of the monarchy. Throughout his writing he vehemently defended the Kings of Spain and Portugal, absolving them of having any fault in slavery, and claiming that the criollos “never allowed the majestic Kings of Spain to know that in their Americas slavery continued.” Furthermore, after the beginning of the revolution, Molina was very critical of the Uruguayan revolutionary leader José Artigas and the inscription of black slaves into the military. Though the Spanish set the precedent for using black slaves in military campaigns in the sixteenth century, and continued this policy in their campaigns against revolutionary forces, Molina did not critique the king for these actions. Molina declares that slaves are “the victims of a Liberty that has sacrificed them,” and makes the claim that the Artigas revolution and the independence movement have done little to improve the condition of slaves, and that slaves are being sacrificed in a war that does not include them in the beneficiaries. The opinions of Molina are crucial to
understanding slave participation in the wars for independence as his reasoning represents one of the reasons the revolutionary leaders instituted the policy of manumission through military service: the Spanish were offering slaves freedom for fighting, and as Molina clearly shows, allegiance was to be won through this freedom, and not because slaves truly believed in fighting for either the patria or the crown. Why then would slaves fight for the patria instead of for royalist forces? The black population declined sharply in Buenos Aires and Montevideo during war years between 1810 and 1827 and the “masculinity index among the black population dropped by almost half” in the cities, evidence that slaves were joining the war. Their contemporaries wrote about the willingness and suitability of slaves to go to war, whether it was because they had recently arrived from Africa and had military experience or because they too had developed a loyalty to the patria. As few slaves were writing about these events during this time period, most of the scholarship on this issue has been based on nineteenth century elite perceptions of slaves. Slaves have historically been portrayed as willingly going to war because they identified with the independence movement, as seen in the eulogy of a prominent black soldier from Mendoza, Argentina:

“These blacks, if they had ambitions, it was the ambition of their country, and if they were motivated by some passion, it was the passion to complete God’s mission for the good of the people of Argentina.”

Thus this eulogy linked slave military participation to genuine alliance with the independence cause. Many scholars have struggled to distinguish how slaves were responding and thinking about independence movements. Some have proposed that slaves were naturally drawn to the rhetoric of freedom, in which analogies were drawn between the Americas as enslaved and suffering and Spain as a cruel master. Independence, framed in this manner was thought to have given “slaves and masters…a common experience and a common language.” Other scholars have taken slave participation at face value, citing that “what is surprising is not that slaves sought to avoid military service but that so many agreed to serve.” However this analysis does not inquire into the ways slave soldiers resisted their status after enlisting. The knowledge that slaves were fighting against each other by joining both royalists and independence forces suggests that slaves had a more complex way of understanding independence movements. Joining both forces was a means to freedom, but this process was not unilateral. Slaves were not simply cannon fodder and joining the military to fight in the hopes of gaining access to freedom. Death and casualty rates were high among men at this time, and as George Reid Andrews shows, slaves were aware of the costs of going to war, and the ways in which criollos were not
fulfilling their agreement to free slaves after serving their term of service.

Thus slaves must have had other reasons for enlisting. Numerous records suggest slaves would enlist in the military, and then run away, be uncooperative, or refuse to serve at all. The most important revolutionary figure of this time, Simón Bolívar, “complained bitterly about the slaves’ refusal to serve, charging that they ‘[had] even lost the desire to be free’” while other commanders complained of slaves defecting and causing disciplinary problems in the barracks. Slaves were using the policy of manumission through military service as a vehicle to protest slavery and change their status. Though some slave soldiers may have earnestly agreed with independence, there are instances of slaves selling out their masters, running away, and inventing stories to get themselves into the military. This policy was not only a way for criollos to occupy the black population during this time of increasing unrest among slaves. Before the independence wars began, leaders were becoming increasingly aware of the dangers organized and unhappy black populations posed to the stability of plantation economies, as evidenced by slave and pardo uprisings in Saint Domingue and Venezuela. In its implementation, this policy became more than a criollo effort to keep slaves from revolting and support the independence project. It became a way for the enslaved to take advantage of the former colonies’ desperate need for soldiers, gain their personal freedom, protest slavery, and advocate a new place in society for blacks after independence.

IV. Slave Soldiers’ Participation, and Resistance in the military

On July 12, 1810 the Gaceta de Buenos Aires, an Argentine newspaper, ran the story of a black slave who sold out his masters to the junta, or military leadership, claiming that his master had “more than three hundred rifles hidden” presumably to support royalist forces. This slave came forward of his own accord with the knowledge that he would be punished if the junta found out the accusations were false, and they indeed were false. After verifying that his master, Don Pedro Cerviño, was not hiding arms for the Spanish forces the government quickly punished the slave to discourage others from attempting this same ruse:

“the junta ordered immediately that the next morning the slave would be punished with one hundred lashes in the street...the mayor was in charge of finding out the cause of this accusation and if some instigator had persuaded the slave to commit this crime.”

Similarly, after the policy of manumission through military service began in 1811 in Uruguay, reports of slaves selling out their masters were frequent. One slave Francisco Agüero even “[revised] the nationality of his owner as circumstances demanded.” Additionally slaves were
running away from their owners in the Río de la Plata region, telling recruiters they were free men and enlisting in the military. Thus slaves were actively involved in determining their status in the independence conflict. These instances where slaves manipulated the colonial divide by pitting the Spanish against the revolutionaries as need arose represents a deep understanding of this conflict and the agency with which slaves resisted bondage. Some slaves negotiated with their owners to send back portions of their wages in order to convince owners to let them leave to join the military. War created an opportunity for slaves to gain bargaining power and as agents of change these slaves used their understanding of contemporary Argentinean and Uruguayan society to create their own paths to freedom. The policy of manumission through military service was intended to be a way for criollos to utilize slave forces to their advantage, while still maintaining control. However, as is seen in the stories of the slave of Don Pedro Cerviño and Francisco Agüero, slaves used this opening and the chaos of the independence wars to take their freedom.

Other forms of resistance to this policy took the shape of misbehavior in the armed forces. Slaves in the Uruguayan forces were resistant to forms of punishment reserved for blacks in the military such as demolition and construction jobs, punishments that were sometimes implemented by a few black officers in the military. These soldiers would “desert temporarily and take refuge in the cities, or permanently, leave for the enemy camp or set a course for the borders.” Slaves would find ways to enlist in the military, and subsequently run away, or enjoy the wages and new freedom that the military offered without completing their duties as soldiers. Liberto troops in Uruguay were often the model of disorder because of uncooperative ex-slave soldiers. As Borucki, Chagas, and Stalla claim, “desertion, alcoholism, and embezzlement turned the troops into forces of chronic indiscipline.” Commanders and government officials alike complained about liberto troops not following orders and even starting fights in the barracks. As Peter Blanchard analyzes, the all black Company of Pardos of Punta Gorda were so rowdy that one soldier went as far as to “[strike] his officer in the face” while the troop numbers dwindled because libertos were deserting and stealing weapons as they went. In the chaos of war former slaves would “wage war on their former owners and loot the estancias on which they had formerly labored,” exacting revenge upon those who had kept them in bondage. Just as the French revolution created prime circumstances for slaves in Saint Domingue to revolt, in the Río de la Plata the confusion of war and the enactment of this policy allowed these slaves to resist the institution.

Though many slaves found resistance through this policy, there
are narratives of some black slave troops that appear to be the exception to this behavior. Joaquin Chaves was a black fighter in the famous all black sixth regiment of Uruguay. During the Battle of Cerrito in December 1812, Chaves supposedly sounded the battle cry that led the black troops to follow their commander into enemy fire in a surprise attack against the Royalist forces. The commander of the Royalist forces was shot and killed, causing confusion among the soldiers and a subsequent victory for the independence rebels. Marcos de Estrada in his glowing mini-biographies of prominent Afro-Argentines describes Chaves as “the heroic African, with exceptional agility attacked and defended as much as possible the blows of his enemies.”

Despite this glorified account of the Battle of Cerrito, the death toll was high among black soldiers, and Molina takes a different view of the battle, lamenting that “15000 have perished in the Americas […] your grace should observe if God [likes] that [display of] humanity.”

Though it is impossible to know the motivations of the black libertos of the sixth regiment, De Estrada’s description must be read with some skepticism as his description of Chaves’ character was written over a hundred years later. Molina’s reaction is probably the closest to the views held by the contemporary black community in the Río de la Plata.

This tale of the sixth regiment marching valiantly to their deaths in the Battle of Cerrito fits the nineteenth century criollo version of the independence narrative. If any recognition was given to blacks in this war, they were portrayed as willing and faithful servants of the patria, as opposed to unruly and uncooperative soldiers. This is another example of silencing blacks in the independence narrative; when slaves have been mentioned in this narrative (which is little) their actual reactions to military service have been silenced. They have been portrayed as eager and blind followers of this movement, but evidence suggests that they had much more agency in this conflict. The instances of slave running away, stealing weapons, selling out royalist owners and causing trouble for their commanders are not simply isolated acts of rebellion. As Robin Kelly analyzes in his chapter on black racial working-class resistance in America, even small acts of resistance such as refusing to wear a work uniform the assigned way or stealing food from the workplace can represent a concerted effort by a marginalized group of people to rebel against their status in society.

