A collection of historical essays and book reviews written by undergraduate students at Washington University in St. Louis and our peer midwestern institutions.

A journal of the Washington University in St. Louis Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta.

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Special thanks to the History Department at Washington University in St. Louis.
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* Denotes Washington University in St. Louis Phi Alpha Theta members.
We are proud to present this year’s edition of Gateway on behalf of Phi Alpha Theta at Washington University in St. Louis. Here at Gateway, we strive to serve not only as a forum for scholarly conversation on our own campus, but also as a facilitator of inter-collegiate discussions about historical issues. To this end, we accepted submissions from the top ten universities in the Midwest for this edition. By expanding submission eligibility beyond our own student body, we hoped to incite a more inclusive, lively discussion of the historical issues concerning undergraduate historians today.

As the Editorial Board, we were confronted with the difficult task of choosing a select few of this year’s submissions for publication. The diversity within our application pool alone—in theme, time period, opinion and methodology—speaks volumes about the scope of student interest and potential for progressive and innovative approaches to understanding the world today as a product of history. The essays ultimately selected for publication, we believe, excelled in their historical analysis and argumentation. The topics of these articles range from American race, genera and culture relations to the succession of Roman rulers in the second century. We are confident that this selection represents the quality of research and critical analysis needed in our discipline to push new ideas forward and bring new voices to the discussion table on these issues.

We are also very happy to announce that Gateway is available online and in print for the first time in three years. A major part of our mission as a student history journal is to make the ideas of hard-working, rigorous history students available for our peers, professors and visitors at Washington University in St. Louis, as well as our readers abroad. Also new to the Gateway repertoire in this edition are book reviews. In the past, Gateway featured senior theses abstracts. Part of inciting a higher-level historical conversation among undergraduates is promoting engagement with professionals and their research.

As the editors of Gateway, we would like to extend our sincerest thanks to our writers for their contributions, our faculty advisor and the History Department for their support here at Washington University in St. Louis, and, of course, our readers.

Your Editor-in-Chief, Lauren Henley
Your Assistant Co-Editors, Jacqueline Blickman & Sarah Heintz
Contributors to this Issue

**Article Contributors**

**Micaela Heery** (‘16) is a History and Political Science double major with a minor in Spanish. She wrote the following article for Professor Dubé’s “Historical Methods: Things” at Washington University in St. Louis.

**Nathan Rice** (‘15) is a History major with a minor in Anthropology. The following excerpt in a chapter of his Senior Honors Thesis, conducted under the guidance of Professor Pegg at Washington University.

**Isobel Rosenberg** (‘15) is an International Studies major with a minor in History. She wrote the following article for Professor McNair’s “Black History Through Fiction and Film” at Kenyon College.

**Evan Stark** (‘16) is a History and Archaeology double major with a minor in Operations and Supply Chain Management. The following paper was written for Professor Labendz’s “‘East’ and ‘West’ in Jewish Imagination and Politics” at Washington University.

**Lindsey Walters** (‘16) is a History and African/African American Studies double major with a concentrator in Women’s and Gender Studies. She wrote the following article for Professor Khalid’s “Nations and Nationalism” at Carleton College.

**Book Reviewers**

**Jacqueline Blickman** (‘16) is a History major with a minor in English Literature. She wrote the following piece for Professor Borgwardt’s “History of US Foreign Relations: 1920-1989” at Washington University.

**Nikhil Dharan** (‘15) is a History and Chemistry double major. He wrote the following piece for Professor Watt’s “Historical Methods: Decolonization in the Twentieth Century” at Washington University.

**Jaime Sánchez** (‘15) is a History and Comparative Race and Ethnic Studies double major at the University of Chicago.
“King Cotton”: A Consideration of Southern Diplomatic Strategy and Identity
Micaela Heery

I wish I was in the land of cotton, Old times there are not forgotten;
    Look away! Look away! Look away! Dixie Land.”
    --“Dixie,” Daniel Decatur Emmett, 1859

The song “Dixie” was an unlikely candidate for a Southern anthem. Written by a Northerner, Daniel Decatur Emmett, and for minstrel shows, an unpopular art form in the South, the song was slow to gain popularity. Despite its unlikely origins, the song eventually gained such prominence that it was played at Jefferson Davis’s Inauguration as President of the Confederate States.¹ The idea of “Dixie,” however, extends beyond a mere song and serves as an identifier of the development of a Southern identity in reaction to increasing regional division between the North and the South. Among the many divisions between these major regions was economic. For Southerners, their economic identity had cotton at its center.

Emmett was not the only person who identified the South with “cotton.” During the American Civil War, Southerners, Northerners, and Europeans all used cotton as a common identifier of the South. As cotton gained global prominence, with the South transformed into the world’s major provider, it is unsurprising that the economic health of the region became linked to the good. More nuanced and complicated are the ways in which this material object became intrinsic to Southern identity and in turn, influenced political action. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of cotton, documented in diplomatic correspondence and newspaper articles, a relationship between the South and its identification as the “land of cotton” becomes clear. The culture of cotton was a source of strength, a way to distinguish the region from the rest of the world and in turn, control the region’s destiny through economic power. Moreover, cotton was a proxy for the entire Southern system of plantation based agriculture, one which relied on slave labor for survival. Cotton culture created a sense of stability through a connection to a prosperous system of the past during the turbulent times of the present.

If we look beyond the immediate South, it is apparent that cotton played a role in international perceptions and action as well.

Because the South was a global provider of cotton, a Northern blockade and a self-imposed Southern embargo, limited the flow of cotton to Europe. This question of Southern identity gains greater importance because it involves a multitude of actors. A consideration of the South from internal and external perspectives reveals the development and adoption of a Southern identity based around cotton.

Analyzing the ways in which government officials and private actors discussed cotton in public sources such as letters and newspapers offers insight into the discrepancy between the actual demand for cotton and perceptions of demand, economic reality and identity. In order to understand the value that cotton gained as part of Southern identity, it is crucial to consider the development of the global cotton industry in order to understand cotton’s economic prominence. Then, an investigation of diplomatic correspondences from and between Southern diplomats and statesmen will demonstrate how the South perceived cotton in terms of its relations with the rest of the world. Through the letters we can gauge the economic needs of the world with the perceptions of diplomats to inform our understanding of Southern cotton culture. Next, a comparison will be made between the diplomatic letters and newspaper articles from the Daily News published in London. The newspapers allow us to compare both the economic needs of Britain while reading multiple perspectives interpreting Southern identity. Ultimately, the difference between internal and external perceptions of cotton will be explored considering Southern cotton identity and external factors. Before the rhetoric of cotton during the Civil War can be explored, the historical development of the industry is a necessary precursor.

Cotton as a Global Good

The industrialization of Europe transformed cotton into a fundamental and radically successful material good. Although cotton was grown, traded, and manufactured into goods in various parts of the world prior to the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, Europe transformed the good into a global staple. After receiving supplies of raw cotton, Europe utilized its superior machinery and sold these processed goods using vast and already existing trade markets. As Giorgio Riello explains “cotton textiles became in the nineteenth century one of the main features of a commercial process that today we call globalization.” Britain existed at the center of this global market piloting the first modern “export-oriented economy.” Cotton served as a crucial piece of this globalization due to its volume and value: cotton
exports represented a majority of goods sold and brought in significant wealth. Also unique to cotton was its source of production. Unlike other raw, unprocessed goods, most of the world’s raw cotton was grown in North America.²

The cotton sent around the world originated mostly in the American South. The Southern states supplied three-fourths of the world’s raw cotton, a trade which represented three-fifths of total American exports. Southern crops contributed to the national economic growth and tremendous territorial gains the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century. As Southern cotton maintained its international prominence, “it paced the industrial revolution in England and New England, and fastened the shackles of slavery more securely than ever on Afro-Americans” as James McPherson explains in *Battle Cry of Freedom: Civil War Era*.³

In the 1850s, economic indicators showed the South trailing the North in indicators of economic development such as canal mileage, railroad mileage, construction, and industrial production. These indicators were accompanied by low birth rates and high rates of migration from Southern to Northern states. Amidst these troubling signs, cotton served as a source of strength for the region. In the 1850s, the price of cotton rose from a low of 5.5 cents in the mid-1840s to almost double. The nature of this profitable industry was almost entirely export based. Only five percent of the cotton grown in the South remained in the region for manufacturing while seventy percent went abroad and to the North. The selling of cotton also involved a huge cost paid to outside actors. McPherson explains the cost of “factors”:

Some 15 or 20 percent of the price of raw cotton went to “factors” who arranged credit, insurance, warehousing, and shipping for planters. Most of these factors represented northern or British firms. Nearly all of the ships that carried cotton from southern ports and returned with manufactured goods were built and owned by northern or British companies.⁴

Even in the trade of its most prominent good, Southerners lacked a certain degree of autonomy. Although locally grown, the sale of cotton was a globalized activity that involved a multitude of actors outside of the South. Southerners simultaneously benefitted from the sales of cotton while suffering from the dominance of external actors.

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⁴ Ibid, 91-92.
Southerners also suffered from the sheer dominance of the crop in comparison to other goods. As the price of cotton continued to rise in the 1850s, production similarly increased. Sugar and tobacco followed a similar pattern and Southern planters dedicated increasingly higher amounts of land to these products. The region began to lack space to produce food goods, but most Southerners only “expressed rapture over the dizzying prosperity.”

In the antebellum years, cotton linked the South to both its neighbors in the North and to the world. When the Civil War began, President Lincoln declared a blockade against Southern ports. Both the navies of the North and South were unprepared for actual wartime actions. The blockade only limited Southern trade to a third of its pre-war levels; however, trade did change during the war due to a self-imposed embargo. The South embargoed its own cotton beginning in 1861 and a year later British imports of cotton were at three percent of their 1860 level. The material value of cotton allowed a local conflict to gain global prominence.

The cotton trade caused the U.S. Civil War to affect areas far beyond its shores. Consider an article from the New York Times published November 26, 1862 entitled “The Distress in Lancashire.” The article described the increasing unemployment and destitution among cotton manufacturing workers in Lancashire, England. Because these workers lived off wages, poverty quickly developed once hours were cut back or eliminated. A variety of charitable organizations began distributing aid, but the “Cotton Famine” as this economic depression is called, was controlled largely by external factors. The General Relief Committee, a group who supplied aid to unemployed and impoverished individuals, issued a report in October of 1862 explaining that the organization had no hope of ending the suffering soon. The report noted that “should this war be immediately settled, it would still take months before our spindles and looms can be again humming their pong of industry.” The product of cotton was perceived to be shaping the conditions of a region thousands of miles away from the battles of the Civil War.

While the Committee and indeed many others, believed the war caused the “Cotton Famine,” scholarly work suggests otherwise.

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5 Ibid, 100.
6 Ibid, 313-4.
7 Ibid, 382-4.
In 1963 Eugene A. Brady challenged the common notion that the deprivation of Southern cotton actually caused the distress in Lancashire. Although three-fourths of the region’s cotton did come from the South, Brady argues that the Civil War’s “main effect was that of inducing expectations of a future input shortage.” These altered expectations increased the price of cotton unconnected to its real value or real supply.9 Brady’s work demonstrates a crucial discrepancy between perception and reality. Why is it that expectations of cotton could be manipulated? Part of this answer is found in an analysis of the rhetoric of cotton. I argue that the economic dominance of cotton in the South played a significant role in the formation of Southern identity, an identity that is evidenced through the diplomatic actions taken on behalf of the South.

Is Cotton King in the Land of the Queen?: Southern Diplomats and Her Majesty

“What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? … England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king.”

-Senator James H. Hammond, South Carolina, 185810

When William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Man received their commissions to act as diplomats to Europe for the Confederate States of America in March of 1861, they were forced to grapple with a Europe deprived of cotton. War had indeed been made against cotton, in the form of an embargo imposed by the United States and now, the men negotiated with cotton in the foreground of their minds. In a letter offering them instructions, the men were told to proceed first to London and inform the Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs that the Confederate States had separated themselves from the United States. As the Confederacy sought to complete it separation from the North and establish itself as sovereign, its diplomats abroad were a critical lynchpin between domestic developments and international sentiments.

The trade of cotton proved a common language between the Confederacy and European nations, allowing them to build relationships focused on trade based dialogue. For the Confederacy, however,

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trade represented much more than merely a conversation starter. Cotton for Confederate diplomats represented a source of economic power that held vast power in Europe. This critical assumption held true as long as the South continued to remain the main source for cotton. Cotton also took on a role as a rhetorical tool as Southern diplomats framed issues of war as moral issues predicated on the denial of a good to innocent populations. Far more than a tool to be leveraged, however, cotton was an integral part of Southern identity, an identity which resisted the changes of the world until they could not be denied.¹¹

Methodology

To understand the critical nature that cotton played in both rhetoric and values, I consider the relationship between England and the Confederacy during the American Civil War. An analysis of a sampling of diplomatic records taken from *The Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy: Including Diplomatic Correspondence* reveals critical realities about the multi-dimensional value of the agricultural product of cotton. To track the ways in which diplomats regarded cotton in their diplomatic exchanges, a general search for the word “cotton” was conducted which narrowed the original 798 pages of the collection to 101 pages where cotton was referenced. Each page that contained at least one reference to cotton was then coded according to topic, countries referenced, and date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cotton References, by Year</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1861</strong></td>
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<td>32%</td>
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*Table 1, Cotton References, by Year*

A reference was considered for further analysis if its topic involved a discussion of cotton as a diplomatic tool, cotton as related to its global supply, the blockade of the South’s supply in a general way, and cotton production in the South. References were excluded based on topic if they focused on specific negotiations of cotton including

cotton loans, or specific incidents of ships carrying cotton being detained. References were excluded if their country of focus was not England or did not discuss in broad terms cotton’s meaning to the South. The reason for this country specific focus on England reflects the prominent position that England played during this period and the substantial impact that the shortage of cotton was perceived to have had on the country. Table 2 demonstrates reasons for references not being selected for further analysis.

Table 2, Reason for Rejection of References, Across Years

A study of England is not supposed to be representative of the relations that the Confederacy had with Europe or the world at large, but rather, illustrates one of the most critical relationships of the Confederacy during the war. Under these criteria the sample size was reduced to twenty-seven letters. Some of these letters contained pages which had earlier been excluded; however, the context of each letter was important so some pages were retroactively included. Table 3 illustrates the final selection of references organized by year.
It is this analysis of these diplomatic letters which sheds light on the critical role that cotton played in diplomacy for Southern diplomats during the American Civil War.

**Cotton as Strength**

The Confederacy’s diplomats believed the ability to leverage the South’s unparalleled cotton supply was a useful tool in their diplomatic arsenal. This belief was not without merit considering the extensive nature of textile productive and consumption during the 19th century. Giorgio Riello states that “Europe was a machine that absorbed raw materials and churned out goods in exchange for further raw materials.” This churning out of manufactured goods was only possible through the importation of raw materials from outside of Europe. The South, as a major producer of cotton, grasped its nature as an integral aspect of the economic health of Europe.\(^\text{12}\)

Southern cotton comprised most of the United States’ cotton exports in the antebellum period, a fact which Southern politicians including Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs appreciated. In a letter to the newly appointed diplomats to Great Britain, France, Russia, and Belgium written on March 16, 1861, he explained to the men the economic advantages of the Southern states.

> It must be borne in mind that nearly one-half of all the Atlantic coast and the whole of the Mexican Gulf coast lately within the boundaries of the United States are at present within the boundaries of the Confederate State. The Confederate States produce nearly nineteen-twentieths of all the cotton grown in the State which recently constituted the United States.

Toombs emphasized that the South’s strength lay in its dominant production and exportation of goods that were desperately needed in Europe, especially Great Britain. In his letter, he noted that the annual yield of British products made from Southern cotton reached $600 million.\(^\text{13}\)

More than merely establishing a connection between the two countries, Confederate diplomats believed that a shortage of cotton could be used to the South’s advantage. A consistently mentioned desire of the diplomats was for diplomatic recognition of the Confederate States, a decision which would signal a power’s move from neutrality and hopefully, military support. A letter from Paris dated May 10, 1861 spoke of a motion made in the House of Commons in

\(^\text{13}\) Davis and Nevins, *The Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 7-8.
England concerning recognition. The motion was withdrawn, but the authors of the letter were not yet without hope; they believed receiving English, and for that matter French support, was simply a matter of waiting. William Lowndes Yancey and Pierre Adolphe Rost wrote from Paris that “their necessities will force them to conclusions favorable to the South.”14 As time progressed, the belief that market forces alone would force support of the South became a more nuanced position that either the market or a favorable military event, whatever happened first, would certainly assure the support of England.15

The economic good of cotton served as a substantial connection between the Confederacy and England. The value, however, that each party placed in the other varied. While the South perceived its cotton supply not only as its own strength, but also as a weakness of England, its lukewarm trade partner looked beyond this relationship. The mighty empire of Great Britain would not be strong-armed into offering recognition of the Confederate States by the deprivation of cotton from its markets. The diplomats of the Confederacy overestimated their economic power because of the values they imbued upon cotton.

**Cotton as Identity**

It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a determinative causation for historical actions; however, the Confederate diplomats, and by extension the Confederate governments, conception of cotton formed a critical dynamic in their perceptions of the South’s role in the world. The expression “Cotton is King” invoked by Senator Hammond holds credence when considering diplomatic correspondence because the diplomats show not only a reliance on cotton as a form of economic power, but as a good that set apart their states.

In a letter written to Earl John Russell in August of 1861, diplomats Yancey, Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann demonstrated their view of the South’s utility to the world. Speaking of the cotton and tobacco available to the world at Southern ports they wrote that, “the commodities produced in the Confederate States are such as the world needs more than any other…But it is far otherwise with the people of the present United States. They are a manufacturing and commercial people.” The men placed distance between the Southern states, which produced commodities for global consumption from the North, which could only serve as a beneficiary from raw materials. This distinc-

15 Ibid, 40-44.
tion between the South as a producer of materials, and the North as a usurper of goods, gains even more meaning when we focus on cotton.\textsuperscript{16}

Cotton diplomats spoke of their land as being made for the production of cotton. It is possible that cotton gained a prominent position in diplomatic letters because the shortage of cotton began to impact the English manufacturing sector; however, the shortage alone cannot entirely account for the heightened language. Secretary of State of the Confederacy, Robert M. T. Hunter, wrote to James M. Mason on September 23, 1861 that, “within these States must be found for years to come the great source of cotton supply. So favorable a combination of soil, climate, and labor is nowhere else to be found.” In a letter sent from Hunter again to Mason in February of the following year, Hunter speculated on the economic potential that a relationship with the border states of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri. This relationship would allow the states of the Deep South to focus on cotton and sugar while allowing the other states to provide provisions. As the South cultivated its identity, it identified its ability to supply the world with cotton as its distinguishing factor.\textsuperscript{17}

**Cotton as Global Identity**

The Southern diplomats believed the South to be the world’s cotton supply, allowing them to understand their relations with other nations through the lens of cotton. Confederate diplomats wrote in November of 1861 that the Confederate States were “the only certain and sufficient source of cotton supply.”\textsuperscript{18} With war raging, the cotton supply was threatened. The Southern diplomats transformed this domestic issue into an international one claiming that the denial of the transportation of cotton from producers, transporters, and manufacturers constituted a war against all parties. Claiming that a denial of a single commercial good constitutes a war assumed the critical importance of cotton to all parties. In fact, the Secretary of State, R. M. T. Hunter, used similar rhetoric a few months earlier. Hunter, too, argued that a war that denied cotton was a war against all parties involved in the trade of cotton; however, he furthered the argument claiming that not only was this war, but an unjustified action.