Thus, though some slaves were joining the military and “serving,” the acts of rebellion they engaged in while in the military and how they manipulated this policy to fit their own needs represented a movement of slaves in the Río de la Plata region to resist the institution of slavery and start the process towards abolition.

V. Conclusion
The policy of manumission through military service in the Río de la Plata was not always received positively by criollos. Many framed the action of giving up slaves as a sacrifice for the patria and in the *Gaceta de Buenos Aires* of 1810, the names abound of masters who willingly gave up their slaves to fight. These public displays of dedication to the patria were another way of silencing slaves from having agency in the independence narrative; the sacrifice was born by the masters who were losing valuable servants in their households and labor that maintained their estates, not by slaves being sent off to fight. As the master of the slave Francisco Xavier stated in the Gaceta, “now he is admitted [to the military] and this was the moment I waited for […] to make it known my heart [was] in service to the nation.”

The wars for independence wore on and the slave trade was declared over (1812 in Argentina, 1825 in Uruguay) though it was later reopened in Argentina and continued illegally in Uruguay. Though slaves could gain freedom through service in the military, criollos had no intention of ending slavery in the Río de la Plata and only with the conclusion of bloody civil wars late into the nineteenth century was abolition achieved. Blacks and slaves continued to be used as armed forces in the civil wars, and freedmen were being illegally made to fight again. Segregation and inequality continued in the military with only a few black soldiers making the rank of officer.

Blacks were silenced from the independence narrative because their service was not seen as exceptional. While criollo revolutionaries were sacrificing their lives and livelihoods for the patria, there was an “expectation that black men had a special obligation to serve the nation, and the [result was the] singling out of these men for forced conscription and impressments.” This exclusion continued after the wars into their socioeconomic and political place in Uruguayan and Argentinean society. Many poor veterans could be seen begging on the streets of Buenos Aires and Montevideo in the late nineteenth century, freed, but poor and suffering from the aftermath of fighting in a war. A former black soldier from Uruguay, Pajarito, laments his time in the wars and poor status in contemporary Uruguayan society:

“Do you know who I am? I am the black Pajarito […] I am an old soldier of the independence that finished in this land; I was a trumpet blower in that time. Give me a horn and I’ll show you how it will leave you deaf […] they told me to go to serve again and I went because I have always been a brave negro.”

Thus the marginalization of blacks continued after the wars of independence even when freedom was attainable.

In conclusion, the silencing of black slaves in the independence narrative in the Río de la Plata region has been propelled since the
nineteenth century. There is a need for scholars to revisit and revise this history, as the lack of research available on the Afro populations of Argentina and Uruguay is exemplary of modern silencing. Additionally, women have been silenced in the independence narrative and little is known about the role black women slaves and freed women played in independence. As there were more women living in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and slave women were more likely to be able to purchase their freedom or be freed by masters because of the close relationships they developed working domestically, it is likely that they too were influential in the independence process. The wars for independence provided an opportunity for slaves to take advantage of the chaos of war and the poor implementation of new policies like manumission through service, to gain equal rights to criollos.

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7 My translation from Gaceta de Buenos Aires, 1810-1821.
8 Andrews Blackness in the White Nation, 4
10 Andrews Afro-Latin America, 56
12 Blanchard Flags of Freedom, 7
13 Blanchard Flags of Freedom, 4
14 Acree & Borucki Jacinto Ventura de Molina, 271
15 Acree & Borucki Jacinto Ventura de Molina, 90
16 Andrews Afro-Latin America, 62
18 Blanchard Flags of Freedom, 500
19 Andrews Afro-Latin America, 62
20 Ibid.
22 Buenos Ayres 12 de Julio de 1810." *Gaceta de Buenos Aires*, July 12, 1810, 112.
23 *Gaceta de Buenos Aires*, 112
24 Blanchard *Flags of Freedom*, 55
26 Borucki, Chagas & Stalla, *Esclavitud y Trabajo*, 76
27 Blanchard *Flags of Freedom*, 57
28 Andrews *Afro-Latin America*, 60
29 De Estrada *Argentinos de Origen Africano*, 69
30 Acree & Borucki *Jacinto Ventura de Molina*, 91
33 Andrews *Blackness in the White Nation*, 34
Hanged by Its Cross of Iron: The Vietnam War’s Virulent Effect on the Military-Industrial Complex

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Introduction:

_In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist._

-Dwight D. Eisenhower

When President Eisenhower gave his farewell address, he warned the nation of the danger posed by the Military-Industrial complex. By the end of the Vietnam War, his prescient remarks had all but been fully realized. America had withdrawn from the longest and bloodiest foreign conflict in its history. It had soiled America’s standing abroad and shaken confidence in government at home. Moreover, America’s ignominious departure from the conflict precipitated numerous questions about just how much “misplaced power” the Military-Industrial Complex actually wielded. Were war-profiteers and moneyed interests responsible for the conflict? Did they in turn profit from the devastation caused by the war? Finally, what happened to the Military-Industrial complex following the war, and how did the Vietnam War alter its role in future conflicts?

Even before considering these crucial questions, an even more fundamental inquiry lingers. Just what was the Military-Industrial complex? Was it a secretive, monolithic entity that sought to trade the integrity of the American political process for financial gain or was it a more complicated and diffuse set of institutions? Did it serve as an economic catalyst or inhibitor during the war? In turn, this paper will address all of these questions through a nuanced interpretation of the Military-Industrial complex that situates its influence, implications, and involvement in the Vietnam War. First, and in opposition to the prevailing scholarly interpretation, which views the Military-Industrial Context neither exhibited significant influence on the instigation of the Vietnam War, nor directly benefited from the experience. On the contrary, the Military-Industrial Complex suffered measureable loss and decline through its involvement with the conflict. Second, this paper will demonstrate how the Military-Industrial Complex is not necessarily a negative force on the American political economy.
Even though the perpetual war mentality of the Cold War may have pushed the Military-Industrial Complex into an immutable cycle of costly armament production, this paper will highlight how America’s defeat in Vietnam, in particular, created an unprecedented cost for the Military-Industrial Complex that even produced negative externalities for American society writ large. Specifically, the Vietnam War caused the Military-Industrial Complex to become an economic, political, and social focal point of destabilization through the unleashing of damaging inflationary pressure across the entire economy, the creation of harmful unemployment dislocation effects, and the promulgation of overt discontent among labor groups against both American industry and government.

The central claim of this paper will also help dispel some preconceived notions of the Military-Industrial Complex. Most visibly, this paper will address the notion of war profiteering. It is commonly accepted that the individual industries and politicians who can profit from the means of war will do all in their power to achieve those ends. Yet the terrible destruction, cost and loss of the Vietnam War, both foreign and domestic, should cast serious doubt on the assumed Military-Industrial-Political profit relationship. Further, the explicit cost in political capital and profit, resulting from the Vietnam War, should have deterred the involvement of the Military-Industrial Complex. Therefore, the particular experience of defeat from the Vietnam War should recast the unquestioned assumption of American money and militarism. Finally, the findings of this paper should have serious implications on the Military-Industrial Complex’s position in American history. Whereas the United States’ irrevocable evolution from a nation of farmers to a nation of bomb makers seemed like a natural process, aided and abetted by the Military-Industrial Complex, the loss and corresponding virulent effect of the Vietnam War on the Military-Industrial Complex suggests a substantially less instrumental role of this particular institution on America’s military historical narrative.

**The Military-Industrial Complex?**

Before engaging in systematic historical analysis, it is important to formulate a working definition of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC). Within historical literature a precise definition of the MIC remains elusive. Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of the pernicious grasp of the military establishment, yet he only vaguely defined the contours of its existence as an immense “economic, political and even spiritual” entity that can be found in all levels of the government. Since 1961, scholars have wrestled with the concept to construct a more definitive definition. Pilisuk and Hayden defined the complex as “an informal and
changing coalition of groups with vested psychological, moral, and material interests in the continuous development and maintenance of high levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in military-strategic conceptions of international affairs.” However, this conception of the complex fails to capture the micro-motivations of individual actors in addition to institutional dynamics which strongly influence their decisions. C. Wright Mills described the Military-Industrial Complex as a collection of ‘power elite’ who occupied the principal positions of power across American society that could easily navigate institutional constraints to implement favorable policies. Even though Mills parsimoniously distills the vast notion of the MIC into a singular unit of analysis, he nevertheless loses analytical leverage by omitting the crucial impact of “iron triangles,” which are coalitions both purposefully and inextricably connected in the pursuit of mutual interest. Without incorporating the overarching political, institutional structure into his definition, Mills misses an influential explanatory framework of human behavior.

From the overlapping and conflicting notions of the MIC emerge a number of essential characteristics that will constitute a working definition for this paper. The first is the importance of individual agency. An essential component of the argument is to trace the actions of specific individuals and how they navigated the confines of the MIC and the Vietnam War to obtain their objectives. Therefore, this paper’s definition of the MIC places the ‘actor’ as the most basic and fundamental unit of analysis. The second characteristic is ‘mutual benefit.’ A common theme in all MIC literature is how the main players aligned themselves in a natural constellation of self-reinforcing interest. Although this is the most self-evident component of the definition, it is also of vital importance to establish the impetus of cooperation amongst these disparate groups working within a defined set of institutional constructs. Finally, the third characteristic encompasses the actual composition of the complex. Neither Eisenhower, nor Pilisuk and Hayden nor Mills identify any particular entities, agencies or individuals as specific members of the MIC. While this paper cannot identify every important figure, it nevertheless completes the definition of the Military-Industrial complex by recognizing some of the most important political figures, defense contracting executives and pentagon procurement specialists as the primary players of the complex.

**Positive Effects of the Military Industrial Complex**

The most salient criticism of the Military-Industrial Complex concerns its inherent and self-fulfilling goal to fuel American militarism. Since the United States’ emergence as a global superpower after World
War II, historical critics point to the MIC as a culpable force behind America’s permanent transition to a wartime economy. However, the historical literature’s focus on the causal relationship between the MIC and the United States’ propensity for war-making crowds out the MIC’s important, beneficial contributions to the United States’ political economy. Even if the advent of the Cold War effectively abolished the distinction of a “peacetime economy,” the MIC still added indispensable economic, defensive, and political value to American society. Before America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the network of factories, research institutions, development centers, and corporate offices associated with the MIC constituted a vibrant network of productivity and innovation in addition to a sizeable contribution of high value-added jobs to the American workforce. Mary Kaldor, an ardent critic of the Military-Industrial Complex, even concurs by adding, “In the first postwar decades this may have helped mobilize resources for investment and innovation and to avoid the crises to which rapidly changing capitalist economies are prone.” From a national security standpoint, the Pentagon had a vested interest in establishing a “defense industrial base” where an amalgamation of factories, research laboratories, and other essential industries could be established to maintain a permanent and highly responsive military-industrial center. Finally, the establishment of a tightly connected military-industrial nexus provided stable and reliable political capital for representatives in Washington, namely through jobs and political contributions.

The explicitly positive characteristics of the MIC can be observed up until the beginning of President Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War. Before President Johnson’s increase in combat troops in 1965, and following the French withdrawal from the region following their 1954 defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the United States had a limited, albeit disguised military presence through counter-insurgency and clandestine operations. Ironically, the cost of these operations pale in comparison to Eisenhower’s other contemporaneous defense spending initiatives as part of his “massive retaliation” strategy of the 1950s. During these years the approximate cost of a U.S. soldier in Indochina was $23,000. Thus, the total cost of U.S. military involvement between 1954 and 1960 was only about 15 million dollars. After Eisenhower, the Kennedy administration initiated a new, cheaper, and more manageable policy of “flexible response” that enabled the United States to engage in smaller scale, “proxy wars.” The backdrop of this new strategic framework coupled with Johnson’s increase of ground soldiers necessitated an unprecedented, comprehensive logistical network to facilitate the increase in global military involvement.
Operations in Vietnam were no different as chief military commander, General Westmoreland, erected an intricate and expansive support system for the American military campaign. In response to this military and logistical imperative, the Pentagon turned towards the American defense industry. In particular, the Pentagon sought the development of a large carrier plane to expedite the movement of soldiers and material. Yet the Department of Defense's process for selecting contracts revealed the potential danger of the MIC in explicit times of war. The aforementioned priority to maintain a sufficient and responsive defense industrial base precipitated Defense contracts to be awarded evenly if not inefficiently across the major firms.\(^\text{16}\) Senator William Fulbright noted with dismay the reality of this arrangement as "a degenerated form of Socialism. Certainly there is no enterprise in it. There is no competition in it, and no efficiency."\(^\text{17}\) Such a phenomenon proved to be especially true in 1965, as even though the Air Force C-5A Selection board judged Lockheed’s proposal to be inferior as compared to other major contractors including Boeing and Douglas, they nonetheless awarded the contract to Lockheed.\(^\text{18}\)

Even with the Pentagon’s priority of maintaining equitable competition among its private contract network, it would be naïve not to point also to the efficient lobbying of Lockheed’s political supporters: Mayor Howard Atherton of Marietta, Georgia and President Johnson’s friend, Senator Richard Russell from Georgia.\(^\text{19}\) Senator Russell’s influence is not to be understated as he was then the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee. These committees in particular proved to be a pivotal linkage between the MIC and the Vietnam War. In studies conducted investigating the connection between defense spending and congressional voting for war, a significant correlation emerged between members of these committees and general ‘hawkishness’ for war.\(^\text{20}\) Of course, it probably comes as no surprise that members of the Armed Services Committee might be predisposed for war, but it still signifies that those congressmen occupying these seats had an advantageous position in combining military policy with pork-barrel politics.

In addition, during his tenure as Senator, Russell had overseen the transformation of Georgia from an agrarian state into a military-industrial center with over one billion dollars in defense contracts awarded to the state by the end of the Vietnam War.\(^\text{21}\) In short, Russell had a proven record of translating political leverage into lucrative defense deals and populist, military-industrial growth policies for his constituents. Even President Johnson acknowledged Senator Russell’s clout, “I would have you good folks know there are a lot of Marietta, Georgia’s scattered throughout the fifty states… but all of them don’t
have the Georgia delegation.” President’s Johnson’s reference to the “Georgia Delegation” is a thinly veiled nod to Senator Richard Russell. Therefore with the political, economic, and military arms of the MIC aligned, the C-5A galaxy was born.

The C-5A Galaxy was an extraordinary engineering feat as it featured a payload of 650,000 pounds; it could carry 650 fully equipped soldiers, and just ten of the planes could have handled the entire Berlin Airlift. Yet despite its prodigious specifications, the C-5A plane was not without critics. Furthermore, as the costs of the Vietnam War continued to rise without any significant advances on the ground, American policy makers became more sensitive to any perceived prodigal waste accumulating from the nested relationship between the defense industry and the Pentagon. The furor surrounding the C-5A’s procurement, costly development cycle, and ineffectual production symbolized the inefficient and insulated process of procurement within the MIC. In fact, the conspicuous lack of congressional oversight within the weapon procurement process has often been noted. Though, this did not mean the complete free reign of the MIC within Washington as Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee articulated the fundamental dilemma posed by the C-5A aircraft and other military technology created by the MIC:

If we get enough C-5A’s… we could send enormous numbers [of troops] anywhere overnight…But I don’t think we ought to be projecting our military power all over the world… I do not think we have the wisdom and the experience and the manpower to run the world and keep the peace in that sense.

Senator Fulbright’s caution against over-commitment reflects a clear weariness of other Vietnam-like obligations around the globe. More importantly, his quotation summarizes a basic and unintended harm of the Military-Industrial complex, which is even though the MIC can produce technological progress and innovation it can also encourage unnecessary and costly endeavors by virtue of these technological innovations’ very existence. Mary Kaldor’s often cited classical text, The Baroque Arsenal, embodied Senator Fulbright’s fear in a comprehensive sweep, “Modern military technology is not advanced; it is decadent…they are feats of tremendous ingenuity, talent, and organization…but they are incapable of achieving limited military objectives, and they have successively eroded the economy of the United States.” Kaldor implicitly ascribes the blame for “decadent” military technology to the MIC. Therefore, the advent of the Vietnam War served only to fulfill the MIC’s lust for additional and more costly war machines. Furthermore, until the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the MIC had steadily grown, unfettered, in size, production, and influence.
America’s insatiable appetite for technological and military dominance, fueled by the Cold War and sustained by the MIC’s select, positive contributions enabled its expansion with little thought of the consequences. The loss of the Vietnam War dramatically altered the public’s relationship with the MIC, especially as Vietnam War’s virulent effect on the MIC began to affect the civilian sectors of America’s political economy.

**The Vietnam War’s Effect on the Military-Industrial Complex and the American Economy**

By 1968, the Vietnam War had reached its apex. A stagnating ground war and waves of ineffectual bombing campaigns had seen President Johnson escalate American involvement. Compared to the paltry sums of the Eisenhower administration, the costs of Johnson’s war had multiplied by almost 2000 times in eight years, though defenders of American foreign policy would point to these figures as drops in the bucket when considering the enormous American economy. Further and on a macro-economic level, Vietnam War military spending occupied only 9.5% of the gross national product (GNP). To put this figure in perspective, the Korean War required 13% of GNP while World War II consumed 41% of the United States’ total output. Even on a micro-economic level, the effects of the war seem tame as the Vietnam War forced neither wage nor price controls on the economy unlike the Korean and Second World War. Thus initially, it seemed as though the involvement of the Military-Industrial Complex, and consequently, its costs and effects ought to be comparatively diminutive.