If it has become obvious…that no blockade which they can maintain will enable the United State to subdue the Confeder-\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 63.\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 89.\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 130.
ate States of American, upon what plea can its further continuance be justified to third parties who are so deeply interested in a ready and easy access to the cheapest and most abundant sources of cotton supply?\textsuperscript{19}

The Southern diplomats framing of this issue reveals fundamental notions of the importance of cotton not only for the South, but for other countries as well. The blockade constituted warfare and involved more parties than simply the Confederate States. Further, the nature was unjustifiable due to the critical importance of the cotton supply. The argument made by Hunter relies on not only the South remaining a singular source of cheap cotton and carrying significant importance to other nations. Both of these assumptions would prove untrue in the coming months and years. Analyzing other sources of rhetoric from a contemporary period demonstrates the disconnect between Southern identity and global realities.

**Cotton and the World: Newspapers**

To compare the South’s perception of the power of cotton and to isolate whether the South’s dependence, if not glorification of cotton, is unique to this region, outside perspectives must be considered. Comparing the rhetoric of diplomacy against the rhetoric of news media allows us to trace the same historical events, but through both different regional perspectives and through different mediums of communication. While the diplomatic letters were private in nature, newspapers allow us to glean valuable information about public perception.

**Methodology for Newspapers**

I adopted a similar methodology as the one used for diplomatic letters. I searched a database of British periodicals but chose to limit analysis to the *Daily News* based out of London. The publication possessed several advantages including quantity of articles, being that it was a daily publication, and its city of publication. Being based out of London, the *Daily News* can capture both political and public sentiments relating to global events while also aggregating perspectives from various cities in the United States and the South. I narrowed my analysis further by limiting selection to three times periods: first, March 1, 1861 to May 1, 1861; second, September 15, 1862 to November 1, 1862; finally, December 1, 1862 to February 1, 1863. The first set was chosen to explore sentiments toward cotton immediately before and after the start of the war. The second set was chosen to

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. 93.
test the effect of the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation on sentiment. Finally, the last set examines the month before and after the actual implementation of the Emancipation Proclamation. The search terms varied between sets. I began the first set searching for “cotton” and “Confederacy.” This search yielded twenty-two results which were narrowed to ten through the exclusion of letters which were not applicable. When I began the next time period I did not find enough test cases for the Emancipation Proclamation so I substituted “Confederacy” for “Emancipation Proclamation.” Although nine articles were found, none of the articles explicitly connected cotton and the Emancipation Proclamation. For the final set I again used “cotton” and “Confederacy.” This period yielded twenty-seven articles, eleven of which were selected. An analysis of these newspapers highlight the weakness of “Cotton diplomacy” and the variety of factors actors considered when forming opinions on the war; these opinions too, changed over time as the war took on new meanings.

A Vulnerable “King Cotton”

The first report of the developments of Southern diplomacy appearing in the *Daily News* concerning early war diplomacy mirrored accounts found in the diplomatic letters. The newspaper reported the appointment of the commissioners to England and France and identified their mission as obtaining recognition and making commercial arrangements. The subsequent letters, however, show substantial variation in global perceptions of both the South’s odds in achieving its goals, the value of cotton, and even critiques of Southern reliance on cotton diplomacy. Because the *Daily News* contained reports of Parliament’s debates, events, letters to the editor, and articles from other publications, the diversity in viewpoints is extensive. Across the variety of accounts, trends illustrate an appreciation of global cotton markets, a multi-faceted critique of King Cotton, and a weighing of the importance of cotton.

A clear contrast is present between the one-dimensional perspective of Southern diplomats and almost all other actors. An article published in the *Daily News* on March 29, 1862, but originally printed in the *New York Herald*, represented a classically Southern viewpoint when it announced that “the necessities of the cotton mills of Manchester, when put to the test, will supersede the abolition love feast of

he Duchess Of Sutherland.” Through Letters to the Editor, however, we observe a rejection of the “King Cotton” mentality. One author in particular published under “S. Levison” wrote about the complete uselessness of the cotton. Cotton did not have value unless transformed into a good for production making Southern cotton functionally useless. Unfortunately for the South, its security rested in the hands of external demand. Moreover, even if England bought raw cotton and manufactured it, “the free states are her largest customers for manufactured goods.” It is noteworthy that even before the real effects of the cotton shortage had taken place, this author was critically evaluating the nature of the good’s economic worth in a manner separate from its cultural prominence. A separate letter claims that in the United States, groups were already mobilizing against England in the event of Southern recognition. If Britain recognized the South, this author promises that there will be a boycott of all British manufactured goods. This contributor, in recognizing the clear connection between the politics of the South and it cotton, considered cotton’s worth outside of its economic value. Outside of the South then, there was a rejection of the economic value of cotton, which some perceived as useless, and the possibility of using Southern cotton as a negative political issue.

From debates in Parliament, there was also a minimization of the effects of the probable cotton shortage; moreover, Parliament considered a multitude of factors outside of cotton in deciding war policies. In May of 1861, members of Parliament discussed reports indicating short supplies of cotton, but these reports were mocked and one speaker even stated that the telegrams were being used for the purpose of “keeping up the cotton market.” Moving past the cotton of the American South, the members of Parliament consider other regions, such as India, and weighed their suitability for providing increased amounts of cotton. Southern diplomats initially disregarded the consideration of India as a source of cotton not perceiving that Britain was encouraging the development a supply of cotton in India until late in the war.

Members of Parliament were not the only actors who considered other sources of cotton. An article published in July of 1861

spoke of the need for a shift from Southern cotton. The article identified the critical miscalculation of Southern diplomatic strategy, that is, it “took for granted that neither England nor the Northern States could relinquish Southern cotton.” The article explored a multitude of regions that cotton could be obtained from even if in small quantities, but of higher quality.28 Other articles show this similar willingness to look beyond Southern cotton and also look beyond the issue of cotton in making decisions. Even as early as late May in 1861, an article weighed four separate factors to consider when estimating the South’s chances including the strength of the Union party in the South, the lack of food in the South, the issue of both free and enslaved blacks, and abilities of the Southern army.29 Before the real effects of the cotton embargo and the blockade had taken hold, actors were willing to criticize the economic importance of Southern cotton and consider the war in a broader perspective. Articles written after the Emancipation Proclamation’s announcement, however, show further rejection of the culture of King Cotton.

**Death to “King Cotton”**

President Lincoln declared the Emancipation Proclamation in September of 1862, with the provisions of the document not taking hold until January of 1863. The Emancipation Proclamation was limited in that it only freed slaves in states fighting against the Union, but failed to free slaves in slave-holding states that did not secede. Although limited, some perceived the Emancipation Proclamation as a transforming moment in the war when the North embraced its role as liberator. Critics, both domestically and in Britain, criticized it for its hypocritical nature.30 When trying to examine cotton culture in light of this proclamation, searching from September 15 of 1862 until November 1, 1862 did not yield sources that made connections between cotton and the Emancipation Proclamation. However, a lagged effect of the doctrine was observed in the sampling from December and January showing further transformations concerning the meaning of cotton and the war in general.

In December, the calculations over the outcome of the war demonstrate a shift from the weighing of the odds of each side prevailing to a focus on the weaknesses and impending loss for the South. One article cited the small population and lack of food production as

factors making it likely that any further conflict will be a guerrilla war, not a full out conflict.\textsuperscript{31} Other articles note regions where slavery was no longer “profitable or possible” in other areas “hundreds of acres of cotton are standing in the fields ungathered, the negroes having fled from their masters.”\textsuperscript{32}

Apart from these reports of the South’s demise, which may not be representational of reality, there was a clear rejection of the rhetoric of slavery. While some in the South suspected that economic need would force the hand of British politicians, there is evidence of a rejection of the underlying premise of cotton production: slavery. One author rejected the complaints of individuals criticizing the breaking down of British political economy, arguing that they violated their own moral principles by depending on slave labor for cotton.\textsuperscript{33} In late January another article made a similar argument, but goes further, connecting the entire Confederacy to slavery, writing that “the Southern Confederacy is based upon peculiar principles...the corner-stone of the new edifice is Slavery-traffic in human flesh.”\textsuperscript{34}

The \textit{Daily News} did not limit the criticism it published from internal actors, but also included a piece from an exiled Southerner. R.S. Tharin, detailed his forced exile from the South after publically supporting the Union. Tharin launched a critique against the rallying cries of Southern secession namely: Southern rights, Southern independence, and cotton.

Where are my Southern rights? Am I less a man because I am not a cotton planter?-less than a freeman because I do not bow the knee to ‘King Cotton?’ – a usurper not yet and never to be ‘recognized’ in the constitution of the United States!....Where are the Southern rights of that multitude of poor white men, who have been pressed into the battalions of ‘King cotton,’ with whose success will perish the very name of their blood bought rights?

Tharin’s argument sheds light on the nuance of the diversity within the Southern people. His argument is not anti-slavery, but anti-cotton wealth. Tharin illustrates the limited appeal of King Cotton to those who own cotton plantations.\textsuperscript{35}

The newspaper articles show a myriad of experiences relating to cotton, ranging from objective considerations of its economic worth to discussions about supply. Later, the letters delve into the implications of the meaning of the cotton industry: slavery and classism. The varying perspectives of the newspapers show critical critiques of an existing cotton identity.

**Cotton Identity: A Second Look**

Underlying the South’s use of “King Cotton” Diplomacy was a more fundamental ideological connection with cotton as a symbol of Southern prosperity, strength, and exceptionalism. The picture that emerges from an analysis of Southern diplomatic correspondence highlights the vast misperceptions that Southern diplomats possessed of global realities. Comparing Southern diplomatic strategy with world events shows a hesitation, if not refusal to adapt to changing circumstances, such as the development of cotton markets in India. However, this tendency to cling to the remaining threads of the successful cotton industry can be better understood if we consider cotton as an integral part of identity.

In his study of Confederate nationalism and symbolism, Ian Binnington explains that in 1860 and 1861, white Southerners “recast themselves as Confederates, partisans of a new nation.”

Binnington explores the development of Southern nationalism and symbolism using case studies, but does not use cotton as one of these studies. Although he leaves out cotton, the trends and insights that he finds have corollaries in the development of cotton culture. Generally, the concept of “nationalism” refers to the process through which a group adopts an identity incorporating aspects of a past history, including regional, cultural, or religious histories. These histories, however, are transformed for the group’s purposes. Binnington explains that “it is fair to say that nationalisms generally speak to an ahistorical past, based on a vision of what should be true, rather than what actually was. Confederate nationalism was no exception.”

Both Confederate nationalism and cotton identity represented a constructed South that was “uncomplicatedly white,” but the looming shadow behind these white visions was a system “based on a social and economic foundation of black labor.” The rhetoric of cotton culture was easy to adopt and proliferate because its speakers were

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37 Ibid, 2.
38 Ibid, 4.
the beneficiaries of the hierarchy of labor and racial inequality that existed in the South. Cotton culture was emblematic of an identity that was not representative of the totality of the South, but rather the identity of a specific segment of the population. The perspective into the South that this project focused on was that of Southern diplomats, who serve as representatives, not of the general population, but of the wealthy, white, and often slave owning Southerners in control. The identity then that is demonstrated through Southern diplomacy is that of an elite group. “King Cotton” Diplomacy reflects an identity linked to cotton existing in a limited socioeconomic group.

The existing cotton culture embraced the idea that the South was uniquely suited for the production of cotton. Its prolific supply of cotton, in turn, gave the South power over other countries and served as the identifier for the region in the global environment. Although cotton itself was economically powerful and a source of social and financial stability, cotton served as a proxy for the institution of slavery. Binnington contends that “the future of slavery was the main issue of stake in the Civil War” which makes it impossible to divorce the issue of nationalism from this institution. As Southern diplomats spoke the language of cotton, the South’s system of slavery whispered in the background. Cotton was the indicator of the success of the slave system, a system which served to divide the North and the South. As Southerners sought to distance themselves from their brothers of the North, cotton was a proxy for the true divisive issue of slavery. Cotton was also a way to expand the influence of slavery. Exporting cotton became a way to export the values of the Southern system to the rest of the world, to offer tacit support for a morally corrupt system. Cotton diplomacy was a manifestation of values possessed by a limited group of Southerners who benefitted from slavery and the cotton it produced.

A Failed Strategy

Why is it that “King Cotton” diplomacy failed? As the South embraced the notion of its uniqueness, Great Britain looked for other sources of cotton. While the British used extensive networks of trade and had multiple trading partners, the American South relied almost singularly on cotton exportation. Although cotton was the center of its world, it was not the center of the British Empire. Moreover, an over focus on cotton ignored the multi-dimensional nature of the decision for British leaders. Some scholars, such as Brent Steele, isolate the Emancipation Proclamation as the transformative moment for British leaders.

39 Ibid, 10.
foreign policy because it was then that the war transformed into a war over slavery.\textsuperscript{40} However, even before the Emancipation Proclamation there were several reasons why cotton diplomacy did not work.

In “The Case of the Missing Hegemon” Peter Thompson analyzes a number of competing explanations for British non-intervention including the explanation advanced by Brent Steele. After providing a basis of understanding through the summarization of a multitude of differing theories, Thompson explores a number of different explanations for the lack of intervention including: events, such as the Trent Affair\textsuperscript{41} and fears of invasion of Canada, domestic politics, non-intervention precedents, British naval policy, slavery, and domestic economy.\textsuperscript{42} Thompson’s eventual theory focuses on “a more complete understanding of how Britain sought to protect its long-term interests and position in the international system during the Civil War by adhering to the precedents and conventions that shaped state behavior.”\textsuperscript{43} Thompson contends that a larger policy conforming to the conventions of nonintervention in combination with naval policy and neutrality were decisive factors in determining intervention.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, Britain’s decisions to develop other cotton markets, reflects in many ways its desire to maintain its economic strength in addition to maintaining the naval policies that had been successful thus far.

Considering the connection between slavery and cotton, the question of the Emancipation Proclamation cannot be easily dismissed. Thompson presents the picture of a divided Britain, sympathetic to the free-trade and independence seeking goals of the South, but unable to reconcile those policies with slavery.\textsuperscript{45} This image of a divided nation is further substantiated by the work of Mary Ellison in \textit{Lancashire and the American Civil War}. Ellison studied this specific region of England exploring the nuance of public opinion, political movements, and economic conditions in Lancashire. Ellison writes that “extreme

\textsuperscript{41} The Trent Affair refers to an incident on November 8, 21861 in which Captain Charles Wilkes of the U.S. Navy captured a British ship the \textit{Trent} which was transporting two Southern commissioners James Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana. After Wilkes captured the ship, he arrested the two men and released the ship. The event caused an international uproar and raised serious tensions between the British and Americans making war seem imminent. Eventually, President Lincoln released the men and apologized. See McPherson, \textit{Battle Cry of Freedom}, 389-391.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 103.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 105.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 120.
deprivation gave Lancashire a basic involvement in the outcome of
the American Civil war.” Ellison explores the intersection between
ideology and economic reality and the ways in which actors recon-
ciled the two. For example, staunch abolitionists mistrusted the moti-
vations of President Lincoln and the North with regards to slavery; to
them the Emancipation Proclamation in particular was a hypocritical
way to free Southern slaves while leaving Northern ones in bondage.46
Ellison furthers explains that “the towns that needed Southern cotton
most urgently were the towns that were most unshakably convinced
that Northern schemes for emancipation were no more than amoral
weapons in the armory of war.”47 While there may have been mixed
sentiment for the South, this sentiment never politically materialized.
Thompson explains that workers’ sentiments never translated into out-
comes because “of the twenty-six members of Parliament from Lan-
cashire in the House of commons, only one made a serious motion
for recognition of the Confederacy.”48 Thus, even if mixed sentiment
existed, it never amounted to policy.

Neither cotton nor slavery can singularly explain British
non-intervention; however, the system of slavery and by extension, the
purchasing of cotton from the South was ill matched with the ideology
of Britain. Although Brent Steele’s work focuses perhaps too heavily
on the Emancipation Proclamation as the point of transformation of
the war, his theory concerning ontological security grants insight into
the mismatch of ideology between the American South and Britain.
Steele focuses on the notion of ontological security which he defines
as “a sense of continuity and order in events.”49 The Emancipation
Proclamation transformed “the Civil war from ‘Northern Aggression
to ‘liberation’ meant that any intervention would threaten British
identity, and ostensibly Britain’s ontological security.”50 If governing
Southerners found assurance in their system of slave labor, British
leaders understood the contradiction it posed to their values. Not only
did British intervention fail to possess any advantage in terms of ad-
vancing overall trade or security, British intervention would not reflect
societal values. British and Southern identities could not be ignored
even for cotton the economic good; however, because cotton was such
a critical part of Southern identity this incongruity was not perceived.