The defenders of Vietnam fiscal policy relied on even more sophisticated economic analysis than GNP. A popular interpretation of the Second World War is that the rapid mobilization of American industry to support the war effort elevated the American economy from depression to robust expansion. Indeed an academic debate emerged around this interpretation and focused on the ability of the Military-Industrial Complex to serve as a monetary policy tool. The more conservative interpretation views the MIC as a marginal Keynesian economic player. In other words, in sporadic downturns, military spending can serve as a quick stimulus for the economy. On the other side of the spectrum is the belief that the MIC serves as a prominent counter-cyclical monetary mechanism that can actually be used to reverse serious structural impediments in the economy. To briefly return to the case of Lockheed, in 1971 the secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, advocated a 250 million dollar loan to Lockheed in order to “minimize their losses so they can provide employment for 31,000 people throughout the country at a time when we desperately need that
type of employment. Michael Reich contributed additional empirical support for the claim. He investigated the effects of military spending, and his findings to some degree validated the positive macro-economic effects of the MIC. In particular, he notes the significant spill-over effects defense contracts have in other non-military sectors of the economy. For example while Boeing may receive a one billion dollar contract for a jet-fighter, it concurrently boosts the American steel, electronic, and automobile industries just to name a few. Thus, in theory and practice, one can see the potential value of war in not only buttressing the economic prospects of the MIC but also the entire economy.

On the other hand, using the Military-Industrial Complex as a backstop against cyclical forces came under serious criticism in Congress. Senator Proxmire, a fervent and vocal critic of Vietnam War spending, raised an important point about the nature of MIC monetary policy. He claimed that while it may individually buoy defense firms, in terms of the entire economy it fails to provide a net benefit. Ostensibly channeling the sentiment of Eisenhower’s famous “Cross of Iron” speech, Proxmire illustrated that while government payments to infrastructure, schools, or even corn subsidies may provide a tangible return for the investment, a veritable “quid pro quo” as Senator Proxmire asserts, there lacks such a return for many large defense contracting bids. To appreciate Proxmire’s point more simply, how can the MIC be viewed as beneficial for the country if it requires a 250 million dollar loan to both keep a company afloat and not drag the local communities into recession? More critically, how can the Vietnam War be viewed as beneficial for the MIC, if its constituent firms require a bail-out after a war? While at the outset, the Vietnam War seemed to create an economic stimulus for some industries, by the end of the war many of these same industries were struggling under the weight of their moribund defense contracts, which placed additional strain on the struggling American economy.

Even though some economists and defenders of U.S. foreign policy point to both the limited economic effect of the Vietnam War and a rich historical precedent of World War II to counter any negative claims of the MIC, much of this argument relies on faulty logic and a misleading historical comparison. At the time, Vietnam was America’s longest conflict, and as it dragged on, it began to expose cracks within Military-Industrial complex’s overly inflated edifice in addition to rusting away America’s previously untarnished prosperity. Economist Lawrence Klein succinctly summarizes the negative transformation of the Vietnam War, “At the beginning of the war, it appeared that the increased level of economic activity was a net benefit to the nation…The
war, however soon became an economic burden...and, worst of all, it divided the nation in spirit.” The Military-Industrial Complex was at the center of the economic, political, and social schism precipitated by Vietnam.

First, a closer look at the economic impact of the war reveals the Vietnam War’s overall deleterious effect on the Military-Industrial Complex. In particular, GNP and relative expenditures on the war tell only half the story of the damage associated with the MIC and the American economy. For example, while the war might have only occupied 9.5% of American economic output, the economy was also almost five times larger than during World War II, thus the small percentage of GNP cloaks the huge, real increase in cost. Another flaw in the defense of the MIC is the comparison between the Vietnam War and World War II. The historical differences are too numerous to be addressed in this paper, but the economic circumstances are as dissimilar as they are significant and ought to be discussed. In the 1930s, American factories laid idle. Millions were unemployed, and the advent of a massive military engagement ignited the engine of the military industrial complex. Not only were unemployed men able to join the war, but the demand for armaments, munitions, and supplies brought the industrial capacity of America to full bare. The American’s victory in the war seemed only to reinforce the reverence of American industrial prowess. However, by the time of the Vietnam War, America had reached the height of her prosperity. The economy was at a ‘full employment,’ and thus the ignition of the military industrial complex caused an inflationary over-heating. Unlike the depressed economy of the 1930’s, the Vietnam-era economy had no exhaust valve to release any excess heat; therefore, when the war ended, the MIC entered financial straits which placed strain on the American economic engine.

In fact, inflationary pressure in and of itself posed a grave threat to the American political economy. To pay for the expensive contracts endemic to the MIC, President Johnson faced a number of equally politically unsavory options. In the end, inflation ensued which weakened the American economy. Another issue of inflation concerns the type of goods produced by the MIC. Products from military industrial firms never enter the market place; they are not subject to exchange or competitive forces. Instead they are directly procured by the military and then are ostensibly used up and discarded. This process had two negative effects. First, it established a relationship of dependence for the MIC. The case of Vietnam escalated this relationship to new heights, but America’s subsequent defeat created a precipitous drop in contracts, which damaged the MIC’s defense firms. Second, this process exacerbated the effects of inflation because, as economist Seymour
Melman points out, it surged “quantities of purchasing power into the system without pumping an equivalent value of parallel and collateral goods and services.” 40 Melman’s concerns of MIC’s war-time inflationary tendencies echoed the cautionary sentiment of Senator Proxmire’s “quid pro quo” argument. The fiscal burden of the MIC is a high, albeit necessary cost to swallow for American citizens during the stable economy of the Cold War, yet the tumultuous experience of the Vietnam War made this cost particularly unpalatable. The MIC’s process of escalating defense contracts combined with the obsolescent nature of military armaments only contributed to its economic woes following the Vietnam War.

Seymour Melman continued his argument by elucidating the potential negative, economic cycle created by the Military-Industrial Complex. He claimed there is an “intimate connection… between mounting defense expenditures and the non-competitiveness of any American industries”41 Melman’s point is that the cost of the Vietnam War, which for estimating purposes he puts at 150 billion dollars, considerably constrained purchasing power on other consumer and more socially productive initiatives. And considering how Johnson faced serious budgetary constraints from his Great Society programs, the loss of the Vietnam War only worsened the undue, costly trade-off between financial support to the Military-Industrial Complex and support to either social welfare or non-military commercial sectors.42 Yet for the Military-Industrial Complex, whose primacy within the American political landscape usually afforded it an unparalleled position of funding and influence, saw the very imposition of a policy trade-off from the Vietnam War as a serious blow to its long-term interests.

The most important and most insidious damaging economic impact of the Vietnam War on the Military Industrial Complex was the structurally inherent inefficiency and time lag between defense contract procurement and defense contract production.43 The logic behind this argument is as follows: as the military situation in Vietnam rapidly changed, it precipitated new armament requests from the Pentagon. Once the defense contract had been awarded, there existed a subsequent delay in production and deployment. However, given the relatively quick hollowing out of public opinion on the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense paid huge contracts for unnecessarily military armaments. More importantly, these huge contracts forced the MIC to ratchet up production and hire additional skilled laborers and engineers. Yet this production and employment increase was dependent on long-term demand, thus when public opinion of the war soured, the MIC’s revenue stream quickly dissipated resulting in concentrated, yet nonetheless costly, socioeconomic dislocations across the United States.
The C-5A affair offers a lucid example of this unforeseen but damaging mechanism of the Vietnam War at work. When President Johnson escalated American military involvement, it necessitated a larger logistical support network, hence the C-5A Galaxy transport plane. The contract was quickly awarded to Lockheed in 1965. As mentioned before this process was both easy and swift because it satisfied the tripartite interests of the MIC: the military received a state-of-the-art airplane, the defense contractors, in this case Lockheed, received a lucrative contract, and the political representatives Russell and Atherton received a massive employment boost in their district.

However, what did the United States public writ large receive, and what was the final outcome for Lockheed? Throughout the rest of the war, the plane’s production was mired in engineering delays, spiraling costs, and even technical malfunctions. By the time the plane was ready in 1970, America began to draw down its involvement in Vietnam. In the end, the United States public endured a massive cost without any material benefit to the war effort. Likewise, as the war ended, funding dried up and threatened bankruptcy for an employer of over 100,000 Americans. In addition, the C-5A plane debacle forced Lockheed to fire many of its highly-valued aerospace engineers to regain its fiscal solvency. Unfortunately, because of the saturation and slowdown in the economy, these highly trained engineers were left unemployed and idle instead of being able to lend their talents in other productive, non-military sectors. This example is representative of the damaging relationship between the Vietnam War and the MIC. Because of the inherent lag time between the contract, development, and production, the MIC received awarded huge contracts without any positive economic return. Because of the nature of “full employment,” the evaporation of military funding after the war ended created a downward drag on the economy, which affected commerce even outside of the immediate scope of the MIC.

**Vietnam and the Military-Industrial Complex’s Political and Social Ramifications**

The full damage of the Vietnam War on the Military-Industrial Complex was contained not only to macro-economic indicators. The negative experience of the Vietnam War on the MIC not only directly led to harmful political and social ramifications on American society, but it also greatly undermined the image of the MIC within America popular consciousness. During the Vietnam War and immediately afterwards, the United States entered a new period of economic uncertainty. The huge increase in defense contracts to the companies attached to the military establishment created an employment bubble; however, because the
economy was already at ‘full employment,’ the economy had no short-term room to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of demobilized soldiers and tens of thousands of workers laid-off by the end of the war. In response, there was a distinct public frustration with American military policy, and the MIC served as one of the primary targets for this frustration.

This public sentiment is typified in a pamphlet published by the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. In particular, this pamphlet claimed that military spending was directly responsible for the unemployment of 907,000 workers, while each additional billion dollars of defense spending would cause another loss of 11,000 jobs. The Coalition’s source for these figures was The Empty Pork Barrel, which measured Pentagon defense spending and unemployment figures for the latter years of the Vietnam War. Even though the credibility of their sources and their methodology for calculating economic damage might be questionable, their economic prophecies paled in significance to the remainder of the pamphlet’s contents, which called for the recruitment and mobilization of citizens against military spending. The power of this document comes from the audience’s disillusionment with Vietnam, especially those individuals directly harmed by the war’s effects. Take for example the following vignette of a perennially unemployed engineer, “Since I have been at Lockheed, I’ve been laid off a total of five times in nine years. Lay-offs [are] a real, severe problem to people who are married, people who have house payments, families to bring up.” This article exemplifies that instead of being a recipient of reverence, as was the case following World War II, the MIC became the recipient of overt disdain and distrust because of the harmful effects caused by America’s loss in the Vietnam War.

Yet the public conception of the MIC’s damage to the American economy was not just expressed by activist groups. In 1971, President Nixon gave a speech entitled, “The Challenge of Peace,” which attempted to lower expectations surrounding the American withdrawal from Vietnam. In addition, Nixon explicitly articulated the cost of the War on the MIC, “We all know why we have an unemployment problem. Two million workers have been released from the Armed Forces and defense plants because of our success in winding down the war in Vietnam.” Nixon’s spin of the ‘success in winding down the war’ aside, his speech’s significance comes from the tacit admission of economic strain caused by the MIC through the over-expenditures of the Vietnam War. Moreover, it implicitly acknowledged the largest recession within the defense industry since 1946. However, Nixon’s speech omitted the “real victims of the recession,” as Mary Kaldor asserts, which were the thousands of subcontractors and small companies that went bankrupt.
through the collapse of military spending.\textsuperscript{52} But unlike major defense firms, who could receive quick bailouts from the federal government, the individual worker or sub-contractor faced a considerably more daunting challenge to reestablish fiscal solvency.\textsuperscript{53}

Perhaps the most intriguing validation of the sizeable political turmoil created by the Vietnam War comes from a loosely termed Vietnamese “International Commentary” article, which more closely resembles Vietnamese propaganda. Regardless of the explicit bias, the article highlights the negative impact of the Vietnam War on the American political landscape. This article is worth noting because it indicates that the precise political trauma initiated by the Vietnam War was significant enough to be commented on by Vietnamese observers even during the turmoil of post-war reunification. Dripping with Marxist-Leninist terminology, the author denotes the high inflation, unemployment, and diminishing American prestige worldwide following the war. Yet the most insightful comment surrounds how the Vietnam War had driven a wedge between the “American monopoly capitalist cliques” and the American people.\textsuperscript{54} In between the authors incendiary rhetoric rests an implicit recognition of the damage the MIC has wrecked on the American political fabric. In sum, the political costs to the MIC were visible in multiple contexts, from the Presidential political foreground to the polemical political background of Vietnamese commentary.

Another significant cost of the Military-Industrial Complex was the social dislocation it caused following the war. The quick escalation of defense contracts followed by the corresponding precipitous drop in funding following the war created both inflationary and unemployment effects on the American economy. While these effects spurred political protests, they also had equally harmful effects on social cohesion. In 1967 a special committee under the auspices of the President’s Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament noted that reduction in defense-related activity “may create serious local unemployment, declines in retail sales and construction, and depressed property values. Local problems may derive from the closing of military installations or from cutbacks in defense orders of goods and services.”\textsuperscript{55} The significant point of this quotation is the undeniable dislocations created by MIC demobilization after war. In other words, the report prophesized the inevitable harm the post-war economic environment will have on local communities.

An insightful lens of this negative social effect from the Military-Industrial Complex can be seen from the reaction from labor. Initially one would suspect that labor, particularly those who are associated in some way to the MIC would provide broad support for the
war as they would be the direct or tangential beneficiaries of lucrative defense contracts. Indeed the AFL-CIO gave a vague statement in support of the war as a means “to halt Communist aggression and secure a just and lasting peace.” However beneath the façade of public posturing was a deeper concern for the costs of war. For example, while labor may slightly receive trickle-down benefits from their industry receiving short-run profits through defense contracts, labor loses considerably more in the long-run because of the resulting cuts in social welfare spending.

In response, the United Auto Workers, International Association of Machinists, and several other unions proposed a post-war adjustment plan to Congress; yet either because the Vietnam War sapped the necessary political capital to act or congressmen simply did not prioritize the fate of unionized labor, Congress ostensibly ignored the union leaders’ efforts.

By 1970, a collection of union members aggravated by the impending post-war shock to their industries came out in dramatic fashion in opposition to the war. They published a manifesto against the Vietnam War which specified its strain on American workers. In particular they articulated an end to the war and a reorganization of economic priorities by wanting “to begin putting our money where it counts – at home.” Their manifesto against the war is important for several reasons. First it breaks the commonly believed myth that labor were staunchly pro-Vietnam because their manifesto demonstrates the actual net economic cost posted by the war. Secondly, it indicates a more resonant social reaction against the MIC. If the actual workers within the MIC become opposed to its function during Vietnam then it must signify the true cost of war on the Military-Industrial arrangement.

The social reaction caused by the Military-Industrial Complex poses one final puzzle. By the end of the war, public perceptions of the military and the associated defense industries had turned negative. From a contemporary standpoint, such a reversal in opinion does not seem surprising. The 1960s and ’70s was a tumultuous era in which social upheaval and distrust of government was commonplace. However, at the time, this turmoil was a recent development in the American experience. Moreover, the negative reaction to the MIC is especially puzzling when one looks at the almost universal praise of the MIC following World War II. What could possibly account for this reversal in opinion? The role of the Vietnam War offers a plausible explanation. Many citizens viewed the Vietnam War as a catalyst for the invasive influence of the military and the over-militarization of society through a growing “military industrial complex.” Indeed it is revealing how the growth of the MIC in the context of Vietnam was viewed as a negative development as opposed to the growth of the MIC in the context of the Second World
War in which, combined with a generational-defining military victory, it was viewed as an essential pathway to economic prosperity. While there were numerous other factors that could have affected this change in opinion, it nevertheless seems as though the Vietnam War was the mechanism that transformed positive views of American military-industrial prowess into negative ones. Ultimately, the change in societal opinions of the MIC serves as a synecdoche for the MIC’s entire, negative, transformative trend caused by the Vietnam War.

**Overstating the Causal Effect of the Vietnam War?**

Although arguments that explicitly link the Military-Industrial Complex and American involvement in war are largely unfounded, the basic idea underpinning the argument is not. When Dwight D. Eisenhower issued his warning against the Military-Industrial Complex, he had seen firsthand its growth in both size and influence. He witnessed the creation of the modern armament sector as Supreme Allied Commander during World War II, and he then oversaw its consolidation as a formidable, political institution during his tenure as President. His warning thus incorporated and cut across both ‘peaceful’ and ‘war-time economies.’ Therefore within the context of the Cold War, in which the threat of a sudden military conflagration perpetually lingered in the minds of American policy makers, the growth of the MIC seemed not only inexorable but essential within an economy orientated around exigencies of war. And if the growth of the MIC was inevitable, then it can be subsequently reasoned that the costs of its existence on the American economy would therefore be as inevitable as they would be temporary. Because if the United States operates in a consistent mentality of war, be it through the threat of the USSR in the Cold War or even the threat of terrorism in the post-communist world, then any ephemeral cuts in defense contracts in response to public opinion shifts would be immediately reinstated once the next military threat appears over the horizon. The Regan-era military spending all but illustrates this point as Americans wished to place the trauma of Vietnam behind them, and resume the position of global hegemon. The ultimate implication for this line of reasoning is that it limits the causal impact of the Vietnam War on the Military-Industrial Complex and the American political economy because any changes to the American militaristic experience seem aberrant in the long run.

But even if the American Military-Industrial Complex will forever condemn the United States to a war-time economy and incentivize its involvement in military engagements, it does not sufficiently nullify the immediate and directly negative causal impact of America’s loss in the Vietnam War on the Military-Industrial Complex.
In other words, even though the Military-Industrial Complex continues to exist as an influential and unavoidable reality of the American political economy, the experience of the Vietnam War stymied its growth not only through the immediate costs of the war, but through the War’s elevation of the MIC’s seemingly pernicious influence into the forefront of American political discourse. And while military spending may ebb and flow in response to new conflicts and international objectives, the experience of Vietnam lingers as a permanent reminder for both MIC and for American political operatives of the cost of war.