46 Mary Ellison, Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1972),  5, 10.
47 Ibid, 56.
48 Thompson, “The Case of the Missing Hegemon,”126.
49 Steele, “Ontological Security,”519
50 Ibid, 521.
Conclusion

The cotton identity that developed in the American South embraced its economic power and its ability to make a place for the newly formed Confederacy on the world stage. The exceptional nature of the South’s cotton production gave Southern leaders a sense of security even as it waged war against its northern neighbors. A discourse analysis of the letters of Southern diplomats demonstrates a high reliance on cotton as part of the South’s overall diplomatic strategy. Even more than a reliance on economic utility, Southerners imbued value on cotton. When the rhetoric of “Cotton Diplomacy” is compared with newspapers, both the actual economic power of cotton is questioned in addition to the identity associated with the good. A multitude of voices questioned the system that produced cotton. Although sentiments may have been mixed in Britain, at a fundamental level the cotton culture of the South, a culture based in slavery and representative only of a portion of the total South, was incongruous with the identity of Britain: a global hegemon who also happened to reject slavery. The culture of Britain played a part in its decision not to intervene, but more than anything else the limited nature of the cotton culture of the South was ill-matched against a multi-variable world.
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NERVA, THE ADOPTIVE EMPERORS, AND ROME’S IMPERIAL SUCESSION
Nathan Rice

“The son generated becomes whatever sort of person divine power may determine but a man selects as an adopted son a chosen individual.”¹ This statement, attributed to Hadrian during a speech announcing Antoninus Pius as his son and heir, epitomizes the bulk of historical writing devoted to the adoption of the five good emperors. Scholars from Machiavelli to Grant have believed meritorious adoption and succession to be the primary determinant of Rome’s success in the second century. The main primary sources, Dio’s Roman History and the Historia Augusta, both address the topic at length, but neither approaches the extravagance of Pliny the Younger in his Panegyricus to Trajan. Pliny’s praise of Trajan serves as the basis for many of the historiographical claims regarding adoption. Trajan, Pliny proclaimed, “was not created for us by civil wars and country racked by the arms of battle, but in peace, through adoption.” He continued, “no tie of kinship or relationship bound adopted and adopter; your only bond was that of mutual excellence, rendering you worthy either to choose or to be chosen.”² Pliny’s claims have been accepted by scholars who have then applied the ideas of peaceful adoption and mutual excellence over the course of the era to explain the emergence and eventual fall of Rome’s “High Empire” in the second century.³

This paper will show that, despite Pliny’s glowing praise, adoption is a problematic explanation for the success of Rome and its emperors in the second century for three primary reasons. First, Nerva’s adoption of Trajan, instead of fitting neatly into the manufactured narrative, can better be explained by examining his specific motivations in their historical context. Second, his successors did not follow one single historical model, least of all Nerva’s, instead opting to choose or not choose heirs as best suited their desires. Third, the succession practices of the second century fit better into the historical

² Pliny, Letters and Panegyricus, Betty Radice, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 4.5, 7.7. On historicity: given the context of the speech, it is very likely that aspects of the speech are exaggerated, but it must be noted that any exaggerating on Pliny’s part in the Panegyricus was likely intentional. It is best understood as a political document.
tradition of Roman emperors as exemplified by the Julio-Claudians than they do into a new category along the lines of Pliny’s description. These three criteria combine to show that adoptive succession alone did not differentiate the second century from the period immediately preceding it.

The Emperor Nerva

When M. Cocceius Nerva became emperor on 18 September 96, the city of Rome and its vast empire were in a state of tense uncertainty. The Emperor Domitian had been murdered by members of his Praetorian Guard earlier in the day, leaving the Roman government in flux. Since Augustus established the role of princeps, or first citizen, Rome had become increasingly dependent upon the rule of a strong emperor as its Republican history faded into the past.\(^4\) The last imperial assassination—Nero in 68—had thrust the empire into a period of chaos and civil warfare that ended only when Vespasian triumphed over his competitors in 69. Romans who were old enough would have worried that history would repeat itself in the wake of Domitian’s assassination. The Senate acted quickly to quell those fears by appointing Nerva later on the day of the assassination, and bestowing the imperial titles and powers on him the next morning.

The mood of the Senate at that time was no secret, and can only be described as celebratory. Although there were undoubtedly senators who had been close to Domitian politically, the body as a whole had detested Domitian’s power over them. Their relief at his assassination was manifest in several decrees passed in the same meeting where they bestowed the titles on Nerva. They decreed that Domitian’s statues, portraits, and effigies should be pulled down, removed, collected, melted, or destroyed in any way possible.\(^5\) They followed this by declaring that Domitian’s name should be struck from any engravings throughout the entire empire, removing any public record of his reign. While that announcement was being disseminated through-

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4 The role of the princeps throughout the empire has been discussed extensively in historical literature. For a full discussion see Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World, 31 BC-AD 337, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). To summarize, in the 125 years between Augustus and Nerva, the position had grown in power and had been institutionalized within the government. Augustus’s role had been a tenuous position that required all of his political savvy to maintain balance between influencing the Senate and the people without appearing too autocratic. By Nerva’s time, the emperor had become a legitimate position, while still requiring that he balance the Senate and people’s desires.

5 Suetonius describes the’s delight at the end of his biography of Domitian, the last in his series. Suetonius, “Life of Domitian,” The Twelve Caesars, Anthony Birley, trans. (New York: Penguin, 2003), 301. Suetonius also describes the Roman public as “indifferent” while the troops were “deeply affected” and desired vengeance.
out the provinces, the news of Domitian’s death, especially the manner of his death, was spreading even faster. While the public within Rome had been indifferent to Domitian’s murder, the real intrigue and danger would begin when the news reached the legions, a group that had historically played a large role in determining the succession after an assassination, dating back to the Julio-Claudian dynasty.

Given the danger of revolt from the troops in the provinces, Nerva was a curious choice to assume power. Nerva was old, already in his sixties, in relatively poor health, and had no sons to succeed him. Moreover, he lacked particular credentials; he had been an advisor to Domitian, had very little knowledge of Rome’s provinces, and had no knowledge or experience in the army. As John Grainger put it, “the unmilitary Nerva was a most unsuitable figure as a ruler for an empire such as Rome’s, which was military to its core.” The military factor was most significant because of the historical basis provided by the events of 68-69 when Nero was killed and Rome’s many generals rebelled and competed amongst each other for power. With no military experience, Nerva was powerless to stop a revolt should it occur, and his appointment was unlikely to appease the military in order to preclude that scenario from coming to fruition. Nerva’s succession was an open question from the moment of his accession, a question that increased in urgency given Nerva’s poor health and his tenuous control of the military.

Cassius Dio notes two significant episodes during Nerva’s reign that predate his adoption of Trajan. The first was a conspiracy of Calpurnius Crassus and colleagues to overthrow the emperor, and the second was mutiny of the Praetorian Guard under Casperius Aelianus seeking justice for those who conspired against Domitian. Although he dealt with the two incidents swiftly and decisively, there is no doubt that they affected Nerva’s legitimacy from the outset of his reign. Immediately after his discussion of these incidents, Dio stated the following: “Nerva, therefore, finding himself held in such contempt by reason of his old age, ascended the Capitol and said in a loud voice: ‘May good success attend the Roman Senate and people and myself. I hereby adopt Marcus Ulpius Nerva Trajan.’”

6 John D. Grainger covers everything in this period from the conspiracy to kill Domitian to Nerva’s death and the beginning of Trajan’s rule. He devotes significant space to a discussion of the odd choice of appointing Nerva given the precarious position of the empire. Grainger, Nerva and the Roman Succession Crisis of AD 96-99, (New York: Routledge, 2003).
7 For more on Nerva’s health issues and how they may have affected his ability to control the empire, see Dio, History, LXVIII.1.3-2.1.
8 Grainger, Roman Succession Crisis, 30.
9 Dio, Roman History, LXVIII.4.
ity of this scenario is questionable for an abundance of reasons. First and foremost, Dio gives no indication that Nerva had been considering naming a successor until this point, and makes it seem in this context to be a spur of the moment decision. Additionally, in Dio’s scenario, Nerva’s decision was meant to appease those who had been giving him difficulty, which included senators, the Praetorian Prefect, and the Guards. If Nerva sought to appease people within Rome he would not have chosen Trajan, who came from one generation of nobility and was born in the provinces outside of Rome, in Spain. In fact, if the Senate had to be appeased Trajan’s heritage would have likely had the exact opposite effect.

A much more likely explanation for Nerva’s decision to adopt Trajan, although it is not mentioned by Dio, is that Nerva hoped to solidify control over the military. In Suetonius’ description of the aftermath of Domitian’s murder, he asserted that the troops were angered deeply by the event, and desired justice, primarily against those who had conspired against Domitian. Another account, from Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, describes a legion in Moesia whose soldiers staged a mutiny after Domitian’s assassination, and violence was only mitigated by the swift action of the orator Dio Chrysostom who happened to be passing through the camp. Although this anecdote is by no means indicative of every legion’s reaction, it nonetheless indicates the atmosphere of uncertainty, especially in the provinces, with which Nerva contended. While in this case the soldiers eventually backed down, a similar legion with a discontented general could have easily inspired a revolt.

Nerva was particularly vulnerable because without any military experience he could not count on the support of a single legion in the case of a revolt. Nerva’s answer to this uncertainty was to name Trajan his son and heir in the summer of 97. Trajan was young and influential, which would have quelled fears about Nerva’s age, but more importantly, Trajan was a powerful general who had demonstrated his abilities in the field and possessed the loyalty of one of Rome’s most powerful armies in Upper Germany. The news of Trajan’s adoption would have spread throughout the provinces, and the implications to the other generals would have been obvious. While having an obstacle such as Trajan would not have precluded a highly determined and

11 This account is mentioned in Grainger’s Roman Succession Crisis. Grainger believes that the premise of the story— that the soldiers attempted a mutiny in response to Domitian’s murder— was quite likely given both the circumstances and Rome’s particular history of such events.
equally powerful general from attempting a coup, any general who were so determined would have made their move in the first year of Nerva’s reign. Trajan’s adoption would have effectively dissuaded any potential usurpers who were considering action or were already actively plotting against Nerva from their conspiracy with the knowledge that they could not succeed without acquiring extraordinary military force.

From this perspective, Nerva’s decision to adopt Trajan was wise and effective, but it does not fully explain Nerva’s thought process. Trajan was undoubtedly a competent general with a large army, but he was hardly the only individual to meet those criteria. There were multiple generals of equal standing with Trajan, including Marcus Cornelius Nigrinus, Governor of Syria, and Pompeius Longinus, commander of Rome’s largest army – the Pannonian forces who were fighting on the Danube. As a result, Nerva had multiple options when considering who, as his successor, would best consolidate his control over the military.

At the beginning of his reign Nerva first attempted to bolster his support in the provinces by naming new governors in Germany – L. Licinius Sura in Lower Germany and Trajan in Upper Germany. Trajan’s appointment by Nerva is telling of their relationship, since it can be safely assumed that Nerva would only appoint individuals of whose loyalties he was assured. Perhaps their bond was through their mutual service under Domitian, as both had been conspicuous supporters of the previous emperor. In any case, by Trajan’s appointment as governor in 96 he had clearly demonstrated his loyalty to Nerva and earned the emperor’s trust. With such a bond, Nerva would have been confident that Trajan would not be overly anxious to assume power by violent means through revolt. Nerva’s decision to adopt Trajan, therefore, was a calculated political move to enhance his control over the military, securing his old on the imperial seat until the end of his reign.

This analysis presents a counter argument to the narrative proposed by Pliny and augmented by modern historians. Instead of a tenuous bond of “mutual excellence” between Nerva and Trajan, there are very concrete motivations for Nerva to choose a successor, and for that successor to be Trajan. Although Dio suggests, like Pliny, that Nerva set a precedent by his actions, the context within which Nerva acted shows that this explanation is overly simplified. Nerva’s choice

12 Grainger briefly discusses this topic in Roman Succession Crisis, but he reverts to the narrative of mutual excellence, concluding that Trajan was favored because of his character and personality. See pp. 71-72.
of successor served as a method for him to consolidate power upon accession, not as a model of succession for future emperors. Rather than follow Nerva’s example, each of the succeeding four emperors found different methods to legitimize and maintain their power without relying on choosing a successor.

**Nerva’s Successors**

For the later second-century emperors, adopting an heir was a necessary part of their familial and imperial duties, but it was far from a mandated political measure as it had been for Nerva. The deviation from Nerva’s example became apparent by the end of Trajan’s reign. When Trajan became emperor in 98, Trajan faced very different circumstances than his predecessor had in 96. The political uncertainty and instability that had permeated the majority of Nerva’s reign dissipated when Trajan was named heir and successor in the summer of 97, and the ensuing stability endured until Trajan’s accession in January of 98. Trajan’s accession was unique in that it was in absentia due to his posting in Germany. He received notice of his adoption by letter in 97, and when Nerva died in 98 he chose to stay in Germany. That conditions in Rome remained stable is indicated by Trajan’s conspicuous absence from Rome throughout the first year of his reign.\(^{13}\)

When Trajan returned to Rome in the fall of 99 he could be characterized as the opposite of his predecessor. He was young and vital, fresh from small but successful military campaigns in Germany. He brought with him a presence of tremendous energy that characterized his rule. As a result, Trajan had no immediate need to declare a successor. He was in good health, his position vis-à-vis the military was secure, and he faced no resistance from within Rome itself. From his accession, it was nineteen years until Trajan finally named his successor. His eventual choice of a successor was dissimilar from Trajan’s own succession in two important ways. First, and perhaps most significant when considering the adoption narrative, is that Trajan and Hadrian were related. They were not blood relatives, but family relationships of any kind were supremely important in Rome, and Hadrian was Plotina’s (and thus Trajan’s) nephew. Recall Pliny’s statement regarding Trajan and Nerva, “No tie of kinship or relationship bound adopted and adopter; your only bond was that of mutual excellence.”\(^{14}\)

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13 Historians have different interpretations of Trajan’s initial absence from the city. Some see his absence as a sign that he considered returning to Rome to be dangerous. Certainly while he was in Germany for that year he summoned the aforementioned Casperius Aelianus of the Praetorian Guard to him and presumably had him executed.

Considering this in combination with Dio’s assertion that “Nerva did not esteem family relationship above the safety of the State,” Trajan’s decision to adopt a relative is a major deviation from the prescribed model.\textsuperscript{15} Their relationship was not insignificant prior to the adoption; it is noteworthy that Hadrian was chosen to deliver important messages to Trajan during Nerva’s reign. Not only was Hadrian a relation, but he was a favored relation, which casts further doubt on the idea that Trajan emulated Nerva’s example. The other complicating factor is that Trajan did not name Hadrian his heir until he was on his deathbed, putting Hadrian at a significant disadvantage both in terms of gaining experience by serving as Caesar under the preceding emperor and in terms of establishing the legitimacy of the succession. Trajan differed in nearly every respect from Nerva’s example: he adopted a relative, and failed to ensure that individual’s success.

After his accession in 117, Hadrian further deviated from the example of successive practices set by Nerva. Hadrian, according to the Historia Augusta, became convinced of the need for a successor after suffering a severe illness. The author claimed that Hadrian refused the most qualified candidates on the grounds of personal disputes, and eventually decided on L. Ceionius Commodus, who then became Lucius Aelius Caesar. Aelius, whose commendation to Hadrian was said to be his physical beauty, was extremely sickly and died little more than a year after his adoption.\textsuperscript{16} Hadrian’s initial adoption of Aelius raises different questions than Trajan’s adoption of Hadrian. By adopting Aelius, Hadrian adopted a non-relation, but also directly contradicted the idea of mutual excellence and acting to benefit the empire. This incident is often overlooked because it did not have a lasting impact on the empire’s course, and because Hadrian’s next choice for a successor, Antoninus Pius, did illustrate those exact qualities. Yet even in adopting Antoninus Hadrian did not fully overcome his previous folly. In the same act by which he adopted Antoninus, he also decreed that Antoninus should adopt two sons: Marcus Annius Verus, subsequently Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Ceionius Commodus, son of the previous heir and subsequently called Lucius Verus. By attempting to ensure a dynastic lineage, Hadrian directly rejected

\textsuperscript{15} Dio, \textit{Roman History}, LXVIII.4.2.

\textsuperscript{16} The \textit{Historia Augusta}’s biography of Hadrian is extremely critical of Hadrian at times, including the instance of his first adoption. It seems unlikely that Hadrian was as jealous of popular senators as the \textit{HA} would claim, but Hadrian’s choice of Aelius certainly indicates an aversion to the others. The remarks on Aelius’ physical beauty and lack of other credentials are most likely influenced by the story of Hadrian’s young Greek consort Antinous, who drowned in the Nile under suspicious circumstances in 130. The \textit{Historia Augusta} is published under \textit{Lives of Later Caesars}, Anthony Birley, trans. (Baltimore: Penguin Classics, 1976).
the narrative that Pliny had proposed, and that historians have been so willing to adopt.\footnote{As stated by Pliny in his previously mentioned remarks on successive practices. See Panegyricus 7.7.}

Despite the unconventional situation that Hadrian created, when Antoninus Pius became sole ruler in 138, his choice of successor both supported the narrative in some aspects and rejected it in others. Antoninus demonstrated a firm commitment to the principle of mutual excellence in adoption and succession by ignoring Hadrian’s instructions and naming Marcus Aurelius his sole successor, notably slighting Lucius Verus. The reason for this, provided by the Historia Augusta, is that Marcus’ qualifications were abundant and were recognized by both Antoninus and Hadrian, while Lucius Verus had questionable character and was most likely included by Hadrian in deference to his father and their presumed affection.\footnote{Antoninus and Marcus were very close and are lauded extensively by ancient sources. Verus, on the other hand, receives far worse treatment in the HA, including references to a dearth of positive virtues, especially in relation to his adoptive brother Marcus. See “Lucius Verus.”} Antoninus’ actions would make this instance seem a clear adherent to the Plinean narrative, but this view must be questioned when considering that Marcus was Antoninus’ nephew. Despite Marcus’ undoubtedly clear qualifications, his relation to Antoninus distinguishes this case from a true illustration of voluntary adoption, especially considering Hadrian’s role in Marcus’ initial adoption by Antoninus.

Antoninus’ virtuous comportment in choosing a successor culminated with Marcus Aurelius’ accession in 161. Marcus’ first act was to name Lucius Verus co-ruler, an unprecedented decision that made them the empire’s first co-rulers. This was a curious act because it went directly against his father’s wishes while confirming Hadrian’s original vision as explained upon Hadrian’s adoption of Antoninus. The decision is doubly strange because Lucius Verus’ questionable character seems at odds with Marcus’ personal philosophy. This act, however, is overlooked with surprising frequency in the historiography, most likely resulting from Verus’ early death in 169, less than halfway through Marcus’ reign.\footnote{It should also be noted that despite Verus’ maltreatment in the primary literature, his tenure as co-emperor was without major incident, which likely adds to the reason the Verus is often ignored when discussing Marcus’ reign.}

In comparison, Marcus has not escaped historical criticism for his decision to name his son Commodus his successor, as historians who abide by the narrative of meritorious adoption naturally blame Marcus for abandoning that process.\footnote{For a discussion of Marcus’ abandonment of the succession model see Michael Grant, The}
cession process during the entire dynasty, Marcus’ selection of his son Commodus, an example of hereditary inheritance, provides further evidence that the emperors of this period did not consider themselves to be bound by a precedent set by their predecessors and adoptive fathers. After all, while Marcus has received the blame for abandoning the model, it should be noted that he was the first of his imperial lineage, and the first emperor since Vespasian that had a son survive to adulthood. In naming his own son heir, Marcus was following an example set not only by previous Roman emperors who, like himself, had adult sons, but also by rulers from almost every kingdom and empire in the region and in history. For a final illustration of this point, there is a relevant passage from the Historia Augusta describing Marcus’ death:

Two days before he expired his friends were admitted to his presence, and he is said to have expressed to them the same opinion about his son as Philip did about Alexander, when he thought ill of him, adding that he did not take it amiss at all that he was dying, only that he was dying leaving such a son to survive him; for Commodus was already showing himself to be base and cruel. 21 Above all else this quotation illustrates one fact: neither Marcus Aurelius nor the author of the Historia Augusta considered an alternative to Commodus, the first-born son, succeeding his father as Emperor. In spite of Commodus’ flaws that were purportedly apparent from a young age, Marcus expressed not reluctance at naming Commodus his heir, but regret that he had not produced a son more suitable to succeed him. In so doing, Marcus not only did not follow the supposed example of his predecessors, but also did not even acknowledge its existence in the first place, entirely repudiating the assertions of historians.