**Conclusion**

The Vietnam War was a monumental event in American History. It dramatically altered the course of United States foreign policy, it compromised American international standing, and it damaged social harmony and political unity. The Military-Industrial Complex was an integral albeit inadvertent instigator of the instability created by the Vietnam War. In the relatively stable Cold War environment, the Military-Industrial Complex served as a well-spring of innovation and creativity. It offered a lucrative source of employment and passively projected the capacity of American military power. However, the Vietnam War caustically damaged this arrangement as it forced the mobilization of the Complex at the expense of its constituent members and the American political economy writ large. The weapon procurement process was inefficient and focused on short-term production that created long-term over-expenditures. It promulgated the over-employment of defense firms, which resulted in unmanageable unemployment that damaged local communities. Finally, it unleashed inflationary pressure that has yet to be fully ameliorated even today. In the end, the Military-Industrial Complex suffered from the importance of its very existence. A sophisticated and unrivaled military-industrial complex is both necessary and sufficient to support American hegemony, whether in times of active war or during America’s passive yet permanent warlike state. Nonetheless, the loss of the Vietnam War introduced unprecedented costs on the American military-industrial system, which should cast a new, critical light on the assumed connection between money and war.


In a more contemporary review of the Military-Industrial Complex, Donne and Sköns assert “the components of the MIC may have changed but the dynamic and impact of vested interests remain.”
America’s initial involvement date in the Vietnam War is a controversial topic. Whether one points to the clandestine operations of the 1940’s or the marine landing in Da Nang, there can be a full range of starting points. For purposes of economic analysis, this paper utilizes the ‘Gulf of Tonkin Resolution’ as the starting date.

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In another study, Anthony S. Campagna notes the variation in cost estimates during this period. He notes testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert N. Anthony that the figure could be closer to $25,000-$30,000 per soldier. He cites the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Effect of Vietnam Spending, 90th Congress, 1st Session (1967), 1:26.

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Apparently from 1961 to 1967, Congress only spent 16 days reviewing weapon procurement. To put this figure in perspective, in 1975 alone there were 43 days of congressional review.


Mary Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal*, 3.


Ibid., 5.


http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1840101024

By contemporary standards, the 250 million dollar loan to Lockheed seems like a trivial bailout from the federal government. But adjusting for inflation, this loan valued at approximately 1.4 billion dollars.

Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal*, 79.


Robert Stevens lists seven possible options: First, the government could promote a larger than normal increase in GNP. Second, cut back on other forms of spending. Third, increase taxes. Fourth, run larger balance-of-payments deficits. Fifth, restrict monetary growth and enforce higher interest rates. Sixth, enact direct controls over wages and prices. And seventh, use inflation. Stevens includes that “this method was liberally used in 1966-68.”

Stevens, *Vain Hopes, Grim Realities*, 16-17.


Ibid, 3.

Anthony Campagna estimates the total cost of the Vietnam War to be around 900 billion dollars. This is based on a 1991 estimate that also incorporates veteran benefits. And by contemporary standards with two more decades of veteran pay and inflation, it can even be presumed that this number could even surpass the one trillion dollar mark. While the precise cost of the war can be subject to debate, it is nonetheless important to consider the sheer magnitude of the expenses and the kind of pressure its cost exerts on the American economy.


Thanh Tin, “International Commentary Article: The American Imperialists Pass Through a Dark Year, Enter a Gloomy One,” February 1975. 82.


The full, long-run social repercussions of cuts in welfare spending are beyond the scope of the paper, however an insightful commentary on the impact of the dismantling of welfare programs can be found in Krugman, _Conscience of a Liberal_, 2007.
60 Ibid., 2-34.
61 Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, 5.
Jewish presence on the Iberian Peninsula had a long and influential history, spanning more than a millennium and a half. By the end of the fourteenth century, pressure had considerably increased on the Jews to convert to the Christian faith. In 1391 massive conversions occurred where tens of thousands of Jews were either forced to submit to baptism or sacrifice their lives. Jews who converted were known as “New Christians” as opposed to long established “Old Christians.” By the fifteenth century the Spanish Inquisition was instituted to investigate the behavior of these New Christians, judging whether they were secretly still “judaizing” and so heretics. Ines Lopez epitomizes the dilemma of conversos. She was born around 1465, it is believed that her (great) grandparents converted to Christianity, perhaps during the massive conversions of 1391. Although nominally a Christian, she apparently still retained Jewish rituals. In 1495 Ines was brought before inquisitors and questioned about her actions and their relevance to Jewish identity. She confessed to lighting candles on Friday nights, to not eating pork, and to preparing for the Jewish Sabbath on Saturday. Although she confessed ignorance as to the meaning of these rituals, the inquisitors judged her to have been Jewish. In 1496, she was sentenced to house arrest and was reconciled to the Church. Fifteen years later she was again interrogated; although now she was burnt at the stake for her “Judaizing, backsliding” ways. This thesis evokes the life and world of Ines Lopez through her two trials.
From Mehmed Ali’s consolidation of power in 1805 to the mid-twentieth century, venereal diseases functioned as a public source of anxiety and a site for larger debates about the intersections of gender, class, and sexuality. An examination of archival documents, newspaper articles, and medical journals from the Egyptian semi-colonial period dealing with venereal diseases reveals that the years immediately after Egyptian independence in 1922 represented a unique, transitional moment in which elite men contested and articulated ideas of nationhood. The discourse around venereal diseases provides a lens to determine how marginalized groups of people (the lower class, Egyptian prostitutes, and middle- and upper-class women) fit into nationalists’ and elite mens’ idealized nation.

Elite men determined each group’s status in the nation according to their reproductive and sexual value. While the state constructed lower-class Egyptians as sites of reform and treatment for venereal diseases in the nation-building process, it did not deem them reproductively or sexually valuable and excluded them from national citizenship. Bourgeois women, on the other hand, were reproductively and sexually valuable, allowing them to enter the confines of the nation if they remained venereal disease free. Among the groups of marginalized people, lower-class prostitutes were the worst off. Because they were sexually valuable to middle- and upper-class men but not reproductively valuable, they functioned in a dangerous, liminal space in which they could neither be the sites of larger state reforms nor prove their value by spawning children. This narrative of venereal disease control in the early semi-colonial period demonstrates the historically dynamic process through which male elites repeatedly sought to dictate the terms of disempowered groups of peoples’ citizenship in order to substantiate their own political power and determine the nation’s development.
Britain’s Empire and the First World War: The Strategic Importance of Palestine

In the winter of 1916–17, Britain transformed its military strategy by advancing the Egyptian Expeditionary Force across the Sinai Desert and into Ottoman lands. A momentous decision that irrevocably shaped modern Middle Eastern history, this thesis explores the reasons accounting for Britain’s entrance into Palestine during the First World War. Disheartened by stalemate on the Western Front, Britain sought military victories and a means of improving national morale. In search of alternative theaters of war, Palestine appeared both viable and attractive. Not only would it divert troops from slaughter in France and Belgium, but it presented a deep-seated romantic and religious allure. Laying territorial claim to Palestine would also improve Britain’s standing in the region, as well as bolster its postwar bargaining position. After Germany announced its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, protecting existing shipping lanes, particularly to India, became a matter of vital necessity. As the Suez Canal’s defense grew in importance, the danger of Ottoman assault was deemed unsustainable. Palestine was consequently sought as a strategic defensive barrier. Turning to the Anglo-Zionist alliance, I investigate prejudice and exaggeration associated with perceptions of Jewish influence. After evaluating international Jewish leverage, especially within Russia and the United States, Britain concluded that “world Jewry” was an interest group worth courting. Prompted by Chaim Weizmann and a notable entourage of Zionists, Britain decided to endorse a pro-Zionist agenda. By so doing, the Government hoped to secure widespread Jewish support, thereby strengthening its political and financial standing. Britain thus altered its Near Eastern strategy, resolving to advance troops past the Suez Canal and stake claim to the land of Palestine.
The Mapuche, Chile’s largest indigenous minority group, like many indigenous peoples in Latin America, have struggled to balance regional autonomy with political and economic incorporation throughout the twentieth century. This work investigates the evolving relationship between the Chilean state and the Mapuche during the presidency of Salvador Allende and the military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet, highlighting struggles over identity and over the concept of the Chilean nation. Salvador Allende, president from 1970 until the military coup in 1973, used the narrative of Mapuche activists to promote a political agenda though simultaneously responded to the community’s demands for greater regional autonomy. Allende’s government enacted agrarian reform laws and the Indigenous Peoples Act of 1972, expanding the rights of the Mapuche to what they considered ancestral lands. An internal document published by the Office of Agricultural Planning revealed the intentions of the government to incorporate Mapuche demands into its socialist program and vision of the nation. The relationship between the state and indigenous groups changed again after the military coup. Pinochet and his military junta reconstructed the nation to fit a new ideology, and, in the process, attempted to assimilate the Mapuche and put an end to communal landholding practices. Neoliberal economic policies, along with legislation passed during the dictatorship, targeted Mapuche groups while reversing many of Allende’s agrarian reform laws. Violent police action and the development of a new Anti-Terrorist Act served to silence the regime’s opposition and, by extension, indigenous dissenters. However, the Mapuche were by no means pawns in the struggle over national identity. From Allende’s presidency through the authoritarian regime, Mapuche groups actively engaged with the Chilean government to create their own narrative, attempting to negotiate the terms of their incorporation into the national political and economic system. To accomplish common goals, indigenous organizations formed alliances with a diverse coalition of social forces, from left-wing political parties, to international human rights bodies, to the Catholic Church. In turn, those alliances shaped perceptions of indigenous identity in the public sphere. This research aims to trace the current struggles of the Mapuche community for recognition and autonomy to the changes that occurred between 1970 and 1990.
St. Louis Jews and Jewish institutions were far from unified. In the 1880s, the already established German Jewish population was faced with a mass immigration of Yiddish speaking Eastern Europeans. Language was one of the many fragmenting forces. Differences in geography, religious beliefs, and economic status resulted in the formation of separate synagogues, charitable institutions, and newspapers.

By the 1920s, the Jews of St. Louis, whether from Eastern Europe, Germany, or the United States, came to see themselves as having common interests and formed shared institutions. Organizations initially founded and supported only by German Reform Jews began to unify the diverse Jewish population by providing venues for social interaction. Zionism spurred separate groups to unite both politically and economically. With the onset of the Great Depression, Jewish institutions were financially centralized in order to save administration costs, further uniting previously separate groups.

This study, through the lens of immigrant history, traces the ways that St. Louis immigrants fashioned a new collective Jewish identity in an American city.
On 24 March 1989, Joel Steinberg, a New York City criminal defense attorney, was convicted of first degree manslaughter. He was found guilty of killing a six-year-old girl named Lisa who he had taken in as his daughter. His conviction came after an exhausting trial of nearly two years. Countless expert witnesses took the stand testifying to the contested issue of how Lisa died. The most important witness, however, was Hedda Nussbaum, a former children’s book editor and Steinberg’s ex-girlfriend. After making a deal with prosecutors, she testified against Steinberg, offering vivid testimony on the night in question as well as the extraordinary physical and psychological abuse she endured at his hands. When she testified, her bruised and battered face came to symbolize the middle class dream gone horribly wrong.

After Steinberg was sentenced to twenty five years in prison, many began to ask whether an innocent man was punished for a crime he did not commit. Their inquiry was primarily focused on the court’s decision to allow television cameras in the courtroom in which Steinberg was tried. Such had been done before in the US, but People v. Steinberg marked a shift in the evolution of the American television trial in that it broadcast large portions of the trial gavel-to-gavel, or without interruption, rather than simply airing segments. The central question of this thesis is whether this inclusion and broadcasting is unfair to defendants. To answer this question, the thesis first considers theoretical arguments for and against inclusion. It establishes a framework for analyzing fairness in light of potential impact on key court participants. Then, the thesis outlines the narrative of the Steinberg trial. Finally, it argues that, while the inclusion of the cameras and broadcasting inspired changes in the behavior of key court participants, such behavior did not wholly render the trial unfair as fundamental legal processes whose preservation is necessary for due process, such as witness examination or closing arguments, remained intact.
Cenap Şehabettin was an Ottoman health official and poet during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. His work in quarantine stations took him throughout the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire, and he wrote several travel accounts that provide historians with an invaluable picture of the elite Ottoman cultural sphere. New technologies of the steamship and the railroad had revolutionized and “democratized” travel in the region, but economic and political histories dominate current academic narratives of these developments and leave much to be desired in social and cultural history. Şehabettin’s writings fill this historical gap by recounting the conditions of the steam-travel experience as well as providing insight to elite ideologies about class and ethnicity within the empire. First, his observations described how new means of travel such as the steamship and the locomotive created new class divisions, more rigid and systematic than previous means of long distance travel such as the pilgrimage caravan had been. Second, his writings themselves were a means for him to display his elite ideologies so as to enhance his class status for his elite readership in Istanbul. Close examination shows this ideology to be laced with contradictions, and the travelogue as a performance of class status contained several points of weakness or falsehood. Consequently an attempt at analyzing ethnic perspectives in the empire results in paradox and failure, as the cross-cutting factor of class precludes any consistent conclusions. In this way his travel accounts point to changing class dynamics around 1900 while also displaying the conflicted relationship between writing and power through the tactics that the elite official employed to prove his bourgeois class status.
Jonathan Kovacs
Advisor: Iver Bernstein

The Life and Death of an American Town: The Hamburg Massacre of July 1876 and the Rise and Fall of African-American Political Culture in Reconstruction South Carolina

This thesis represents the first full study of the Hamburg Massacre of 1876, an event little known among historians but one that had major significance for African-American political culture in South Carolina as well as for race and public memory in the post-Reconstruction era. After the Civil War free African-Americans had begun to play a creative role in Southern society as free citizens and voters. They formed towns, gained wealth, and even got elected to the state legislature. Their newfound citizenship offered them the chance to build their own future and establish a political culture that would be the foundation for their future success in America. However, the former planter elite, a group of whites who had been slave owners before the war, would not let this endure. They despised any form of African-American advancement that threatened the tenets of the antebellum society of old. Left with few other options, these whites resorted to violence in order to return freed people into a state of subjection. These dynamics represented the root of the Hamburg Massacre, which happened on July 8, 1876, and resulted in the death of six African-Americans. Not only did the perpetrators of the massacre begin a campaign of violence that would culminate in the end of Reconstruction in South Carolina, but they also ensured that history vindicated their actions by distorting the narrative of the massacre, establishing the white men as the victims rather than Hamburg’s black citizens. This distortion was critical as to why Hamburg’s story was lost for decades and why the town would eventually disappear from the landscape and the maps in the years after the massacre. In the end, the flowering and destruction of Hamburg, that life and death of an American town, represented a key to the deepest stakes of the Reconstruction struggle, which included not simply political power, but political culture in its broadest parameters involving the self-rule, the public life, and the existence of the town in all of its political, physical, and aspirational dimensions.
In this thesis, I examine portrayals of Stalin in various Russian-language textbooks for university students of history, beginning with the late 1940s and continuing up to the present day, and how these portrayals have shifted depending on the political climate in which textbooks were written, as well as the authors’ desire to ingratiate themselves with the leadership. After World War II, when he was still in power, textbook authors enthusiastically praised Stalin. During the Khrushchev thaw, authors were free to criticize Stalin, and they did so enthusiastically, condemning Stalin’s crimes and the cult of personality that sprang up around him. When Brezhnev was in power, the government did not pursue such an anti-Stalinist line and Stalin’s role in history was often ignored or glossed over. Textbook authors were freer to examine Stalin during Gorbachev’s perestroika, though there was still some restraint, and they became even more openly critical in the 1990s when Boris Yeltsin was president of the Russian Federation. Textbooks from this decade openly discussed the costs of collectivization, reasons for the Great Terror, and other subjects that were previously controversial. However, since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the government has resumed its ambivalent stance towards Stalin, evident in textbook authors’ treatment of Stalin during the last decade. Some textbooks published in recent years have received condemnation for being too favorable, even praiseworthy, towards the dictator. These shifting portrayals of Stalin show how the Soviet (and later Russian) government’s view and treatment of its own history has changed and sheds light on the troubling trend in modern Russia to use historical accomplishments for propaganda purposes.
The Norman influence in pre-Conquest England increased considerably over the course of the eleventh century, culminating in the Norman Conquest of 1066. This thesis reassesses the political contours of Anglo-Norman relations in the form of a series of mini biographies. The biographies are of Emma of Normandy, Edward the Confessor, and William the Conqueror, with Godwin and Harold also receiving extensive treatment. We can learn through the political history of Anglo-Norman relations of the eleventh century that although there was a significant change when William the Conqueror took control, that change was less substantial than commonly thought.

During this time England shifted from an orientation towards Scandinavia to that of Normandy. Emma of Normandy was one of the first Normans to move to England upon her marriage to the Anglo-Saxon Ethelred the Unready in 1002, and she married the Danish Canute in 1017. One of her sons with each man eventually became king of England. Despite her Norman roots, Emma primarily identified as English and showed preference during her life for the Danish marriage and son over the English. Her son, Edward the Confessor, who ruled England from 1042 until 1066, spent around twenty-five years living in exile in France, particularly Normandy. Upon unexpectedly becoming king he brought Norman advisers with him, a move that upset the existing nobles. Edward’s reign became something of a battle between the Normans and supporters of the Anglo-Saxon Godwin, who was Edward’s father-in-law and whose son Harold briefly succeeded Edward in 1066.