**The Julio-Claudian Example**

The practice of adoption and succession in the second-century dynasty was not demonstrative of an underlying ideological emphasis on choosing qualified successors. Nerva, who is said to have created the practice and set the precedent for his successors, was motivated more by self-interest than by his sense of duty to the empire. His succession, in combination with the disparate practices of his successors, illustrated a repeat of historical precedent set not in the second century, but in the first century by the Julio-Claudian dynasty. 22 Rath-

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21 “Marcus Aurelius,” Historia Augusta, 27.11-12.
22 The Julio-Claudians ruled from 27 BC to AD 68, and the dynasty includes the Emperors Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero. After Nero’s death in 68 they were succeeded...
er than demonstrating an innovative practice that raised the empire to new heights, succession under the Adoptive Emperors indicated a restoration of practices from earlier in the empire’s history. This is alluded to in Pliny as one aspect of his praise for the relationship between Nerva and Trajan. “Thus you,” Pliny declared to Trajan, “were adopted not as others have been hitherto, in order to gratify a wife; no stepfather made you his son, but one who was your prince, and the divine Nerva became your father in the same sense that he was father of us all.”

The succession of the Adoptive Emperors emulated three aspects of the various successions under the Julio-Claudian dynasty, which can be extrapolated from Pliny’s claims. The three comparisons are the practice of adoption, the influence of wives and family ties, and the practice of solidifying dynastic lineages through marriage alliances.

The practice of adoption was not unique to the Adoptive Emperors, nor was it unique to the imperial family or the broader nobility. Adoption had been a common practice in Rome for centuries, often as a legitimate means for filling a deficiency in family make-up. Adoption as a political tool, on the other hand, dates back to the times of the Roman Republic when elite families would practice adoption as a means of cementing alliances. The Julio-Claudian dynasty, in fact, featured a number of cases of adoption. The five members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty included three who became emperor as a result of adoption. Tiberius, technically Augustus’ stepson, was adopted as his heir in AD 4. Tiberius then adopted Germanicus, who died prematurely, leaving his son Caligula as the sole male heir. Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudians, was adopted by Claudius in the year 50. It is also important that Augustus’ own adoption by Julius Caesar be considered, both as the forefather to the Julio-Claudians and as the emperor to which every subsequent ruler was compared. Ancient and modern writers alike have ignored the similarities between dynasties on the grounds that Julio-Claudian adoptions were restricted to family members in contrast to the true Adoptive Emperors. Even that, however, ignores the fact that Hadrian was Trajan’s nephew on his wife’s side, just as Marcus Aurelius was Antoninus Pius’ nephew through his wife Faustina. In spite of this, historians who support the meritori-

by the Flavian dynasty.

23 Pliny, Panegyricus 7.7

24 For an extensive discussion of adoptive practices in Roman history, see Hugh Lindsay’s Adoption in the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Lindsay argues that adoption as a political tool emerged during Republican Rome, among other strategies, as a means for cementing elite alliances and power.

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ous succession narrative still assert that the initiator of second-century adoptive practices, Nerva, set a precedent of passing over relatives for the succession, even if it wasn’t followed by his successors.

The similarities between dynasties extend beyond the basic adoptive practices to include the influence that the emperors’ wives exerted in the arena of succession. To begin with examples from the Julio-Claudian dynasty, the adoptions of Tiberius and Nero were rumored to be the result of the influence of their mothers, Livia and Agrippina the Younger. Both women had divorced their first husbands to marry the emperor of the time, Augustus and Claudius, respectively, thereby forming the relationship between father and eventual adoptive son.25 Pliny’s statement, “You were adopted not as others have been hitherto, in order to gratify a wife,” is evidence of the enduring power of these stories.26 The actions of Trajan’s wife, Plotina, provide an excellent corollary for evaluating Pliny’s claims. The Historia Augusta notes two specific instances in which Plotina’s actions resemble those of Livia and Agrippina. The author claimed that many of Hadrian’s promotions throughout his career were the result of Plotina’s influence.27 Even more significantly, the Historia Augusta related a rumor that Plotina engineered Hadrian’s adoption: “Some say that Plotina’s party concealed [Trajan’s] death and got an actor to impersonate him, speaking a tired voice.”28 The idea that Hadrian’s adoption was illegitimate plagued him throughout his career and likely was a factor in his aggressive treatment of rivals at the outset of his reign.29

The last similarity between the two dynasties is the use of marriage as a means of strengthening dynastic lineage. Under the Julio-Claudians this was an extremely common tactic that nearly every emperor practiced. When Augustus adopted Tiberius he forced Tiberius to divorce his first wife and marry Augustus’ only daughter Julia.30 Claudius exhibited this practice twice, both by taking Agrippa-

25 For an account of the rumors associated with Tiberius and Nero see the relevant sections from Suetonius’ The Twelve Caesars. In “The Life of Tiberius” note specifically passages on 110 describing arguments between Augustus and Livia over Tiberius. In “The Life of Claudius” see 204-205 for a description of Agrippina’s character and relationship with Claudius. In “The Life of Nero” see 210-211 for Agrippina’s influence over Nero’s upbringing.
26 Pliny, 7.7.
27 Hadrian was never a favorite of Trajan, but was a particular favorite of Plotina which earned him many favors. “Hadrian,” Historia Augusta, 4.1-5.
28 “Hadrian,” Historia Augusta, 4.10.
29 A primary example of this was Hadrian’s murder of four prominent senators immediately after his succession.
30 “The Life of Tiberius” in Suetonius’ The Twelve Caesars describes this situation in depth, and argues that Augustus’ decree was a significant detractor from the relationship between the two. See 108 for a full account.
pina as his own wife to bolster his political status, and by forcing his own daughter, Octavia, to marry his adopted son, Nero. These practices were later mirrored by relationships formed between Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Verus. Hadrian decreed that Antoninus should have his daughter Faustina marry Lucius Verus to create a concrete link back to Hadrian’s original heir, Aelius. After Hadrian’s death, however, Antoninus reneged on that commitment and instead had his daughter Faustina marry Marcus Aurelius, who he preferred as an heir over Lucius Verus. In so doing Antoninus created a dual dynastic lineage, whereby he was not only the adoptive grandfather of Commodus, but also his blood-relation through Faustina.

The comparisons between the Julio-Claudian and second-century adoptive dynasties are indicative of one aspect of a larger shift in historical narrative. The narrative of meritorious succession promoted by Pliny, Dio, and many historians does not fully account for the intricacies of Roman politics, especially as it relates to succession. Instead, the successive practices of the Adoptive Emperors constitute a link back to the earlier Julio-Claudian dynasty. Nerva’s adoption of Trajan in the second century, considered by so many to be the predecessor that facilitated Rome’s expansion, and by some accounts its climax, can be better explained as a calculated and self-interested decision that ensured a continuation of Nerva’s power and the stability of the empire until the end of his reign.

31 The details of both of these marriages can be found in *The Twelve Caesars*. “The Life of Claudius” on 202 discusses Claudius’ incestuous marriage to Agrippina, and “The Life of Nero” describes his marriage to Octavia.
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To say that the O. J. Simpson murder trial gripped the nation would be an understatement. For eight months, Americans obsessively followed the sensational trial as if it were a soap opera: celebrities and socialites gave testimony; the legal teams became overnight sensations; police officers were accused of tampering with evidence. And throughout this trial of Hollywood-sized proportions, racial tensions bubbled beneath the surface of the whole affair.

The Simpson case proved to be a landmark event in the history of the criminal justice system and American race relations. As a result of historically distinct experiences with the criminal justice system, black and white Americans had starkly different perceptions of crime and of law enforcement, differences which the trial made clear. In this paper, I will examine the Simpson trial in conjunction with public opinion on race, and I will examine some of the roots of these differing perceptions. In doing so, I will look at the way historically rooted violence and injustice perpetrated against black Americans, which has manifested itself in racial stereotyping, taboos about interracial sex, and starkly different experiences with the criminal justice system came to a head during the trial and resulted in fundamentally different black and white perspectives on this tumultuous episode in the history of American race relations.

In 1977, Orenthal James Simpson, a professional football star nearing retirement, met Nicole Brown, who was working as a waitress at “The Daisy” nightclub. By all accounts, eighteen-year-old Nicole was a beautiful and vivacious young white woman. The two began dating shortly afterwards, though the African-American Simpson was still married to his first wife, Marguerite Whitley, who was also black. That marriage ended in divorce in 1980. Meanwhile, Simpson and Brown continued dating, and were married on February 2, 1985. On February 25, 1992, Nicole Brown Simpson filed for divorce, citing irreconcilable differences.¹

But years before the divorce proceedings began, red flags had appeared in the Simpsons’ relationship. On January 1, 1989, Mrs. Simpson called the police with a report of domestic violence, claiming she feared for her life. Police records, released during the trial, stated that Mrs. Simpson had been beaten badly enough to require medical

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treatment. When officers arrived on the scene, a police report stated, “Mrs. Simpson ran out of the bushes, yelling: ‘He’s going to kill me! He’s going to kill me!’ She told the police that they had been called to her house on eight other occasions after her husband had beaten her.” This incident was an obvious indicator of Mr. Simpson’s violent tendencies, and would later be brought up during the murder trial. He eventually pleaded “no contest” to the charges, was fined a mere $700, required to do community service, and placed on probation. Even after the divorce, Nicole Simpson was not able to achieve much separation: she moved from Simpson’s Brentwood estate, with the couple’s two children, to a condo in the same Los Angeles neighborhood. Mr. Simpson continued to keep “a close eye on his ex-wife after the divorce. ‘It was common knowledge that he followed her… he would just show up at places.”

On the night of June 12, 1994, between 10:15 pm and 10:40 pm, Nicole Simpson and her friend, Ron Goldman, were brutally stabbed to death. Simpson, who would leave Los Angeles later that night for a business trip to Chicago, had no solid alibi for that time frame. Simpson was eventually declared a suspect, and his lawyers made a deal with the LAPD allowing him to turn himself in at 11:00 am on June 17, 1994. However, Simpson failed to show up at the appointed time, and at 5:00 pm, Robert Kardashian, a member of Simpson’s legal team, read what appeared to be a suicide note from the former football player, which asserted his innocence. Lawyers, police officers, and psychiatrists became concerned. Around 6:20 pm, Simpson was spotted in his soon-to-be infamous white Ford Bronco. Shortly thereafter, police officers caught up with Simpson on Interstate 405, when his friend, Al Cowlings, who was in the car with Simpson, told officers that Simpson had a gun. Dozens of officers and news helicopters participated in the low-speed chase—Simpson’s vehicle was going about 35 miles per hour—until the procession reached Simpson’s home at 8:00 pm. After Robert Shapiro, Simpson’s lawyer, arrived about an hour later, Simpson turned himself over to the police. Three days later, on June 20, 1994, he was arraigned, and on July 8, 1994, after a brief preliminary hearing, Simpson was charged with two counts

3 Ibid.
4 Rimer, “The Simpson Case: The Victim.”
As Simpson was charged, one thing was abundantly clear: the American people were hooked. Coverage of the case had dominated news headlines for days. And already, an undeniable racial element began to emerge. A nationwide survey published in July 1994, a month after the murders, was the first to ask the American people whether they believed Simpson was innocent or guilty. The outcome of these polls indicated a distinct divide along racial lines. According to the polls, “whites were nearly twice as likely as blacks to consider Simpson ‘probably guilty’ (34 percent versus 18 percent), while blacks were three times as likely as whites to conclude that the defendant was ‘probably not guilty’ (33 percent versus 11 percent).” Additional questions asked respondents whether they believed “the news media in the United States is biased in favor of blacks, or is it biased against blacks, or does it generally give blacks fair treatment?” Again, the response was dramatically divided: “blacks were three times as likely as whites to respond that the media are biased against blacks (46 percent versus 13 percent), whites were nearly twice as likely as blacks to view the media as racially neutral (68 percent versus 35 percent).” Finally, the poll turned to the question of the criminal justice system. Answers revealed that “blacks were more than twice as likely as whites to believe that the criminal justice system is biased against blacks (54 percent versus 19 percent), while whites were nearly three times as likely as blacks to believe that the system is ‘fair’ (62 percent versus 23 percent).”

What these polls demonstrated was a distinct racial division in the United States. In the early 1990s, racial conflicts were prominently featured in the news. In 1992, for example, the Rodney King case made headlines when King, a black man, was violently beaten by four white officers of the Los Angeles Police Department, an episode caught on tape and shown repeatedly on the news. The officers were acquitted by an all-white jury, sparking intense criticism of the police department and a national dialogue on police brutality. Violent race riots rocked Los Angeles, as the acquittal served, according to a New York Times report, as “a spark put to a tinderbox of anger constructed

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 8.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
from years of deep poverty, governmental neglect, racism, charges of police abuse and high unemployment.\textsuperscript{14}

Incidents such as the Rodney King case served to exacerbate racial tensions even before the murders of Brown and Goldman. Thus, by the time Simpson was charged with murder, the anger and feelings of injustice in the black community were clear, as quantitatively documented in the July 1994 polls, which are particularly striking, considering the drastically different answers given by white and black respondents. Such polls demonstrate that even before Simpson’s trial began, race had already had a major impact on the American people’s perceptions of Mr. Simpson’s guilt or innocence. On a larger scale, race also influenced whether people believed blacks were treated fairly or unfairly by the criminal justice system. The Simpson case would build on the countless historical injustices blacks had endured in the United States at the hands of white Americans, including white law enforcement officials.

The lynching era, generally viewed as the decades between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great Depression, resulted in an estimated “2,018 separate incidents of lynching” and the deaths of at least 2,462 African-Americans at the hands of white, southern mobs.\textsuperscript{15} Allegations of black males raping or sexually assaulting white women were frequently at the root of lynchings and the race riots that sometimes followed. In 1906, Atlanta, Georgia, was rocked by riots after the press reported the rapes of twelve white women by black men in a single week, “giving the impression that there was an epidemic of Black rape.”\textsuperscript{16} In another incident in Springfield, Illinois, in 1908, a white woman’s claim that a black man had assaulted her led to the formation of white lynch mobs and the eventual deaths of four whites and two blacks.\textsuperscript{17}

Historian David R. Colburn has written that the construction of Southern culture “places white women at its center… An attack on women not only represented a violation of the South’s foremost taboo, but it also threatened to dismantle the very nature of southern society.”\textsuperscript{18} Lynchings such as those described above illustrate the violence

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
that could follow the perceived violation of white women by black men. Whether consciously or subconsciously, many white Americans may have seen O. J. Simpson’s relationship with Nicole Brown as taboo.

The next facet of the racial debate sparked by the trial concerned the racial and ethnic make-up of the jury. Of the twelve-person jury, nine were people of color. Nor was this a coincidence. The murders occurred in Brentwood. Had the charges been filed in that neighborhood’s own district, the trial would have taken place at the Santa Monica Courthouse, where only 7 percent of the jury pool was African American. However, charges were filed in the Central District, meaning the trial would be held in downtown Los Angeles, where over 30 percent of the jury pool was African American. Sociologist Darnell M. Hunt considers this a major advantage for Simpson, citing a poll of lawyers, taken shortly after the jury selection was announced, that “indicated that most felt the upcoming trial would result in either an acquittal or a hung jury.” What this suggests is that Simpson’s attorneys would effectively play the “‘race card’” to “inflame the passions of the African-American jury.”

But such opinions might have had less to do with overt racism and were perhaps more a result of what reporter Roger M. Grace called “differing perspectives on the part of racial groups, based on differing experiences.” A predominantly black jury in Los Angeles would likely have had negative encounters with the police, which many white Los Angelinos would not have experienced. These undoubtedly played a part in shaping perceptions of law enforcement. Hunt affirms this notion, writing that a great deal of the differing opinions about police and the criminal justice system based on race “can be attributed to police and prosecution practices.… Police departments tend to focus on ‘street’ instead of ‘white collar’ crime. This focus results in a targeting of inner-city areas where large portions of the black population reside.” The consensus that these two authors provide is consistent with my argument that racial polarization led to differing views of Simpson’s guilt, which stemmed, in turn, from the quite different perceptions of the police held by black and white Americans.

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20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Grace, “Trying the O. J. Simpson Case.”
District Attorney Gil Garcetti was heavily criticized for deciding to file the Simpson case in a central-L.A. court instead of in Santa Monica. Compared to so-called “downtown” juries, Santa Monica juries tended to be “more affluent, better educated,” and composed of “a different ethnic mix than those at the Downtown courthouse.”

“Downtown” juries, as they are known in Los Angeles, refer to the radius from within which the jury is drawn, and typically have a large percentage of “African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans and blue-collar workers.” Trial experts (i.e., criminal defense lawyers and trial consultants) agreed that Simpson probably could not “be convicted by a ‘downtown jury,’” and correctly predicted that the trial would end in a hung jury, if not an outright acquittal, as did in fact occur.

Judges interviewed cited a number of legal reasons why trying the case in Santa Monica would have been a better option. According to one judge, “It is the jurisdiction where the crime occurred and the jurisdiction where the suspect lived. It is also where Simpson, an affluent celebrity, could be judged by jurors many of whom are his peers in every respect except race.” This might have made a critical difference because a Santa Monica jury’s perception of law enforcement meant the jurors might have recognized that Simpson’s celebrity status transcended race. Proof of this is shown in the fact that LAPD Detective Mark Fuhrman, who would serve as a key witness in the trial, had given Simpson “special treatment” in a previous incident, in which Simpson shattered the windshield of Mrs. Simpson’s Mercedes with a baseball bat and was not arrested. To this hypothetical Santa Monica jury, then, the idea that the police were “‘out to get O. J. [was] preposterous. You realize he is a celebrity and that celebrities get special treatment. But Downtown, the case was about race.” Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the Simpson trial would not have become racially charged, wherever the charges were filed.

But Garcetti, it was suggested, was extremely concerned about the potential implications of Simpson’s possible conviction by a mostly white jury. He noted that “the ‘perception of justice’” was critical
to this case. In Los Angeles, a city so polarized on racial issues and perceptions of justice, Garcetti might have been reflecting on the bigger picture, as well as wanting to be perceived as making a statement about his own color blindness. As Hunt points out, blacks in America are the most represented group through every stage of the police and criminal justice system, from the number of arrests to prison makeup. According to Hunt, while “black Americans make up only about 12 percent of the US population, they account for more than 30 percent of all arrests, 44 percent of all prisoners, and 40 percent of prisoners on death row.” These statistics suggest why African-Americans’ perceptions of the police and criminal justice system were different from those of white Americans. Additionally, the LAPD had an infamous history of harshly policing the city’s black community “as if it were an occupied war zone.” Race riots broke out when the white police officers in the Rodney King case were acquitted, and Garcetti “may have feared for the long-term race relations of the city.” While the decision about where to file charges was highly political, it also points to the system’s racial divides. It was no secret that legal experts suspected that a “downtown jury” would be more sympathetic to Simpson, based solely upon his race. And, as journalist Roger M. Grace suggested, the decision to file the charges downtown determined the trial’s ultimate outcome.

In an analysis of the racial dimension of the Simpson trial, it is important to consider the role played by LAPD Detective Mark Fuhrman, who was one of the first detectives at the crime scene on the night of the murder. After conducting an investigation of the scene, Fuhrman drove from Nicole Brown Simpson’s Bundy Street townhouse to O. J. Simpson’s Rockingham mansion to alert Simpson of Nicole’s death. After finding the house empty, Fuhrman discovered bloody marks on the driveway and climbed over the estate’s wall to further investigate, finding the infamous blood-soaked leather glove inside the estate grounds. This black glove would go on to play a huge role in the trial. When Simpson was ultimately asked to try it on in court and it appeared too small for him, the defense was convinced that it had achieved a critical victory in the case. It was this scene that led to the famous declaration by defense attorney Jonnie Cochrane “if [the glove] doesn’t fit, you must acquit.” This quip and the drama of

31 Ibid.
32 Hunt, O. J. Simpson Facts and Fictions, 74-75.
33 Ibid, 76.
34 Corwin, “Location of Trial Can Be Crucial to Outcome”
35 Grace, “Trying the O. J. Simpson Case.”
trying on the glove cemented its place in the American consciousness. And it also had a huge impact on the verdict.

Detective Fuhrman, an experienced law enforcement officer and one of the first detectives on the scene, was considered a crucial witness for the prosecution. But here too, racial perceptions of law enforcement would be crucial. Even before the detective’s personal racist history came to light, experts believe his testimony was already doomed, as the predominantly non-white jury, “[was] convinced that police were out to get Simpson because he [was] black.”

Fuhrman who discovered much of the incriminating evidence at the Rockingham Estate, including the other bloody glove (whose match had already been discovered at Bundy Street) and blood droplets. The prosecution was plagued from the outset by the defense argument that Fuhrman had planted the glove at Rockingham. Once tapes surfaced of Fuhrman’s repeated use of offensive racial epithets about black people, his testimony became worthless. In fact, earlier in the trial, Fuhrman had denied under oath having used such offensive language, which would lead to his being found guilty of perjury. The Fuhrman tapes were an unmitigated disaster for the prosecution. A jury that was predisposed to distrust the police was presented with evidence of Fuhrman’s racism, a fact that would have certainly remained on the jurors’ minds as they deliberated. And the perception developed, as Hunt explains, that the jury was “‘a black jury,’ one that had nullified prosecution evidence in the name of emotionalism and/or racial solidarity.”

Thus, when one considers, as scholars suggest, that the jury was predisposed to distrust the police, along with the fact that Fuhrman was later proved both a perjurer and someone who used racist language, it is little wonder that the jury chose to discount his testimony and a great deal of evidence, which led to a vote to acquit Simpson.

The Simpson verdict was handed down at 10:00 am on October 3, 1995. The jury required only four hours of deliberation to arrive at a “not guilty” verdict. But the controversy was not over. Two years later, in 1997, Ron Goldman’s family filed a wrongful death suit against Simpson and Nicole Brown’s estate filed a survivor suit against Simpson in Santa Monica civil court, the district in which many critics believed the criminal trial should have been prosecuted.

36 Corwin, “Location of Trial Can Be Crucial to Outcome.”
37 As a point of interest, it is worth noting that Detective Fuhrman was the only individual ever charged and found guilty of a crime (perjury) in relation to the Simpson criminal trial.
39 An estimated 100 million people worldwide tuned in to watch the verdict’s announcement. In the United States, the verdict cost an estimated $480 million in lost productivity.
Unlike the criminal case, the jury on the civil case comprised mostly white jurors, and required only nine out of twelve votes to reach a verdict: Simpson was convicted by this jury.\(^{40}\)

Polls taken in July 1994, shortly after the murders and the car chase, show that 66 percent of whites believed the murder charges were “probably or definitely true.”\(^{41}\) On the other hand, only 24 percent of blacks believed the charges were true.\(^{42}\) Gallup polls taken in 1997, after the civil verdict was reached, showed that the gulf of opinion between white and black Americans remained as wide as ever. Of whites polled, 68 percent agreed with the civil jury’s conviction, while 71 percent of whites believed that Simpson was probably or definitely guilty of the murder charges.\(^{43}\) Meanwhile, a mere 26 percent of blacks polled believed the civil jury’s verdict was correct, while only 28 percent believed that Simpson was probably or definitely guilty of murder.\(^{44}\) For both white and black Americans, the findings in the 1994 and 1997 polls remained much the same, indicating that the racial divide had scarcely changed in two and a half years.

Another crucial difference between the criminal and civil trials was that the civil court ruled that “allegations that police investigators were racists out to get a black American sports and entertainment celebrity,” which had dominated the criminal trial, were “inflammatory and speculative.”\(^{45}\) Thus, the civil trial was largely free of such claims. Comparing a trial laden with racial allegations versus one that was not makes speculation about the difference in jury composition more difficult. But it is certainly interesting to note that whites and blacks had vastly divergent perceptions of law enforcement and on the probability of Simpson’s guilt. The different verdicts reached in the criminal and civil trials are surely indicative of that fact.

In polls released after the civil trial concluded, both whites and blacks reported feeling dissatisfied with the outcome. Whites did not feel that justice had been served because Simpson escaped jail time.\(^{46}\) On the other hand, most blacks felt that Simpson had “been unfairly punished,” a feeling that might have resulted from the sense that

\(^{40}\) Criminal cases require a unanimous vote to reach a verdict.


\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.


Simpson was persecuted by white law enforcement due to his inappropriate relationship with a white woman.\footnote{Ibid.} These interpretations of the outcome of the trials were almost certainly influenced by the legacy of violence related to interracial sex and relationships, which was sown by the horrific lynching episodes that had plagued the American South in particular.

Years later, polls suggest that not much has changed. A 1999 Gallup poll, marking the fifth anniversary of the double murder, asked responders, “Race played a major role in the trial of O. J. Simpson and made a major difference in the ways in which blacks and whites viewed the case. Has this changed?”\footnote{Frank Newport, “Fifth Anniversary of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman Murders Finds Americans Still Pointing at O. J. Simpson,” Gallup, June 14, 1999, accessed October 4, 2014.} The answer was a resounding “no.” In October 1995, only 27 percent of blacks believed the charges against Simpson true, while 73 percent of whites did. In the 1999 poll, 35 percent of blacks believed the charges were true, compared with 79 percent of whites.\footnote{Ibid.}

These 1999 polls on the racial implications of the Simpson trial were conducted fifteen years ago. Is it possible that things have changed for the better since then? Unfortunately, the answer seems to be no. The deaths of Trayvon Martin and, more recently, Michael Brown rocked the country and again alerted the nation to the grave issues of racism and violence that remain pervasive in America. More recent Gallup polls suggest that the perception gap between whites and blacks of “confidence in police” and “perceptions of treatment by police” remains as wide as ever.\footnote{Frank Newport, “Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police,” Gallup, August 20, 2014, accessed October 4, 2014.} While 59 percent of whites polled expressed “a great deal/quite a lot” of confidence in the police, only 37 percent of blacks did.\footnote{Ibid.} 24 percent of black men aged 18–34 recalled being treated less fairly by police in the past thirty days because of their race.\footnote{Ibid.} This is as telling and troubling a statistic as any other, and helps explain the distinctive perceptions of white and black Americans when it comes to questions of injustice in America.

These polls demonstrate that despite popular opinion and widespread claims that we live in a post-racial society, nothing could be further from the truth. Black Americans are scarcely more confident in the police and the criminal justice system today than they were...
in 1994. Considering the tumultuous racial environment, particularly in Los Angeles in the 1990s, it comes as little surprise that much of the O. J. Simpson trial focused on race: the race of the defendant, the race of the victims, the race of the jury, and the racism of the LAPD. Thus, it seems apparent and even inevitable that the jury must also have been influenced by race, which shaped its perceptions of the LAPD’s treatment of Simpson. To a predominantly black jury, whose experiences with the LAPD were likely difficult, it would have seemed obvious that Detective Fuhrman had attempted to frame Simpson, and even more so after evidence of Fuhrman’s own racism surfaced. To many Americans watching the trial, Simpson’s relationship with Nicole, a white woman, would have influenced their perceptions, as well, based on America’s long and tortured history, which made interracial relationships taboo.

The Simpson trial took place almost twenty years ago. Were the case retried today, it is worth pondering what role race would play. While it is difficult to predict the outcome with confidence, it seems safe to say that race would continue to play a central role in the verdict. This leads one to wonder how far we have come in twenty years.
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The World’s Fair and the Portrayal of American-Jewish Identity

Evan Stark

In September, 1904 a curious incident brought the St. Louis World’s Fair to a standstill. The 1904 World’s Fair included many foreign exhibits, but none was larger, grander or more expensive than the Jerusalem Exhibit. The Jerusalem Exhibit included full-scale replicas of the Dome of the Rock, the Western Wall and other religious sites for visitors to experience.¹ There were also replicas of the streets of Jerusalem complete with shops, attractions and authentic communities imported for the Fair. However, on September 20th, the newspaper The St. Louis Republic reported that 600 American Jews had occupied the Grand Synagogue at the exhibit for Yom Kippur services. The Jews refused to leave or admit entry to non-Jews until Yom Kippur had ended, thus bringing the exhibit to a halt.² Surely these Jews, living in the thriving metropolis of St. Louis, had their own local synagogues at which to attend services, so why occupy the reconstruction of a Jerusalem synagogue? The World’s Fairs offered a unique opportunity for people to not only experience places far from home, but also to stake a claim to that recreated space and time. For the Jews of St. Louis, who had no explicit exhibit with which to present themselves, occupying that synagogue was a way of claiming that even as American Jews they had an intrinsic tie to Jerusalem. For American Jews, the challenge of reconciling what they perceived as their eastern cultural heritage with their desire to be accepted as normal members of western American society was daunting. However, the platform of the World’s Fair offered the opportunity to showcase themselves to a wide audience and shape public opinion. Three fairs in particular, the 1893 Fair in Chicago, the 1939 Fair in New York and the 1964 Fair in New York, trace how subsequent generations of American Jews dealt with the ever-evolving challenge of dual identification and how each generation sought to portray themselves as both Americans and Jews. From the racial challenges of Orientalism in 1893, to the political controversy over the support for Zionism in the late 1930s and the desire to differentiate between American Jews and Israelis in the 1960s, the Jewish exhibits at these aforementioned American World’s Fairs offer not only a window into how the challenges of maintaining dual Ameri-

can and Jewish identities changed for, and were presented by, different generations of American Jews but also how each exhibit helped to shape those identities.³

The 1893 Chicago Columbian Exposition provided a venue for American Jews to promote their supposed Oriental heritage while presenting themselves as model western citizens⁴. The Fair was conceived as a way to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s arrival in the New World. As such, several of the Fair’s backers argued that a primary focus should be the history and advancement of the peoples of North America.⁵ The organizers believed that the progress achieved by the United States and other “Western” industrialized nations could be highlighted by educating fairgoers about western advancements and perceived Eastern backwardness. It was under this didactic, Orientalist guise that the Fair was to be organized both thematically and spatially. The so-called White City area, named for its towering and exquisite all-white architecture, would be reserved primarily for the exhibits of the civilized nations such as the United States, France, Germany and England. Meanwhile, the Midway Plaisance acted, as one observer declared, as “‘a sliding-scale of humanity’”.⁶ The Midway housed exhibits representing the “primitive” people or those people “midway” between barbarism and civilization. The countries or regions represented on the Midway were predominantly located in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America.⁷ While participants from the White City and Midway did interact at forums such as the World’s Parliament of Religion, the physical separation of the Midway from the White City reinforced the supposed insurmountable differences between participants from the West and from the East. Therefore, for

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³ For the purposes of this paper, Orientalism will be understood as a 19th Century sociopolitical philosophy that was inherently complex. As succinctly explained by Ivan Davidson Kalmar, Orientalism can be seen as fundamentally contradictory through its incorporation of “multiple voices” which advocated for both the racial and ethnographic superiority of western European culture over eastern Oriental culture and a romantic respect for eastern authenticity. Therefore, the “‘positive,’ admiring sorts of orientalism were articulated in the context of the disparaging ‘negative’ ones”.

⁴ Kalmar further explains that in the late 19th Century, some Jews saw themselves as the “Orientals of the West” and underscored the difficulty of reconciling both the “positive” and “negative” voices of Orientalism.


⁶ Quoted in Ibid, 112.

⁷ Ibid.
Chicago’s Jewish community, which celebrated both Judaism’s eastern heritage and the community’s place in the United States, bridging the gap between Orientalist divide between East and West would pose not only philosophical but also logistical challenges.

In 1893, the German-Jewish population in Chicago saw the duality of the Fair’s White City and Midway as an opportunity to reconcile their claim to a collective and exotic Jewish heritage with their assertion that Jews were productive members of western society. Since the Fair was designed to be a celebration of the peoples of North America, and since *Conversos* had served as Columbus’s translators and doctors during his journey, the Jewish community had a strong argument for inclusion in the Fair.⁸ Emile Hirsch, a prominent Chicago German Jew, argued that the community should build an exhibit that emphasized the romanticized roots of Judaism. By playing to the common perception that Palestine, and the Orient in general, processed a more authentic nature, such an exhibit could demystify the Jewish religion and suggest to non-Jews that “you are men as we are; your hopes are our hopes; your beliefs are our beliefs”. If non-Jews understood that little differentiated them from Jews, then there was the possibility for broader acceptance of Jews. Other leaders in the German-Jewish community, however, feared that Hirsch’s kind of exhibit would do more harm than good. A July 22, 1893 article in the Chicago Jewish publication *The Reform Advocate* explained that such an exhibit risked reinforcing that Jews were “a curiosity, a freak, an archeological specimen.”⁹ While there was a benefit to claiming that Jews possessed a valuable and noteworthy heritage, an overemphasis on Judaism’s roots could suggest that Jews were fundamentally foreign and possessed an “otherness” that precluded them from fully integrating into their American communities. Thus, a Jewish exhibit needed emphasize the modern inclinations of the Western European and American Jews so as to improve and protect the Jewish community’s reputation. For late 19th Century Jews in the United States there existed, therefore, a paradox between the wanting to embrace a distinctly Eastern heritage with the desire to emulate Western sensibilities. With such diametrically opposed opinions, the German Jewish

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⁸ *Conversos* were Spanish Jews who had converted to Catholicism in the late 14th Century to escape persecution and violence. Julia Brauch, Anna Lipphardt, and Alexandra Nocke, eds., *Jewish Topographies: Visions of Space, Traditions of Place*, Heritage, Culture, and Identity (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 184–185.

population of Chicago made the unprecedented decision to facilitate Jewish participation in both the Midway and the White City.

Jewish participation in the Cairo Exhibit, among other Oriental pavilions on the Midway, reinforced ideas about the exoticism of Jewish heritage that some in the German-Jewish community sought to highlight. In the late 19th Century, Orientalism provided an opportunity for Jews in North America and Western Europe to assert their own special identity. Despite the inherent racism that fueled the belief that Orientals were uncivilized, Orientalism also allowed Jewish communities to embrace a unique space in Western society as the local and civilized manifestation of the Orient in the West. While there was no exhibit on Palestine, Cyrus Adler, a Jewish businessman who was responsible for several of the Midway exhibits, imported Jews from the Near East to populate the Turkish Exhibit and the “Street in Cairo” Exhibit.10 The Cairo exhibit was one of the Fair’s most heavily visited and impressively designed attractions. A picture taken at the Fair shows two towering obelisks juxtaposed to a late 19th Century-styled two-story shopping complex.11 The exhibit was so well designed and received it seemed to demand that “Islamic countries be taken with a seriousness not accorded other countries who appeared along the Midway.”12 Since the exhibit was partially populated by Jews, an implicit connection and claim was made by the exhibit organizers. By associating the Jews with other respectable people of the Orient and by incorporating modern elements into that display, Adler and others asserted that while Jews had a special and ancient heritage that set them apart, that heritage did not preclude them from participating in the modern world.

In response to fears that the Midway exhibits might foster anti-Semitism, the Jewish Alliance Israélite Universelle (A.I.U.) Exhibit emphasized the Western inclinations of Jews, and of German Jews, in particular. The A.I.U. was a French-Jewish organization that addressed the concerns of Western European Jewish communities about the immigration of Jews from the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe. Western European Jewish communities were concerned that the reputation, appearance and rapid arrival of Eastern Jews would somehow undermine Western Jews’ standing in their larger national communities. As such, the A.I.U. established schools in the East to educate, and bring up to Western standards, these Eastern Jewish

10 Ibid, 56.
12 Ibid.
immigrants before they arrived in Western Europe. 13 These schools
taught Eastern Jews the expectations of a modern Western society and
the vocational skills needed to success in the workforce. The A.I.U.
hoped these educational efforts would make the Eastern Jews less of-
fensive to Western non-Jews. Furthermore, these efforts would also
protect the reputation of Western Jews who were linked to Eastern
Jews through their common religion. The latter goal was particular-
ly embraced by the American German-Jewish population. The New
York-based German-Jewish organization Bnai Brith was a strong fi-
nancial supporter of the A.I.U. and helped to establish A.I.U. offices
in American cities.14 With the German-Jewish population of Chicago
facing a large immigration of Eastern European Jews, the A.I.U. ex-
hibit was crucial to buttressing the Jewish community’s Western rep-
utation at the Fair and, with respect to the Cairo exhibit, to presenting
a balanced display of world Jewry.