Edward’s long exile shaped his later reign as his policies of bringing in Normans while diplomatically attempting to continue the policies of his predecessors created a tinderbox. He died without an apparent and uncontested heir, leading to a clash between these two influences as Harold Godwinson and William of Normandy each fought for one side of Edward’s policies, and the Norman won out in the end. Edward had paved the way for this while never obviously aligning himself with the Norman side, preferring to keep England as it was during his reign. There was a gradual alignment with Normandy, but no genuine unification until 1066.
Although past historians of the early relationship between the United States and Pakistan have advanced narratives of American false assumptions, wishful thinking, and misguided policies, their arguments have been based on a mistaken notion of American goals for the relationship and a use of sources which is far too narrow to accurately assess it. This study, which utilizes a broadened primary source base incorporating both South Asian and Middle Eastern sources, analyzed against recent scholarly breakthroughs on Eisenhower’s foreign policy, argues that American policymakers wanted Pakistan to facilitate the creation of the Baghdad Pact, a collective security organization in the Middle East. For Eisenhower, the pact would serve as a tangible manifestation of the benefits of a pro-Western orientation and counter growing anti-colonial nationalist movements in the Middle East which the administration considered susceptible to communism. The leaders of Pakistan, the Eisenhower administration believed, could act as catalysts for the agreement, as their strong Islamic faith could persuade other Muslim leaders in the Arab Middle East to join. For reasons both historical and political, Pakistani leaders supported these American notions of Islam’s role in the world.

While Pakistan did its part in promoting the burgeoning pact, the pact did not turn out the way policymakers had hoped. Soon after its creation, it became a tool of inter-Arab politics, rather than a base of pro-Western unity. Since American policymakers planned on substantially aiding Pakistan only after the pact’s creation--this timeline the result, among other reasons, of inter-departmental bickering within the Eisenhower administration--the State Department was largely able to back out of their oral commitments to Pakistan once the pact had failed. By late 1956, not only did Eisenhower regret the relationship, but so did the Pakistanis.
Although baseball was the most popular sport in the United States throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Major League Baseball did not arrive to California until the 1958 season. In addition to describing the circumstances leading up to and resulting from the Brooklyn Dodgers’ and New York Giants’ moves to Los Angeles and San Francisco, this thesis will investigate the history of California throughout the first half of the twentieth century to show how the growth of both California and baseball within the state were nearly directly correlated. Whereas Los Angeles and San Francisco were regional powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (at which point baseball was confined to youth fields and unstable minor leagues), their rapid growths throughout the first half of the twentieth century, especially that of Los Angeles, resulted in a demand for major league-caliber baseball. After covering this background, this thesis will document the changes that came as a result of California’s entry to major league status. While the Giants’ and Dodgers’ departures from New York have been well documented (moreso that of the Dodgers), there are fewer historical sources that describe the effects that baseball had on California, as well as a dearth of information about the rise and fall of the Pacific Coast League and organized baseball in California. While this thesis will touch upon effects on New York City’s baseball supporters, the wider focus will be on California and their new teams, focusing both on the cities’ past overtures to major league teams as well as what happened in the years immediately following 1958. Los Angeles Mayor Norris Poulson claimed that by the 1950s, Los Angeles was a major league city in everything except for baseball; this thesis will describe the events that led to Los Angeles’ and San Francisco’s “major league” statuses, using baseball as a concrete example to show how far the two cities came from their original roles in the United States in becoming the major international cities that they are now.
“Every Blow from the Ruffian Brooks Gives Ten Thousand to Liberty”: Explaining the Popular Mobilization in the North following the Caning of Charles Sumner

On May 22, 1856, South Carolina Representative Preston Brooks assaulted Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner in response to a speech that Sumner delivered that not only insulted the South and slavery, but also slighted Brooks’ uncle, Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina. Although the caning took place in Washington, far away from the conflicts of “Bleeding Kansas,” Northerners saw the two events as connected. In the aftermath of the caning, Southerners applauded Brooks for his actions to defend their honor against the defamation of an abolitionist. The caning provoked a response in the North that was unparalleled by any antebellum event up until that point. Northerners were angered by what they perceived as an attack upon their region. Anti-Southern rhetoric was widespread and abolitionist sentiment filled the air. The Sumner caning indeed was not any ordinary event because it inspired an “awakening” of democracy that had religious undertones that yielded to secular democratic nationalism. To explain this awakening, this study uses newspapers, letters written to Sumner, and the correspondence of notable abolitionists. Explaining the popular mobilization in the North in the aftermath of the caning is central to understanding assumptions about slavery, violence, sexuality, and ideas of republicanism that are not well understood. These themes are crucial to grasping the processes that led to the Civil War. This thesis argues that the first sectional tensions arose from the caning as a result of northern popular mobilization. The mobilization resulted from Sumner’s oration, which reached out to democratic ideals and transformed them into a new public communication that was accessible. Northerners were also transfixed on the violent nature of the attack, which made Sumner a martyr and a religious figure. The North’s democratic mobilization was the sign of war in practice, if not actually declared. It seemed that there was no turning back.
Lyautey's Divided City: A Defense of the Dual City Theory in its Unique Applicability toward Settler-Colonial Subjugation

In our recent endeavor to fill the cavernous dearth of historical and anthropological scholarship pertaining to states subjugated by European imperialistic power, historians have given rise to a theoretical conception that seeks to both illustrate and elucidate the unique urban metamorphoses that accompanied colonial rule. Guided by the ostensible schisms that have historically divided both the colonial city and those dwelling within it, many have posited the theory of a “duel city,” one intensely stratified and, thus, transformed by the considerable divisive forces inherent to colonialism. While this model convincingly accommodates a number of colonial instances, some social historians and anthropologists have decried its failure to adequately explain the often-convoluted relationships and dynamics that can develop between the colonizer and the colonized. In order to consummate this discrepancy, this work will defend the colonial duel city model in its unique and specific applicability toward “settler colonial” rule, that which presides over a significant metropolitan settler population in addition to a preexisting indigenous society. To this end, this work will comparatively analyze the evolution of colonial administration in Algeria, a definitively settler-colonial realm, and Egypt, which never incurred a significant metropolitan settler population. As this analysis will illustrate, the distinctive nature of colonial polity that resulted from the settler-colonial social dynamic played a definitive role in the formation of intense social and spatial stratifications upon the urban framework, substantiating the selective use of the duel city theory and, thereby, strengthening our understanding of the relationship between administrative polity and colonial urban and social development.
St. Louis is home to the first continuously running public kindergarten in the United States. In 1873, Susan Blow began teaching a small group of students at the Des Peres School using the methods of German educator Friedrich Froebel, “the father of the kindergarten.” Despite the rejection of Froebel’s ideas in Germany, Blow studied his pedagogy and implemented his curriculum into classrooms in America. Her first class was known as the kindergarten “experiment,” which would later become a standard in schools across the nation. Froebel’s kindergarten curriculum was unique because it was based on learning through play, an understanding of nature, and an appreciation for art. He believed childhood should be separated from adulthood and sought to create a learning environment that would interest and accommodate young people, asserting that children’s earliest experiences would shape their entire lives.

This thesis will explore the lives of both Froebel and Blow to better understand their motivations for creating and spreading the kindergarten movement. It will discuss how this movement brought women into the public sphere as educators, and how Blow worked to improve the reputation and competency of teachers through the rigorous training programs she created. It will look at the changing ideas about early childhood education since the seventeenth century, and argue that Blow’s kindergarten represented the culmination of centuries of theories about children. The curriculum she created allowed children, on a large scale, to benefit from the many theories about education developed by previous educators and scholars. The fate of the kindergarten movement came down to the experiment at the Des Peres School. Blow’s devotion to the project and careful implementation of Froebel’s curriculum made it possible for children through age six to have a place to play, learn, and grow across the country.
Malaria is probably the most notorious “tropical disease.” Given the global importance and prominence of malaria, this work interrogates twentieth-century efforts to eradicate it. Changes in medicine in the 1900s, experiments in the 1930s and 1940s, and World War II played important roles in replacing traditional malaria control methods with a new malariology based on insecticides and synthetic antimalarial drugs. Although the newly established World Health Organization (WHO) hoped to act in a political vacuum, the Cold War context encouraged the WHO to seek scientific solutions rather than incorporating medicine with social determinants of disease. The post-War period brought a wave of optimism for public health and the WHO initiated a Global Malaria Eradication Programme from 1955 to 1969 under several assumptions: insecticide resistance jeopardized future attempts at eradication, sufficient resources could be mobilized, and “malaria blocks development.” As the campaign proceeded, the WHO’s Expert Committee on Malaria began to stress the need for health systems before eradication was attempted. In contrast to initial concepts that malaria had to be eliminated before development, it appeared that infrastructure had to exist prior to eradication. The idea that malaria control or eradication would be universally beneficial to local populations is one that has been widely accepted. However, the experiences of several malaria programs in Mexico, South Africa, and Liberia suggest that the relationship between malaria and development is far more complex. Malaria control is essentially linked to political interests and local patterns in ways that shape different malaria ecologies. This study traces the rise of global malaria eradication and argues against viewing the complex relationship between malaria and development as only “malaria blocks development.”