Unlike the Midway’s Cairo exhibit, the A.I.U. exhibit at the
1893 Fair was located in the huge Manufactures and Liberal Arts
Building in the White City. Positioned alongside displays from Princ-
eton University and Harvard, the A.I.U. exhibit displayed the meth-
odologies of the A.I.U.’s schools and items produced by the A.I.U.’s
students. These items were designed to be the tangible evidence of
the benefits of a Western education.15 By sharing in the Western desire
to not only be physically separate from the uncivilized East, but also
to “civilize” the East, the A.I.U. exhibit was designed to prove that
Western European Jews and their North American counterparts shared
Western values and sensibilities. In effect, the A.I.U. exhibit served
as a counterbalancing force to Jewish participation in the Midway and
offered a competing vision of Jewish modernity.

Almost a half-century after the 1893 World’s Fair, the next
generation of American-Jews struggled to reconcile their Western sen-
sibilities and their American secularism with the political claims of Zi-
onism at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York. In 1937, the decision was
made by Nathan Strauss Jr., the protégé of Louis Brandeis, and other
prominent Jewish leaders in New York to ensure Jewish representation
at the Fair. The multitude of political opinions within the Jewish com-
munity would make creating a Jewish exhibit complicated. Whereas
American Zionists supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine, American Anti-Zionists were split into one camp which op-

13 Heckman and Frances, “Packed in Twelve Cases: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the
1893 Chicago World’s Fair,” 57.
14 Ibid, 58.
15 Ibid, 57.
posed Zionism and another camp which financially supported Zionist organizations due to those organizations’ support of Jewish settlers living in Palestine. For reasons to be discussed, these differences underscored the complex internal politics of creating a Jewish exhibit at the World’s Fair. Whereas European Jews sought refuge from the rising tide of European anti-Semitism in the late 1930s, American Jews felt no great need to leave their relatively comfortable circumstances in the United States and move to Palestine. As such, American Jews, unlike their European counterparts, had less reason to see the establishment of a Jewish state as something of direct personal importance. American Jewry, therefore, functioned more as a bulwark of financial and political support for the Zionist movement rather than a source of actual settlers. Naturally, such support was forthcoming from Zionist American Jews. Anti-Zionist sentiment was also strong because, given the unrest in the late 1930s between Arabs, Jews and the British in Palestine, some more cautious American Anti-Zionists feared that supporting the creation of a Jewish state could be misconstrued as nationalist warmongering. In a period of intense American isolationism, advocating for the creation of a new nation had the potential to jeopardize American-Jewish standing in the U.S. Nonetheless, Anti-Zionists had provided support for the Zionist programs in Palestine out of concern for the Jewish population living there and in Europe, rather than because they wanted to create or join a Jewish state. For a Jewish exhibit to be successful, these strong opposing views on a Jewish state would have to reconciled or, for the sake of cohesion and presentation, one perspective would have to be more heavily favored.

The overarching theme of the 1939 World’s Fair was “the world of tomorrow” and the Fair’s showcase of exhibits and pavilions adhered strongly to that motif. From countries to corporations, the Fair was designed to showcase each participating entity’s advancements and vision of the future. Corporations as diverse as General Motors, Wonderbread and Lucky Strikes built large Art-Deco styled pavilions that espoused modernism and innovation. Nations also seized the opportunity to showcase their vision for the future. That is not to say the past was forgotten. The past, rather, was incorporated into the Fair’s futuristic exhibits through a series of romanticized spectacles and reenactments. (The United States, for example, put on

17 Ibid, 39.
a major reenactment of the joining of the transcontinental railroad.)

The Turkish Exhibit reflected that delicate balance between the past and the future. As shown in a photograph taken at the Fair, the Turkish building used Middle Eastern design cues in its extensive tiled patio, but the exhibit also embraced a modernist, almost Bauhaus architectural style that included sharp clean edges. Kemal Atatürk’s government designed the exhibit to emphasize modern Turkey’s transcendence of its Ottoman roots. Much like the other exhibits at the 1939 Fair, the Jewish-Palestine Pavilion looked ahead to the future.

The Jewish-Palestine Pavilion was no exception to the Fair’s obsession with the future. As the name of the pavilion implies, Zionist leaders, including future Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, dominated the organization which created the exhibit. Since the goals of the exhibit were to “articulate a programme that would appeal to disparate elements of the fragmented US Zionist movement [and]…expand Zionist outreach into the non-Zionist community”, the exhibit was designed to assert Zionist aims without being overtly political. Written in conjunction with the construction of the Pavilion, the Palestine Book was an official publication of the Jewish Palestine Pavilion in order to “to supply the reader with the background needed for a deeper grasp of the significance of the exhibits” through a collection of essays. Among these works designed to highlight the nuanced motivations behind the Pavilion was a piece entitled “Jewry’s Undying Yearning for Zion” which accentuated the delicate balance that the Pavilion sought to strike between ardent Zionism and American political isolationism. Written by Chiam Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, the essay is not as forthrightly Zionist as its title might suggest. Weizmann, rather, focuses primarily on the need for a Jewish homeland due to persecution in Europe and the contributions that Jews have made not only in the improvement of Palestine, but also in Europe as well. Weizmann explained that in Germany there “was a Western Jewish community, in a civilized state, to all intents and purposes an integral part of the state. There were Jewish settlements on the Rhine which antedated the Prussian settlements. The contribution made by German Jews to modern Germany is

19 Ibid, 28.
attested by a galaxy of names of international repute. And in a single day this community has been destroyed.” If Jews could constructively contribute to German society, then Jewish settlers in Palestine were more than capable of modernizing Palestine. Furthermore, it was understood to be in the best interest of Western civilization for the productive European Jewish community to have a place to escape destruction such that “Jews could live and express ourselves in accordance with our character, and make our contribution to the civilized world in our own way and through our own channels” free of persecution. Weizmann further explained that Palestine was the only suitable Jewish homeland because, unlike the proposed Jewish homeland in Uganda, Palestine represented a reservoir of hope and connection that would sustain long-term Jewish settlement. This did not mean that the ancient Jewish ties to Palestine were overlooked. Instead, these ties underscored why Jews were drawn to settle in Palestine, to making improvements to the land and to establishing Palestine as a Jewish homeland. The essay highlighted and underscored the major emphasis of the Pavilion itself, not only with regard to the intrinsic Jewish ties to Palestine but also the successful work of Jewish settlers there and the persecution of Jews in Europe which Zionists felt made them deserving of their own country.

The Pavilion blended elements of the past with an emphasis on the present accomplishments and future potential of a Jewish Palestine. The Pavilion was constructed in the Art Deco style with materials imported from Palestine and installations at the Pavilion stretched from the ancient to the futuristic modern. Rather than resort to political speeches to reinforce Jewish claims to Palestine, a musical pageant highlighted Jewish history from the Bible to present-day Europe. To convince Jews and non-Jews alike that a Jewish Palestine would benefit the modern world, one hall in the Pavilion showed how Jewish settlers had brought modern conveniences, like hospitals, and industry to the land of Palestine. That same hall additionally illustrated the vision Zionists had for a modern Jewish state, both economically and politically. By focusing on aspects of modernization, the Pavilion appealed to American expectations for a Western nation. Furthermore, since the Pavilion was situated amongst the other national pavilions, the location and name of the Pavilion implied that

24 Ibid, 23.
26 Ibid, 25.
Palestine was a *de facto* Jewish state and that such claims were legitimate. The Pavilion’s location amongst other nations’ exhibits implied that not only was the Pavilion the true representative of Palestine but also that the Fair itself accepted the Jewish-Palestine Pavilion as the rightful representative of Palestine.\(^{28}\) Letters included in the *Palestine Book*, written by President Franklin Roosevelt and New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia suggest that there was at least some public support for the creation of a Jewish homeland and an appreciation for the modernization efforts of Jewish settlers in Palestine.\(^{29}\) As such, the Pavilion hoped to further convince the public, Jews and non-Jews alike, that Palestine ought to be a Jewish state. By building a common consensus among American-Jews and the American public at large, the Pavilion aimed to forge a sense of solidarity for the Zionist project and sought to generate widespread political support for a Jewish state.

By 1964, the geopolitical world in which American Jews lived had shifted dramatically. With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, American Jews no longer had to make explicit claims about Jewish ties to Palestine. Furthermore, by the 1950s most American Jews were not direct immigrants, but rather first or second generation Americans.\(^{30}\) This distinction was crucial because, unlike their parents or grandparents, these American-born and American-raised Jews were separated from the trauma of immigration. For the older generations whose communities had been uprooted, dispersed and destroyed, the ancient Middle Eastern Jewish narrative served as a source of identity throughout their ordeal. Rather, these later generations saw their heritage as not having sprung from Palestine but rather from Eastern Europe. Furthermore, with the establishment of Israel, the ancient east ceased to be an area of mystery and nostalgia. The Jewish communities of Israel could be experienced and understood in the present, while pre-war Eastern European communities were forever lost. In particular, there was a growing nostalgia for the Eastern European communities of previous generations as Jews moved from the communities in which their immigrant ancestors settled to the seemingly impersonal suburbs.\(^{31}\) That is not to say that these nos-

\(^{28}\) Ibid, 2.
\(^{29}\) The letter by President Roosevelt suggests that the creation of a Jewish homeland as an extension of both a sense of moral obligation and the U.S.’s support for the Balfour Declaration. La Guardia connects the spirit of Jewish settlers in Palestine to the idealized American frontier pioneer and, therefore, the Jewish endeavor in Palestine should be supported and encouraged. Weisgal, *Palestine Book*, 20–21.
\(^{31}\) Ibid, 30.
Talgic Jews opposed the creation of Israel. Conversely, there was a firm sense of pride in the establishment of the State of Israel, despite all the challenges faced by Jews over the course of history. With Israel’s 1962 declination of a national pavilion at the 1964 World’s Fair in New York (in the same location as the 1939 Fair), Jewish participation in the World’s Fair was left solely to the next generation of American Jews.

With the American-Israel Pavilion at the 1964 World’s Fair, American Jews had an opportunity to present how they saw themselves as American Jews, not just Jews in general. Unlike in the past, there was no pressing need to assert that the land of Israel was inherently Jewish and, therefore, the claims of Jewish identity could be more broadly defined and explored. At the Pavilion “guests could wander from Solomon’s Temple to medieval Spain, to colonial America and Hasidic Eastern Europe, ending their journey through Jewish history in the bustling port of contemporary Haifa.” The historical and cultural elements of the Pavilion were fascinatingly diverse, as if to reaffirm that Jews ascribed to the “melting-pot” philosophy of America. The inclusion of a “Hora Platform” and an exhibit on an Eastern European village illustrates the romantic notions American Jews had of Eastern European traditions. Furthermore, the American elements of the exhibit stood out. Besides the colonial display, the Pavilion included a nightclub, gift shop and café which all helped to make the Jewish exhibit more familiar to American audiences and less exotic.

The wide variety of topics and themes explored by this Pavilion was the direct result of unprecedented appreciation for Jewish culture. Whereas in 1893 the Jewish community expressed a fear of becoming an Orientalist curiosity, the prevailing popular opinions of Jews had improved dramatically in the post-war period. The success of *The Fiddler on the Roof* and the novel *Exodus* revealed that mainstream America was “becoming ever more receptive to the Jewish experience.” This popular fascination with Jewish, in particular Eastern European, heritage was different from the Orientalist curiosity of the late 19th Century. This was not a disingenuous racial fascination that sought to elevate non-Jews above the Jews. Rather, the general

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33 Ibid, 130.
34 Ibid.
understanding was that the Jews were a distinct cultural group that, like other ethnic groups, was entitled to a sense of cultural pride within the overarching American narrative. Furthermore, at this Pavilion’s dedication, United States Senator Kenneth Keating underscored that “the United States, which... contains the largest Jewish community in the free world, is proud of its contribution in helping Israel. With United States encouragement, Israel has brought its own resources to a state of development at which it now contributes substantially to other new nations seeking higher material and cultural welfare.”

While Keating did mention the cultural significance of Judaism and its linkages to Israel in other portions of his speech, his distinction between the United States, Israel and the American Jewish community reinforced that these three sociopolitical entities, while intimately interconnected, could be seen as independent actors which had the capacity to help each other progress. The litmus test for the shift in popular attitudes would be the dispute between the American-Jewish Pavilion and the Jordanian Exhibit.

The inclusion of an anti-Israel poem in the Jordanian exhibit presented the organizers of American-Jewish Pavilion with an unprecedented challenge to the belief that American Jewry and Israel could operate distinctly from each other. The poem, etched on a mural showing a downtrodden woman and child, decried the Palestinian refugee crisis and implored visitors to “help us right a wrong”. The poem called into question the politics of Israel’s establishment, and by extension, the right of Israel to exist. Since there was no national Israeli delegation to respond, Israelis, American Jews and non-Jews alike all looked to the American-Jewish Pavilion, located amongst other nation pavilions, for a defense of Israel.

While the organizers of the American-Jewish Pavilion had celebrated Israel in their exhibits, they had designed the Pavilion so as to make a clear distinction between American Jews and Israelis. (To illustrate the obsession with separation, “Israeli” foods, such as falafel, served at the Pavilion could only be served by imported Israeli staff so as to keep the food distinctly Israeli and not Jewish.) This left the Jewish-American Pavilion’s organizers in a fearsome quandary. If the organizers of the American-Jewish Pavilion did not respond, then that would reflect poorly on Jewish American support for Israel. How-

38 Ibid, 131.
ever, responding risked American Jewry becoming the spokespeople for Israel and thus losing a part of their distinct American-Jewish national identity. The outcry from outside the Jewish community put those fears to rest. The New York City Council attempted to outlaw the mural on grounds of racial intolerance. Meanwhile, members of Congress, including Representative Emanuel Cellar decried the mural as flagrant propaganda. Additionally, thousands of Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish, wrote letters to the director of the Fair calling for the mural to be removed. The organizers of the American-Jewish Pavilion responded forcefully to the mural, declaring “the use of the fairgrounds for the dissemination of such propaganda runs counter to the spirit of the fair as expressed in its theme “Peace Through Understanding” and counter to the regulations of the fair”. The organizers demanded that the mural be removed under regulations which prohibited exhibits from casting aspersions on each other. While the mural was not removed, the fact that American Jews and non-Jews were both involved signaled that American Jews could advocate for Israel without diminishing their national standing in the U.S. and that non-Jewish interest in Jewish and Israeli affairs was genuine and not neo-Orientalist. Whereas Orientalism had treated Judaism’s ties to the East as a curiosity, in the 20th Century, interest in the affairs of Jewish Americans grew out of a respect for the community as a distinct, yet equal, member of American society.

Each of these three World’s Fairs offers insight into how American Jews sought to present themselves in their respective time. While there was a consistent desire to showcase the more eastern elements of Jewish heritage, each generation also took great pains to reaffirm their rightful place in the western society of the U.S. For the German American Jews of Chicago around the turn of the 20th Century, the dichotomy of Orientalism and Jewish modernization efforts hinted at a key paradox in American and, more broadly, Western Jewish identity. Orientalism allowed for Jews to claim a distinctly eastern heritage and therefore a special niche identity. However, fears about the “backwardness” of Eastern Jews prompted Jews of Western European descent to undertake multi-national efforts to modernize their eastern counterparts and seemingly disavow that eastern heritage. Therefore, Jewish representation at the 1893 World’s Fair was split between the Egyptian exhibit on the Midway and the A.I.U. exhibit in the White City in order to showcase both sides of the Jews to American audiences. By 1939, there was no need to separate the eastern

39 Ibid, 140.

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and western elements of Judaism. The use of the eastern heritage to support the political aims of the western Zionists was crucial to making the Zionists goals more appealing to Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish. By emphasizing the future and the past, while ignoring the problems of the present, the Jewish exhibit looked to imply that Palestine was already a *de facto* Jewish state and that it should exist as such in the future. As the 1964 World’s Fair was held after the creation of the State of Israel and because it lacked an official Israeli exhibit, the American-Jewish Pavilion accommodated an American-tailored exhibition of Jewish identity. Whereas the other pavilions had claimed to represent, for better or worse, the entirety of the Jewish people, the 1964 Pavilion was explicitly American. Furthermore, the broad support for the American-Jewish Pavilion after the discovery of an anti-Israeli display at the Jordanian Pavilion illustrated that no longer did American Jews have to worry that supporting Israel and being Jewish detracted from their claims of American national identity. The World’s Fair was an opportunity for different peoples of the world to stake a claim to their place in time and space. Over the course of seven decades the Fairs provided American Jews the ability to present themselves and the Jewish people to the world.


World War II constituted a total war effort on the American front, wherein every citizen was enjoined to devote him or herself to the nation and the nation’s triumph. As this paper chronicles, men and women were called upon for service in explicitly gendered ways. Just prior to WWII, more than 80 percent of American men and women thought that it was wrong for a married woman to work outside the home. At the onset of the war, however, attitudes towards working women shifted rapidly. The total war effort necessitated a larger workforce, and as men were increasingly sent overseas, women assumed the jobs they vacated. Campaigns to attract women to the workforce deployed rhetoric of nationalist duty and demonstrate the ways in which citizenship and national service are explicitly and implicitly gendered. This paper broadly examines how the sudden mobilization of nationalist sentiment during the total war effort both broke down and reinforced gender norms. Particularly, I ask: how were women’s jobs in the armed forces, specifically in the Navy WAVES, feminized? To what extent did women’s involvement in the workforce actually maintain the status quo of an “ideal” woman?

I ask these questions not to downplay the significance of women’s involvement in World War II, but more to understand the gendering of nationalist rhetoric. Is such rhetoric, in the context of the total war effort, capable of precipitating a rupture in normative gender

2 In reference to the opening picture:
roles? Through examining how women’s enlistment in the armed forces was promoted, I posit that gender roles were often reinscribed by the explicit feminization of the jobs women were offered. Furthermore, I argue that this feminization of women’s enlistment was necessary because women’s service in the military disrupted conceptions of the “home front.” Enlisted women, even though they were predominantly young and single, were seen as abandoning their families and “home” lives for the military. The “proper” nationalist duty for women was renegotiated during World War II, and opponents of women’s enlistment characterized the concept of a “female soldier” as in inherent opposition to the goals of the American nation. Proponents of women’s enlistment therefore had a twofold mission: to feminize women’s spaces in the military, and to redefine women’s opportunities for nationalist service. Women’s service in the military had to be actively construed as working in service of the nation and of national goals; this conception of women’s service required the simultaneous feminization of military roles and breaking down of ideals that restricted women to roles as homemakers and child-rearers in the private sphere.

**Theorizing Nationalism**

This paper adopts the framework of “banal nationalism” set forth by Michael Billig. Billig argues that much scholarship on nationalism incorrectly makes “nationalist” sentiment the purview of non-Western nations on the “periphery.” He introduces the term “banal nationalism” to describe the ways in which nationalist ideological habits are constantly reproduced in established nations. Rather than nationalism disappearing once a nation has become an established reality, Billig argues that it lingers as a latent but constantly reinforced endemic condition. Billig, however, invokes Hannah Arendt’s emphasis that “banality is not synonymous with harmlessness” to argue that even though the nationalism of western states may appear tame and “banal,” it can be incredibly powerful and volatile. Billig provides examples of wartime mobilization and argues that US “forces can be mobilized without lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments are primed, ready for use in battle. And the nation-

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5 Ibid, 5.

6 Ibid, 6.
al populations appear also to be primed, ready to support the use of those armaments.” Furthermore, Billig has pointed to “the speed with which Western publics can be mobilized for flag-waving warfare in the name of nationhood.” My paper works within Billig’s framework, but unpacks the ways in which national support is gendered, especially within the context of the exigencies of war. To what extent can the urgency of nationalist rhetoric deconstruct women’s “proper” roles?

**Race, Class, and the “American” Woman**

This paper speaks repeatedly to the concept of an “ideal” American woman, yet it is important to note that such a construction is neither fixed nor singular. Class and race mediate discussions of the “ideal,” and determine who has a say in creating and valorizing such a definition. Thus while the debates about ideal womanhood chronicled in this paper primarily refer to the experiences of middle- and upper-class white women, they reflect dynamics of power that define “American-ness” in such terms. In her discussion of wartime advertising, Maureen Honey writes that “women were cast in heroic roles, as symbols of American strength and American values. Racial prejudice precluded using blacks in such a capacity because they were perceived by a racist culture as inferior to whites and therefore inappropriate figures of inspiration or national pride.” The construction of an ideal American woman thus privileged and valorized whiteness, while obscuring the contributions of African-American women to the American nation.

Prior to World War II, the concept of working outside of the home was not foreign to African-American women and women of lower-class backgrounds, and thus wartime employment was compelled of and affected these women in different ways than it did wealthy white women. Women’s involvement in the labor force is mediated by opportunity and necessity, and while conceptions of the “ideal” woman barred wealthy white women from entering the workforce, the constraints of economic need were paramount for many African-American and lower class white women.

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7 Ibid, 7.
8 Ibid, 2.
The ways in which women were compelled to enlist and serve the nation during World War II are intimately connected to ideas of who constitutes the nation; and for the most part the everyday lives and struggles of African-American and impoverished women (and men) have been relegated to the periphery of the “American experience.” The extent to which wartime employment constituted a radical shift and produced a cognitive dissonance in the consciousness of middle-class and wealthy white America was determined by the positionality of the women entering the workforce.

Women enlisted in the armed forces during World War II were predominantly white, educated, and middle- and upper-class, and thus my analysis aims to deconstruct how the entrance of this particular demographic challenged conceptions of an “ideal American woman” set forth by white male America. I clarify this focus because in speaking of an “ideal” woman and of “women’s experiences” I do not wish to contribute to the continued erasure of the experiences of African-American and poor women from American history.

As Melissa McEuen argues, “The idealized female soldier embodies whiteness and its attendant privileges.” This paper thus analyzes racialized and class-based constructs of an ideal woman and examines how the enlistment of wealthy white women problematized these constructs, but it does not speak directly to the many ways women of other demographics challenged this idealization and articulated their roles in the American nation. Therefore when this paper talks about “women’s experiences,” I am particularly referring to those of wealthy white women whose entrance into the workforce and armed forces constituted a significant shift in gender roles.

The Gendering of Space in American Life

The national mobilization to which Billig points must furthermore be located within the dynamic and multifaceted history of gender politics in America. Feminist scholarship has largely articulated a dichotomy of public and private spaces in American life, and recognizes the predominant historical relegation of men and women to separate spheres of life; whereas men “control ‘public’ spaces of government, lawmaking, and employment, including military service,” “women are ‘relegated to the ‘privacy’ of the ‘domestic sphere,’

13 McEuen, Making War, Making Women, 41.
responsible primarily for childbearing, rearing, and homemaking.”

This dichotomy is by no means absolute, and it has been negotiated and resisted throughout history, particularly in the past century. It is, however, a useful framework for putting into context much of the opposition to women serving in the armed forces in World War II. As women assumed the employment positions vacated by enlisted men, their increasing movement out of the private sphere and into the public sphere troubled this gender dichotomy.

Lucinda Joy Peach has argued further that the military in particular is uniquely conceptualized as a male space. In an analysis of the gendered and intersectional nature of violence and law, Peach argues that “through the gendering of the combat exclusions and draft exemptions, the law assumes that the state-sanctioned violence of the military is male. Such assumptions help to perpetuate the view that women are out of place in the military.” In her analysis of the ways violence is gendered, Peach primarily speaks to women’s exclusion from military combat positions, but I argue her thesis can be extended to all military enlistments. Just as Peach argues the law and violence are gendered “male” in American society, so too is the military gendered male. As the violent apparatus of the state, it follows that the military is an inherently male institution. Leisa D. Meyer builds on this concept and quotes Kathleen Jones as arguing that women “cannot become active in their own defense without either calling into question their identity as women or threatening the sexual iconography upon which the discourse [of citizenship] is based.”

Thus how do women fit in to Billig’s argument that the “armaments are primed, ready for use in battle”? When the flag of banal nationalism is waved, so to speak, how should women respond to this national mobilization and what constraints are placed on their responses?

The Nuclear Family and National Reproduction

Women’s responses to a “call to arms” are further troubled by the American conception of the “home” and “family” as bastions of the nation. The exigencies of war demanded movement of women from the private sphere to the public, and such a shift catalyzed

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15 Ibid, 67.
17 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 7.
an anxiety about the integrity of family life. The nuclear family and
the parent-child relationship are primary sites of cultural reproduction
in American life; not only do families reproduce children, but they
also produce subjects of the nation.\textsuperscript{19} As Melissa McEuen has argued,
“Before the United States entered the Second World War, Americans
understood women’s contributions to national security as tasks within
the domestic realm.”\textsuperscript{20} Critics of women’s employment and enlistment
thus framed their opposition in terms of women’s “abandonment” of a
patriotic duty to foster and maintain “American” families.\textsuperscript{21} An October 1943 article in \textit{Survey Midmonthly}, for example, stated that wom-
en who worked were “repudiating their children in their newly found
freedom” and that “many of them are rejecting their feminine roles.”\textsuperscript{22}

Present in objections to women’s employment are conflated
anxieties about women’s “femininity” and about the family as a site of
national reproduction. In 1942, the \textit{Seattle Times} articulated the differ-
ence in men and women’s wartime roles by stressing, “Women fight
the war with stewpans, knitting needles, alarm clocks that go off at 4
o’ clock in the morning, rudely awakened babies, unelastic budgets,
fast-rising prices…the kitchen and the sewing room are the house-
wife’s battleground.”\textsuperscript{23} Critics thus firmly located the site of women’s
nationalist obligations \textit{within} the home, and thereby problematized the
framework set forth by recruiters of nationalist service through em-
ployment and enlistment. As women were mobilized to serve the na-
tion, what avenues for service were available to them and how could
they operate amidst paradoxical expectations about the ideal mode of
service?

Recruiters for the armed forces attempted to dissuade fears
that women’s enlistment in the armed forces would erode American
family life by emphasizing the ways in which service in the armed
forces could make women \textit{better} homemakers. In this sense recruiters
were explicitly feminizing the roles women could occupy by framing
them within discourses of the private sphere. D’Ann Campbell quotes
a chaplain as saying that “after the war women veterans would ‘nat-
urally transmit much of this…respect for authority, discipline, scru-
pulous regard for promptness and exactness and execution of detail
to their children.’ Surely, he added, ‘this will make for a much better

\textsuperscript{20} McEuen, \textit{Making War, Making Women}, 101.
\textsuperscript{21} D’Ann Campbell, \textit{Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era} (Cam-
\textsuperscript{22} Anderson, \textit{Wartime Women}, 91.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 87.
disciplined generation.”

This comment not only attempts to ensure women’s participation in the labor force, but it does so by refuting the idea that women’s enlistment in the armed forces entailed a sacrifice of family values.

Recruiters emphasized that rather than disappearing upon their entrance into a “male” career, women’s “feminine” qualities would be fostered and maintained over the course of their service. A one-minute radio advertisement designed to recruit women claimed, “The girls in the WAVES are real American women – the kind who love parties and pretty clothes, and who are good at cooking and sewing too. They’re very feminine, and proud of it.” This comment defines womanhood, but in particular it speaks to American womanhood, and as such it further attempts to deflect criticisms that enlisted women were abandoning the home and family and were therefore being unpatriotic.

Recruiters further responded to the negative image of women’s abandonment of the home by relocating the private sphere within the barracks at training camps. Recruitment pamphlets devote multiple pages to descriptions of women’s leisure time and homemaking within their armed forces living quarters. One Navy pamphlet advertises, “Each bedroom, ‘top deck’ in nautical terms, has three double-deck beds and a private bath, and there the WAVES doff their uniforms and go feminine in lace-trimmed lingerie of all the pastel shades. Before ‘chow’ at 6 P.M., the girls have ‘scuttlebut,’ which is a gossip session, make their phone calls, and so on.” In specifically advertising enlisted women’s living quarters, pastel lingerie, ‘chow’ time, and gossip sessions, this pamphlet creates a private feminized space within the military, and as such reframes women’s military service in less threatening terms.

Fears of Emasculation

As the wartime effort increasingly necessitated women’s employment in the public sphere generally, and in the historically gendered male military specifically, I argue their service also had to be feminized so as to minimize the cognitive dissonance of women occupying historically male spaces. One Congressman opposed the bill to create a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps by arguing, “Take the women into the armed service, who then will do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble homey tasks to which every woman

24 Campbell, Women at War, 22.
25 Anderson, Wartime Women, 111.
26 Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter, 114.
has devoted herself? Think of the humiliation. What has become of the manhood of America?”

Thus not only did the concept of women’s enlistment challenge ideas of femininity and of the stability of the family, but many also feared it would lead to the emasculation of men.

This sentiment is evident in light of a popular propaganda poster from World War I designed by artist Howard Chandler Christy. The poster depicts a woman in a man’s Navy uniform and reads, “Gee!! I wish I were a man… I’d join the Navy… Be a man and do it.” This poster thus equates manhood with service to the nation – to join the Navy and support the nation is to be a “man.”

This assumption, however, was then problematized in the context of women’s enlistment during World War II; were women in the Navy “manly”? Were men in the Navy less manly now that they shared jobs with women? Feminizing women’s particular service positions therefore served the dual purposes of upholding both femininity and masculinity.

In the context of a dominant societal understanding of gender as a dichotomous binary, women’s employment in historically male positions challenged the “maleness” of such jobs, and by extension, challenged maleness itself. As Rosemarie Skaine has articulated in Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat, “To threaten an individual’s gender role is to threaten his or her gender identity as a male or female. These threats are an important psychological mechanism keeping people in traditional but dysfunctional gender roles.”

For some men and women, women’s movement into the public sphere and enlistment in the armed forces constituted a threat to gender roles and therefore threatened gender identity itself, as is evidenced by

the Congressman’s question – “What has become of the manhood of America?”

Recruiters thus assumed the task of minimizing this threat by refashioning gender roles rather than eradicating them. As Ruth Milkman argues, “what is most striking about the wartime transformation is the way new patterns of occupational segregation developed in the industries opened to women. The boundaries between ‘women’s’ and ‘men’s’ work changed location, rather than being eliminated.”

31 By feminizing women’s employment positions, recruiters minimized the dissonance of women occupying traditionally male spaces, and thus attempted to assuage men’s fears of emasculation.

**Locating Women’s Service in Relation to Men**

Women’s enlistment was framed not just in terms of service to the nation, but also in terms of service to the men in their lives. In actively highlighting women’s roles as girlfriends, wives, and mothers, recruiters tapped into women’s concern for loved ones and offered them an avenue to contribute to the war effort for the sake not only of the nation, but also of the individual. Just as men went overseas as “protectors” of the women in their lives, women’s service was framed in terms of men, perhaps to an even greater degree. One recruiter assuaged men’s fears by highlighting the ways in which women’s service actually made them better romantic partners:

He’s afraid that being in service will change you. He wants the same sweet girl waiting for him when the war is over. What he doesn’t know is that you will not only stay just as feminine, but that your charm and appreciation of his problems will increase. Our biggest jobs, as women, will come after the war when we have to help men become adjusted to the peace.

32 Women’s military service is therefore framed not just in terms of women’s contributions to the nation or to the wartime effort, but also in terms of their ability to care for the men and children in their lives. The War Department, for example, used the slogan, “The Wac who shares your Army life will make a better postwar wife!”

33 Interpreted this way, sharing in the public sphere task of defending the nation made wives more compassionate and capable of fulfilling their duties in the private sphere.

The collusion of national service with family values and fem-

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32 Campbell, *Women at War*, 43.
inity is particularly evident in the promotional pamphlet “The Story of You in Navy Blue,” which states, “Best of all, you enjoy a new pride and happiness – a wonderful feeling of ‘belonging’ that comes from being with the people who are doing all they can to win the war and bring our boys home sooner.”

Women’s service is thus framed in terms of their relationships to men, but also in terms of their relationship to the nation. “Our boys” speaks to the familial and romantic relationships women have with men, but it also speaks of the nation as a collective. Not only are soldiers women’s “boys”, they are also the nation’s “boys.” Framing the discourse of women’s enlistment in this way simultaneously includes women in the concept of national belonging and duty, but also validates and reinforces their femininity by emphasizing their ties to men.

**Women in Uniform: Constructing the Female Body**

In addition to articulating women’s enlistment in terms of their relationships with men, promotional pamphlets and recruiters also appealed to more superficial constructions of the feminine ideal. Women’s bodies and dress have been continuously policed throughout history, and the wartime period was no exception.

Recruiters contributed to the process of politicizing women’s bodies by turning the body into a particularly feminized site of nationalist display. One page of “WA VES: A Boot’s Eye View” is entitled “Keeping Slim with Gym,” and advertises “In gym we do the fun things that make us physically fit for the job ahead and streamline our figures in the bargain… and our lax bodies become firm, feminine strength.”

Women get to build up “suppleness and good posture in gym” and, as the pamphlet advertises, “we look better for it and our new Navy blues fit with military smoothness as we take our place in the fight for freedom.” Thus women’s embodied corporeal femininity becomes a central feature and requirement of their national service. Their place in the “fight for freedom” is outright predicated on this embodied femininity.

Women’s recruitment pamphlets advertised the attractive, form-fitting uniforms enlisted women got to wear, and in doing so they framed national service in feminized terms. The pointed conflation of the body with its military accouterments was a tactic uniquely utilized in attracting women’s enlistment. Melissa McEuen writes that men were not promised “overcoats ‘fitted to your figure,’ with ‘notched

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37 Ibid, 7.
lapels, flap pockets and pointed cuffs.’ Such details presumably would entice women volunteers who wished to look stylishly feminine.”38 Tailoring women’s uniforms succeeded in distinguishing women’s uniforms from those of men, which further distinguished their service as a feminine venture and helped ease fears of male emasculation.

“The Story of You in Navy Blue,” for example, explicitly feminizes women’s service by saying that “It’s a proud moment when you first step out in brand new Navy blues. The trim, smart uniform was especially designed to flatter every figure and make you look – and feel – your best.”39 The next page of the pamphlet then proceeds with highly feminized and somewhat sexualized drawings of the various outfits enlisted women would get to wear.40

Rather than appealing to women’s love for the male soldiers in their lives, this instance of feminization appeals to “womanly” characteristics of dress and grooming. Depicting women with a full face of makeup subtly demonstrates that enlisted women remained attendant to cultivating and maintaining their femininity.41 These particular depictions are also feminized in that they show “pin-up” women with small waists, broad shoulders, and perfectly rolled hair. The women’s division of the U.S. Coast Guard even went so far as to hire Esquire

38 McEuen, Making War, Making Women, 142.
39 The Story of You in Navy Blue, 16.
40 Ibid. See inserted image.
41 McEuen, Making War, Making Women, 41.
magazine illustrator Alberto Vargas, one of the nation’s premiere pin-up artists, to portray the organization’s enlisted women. The depictions of fashionable slim women, “in the poses of runway models and department store mannequins,” serve to reassure women, and men, that enlisted women do not have to sacrifice their femininity in order to contribute to the war effort.

Another Navy recruitment pamphlet, “WAVES: A Boot’s Eye View,” also highlights women’s uniforms as a benefit of service. Under the heading “The Best Dressed Women,” the pamphlet claims, “Like the scullery maid suddenly transplanted to a court ball, our civilian clothes seem to quail under a terrific inferiority complex as our Navy gear designed by Mainbocher takes its place in our closets.” Implicit in this statement, and the later claim that “like the fairy godmother, who, with a wave of her wand, wrought miracles, so does our uniform department,” is the assertion that clothing has the power to transform or make a woman. By enlisting in the Navy, and thereby receiving Navy uniforms, women undergo a romanticized metamorphosis into a high-fashion and highly feminized figure. Contracting Mainbocher, “a fashion house ‘patronized by the Duchess of Windsor and Hollywood stars,’” to design Navy uniforms further reinforced this promise.

The same page of “A Boot’s Eye View” also includes a picture caption that reads “Something navy, something new, something snappy, something blue,” which plays off of the marriage rhyme, “something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue.” Enlistment in the navy is thereby framed in terms of a marriage commitment, wherein a Navy uniform is likened to a wedding dress. Even though women are enjoined to “marry” the Navy, however, this metaphorical commitment was never intended to usurp actual marriage. Rather, evoking marriage in this recruitment pamphlet serves the purpose of further locating women’s enlistment in a terminological and symbolic framework of the family and the private sphere.

42 McEuen, Making War, Making Women, 142.
43 Ibid, 147.
44 WAVES: A Boot’s Eye-view, 6.
45 Ibid.
46 McEuen, Making War, Making Women, 140.
47 WAVES: A Boot’s Eye-view, 6.
Cartoons and Caricatures

Recruitment pamphlets, war bulletins, and war newspapers are peppered with highly feminized cartoon illustrations of enlisted women, and the “humor” in these depictions can be counter-read to reveal apprehensions about women’s service in the armed forces. Women in these cartoons are depicted in the “pin-up” style discussed in the previous section, with small waists, coy gazes, and exaggerated poses. Significantly, these cartoons were included in publications directed at all audiences, from recruitment pamphlets and newspapers specifically for service women to navy bulletins for men overseas and more general newspapers and magazines. These highly feminized parodies of women in uniform thus were marketed to both men and women, whether enlisted or not.

The cartoon included at right is from WAVES: A Boot’s Eye View, and depicts the woman making a phone call as gossipy and untrustworthy. Though she is portrayed as privy to important information, the Wave on the phone is still consumed by a characteristically “feminine” desire to share this information, as indicated by the angling of her body towards the telephone and the positioning of her left arm. This cartoon echoes the advertisement quoted earlier, which states, “the girls have ‘scuttlebut,’ which is a gossip session, make their phone calls, and so on.” Women thus are able to maintain correspondence and relationships with their family members, and they need not abandon the characteristically trivial pursuits of “womanhood” during their service in the armed forces. Undercutting this cartoon, however, is the less innocent assumption that “feminine” qualities, such as an inclination towards gossip, make women less capable or qualified to serve in the armed forces.

48 WAVES: A Boot’s Eye-view, 12. See inserted image.
Feminization and Empowerment

It must be noted that the feminization of women’s service positions in the armed forces does not necessarily negate the sense of empowerment and fulfillment that many women drew from their enlistment, nor does it detract from the importance of the crucial roles they played in the American war effort. Normative definitions of femininity and masculinity become disempowering when they restrict opportunity; as bell hooks has argued, “Being oppressed means the absence of choices.”50 That is not, however, to say that the sexism evident in the cartoon discussed in the previous section does not function as a form of oppression. Rather, the nuance here is that women can, indeed often do, experience fulfilling and empowering careers even as they function within society’s normative gender roles. Feminist empowerment should not wrongly be conflated with the assumption of historically male gender roles. Feminist thinking argues for the breakdown of normative gender roles, and objects to the sexism and oppression that implicitly and explicitly restrict women’s movement and opportunity.

Women’s service in the armed forces thus had dual implications; on one hand, the entrance of women into a traditionally male domain sparked sexist commentary from critics and spurred a process of feminization in response to those critics; on the other hand, a new realm of opportunity opened to women, and many drew strength from their service to the nation.51 As one recruitment pamphlet begins, “Our way of life has been challenged, and we have been given an opportunity to help meet the challenge. There will be none who can say that we did not meet it with the determination to win that has been bred in us through generations of American women who pioneered for the life we are defending. Within these pages you will see us as we live and train for the man-sized jobs ahead, a solemn dedication of our lives to the service of our country.”52 Women thus drew a profound sense of pride from the experience of serving and defending the nation, and interpreted this opportunity as a result of the pioneering strength of generations of American women. Yet at the same time, the qualifier that enlisted women were to do “man-sized jobs” carries with it an accompanying value-judgment about the worth of men’s roles versus those of women.

In enlisting in the armed forces in service of the nation, women occupied a historically male space and assumed jobs of “man-

50 hooks, Feminist Theory, 5.
51 Campbell, Women at War, 35.
52 WAVES: A Boot’s Eye-view, 1.
sized” importance. Although the exigencies of the total war effort necessitated this movement, women’s entrance into male-gendered spaces constituted a threat to normative gender roles. Critics of women’s enlistment voiced fears about the supposed attendant emasculation of men, and about the abandonment of women’s national duties in the private family sphere. As D’Ann Campbell has articulated, some opponents framed women’s enlistment as a “radical inversion of the traditional roles of women as the passive sweetheart/wife/sex object whose ultimate mission was to wait for their virile menfolk to return from their masculine mission of fighting and dying for ‘apple pie and motherhood’ (that is, for traditional social values).” Recruiters were thus faced with a need to define women’s enlistment in terms that were amenable to the American public, and to reassure critics that enlistment would not mean the dissolution of American ideals of femininity.

As this paper has argued, recruiters attempted to assuage critics’ fears by feminizing women’s jobs in the armed forces. Rather than deconstructing gender roles, recruiters redrew their boundaries to meet the needs of national mobilization. By speaking of women’s enlistment in familial terms and calling attention to their habits of dress and self-care, proponents of women’s enlistment consciously recreated the feminine domain of the private sphere within the public sphere. As such, recruiters called attention to the ways in which national service in the armed forces could make women better mothers, romantic partners, and citizens – in doing so, they simultaneously reinforced ideals of femininity and expanded opportunities for middle- and upper-class white women. Women during World War II had the new option of serving in the armed forces, so long as they conformed to society’s normative standards of femininity.

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In “Power and Protest,” Jeremi Suri develops a multi-national approach to investigate détente, the decrease in tension between nations during the Cold War.\(^1\) He argues that the world’s leaders, whether Communist or Capitalist, feared domestic disorder, and détente became a mechanism for great leaders to reassert their control and provide stability for their nation. He explains, “the distinction between foreign and domestic politics is artificial, [and détente was] “a direct reaction to the global disruption of 1968.”\(^2\) Suri does not just focus on the superpowers, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, but he examines France and Western Europe as well. He applies this global perspective to argue that social protest, power politics, and the dynamics of diplomacy were interconnected in the 1960s.

Suri investigates the “global disruption” of 1968 and the resulting politics of détente. Suri compares the protests in Berkley, Washington, Berlin, Paris and Prague and reflects that all of the protests were similar in their challenge to “the basic authority of the modern nation-state.”\(^3\) He argues that the protests “precipitated a crisis of political authority for the most powerful national figures,” and in order “to preserve their personal authority and the general strength of their states, policymakers had to find new sources of power away from home.”\(^4\) In this state of affairs, détente began to develop. With policy developments like Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” and Nixon’s cooperation with China, Suri claims that détente became a “profoundly conservative response to internal disorder.”\(^5\)

Suri assesses the influence of four main themes on the devel-

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\(^1\) Jeremi Suri is a professor at University of Texas at Austin. He is a Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs. He has expertise in the fields of American diplomacy and international relations. ("Jeremi Suri," the University of Texas at Austin, accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/history/faculty/js33338.)


\(^3\) Ibid, 211.

\(^4\) Ibid, 4, 212.

\(^5\) Ibid, 5.
opment of détente: nuclear weapons, global leaders, internal dissent by students, and the Vietnam War. Suri compares West Berlin, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and France to demonstrate the similarities of their situations.

He makes a striking comparison, for example, between Mao Zedong’s Cold War nationalism in the Great Leap Forward and Charles de Gaulle’s French unilateralism grander. He offers parallels between their growing alienation from the two main power blocs of the Soviet Union and United States, their international quest for power and credibility, and their defiance of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. He argues convincingly that the French and Chinese used their “new relationship to escape the limitations of their independent endeavors.” Their diplomatic relations made “the international system…less stable” and “contributed to upheaval in both societies.” While the French student movement and the Chinese Cultural Revolution were very different in “scope and origins,” he claims that the French-Chinese connection “left a deep imprint on these divergent disruptions.” Suri examines how Zedong and de Gaulle referenced the French Revolution in their diplomatic relations, and how they “portrayed themselves…[as] freeing their societies from the oppressive institution.”

In his chapter, “Language of Dissent,” Suri documents the profound international demographic shifts taking place and the development of an international “youth culture” through his comparison of texts in different countries, including those by John Kenneth Galbraith, Aleksandr Solzheitsyn, Wu Han, and Herbert Marcuse. The samizdats of Solzhenitsyn advocated for the alienation of the communist youth, and Wu Han’s critique on the “imperial principle” of central authority was used to support the Cultural Revolution. Solzhenitsyn and Wu Han’s texts were important, because they questioned society. In the United States, educational reform increased the active social consciousness of students. Suri argues that Mao, Kennedy, Khruschev and de Gaulle “attempted to exploit dissident language.” They used the voices of dissent to further their personal political agendas. For example, Mao “attempted to ally himself with the public critics”

6 Ibid, 79.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, 117.
11 Ibid, 130.
instead of the public officials, who were being blamed for the Great Leap’s failings.\textsuperscript{12}

Suri’s multi-lingual and multi-archival research approach allowed him to develop an international understanding. His use of United States, French, German and Soviet archives in their primary language allows him to perceive insights that others may not have, as well as develop a truly global perspective. Suri makes interesting use of the German sources of student meetings in Dresden, Munich and East Berlin in giving an account of the relationship between Konrad Adeneaur and Charles de Gaulle.\textsuperscript{13} The quotes, statistics, and occasional illustrations provide a substantive background for his analysis and develop a geopolitical and sociological perspective.

While Suri does not claim to provide an in-depth analysis for every important historical event, a reader must still question the scope of Suri’s book and reflect on what he has chosen to omit. While his arguments are logical and well-supported, a reader may question, if Suri is oversimplifying the similarities between countries to support his argument. His attempt to cover so much material leads to the book becoming a general overview rather than rich analysis. He does not discuss the opinions of other scholars, who have different conceptions of détente. His claims would be stronger, if he had analyzed other approaches, which he does not even do in the footnotes. While he is limited by space, his global perspective on the 1960s seems incomplete without considering the war in the Middle East, the domestic protests in Mexico and the fight for human rights in South Africa. His description of the protestors is limited to those who attended universities, and he does not discuss other influential parties, like labor unions. If Suri had included the perspective of other influential parties like labor unions, he would have more completely evaluated and represented the population.

Suri also neglects the economic determinants of détente. The decreasing economic power of Moscow and Beijing influenced their decisions, and the costs of the arms race and the war in Vietnam influenced American diplomacy. There was a dramatic decrease in economic expansion in capitalist, communist and non-Western worlds. With the decelerating economy and the limitation of resources, the

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 118.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 322, 54.
economic pressures were an important consideration in and factor for the decisions made by each country. By neglecting to consider and evaluate the economic perspective, Suri oversimplifies the respective decision of each country.

Suri argues that the 1960s set a precedent for leaders to “protect stability at the cost of liberty,” and that as a result, Americans have alienated parts of the world “who feel dispossessed by globalization.”\(^{14}\) Suri argues that “foreign policy...is also social policy,” and leaders and citizens must “work together” to pursue peace.\(^ {15}\) He believes secret, elite actions to protect their “national,” instead of “international” interests are detrimental for the world.\(^ {16}\) Suri’s thought-provoking argument challenges the reader to question the international influence of American policies and politics of the world today.

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14 Ibid, 264.
15 Ibid, 265.
16 Ibid.

Bravely omitting a subtitle for her monograph, Jordanna Bailkin sets out to characterize the phenomenon whereby the shadowy specter of empire continued to haunt and shape relations between Britons and their former colonial subjects in the postwar era. Using a peculiar combination of the context of the welfare state and the lens of contemporary social scientific expertise, she aims to disprove the stalwart historians of the British Empire who contend that decolonization was not a preoccupation for civilians in the metropole. The choice of the welfare state is wisely intuitive. At the height of imperialism, providing key services for the colonized was, at least officially, the raison d’être for empires as institutions. However, I initially had some misgivings about Bailkin’s particular attention to social theory. A history of it can be done, certainly, but did the musings of armchair anthropologists have any impact on postcolonial lives?

I was quickly convinced that the answer to this question is yes. The first chapter, “The Birth of the Migrant,” illustrates the enormous influence of psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis—which Bailkin endearingly terms the ‘psy’—on state policy. Specialists in psy frequently advised both national and transnational organizations on potential repatriation schemes, as well as served as expert witnesses in landmark social welfare cases. Though the relevance of scholarship is heartening news to academics everywhere, this assertion must be taken with a grain of salt. Bailkin baldly points out that Kenneth Little, a prominent scholar of race relations, affirmed in 1958 that Great Britain did not have a serious race problem, the same year that Caribbean immigrants took to the streets in protest of British xenophobia.

Bailkin justifies her focus on the lived experiences of decolonization by stating her goal as not “to deny or diminish the political import of decolonization, but rather to expand our understanding of the spheres in which it was political” (p. 237). I believe she achieves
this most effectively in “Young Britons: International Aid and ‘Development’ in the Age of the Adolescent.” This chapter tracks the efforts of Alec and Mora Dickson, founders of Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), which for more than half a century has brought the youth of the First and Third World together for the purpose of character building and developing an appreciation for honest manual labor. In order to take advantage of his boyishness, the ideal VSO member was an 18-year-old school leaver, as the Dicksons believed that teenage immaturity mirrored the childish psyche of developing nations, many of which had disproportionately young populations. There was also a hope that adolescents, armed with compassion and heady idealism, could vanquish the postcolonial malaise and hold the temptations of communism at bay. The portrayal of the international volunteer as a caretaker of fledgling nation-states offers a fresh perspective on the development controversy that has garnered attention in recent years.

Bailkin’s most crucial point, however, is that the influx of international students, laborers, and young working families into Great Britain posed various relational challenges for both immigrants and Britons. For the international student, who was often sent to achieve greatness beyond that which was attainable at home, academic stress and homesickness often caused him or her to suffer psychologically. The response evoked from the British bureaucracy in terms of oversight and care for these students was redolent of the colonizer-colonized relationship of years past. For migrants arriving with hopes of resettlement, the state had to decide when such individuals had overstayed their welcome. In her final chapter, “Leaving Home,” Bailkin makes the case that deportation policies did not take shape until after decolonization. British anxieties eventually culminated in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which resolutely linked entry and exit into Great Britain and heralded an entirely new notion of immigrant status.

My praise that this chapter deftly highlights the politicians and organizations that figured in the deportation debate is also a critique of the general absence of other such relevant actors throughout the rest of the book. While I admire Bailkin’s commitment to portraying the politics of the postwar era through the people who lived it, I cannot be sure that the experience of migrants fending for themselves without any advocates from their home governments operating in Britain is accurate. The prioritization of individual stories can be-
come ineffectual, such as in the chapter “Much Married Men,” where after a certain point, each new polygamy case does not contribute any additional insights with regards to the tension this created within the metropole. Some discussion of how public concerns fed into political action would be more useful than analysis of how legal theorists conceptualized polygamy in relation to English law.

The ordering of the chapters in *The Afterlife of Empire* is done very specifically, beginning with the birth of the migrant in the mind of the social scientist, followed by youth, young adulthood, marriage, child rearing, and finally the migrant’s legal death through deportation. This life cycle model, while a clever tactic for linking the studies together, is perhaps more theatrical than it is practical. Although one migrant could theoretically traverse through each of these stages, this was never exhibited for any specific case. When taken at face value, the chapters are related only thematically, with virtually no actual events or historical actors in common. Ultimately, the work reads more as a book of essays with a grand vision thrust upon it, conceivably in hindsight. However, one major advantage of Bailkin’s diverse coverage of topics is that the reader sees clearly the multilocation of decolonization. It is quite possible those spaces today where the most contested battles of race relations and international diplomacy are ongoing are sites where the process of decolonization has not yet concluded.

In *Making Hispanics*, Cristina Mora provides a socio-historical understanding of the complex process that forged “Hispanic” identity in the United States. Mora argues that Hispanic identity as we see it today should not be considered some sort of primordial affinity, but instead an identity strategically forged and legitimized by several actors and organizations. The text frames Hispanic activists, government bureaucrats, and Spanish-language media as the key players in the normalization of the “Hispanic” category at the national scale. Contrary to popular misconceptions and scholarship that argues for a more natural or assumed Latino identity based on religion, language, and other sorts of cultural characteristics; Mora directly challenges this assumed Hispanic cohesion by demonstrating how panethnic identity and ethnic consciousness is an institutionally and historically constructed category. In this way, panethnicity rhetorically grouped together geographically and racially distinct Latin American descendant communities into the politically and economically viable market it is seen as today.

Instead of dividing the book by periods of time, Mora splits the four chapters (not including the introduction and conclusion) by the different actors that contributed to developing Hispanic panethnicity. Chapter 1 looks at the influence of the federal government and Executive Office, which more often than not was reacting to a growing political constituency. The second chapter examines the National Council of La Raza and activist organizations more generally, groups that advocated for Hispanics to be considered racial minorities and allotted their fair share of resources. Chapter 3 looks at the U.S. Census Bureau, which like the Executive Office had to answer to growing demands for counting Hispanic presence. Finally, chapter 4 ends with the role of media wherein media executives worked with both activists and bureaucrats in order to effectively capitalize on the burgeoning panethnic market. While Mora qualifies this organization of the book...
with an acknowledgement that the case studies she employs are only roughly chronological, the overlap and intertwined nature between each of the different actors is made clear throughout the text and especially in the conclusion. In terms of scope, the focus lies on federal policies and national activist organizations during the late 60s going into the early 1990s. Since most of these organizations are based out of the urban hubs of Hispanic population - especially Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and Chicago – Mora is able to cover a wide geographic range, giving the reader a balanced perspective. Addressing the geographic distance between Hispanic communities, however, poses a serious challenge for the study of panethnicity.

Mora acknowledges the political and social dissimilarities between Cuban Americans in Miami when compared to Mexican Americans in Los Angeles, and proceeds to construct a historical narrative of panethnicity that functions at the national level. However, one can imagine that Hispanic identity was more popular or feasible in certain areas when compared to others. The author does qualify her analysis by recognizing the truly multifaceted and incongruous development of Hispanic panethnicity, and points out the strategic and intentional vagueness of the category as defined by the three sets of actors in the text to appeal to all regions. Nevertheless, I find that Mora’s historical analysis could have benefitted from a cross-geographic comparison of the extent to which panethnic labels were embraced across time. Let’s consider Chicago, for instance, as a place that was uniquely positioned in terms of Hispanic panethnicity as one of the few cities with a high concentration of both Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Unlike New York or San Antonio in the 70s, with a single-dominant group of Hispanics, Chicago experienced a very different process of Hispanic identity formation. The top-down, national perspective of the argument thus risks minimizing the role of local histories and processes of panethnic identity formation, like those in Chicago, that sometimes predate even the creation of Spanish-language television media in the late 70s and early 80s.

Despite the incredible challenge of navigating through the complexities of Hispanic identity, Cristina Mora is able to frame an elegant and cohesive argument that is accessible to a wide variety of audiences. In terms of understanding the historical construction and normalization of the Hispanic category, *Making Hispanics* effectively synthesizes the existing research and theory on Hispanic panethnicity.
with archival records and qualitative fieldwork into a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and palatable account for students and scholars of any field. Though a relatively new addition to the discourse on Hispanic/Latino identity in the United States, Cristina Mora’s socio-historical account stands as a soon-to-be canonical contribution to Latino Studies and the scholarship on critical race and ethnicity.